1.Ý INTRODUCTION

In December 1992 the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Environment, Safety and Occupational Health) tasked the Army Environmental Policy Institute (AEPI) with studying the health and environmental consequences associated with the Armyís use of depleted uranium (DU). The Secretariat initiated this AEPI study in response to a request in Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) Report Number 102-408. Congress was concerned with issues associated with Desert Storm; however, during the months between the SAC report and initiation of the study, the congressional and public awareness related to DU markedly increased. Therefore, AEPI expanded the scope of the study to consider the health and environmental effects of DU throughout its life cycle in Army weapon systems.

This report discusses DU weapon systems, including munitions, tank armor and two mines that contain small amounts of DU catalyst. Note that the DU munitions designed for the Bradley Fighting Vehicle were not used in Desert Storm; however, they are discussed in this report. This investigation did not consider issues associated with how other services manage and use DU; however, many of the issues discussed herein are broadly applicable and may pertain to the other services.

The authors are not weapon systems effectiveness experts. The information presented concerning effectiveness was provided by research, design, testing and evaluation (RDT&E) experts and by soldiers who used the weapon systems in Desert Storm. These comments have been included so the reader can consider the health and environmental effects in the context of the technical effectiveness of Army DU weapon systems. The Army has developed extensive data on weapon systems performance and has made informed decisions to use DU systems based upon their performance. Because this report was developed to evaluate DU health and environmental effects, weapon systems performance data were not reviewed.
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1.1 Methodology

To fulfill the task assigned by the Army Secretariat and Congress, AEPI assembled a team of health, environment, legal and systems professionals to perform a comprehensive literature search, conduct interviews, analyze the information obtained and prepare a detailed report. It would not be appropriate to address the health and environmental consequences of DU in an isolated context. Therefore, this report examines the environmental safety and health issues associated with the DU weapon systems lifeÝ cycle?acquisition, testing, use and disposal.

AEPI based its study on a comprehensive review of the environmental safety and health literature available as of November 1, 1993. The authors reviewed the four previous major DU studies:

Medical and Environmental Evaluation of Depleted Uranium?1974 special report of the Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munitions Effectiveness (JTCG/ME)

A Hazard Evaluation of the Use of Depleted Uranium Penetrators?1979 report of the U.S. Army Pierre Committee

Comparison of DU and Tungsten for Use as Kinetic Energy Penetrators?1979 report of the National Materials Advisory Board (NMAB) of the National Academy of Science's National Research Council

Kinetic Energy Penetrator Long Term Strategy Study (Abridged)? 1990 report by M. E. Danesi for the U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command (AMCCOM)

These reports provided a relatively complete treatise of the environmental safety and health history of the Army DU weapon systems development program. However, it was also evident that the Army did not pursue many of the health-related studies and most of the environment-related studies recommended in these reports. To amplify and update information presented in the literature, the study team held numerous discussions with civilian experts and Department of the Army (DA) and other Department of Defense (DoD) personnel who have been involved in developing, manufacturing, testing, using and disposing of DU munitions and armor. These discussions were concluded in July of 1994.

1.2 Document Overview

Part I, which includes Chapters 2 through 4, discusses DU and how the Army uses it in peacetime and in combat. Part II begins with a brief review of the four previous major studies of DU. The remainder of Part II (Chapters 6 through 8) responds to the specific tasks assigned by Congress. The report includes a list of acronyms, a glossary of technical terms, several appendices and a complete list of references used in preparing the report.

AEPI offers the findings and conclusions in Chapter 8 to provide decision-makers a perspective to use when responding to concerns and issues involving DU. Most of the findings and conclusions restate and update information contained in the four previous major DU studies. The report commends the Army for its practices regarding DU and points out areas for improvement. It offers specific recommendations for the Army leadership to consider.

1.3 Conclusions Preview

There are significant costs associated with implementing many of the programs suggested in the conclusions of this report. When policy-makers view these costs in the context of studying problems rather than solving them, it may be easy to conclude that the return on investment is low. This appears to be part of the reason the conclusions from the four foundation studies have not been fully implemented. This report develops each of the conclusions concerned with environmental safety and health in more detail than previous documents; furthermore, it attempts to describe ways in which studies could be undertaken to solve current and projected problems. For example, costs for remediating Jefferson Proving Ground (JPG)Ý may approach $1.5Ý billion (NRC, 1994). Developing environmental migration models for JPG to identify and publicly defend the lowest-cost remediation strategy that is environmentally responsible would cost less than $10 million. Furthermore, the model could be used at other Army sites contaminated with DU. This would be both a good investment and good stewardship of public resources.

The potential for health effects from exposure to DU is real; however, it must be viewed in perspective. It is unlikely that any of the DU exposure scenarios described in this report will significantly affect the health of most personnel. In several areas, neither the scientific community nor the Army have adequate medical or exposure information to defend this assertion. It would be fiscally prudent to develop a more comprehensive understanding of exposure potential and the concomitant medical implications. When DU is indicted as a causative agent for Desert Storm illness, the Army must have sufficient data to separate fiction from reality. Without forethought and data, the financial implications of long-term disability payments and health-care costs would be excessive.

The Army needs a robust policy to ensure environmental safety and health where DU systems are concerned. Without this, the Army will be at the mercy of a proliferation of institutional forces seeking to direct the Army to spend its health and environmental resources in ways that may not serve the best interests of the Army or the nation.

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