MC-130 Combat Talon

MC-130H Aerial Refueling Task Order Study

HQ AFSOC/XPQA

MAJOR McClain

DSN 579-5509

COMM (850) 884-5509

AFSOC 004-97-I

a. Mission Area. This capability is necessary to support FY 1998-2003 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). Specifically, it provides the aerial refueling capability needed to ensure US Special Operations Forces continue to remain "the best equipped, best trained, and best prepared military forces, capable of performing their missions effectively across a wide range of operations" as directed in Section I, National Security Objectives, Dangers, and Strategy. Section I, National Security Objectives, Dangers, and Strategy -- Roles of US Military Power, further directs "...US forces must...be ready to fight. This demands...modern, well-maintained equipment..." Section III, Programming Guidance, Investment and System Acquisition Approach directs that: "Investment programs now must reflect the different nature and sophistication of regional threat, resulting in changes in defense priorities, and the continuing requirement for technological superiority vis-à-vis Russia....Continue to pursue advanced technologies for potential application in current and future weapon systems to preserve... US forces’ technological advantage, and to reduce life-cycle costs and lengthen service lives." The USSOCOM Master Plan (SOMP, paragraph 11a(1)), Modernization Programs, General, Readiness, states, "To ensure rapid employment and successful performance of special operations forces (SOF), it is imperative that SOF be provided a qualitative advantage with the most modern equipment available. The core of the SOF modernization philosophy is to place particular emphasis on high readiness for worldwide rapid response, sufficient sustainment, and enhance mobility." "The USSOCOM modernization efforts must accommodate and confront the challenges of the changing global circumstances and the growth in new technologies." The Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), Provide Mobility in Denied Territory Mission Area Plan (MAP) identifies numerous deficiencies in its ability to support this core mission. Among them are the following three; "the low number of helo tankers available," "heavy tactical reliance on air refueling", and "the fact the MC-130H is not modified to refuel helicopters." The AFSOC Weapon System Roadmap, 3^rd Edition, Sep 95, Chapter 5, AFSOC Present Force Structure -- Fleet Composition, shows aerial refueling as one of many pre-planned product improvements (P³I) envisioned for the MC-130H. Chapter 6, Current Operational Deficiencies, identifies "limited in-flight refueling methods," stating "SOF rotary wing aircraft do not have enough refueling support to meet mission requirements." AFSOC requires an aerial refueling tanker aircraft capable of penetrating low, medium, and (in limited circumstances) high threat areas to reach a designated air refueling track to support in-flight refueling of SOF vertical lift aircraft. Vertical lift aircraft are those aircraft capable of vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL). They include all current SOF helicopters as well as tilt rotor aircraft such as the CV-22 Osprey. The primary AFSOC receiver is expected to be the CV-22 Osprey, but the MC-130H will also support all other SOF in-flight refuelable helicopters, to include the MH-47D/E, MH-60G/K/L, and MH-53J. The operational concepts will remain similar to those currently used by the MC-130E. While on the air refueling track the aircraft will fly low level and may use the terrain following radar (TFR) to provide improved margins of safety. This document combines the general needs outlined in AFSOC MNS 004-97 Aerial Refueling Capability for the MC-130H, and AFSOC MNS 039-91, Enhanced Internal Fuel Tanks for MC-130E.

b. General Employment Description. The mission of an MC-130H equipped with an aerial refueling system (ARS) will be to extend the range of SOF vertical lift aircraft operating in hostile, politically denied, or politically sensitive airspace at night and/or during adverse weather. Operations may be conducted at anytime from crisis response to conventional war. A secondary mission for the ARS-equipped MC-130H will be forward area refueling and rearming procedures (FARRP). The MC-130H will be tasked to perform "high value" missions for which less capable aircraft are not suited.

c. Mission Scenario. Mission length may vary from a four-hour sortie to long duration missions of over 24 hours. Typical ARS usage on operational refueling missions vary from 20 minutes and a single extension/retraction to over 2 hours with multiple extensions and retractions. Average mission length will be 6.5 hours with two aerial refueling rendezvous events. During peacetime training, ARS usage will be above the operational average as multiple receivers practice rendezvous and hook-up procedures. The mission of the MC-130H may require it to fly an aerial refueling sortie one day and reconfigure to a SOF airlift mission the next. The nature of these missions require that equipment not necessary for mission completion be removed.

d. Requirements Correlation Matrix (RCM). See Attachment 1.

2. Threat. Combat delivery assets, such as the MC-130H, are vulnerable to a variety of airborne and land based threats due to their operation at low altitude, relatively slow airspeed, large radar cross section (RCS) and infrared (IR) signatures. The ARS is a subsystem of the MC-130H Combat Talon II weapon system. It will face the same threat environment as the basic weapon system. The MC-130H faces a wide range of threat conditions from unsophisticated area defense using small arms, optically-guided anti-aircraft artillery, and man-portable infrared missiles to integrated air defense systems using modern surface-to-air missile systems and air interceptors. The threat is detailed in AFSOC SORD 005-83 IVA, (AFSOC ORD 005-83 IVB is in coordination) and NAIC 1571-726-96, Special Operations Forces (Aviation) Threat Environment Description (SOFTED) (S) dated 15 Jan 96.

3. Shortcomings of Existing Systems: No MC-130H ARS exists. The ARS used by The MC-130E, MC-130P, and HC-130P/N were designed and built in the early 1960’s and are purely analog/mechanical systems. The current ARS is maintenance intensive. It takes a considerable amount of time to install, maintain, and remove. There is no fault isolation technology to aid in maintenance troubleshooting. The fuel transfer rates are limited to primary aircraft fuel pump capacity. Additionally, the FE must manually select pumps and transfer rates/pressure (pounds per square inch per gallon (psig)) based on the receivers limitations. The current system uses only a single hydraulic system with no back up. Should there be a problem with the aircraft utility hydraulics the current system is unable to retract the extended hose, which forces the aircrew to guillotine and jettison the hose.

4. Capabilities Required. The operational requirement is to provide an aerial refueling capability for simultaneous refueling of both current and planned SOF vertical take off and land (VTOL) aircraft. In the requirements to follow the designator "(T)" indicates a threshold requirement and the designator "(O)" indicates an objective requirement.

1. Receiver Aircraft. The ARS system must be capable of refueling all current and planned SOF vertical lift assets, to include the MH-47D/E, MH-53J, MH-60G/K/L, and CV-22 (T). The system must support the simultaneous refueling of two probe equipped SOF VTOL assets at both optimum and single-engine refueling speeds -- as defined in the respective receiver technical orders (TO) (T). The ARS must have a redundant capability; (T). A a single system failure must not prevent completion of an aerial refueling mission (T). The ARS must provide the ability for independent operation of the left and right refueling hose reels (T). These are Key Performance Parameters.
2. Fuel Types. The ARS must be capable of transferring all aviation fuels used by the MC-130H, adapting to different aviation jet fuel types useable by the MC-130H and still accurately computing transfer rates and fuel off-loads (T). These are Key Performance Parameters.
3. Aerial Refueling Airspeeds. The ARS must be able to operate at normal helicopter aerial refueling speeds and CV-22 normal and single-engine aerial refueling speeds of 95 knots equivalent airspeed (KEAS) to 180 KEAS (T). It should be able to operate at the CV-22 high altitude refueling speed for an objective refueling speed range of 95 KEAS to 200 KEAS (O). The ARS drogue must be able to support refueling operations at all refueling speeds on the same mission without landing to reconfigure or replace the drogue (T). These are Key Performance Parameters.
4. Fuel Transfer Rate. The ARS must support fuel transfer rates of at least 150 gallons per minute (gpm) per side for two receivers refueling simultaneously (T). This is a Key Performance Parameter. Each side should be capable of 300 gpm transfer rates for two receivers refueling simultaneously (O). The capability to transfer 450 gpm during FARRP operations is desired (O).
5. Fuel Transfer Pressure/Regulation. The ARS must not exceed 55 foot pounds per inch squared (lbf/in²) of in-flight refueling pressure at the nozzle outlet at all values of tanker flow down to a flow of 30 centimeters per minute (cc/min) (T). The ARS must not allow surge pressures within each receiver aircraft to exceed the proof pressure of the receiver aircraft’s fuel/aerial refueling system (T). If pressure regulation devices are employed in the ARS to comply with this requirement, any single failure in the pressure regulation device(s) must not compromise the proof pressure capability of the receiver aircraft’s fuel/aerial refueling system (T). Receiver surge pressures include, but are not limited to, those generated by ARS pump start-up and all receiver valve closures. These are Key Performance Parameters.
6. Control Panels. The ARS should take advantage of digital technology where practical. The flight engineer (FE) must have the ability to operate each function of the left and right portions of the ARS independently (T). All illuminated displays must comply with the standards for night vision goggle compatibility IAW MIL-L-85762A (T). The control panel must display an indication of system status/system health (T). The control panel must show the following status: system on, system ready to refuel, loss of hose reel control/response capability, fuel flowing and any LRU failures detected by Built-In-Test (BIT) monitoring (T). The control panel must allow the FE/operator to program off-load schedules (total off-load, off-load rates) and monitor the status of that off-load while in progress (T). The FE must be able to manually override this schedule at any time (T). The control panel should show how much fuel has been off-loaded, and how much fuel remains to be off-loaded (O). The FE must be able to isolate the left and right ARS should there be a system failure (e.g. hose being cut, hydraulic failure) (T). The FE must have the ability to one-time emergency extend the hoses in the event of system power failure (T). The FE must have the ability to jettison the hose at any hose trail length should it fail to retract (T). There should be an one-time emergency back-up capability to extend and retract the drogue and hose should there be a hose reel control/ response power failure (O). It is desired the control panel provide an automated ARS configuration (i.e., the FE would select receiver type and the system would configure the fuel transfer rate and pressures to meet any receiver limitations) (O). During FARRP operations the FE should be able to control all actions currently performed by the panel operator, as defined in AFSOCR 55-12 (under revision to AFI 11-2) (O).
7. FARRP. There must be a refueling receptacle on the ARS to allow the ARS to transfer fuel while on the ground (T). This simplifies and minimizes additional equipment required to support FARRP operations in remote or austere locations. The ARS should support a two point FARRP from either the left or right system (O). This wouldThe objective is to eliminate the current use of a Forward Area Manifold (FAM) cart.
8. External Lighting. For night operations the ARS hoses must be illuminated to aid the receiver’s visual reference (T). The current standard aerial refueling pod status lights (red/amber/green) must be maintained (T). Both the hose illumination lights and pod status lights must be visible to the naked eye and night vision imaging system (NVIS) compatible (T). There must be a capability to adjust the intensity of both sets of lights (T). The level and type of illumination (visible and NVIS-compatible) must be FE selectable (T). The hose illumination for the left and right ARS should be independently adjustable for intensity while in flight (O). The loadmaster must have the ability to pass light signals to the receiver in accordance with TO 1-1C-1-20 (T). The aircraft should be equipped with a programmable and inflight-selectable combination IR/white light anti-collision strobe mounted on the upper fuselage or vertical stabilizer (O). These are Key Performance Parameters.
9. Hose Markings. The ARS hoses must have the same markings as the current Air Force system (T). The markings should be placed on the hose in such a manner as to limit wear and increase useful life of the markings (O).
10. Additional Internal Fuel. The ARS must include provisions to use fuel carried in additional tanks installed in the cargo compartment (T). The internal fuel tanks must be refuelable using the standard aircraft fuel system (T). The tanks must have a fuel quantity system capable of being integrated across MIL-STD-1553B data bus into the MC-130H fuel management system (T). In addition, the tank must have a fuel quantity indicator visible from the right paratroop door for use during ground refueling operations (T). The cargo compartment fuel tanks should be stackable and load bearing (max. weight 250 lb. per square inch) (O). The internal tanks should be easily loaded and unloaded from the aircraft using existing materiel handling equipment (O). A number of internal tanks should be capable of being loaded on the aircraft such that the total combined internal fuel capacity is at least 3,600 gallons (O). The aircrew must be able to dump fuel from the tank system (T). The tanks must also be able to be jettisoned (T). Toward this end, quick disconnects for fuel and power are desired (O). Off-aircraft storage of the internal fuel tanks should not require any new or unique storage requirements (O).
11. Safety Scanner Visibility. To provide adequate visibility for the left and right safety scanners, the paratroop door windows must be enlarged to the same size as currently installed on the MC-130E/P (T). The modified paratroop door must also include a fold-down seat for the safety scanners (T). Any modifications to the paratroop door must include provisions for the safe and easy opening and closing of the door (T).
12. Aircraft Flight Characteristics. With the ARS installed, the MC-130H must still be able to perform all current operations to include: terrain following flight, airdrop, NVG landings, and in-flight refueling from KC-135 or KC-10 aircraft (T). The ARS should not restrict the MC-130H aircraft flight envelope in any regime (O), but in no case will it be more restrictive than the current pod based system used on the MC-130E/P (T). These are Key Performance Parameters.

1. Support Structure. The ARS equipped MC-130H must use the same support structure as the basic MC-130H (T). Support equipment (SE) should remain as common with other SOF systems as possible (O). For simplicity and cost effectiveness, the ARS should use or modify existing Air Force common SE to the maximum extent possible (O). Every effort should be made to minimize the modification of common SE (O).
2. Logistics Reliability and Maintainability. Rapid return to service, and dependability are major considerations. The ARS must be supportable in an austere base environment (T). All equipment must either meet or exceed the R&M values obtained by the same equipment installed on similar aircraft (T).
3. Reliability. The ARS should meet a Mean Time Between Critical Failure (MTBCF) of at least 200 ARS operating hours (O). MTBCF is defined as the average time between failure of mission essential system functions. To assist in tracking this reliability there must be an ability to track ARS operating hours (T).
4. Maintainability. The mean repair time (MRT) will determine system maintainability. MRT is the average "on-equipment, corrective maintenance time" in the operational environment. The MRT for the MC-130H ARS must be less than 3.88 hours (T). The system design shall provide modularity, accessibility, BIT and other maintainability features (T). System design must simplify installation, increase ease of maintenance, and support attainment of maintainability requirements (both corrective and preventative) (T). All plug-in modules shall be mechanically keyed/coded to prevent insertion of the wrong module (T). The left and right ARS must be interchangeable (T).
5. System Readiness. The ARS must meet/exceed the same system readiness as defined in the basic weapon system requirements document (T)should not lower the aircraft mission capable rate below 75 percent (O).
6. Supply Support. The existing AF and DoD systems will support the ARS (T). Six reserve spare parts (RSP) kits are required to support contingency and wartime deployments (T). RSP supports a 30 day deployment without resupply. Methods of supply/resupply will not require development of additional systems or reporting procedures (T). Provisioning and management of the spare/repair parts will be in accordance with MIL-STD-1531/1561 (O). A provisioning conference will determine actual supply support requirements once an ARS selection is made.

1. Mandatory Characteristics. ARS is intended to operated in the same environment as the basic MC-130H. Therefore, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) survivability must, as a minimum, be at least the same as the basic aircraft (T).
2. Security. The MC-130H aircraft will be provided security IAW AFPD 31-7. Physical security will be IAW AFI 31-101. Operational security will be IAW AFI 10-1101. There must be nothing on the ARS that will increase the security requirements for the basic weapon system (T).
3. Safety. System safety program requirements and standards of Military Standard (MIL-STD)-882 and AFI 91-202 (The US Air Force Mishap Prevention Program), Chapter 9 will be met during the design, development, and acquisition process (T). Industrial and Occupational safety programs will comply with guidance outlined in AFI 91-301, OSHA/AFOSH and other applicable safety and health standards (T).

1. System Safety engineering studies and analysis will be orientated toward minimizing personnel injury and accidental system/equipment loss and damages (T).
2. Equipment/capabilities will not degrade the reliability, survivability, and maintainability of the host system (T).
3. A review of air and ground mishaps must be established on similar systems to develop a history of lessons learned to be applied in design and development phases of the program. This package of lessons learned must be made available at all preliminary and Critical Design Reviews, with an explanation of how they were applied in design and development of the system or component being reviewed.
4. Component design and operation will be IAW existing standards to protect the safety and health of aircrew and maintenance personnel (T). Human factors designed to enhance maintenance tasks will be applied during the entire component system development and integration into the aircraft system. Exterior additions to the aircraft will be designed to minimize any hazard to personnel, minimize interference with existing systems, and minimize drag (T). Fuel system will be designed for safe hot refueling (T).
5. The hose jettison capability should be designed to avoid the use of any explosive cartridges or munitions (O).

a. Maintenance Planning. AFPD 21-1, AFI 21-101 AND AFSOCI 21-106 define the on- and off-equipment maintenance concept. Specific levels of maintenance will be determined by a logistics support analysis (LSA), modified by the required operational capability to best satisfy the ARS mission requirements. Mission essential subsystems should have organic off-equipment maintenance capability to ensure the CT II is self-sufficient to the maximum extent possible (O). Mobility is a key mission and support factor. The total system (including subsystems) will, to the maximum extent possible, be designed to achieve fault detection and isolation down to the module, card or component (T). All mission essential components must be easy to change in an austere environment, with minimum external SE and personnel (T).All newly developed ARS components shall be supported by two levels of maintenance: organizational and depot. The complete system maintenance plan shall be derived through a Logistics Support Analysis (LSA). All ARS system critical components shall be easy to change in an austere environment with no peculiar or special support equipment, tools, facilities, or manpower required. Maintenance shall be performed on equipment by SOF 5 level skill maintenance technicians using built-in test (BIT) or diagnostic routines to isolate the failed Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) and Line Replaceable Module (LRM). Corrective maintenance shall be accomplished by replacement of the failed LRU/LRM, followed by a system check to ensure correction of the fault. Repairs shall be accomplished without removal of other host aircraft components or equipment.

b. Support Equipment. SE includes all the equipment required to perform the system support function. This includes aerospace ground equipment (AGE), test, measurement and diagnostic equipment (TMDE), vehicles and tools. Trained AF personnel will perform all maintenance functions (T). All equipment must be operable and maintainable in the extreme environmental conditions expected during deployments to the austere locations identified by theater war plans (T). Existing equipment must be used to the maximum extent possible (T); unique SE must be kept to a minimum, but when designed, should not significantly increase the logistics support structure (O). Equipment design should incorporate self-test features to verify operating status and should include self-diagnostic capability (O). Inspection and calibration frequencies should occur at not less than one year increments (O).

c. Human Systems Integration.

1. Manpower. Specific manpower requirements will be determined by the LSA.
2. Technical Data. Operator manuals and checklists will be provided to outline the system’s use (T). TO will be provided for each level of repair (T). All documentation must be verified, validated and delivered prior to equipment delivery (T). All delivered documentation becomes the property of the government (T). Should contract logistics support (CLS) be chosen as the preferred method of support, the appropriate data must be acquired and maintained to allow for re-competition of the CLS contract the contractor will provide a technical data package, including level 2+ drawings, sufficient for re-competition of the CLS contract (O) (T).
3. Aircrew and Maintenance Training. Aircrew and maintenance training will not change from previously approved concepts (T).
4. Aircrew and Maintenance Training Aids. Aircrew and maintenance training aids and simulators should be modified and upgraded prior to fielding of the production ARS (O).
5. Design Interface. This system must interface with other aircraft systems in such a way that the operation of the overall weapon system is not degraded (T). Human factors interface related issues will also be taken into consideration (O).

d. Computer Resources. Changes to system software will be done in block cycles (T). Delivered, patch-free software must meet all user operational requirements with no mission critical problems. Software changes must take aircrew and maintenance training devices and intermediate level maintenance capabilities into consideration (T).

e. Other Logistics Considerations.

1. Supply support. The existing AF and DoD supply infrastructure will be utilized (T). Methods of supply/resupply will not require development of additional systems or reporting procedures (T). Provisioning and management of the spare/repair parts will be in accordance with MIL-STDs 1531/1561 (T). A provisioning conference will determine actual supply support requirements once an ARS selection is made (T).
2. Facilities. The ARS must be located or stored within existing and programmed facilities (T). No additional MILCON above the already programmed and approved facilities is expected (O).
3. Hazardous Materials. Materials used in the construction of the ARS must not support the propagation of flame nor give off toxic fumes (T). Items such as pumps and motors must minimize vibration and noise levels (T).

6. Infrastructure Support and Interoperability.

a. Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence. This system will not impose any new C³I requirements beyond those identified in the basic weapon system ORD 005-83 IVB.

b. Transportation and Basing. This system will be air transportable when not installed on the aircraft (T).

c. Standardization, Interoperability, and Commonality. The selected ARS must comply with guidance in the Joint Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum (009-96, 9 Feb 96) (T). The ARS must comply with NATO STANAG 3447 except for free space diameter limitations around the refueling probe (T). All SOF receivers provide minimum free space diameters well in excess of NATO minimums. Therefore, the current USAF standard low speed drogue size diameter is acceptable.

d. Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Support. Addition of an aerial refueling capability to the MC-130H will not affect the MC&G requirements for the basic weapon system (T).

e. Environmental Support. The ARS will be expected to operate in the same environmental conditions as the basic MC-130H. It must be capable of operations worldwide (T).

7. Force Structure.

a. Installed systems. 24, one per MC-130H.

b. Spares. To be determined during LSA.

c. Training units. To be determined during LSA.

a. Initial Operational Capability (IOC). IOC will be reached when the first operational squadron has sufficient equipment, trained personnel, and spares to support its smallest unit type code (UTC) deployment commitment . IOC may be declared prior to full organic maintenance capability if Interim Contract Support is sufficient to support deployment requirements (O). IOC is desired prior to the loss of any tanker capable aircraft from the AFSOC inventory (O).

b. Full operational capability (FOC). FOC will be reached when units scheduled for this modification have sufficient equipment, trained personnel, and spares to support full UTC deployment commitments. Organizational and Intermediate (if required) maintenance should be organic prior to FOC.

Parameter 1 – Receiver Aircraft. USSOCOM SOJ-3 study of tanker requirements for the years beyond 2005. The USSOCOM study identified these aircraft as required SOF receiver aircraft. Simultaneous refueling is identified as a mission requirement in AFSOC Mission Area Plan, Provide Mobility in Denied Areas. The critical nature of the Special Operations Mission coupled with limited asset availability demands equipment reliability. Single point failures will degrade ARS reliability rates and could mean the difference between mission success or failure.

Parameter 2 – Fuel Types. AFSOC aircraft must be able to operate using both recommended and approved alternate fuel types IAW 1C-130(M)H-1. Since the ARS will transfer the same fuel as the tanker, it must be able to quantify and regulate those same type fuels.

Parameter 3 – Aerial Refueling Airspeeds. Slow speed AR requirements are currently defined in the applicable helicopter refueling technical orders (TO 1-1C-1-20). A high speed refueling capability is required for CV-22 operations to reduce time in the contact position (reduce threat vulnerability).

Parameter 4 – Fuel Transfer Rate. Survivability while refueling in hostile/denied territory is increased by quickly receiving the planned on load. Fuel transfer rates must be high enough to minimize contact time while at the same time remaining at or below acceptable receiver system limits.

Parameter 5 - Fuel Transfer Pressure/Regulation. Requirements are defined by NATO Standardization Agreement 3447. DoD direction is to "complement each decision affecting DoD receivers and provide Interoperability with the majority of current coalition forces’ receivers." (Joint Aeronautical Commanders’ Group Memorandum, 3 May 96)

Parameter 6a - Control Panel Location. The Flight Engineer (FE) will have primary responsibility for operating the ARS to include deploying hoses, programming fuel off loads, transferring fuel, monitoring operation, and retracting hoses. Therefore, all controls and gages must be within his/her normal reach or view respectively.

Parameter 6b - Control Panel Controls. The FE must have the ability to fully control both the primary and backup operations of the ARS. To reduce work load the system should be automated as much as possible.

Parameter 6c - Control Panel Controls and Indications. This requirement mirrors the capabilities of existing ARS systems as fielded on the MC-130E/P and USMC KC-130. AFSOC cockpit illumination standard is full NVG compatibility.

Parameter 7 - FARRP. FARRP is a current requirement for the MC-130H. In order to accomplish a FARRP mission today, a Forward Area Manifold (FAM) cart is required or the hoses and couplers have to be arranged on the ramp area. Either way, valuable cargo space is taken up, and set up/tear down time is increased. The ARS system configured for FARRP will delete the FAM requirement, increase operational potential by allowing an alternate mission capability, decrease ground time, and increase safety.

Parameter 8 - External Lighting. Lighting requirements are the same as what is currently defined for the MC-130E/P tanker aircraft. Common lighting is required for joint Interoperability. Flight safety dictates the ARS hoses be illuminated a system(s) which are compatible with either normal vision or when added with NVG.

Parameter 9 - Hose Markings. Hose marking requirements are defined IAW TO 1-1C-1-20.

Parameter 10 - Additional Internal Fuel. Without additional internal fuel tanks, the MC-130H will be unable to carry enough fuel for two or more receiver aircraft in denied territory for most missions. Mission distances and the inaccessibility of strategic tanker support (KC-135/KC-10) over hostile territory dictate the use of additional internal fuel tanks for the MC-130H.

Parameter 10a - Tank Construction. By making the additional tanks modular and stackable, other mission requirements such as resupply/personnel airdrops will be possible during a refueling mission.

Parameter 10b - Fuel Dumping. At the high gross weights of the MC-130H the ability to dump fuel is a basic aircraft requirement.

Parameter 10c - Jettison. Survivability will be enhanced by the ability to jettison internal tanks if there is an aircraft problem.

Parameter 10d - Off Aircraft Storage. SOF aircraft operated in remote, austere locations and the with the multitude of mission tasking possible the requirement to remove and store the tank(s) must not impose new logistics requirements for the support activities.

Parameter 11 - Safety Scanner Visibility. During refueling operations, safety scanners must be able to view the procedures. The same configuration as is on the MC-130E/P aircraft will satisfy this requirement.

Parameter 12 - Aircraft Flight Characteristics. The ARS will be an additional capability for the MC-130H. All requirements specified in the MC-130H Operational Requirements Document remain valid. Therefore, the aircraft flight characteristics cannot be altered in a manner to preclude meeting those requirements.

Parameter 13 - Support Structure. Supportability is a key consideration with any modification/acquisition. In order to be supportable within the current logistics system, the ARS components and configuration should use as much AF common equipment as possible.

Parameter 14 - Logistics Reliability and Maintainability. SOF aircraft are often required to operate out of austere locations where maintenance facilities are minimal. Because of this requirement, the ARS must also be capable of functioning reliably on deployed MC-130H aircraft. To ensure the above, the equipment must meet or exceed the R & M values of existing equipment installed on AFSOC tanker aircraft..

Parameter 15 - Reliability. A 200 hour Mean Time Between Critical Failure rate is essential for the MC-130H to meet its refueling requirements once other tanker aircraft are retired. This number is based on operational maintenance experience.

Parameter 16 - Maintainability. The mean repair time for the ARS should be lower than older systems to ensure it does not create an additional maintenance manpower requirement.

Parameter 17 - System Readiness. Installation of the ARS will not should not prevent relieve the MC-130H from any requirements found in the basic weapon system ORD. To ensure MC-130H basic system readiness requirements are maintained, the ARS must meet or exceed the same system readiness as defined in the MC-130H ORD.meeting its current required mission capable rate.

Parameter 18 - Supply Support. Supply support will be IAW MIL-STDs 1531/1561. Actual requirements are TBD.

Parameter 19 - Mandatory Characteristics. Since the ARS will be an integral of the MC-130H, it has to operate in the same environment. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) survivability must be the same as the MC-130H.

Parameter 20 - Security. Air Force Instructions govern security requirements for the MC-130H. Nothing on the ARS will increase the existing security requirements of AFPD 31-7, AFI 31-01, or AFI 10-1101.

Parameter 21 - Safety. For the ARS to be a long term success, maintenance and aircrew safety must be ensured. Also, the ARS must not degrade the reliability, maintainability, or survivability of the host system. The use of explosives should be avoided if possible to reduce maintenance complexity.

Parameter 22 - Maintenance Planning. Maintenance planning will be IAW AFPD 21-1, AFI 21-101, and AFSOCI 21-106. A Logistics Support Analysis (LSA) will be accomplished to determine the specific levels of maintenance required.

Parameter 23 - Support Equipment. The MC-130H has a world wide mission and will be expected to operate from austere and remote locations. AFSOC guidance is to make all efforts to reducing the logistics tail associated with unit deployment.

Parameter 24 - Manpower. Addition of the ARS should not increase MC-130H crew ratios or maintenance positions beyond those already programmed.

Parameter 25 - Technical Data. To ensure safe operation of the ARS validated technical data must be provided prior to fielding of the system.

Parameter 26 - Aircrew and Maintenance Training. IAW the MC-130H System Training Plan.

Parameter 27 - Aircrew and Maintenance Training Aids. Training aids (and simulators) must be upgraded prior to production of the operational units to ensure AF personnel are adequately trained when the equipment is fielded.

Parameter 28 - Design Interface. Capabilities of the basic weapon system must be maintained so aircraft can support other SOF missions.

Parameter 29 - Computer Resources. Requirements for software development are consistent with the MC-130H Computer Resources Management Plan.

Parameter 30 - Supply Support. Until such time as an ARS is selected supply requirements can not be fully defined. AFSOC policy is to comply with higher headquarters guidance as defined in appropriate Policy and Instructions.

Parameter 31 - Facilities. No additional MILCON is envisioned.

Parameter 32 - Hazardous Materials. To ensure personnel safety, the materials used in the construction of the ARS must not propagate flame or give off toxic fumes. Excessive vibration could lead to structural fatigue. Excessive noise could prove detrimental to mission success rates and negate current projects such as Active Noise Reduction.

Parameter 33 - Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence. No new requirements are envisioned.

Parameter 34 - Transportation and Basing. Forward deployed units must be able to receive spares in a timely manner. Accordingly, an air transportable ARS is required.

Parameter 35 - Standardization, Interoperability, and Commonality. Guidance found in the Joint Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum (009-96, Feb 96) and in NATO STANAG 3447 apply.

Parameter 36 - Mapping, Charting and Geodesy Support. Not affected.

Parameter 37 - Environmental Support. Must be capable of operations in the same environment as the basic weapon system.