The United States Navy

PLANNING OBJECTIVES… PROGRAMMING DECISIONS

Decisions about funding choices are critical to the future of the Navy. A dynamic, uncertain, but still-dangerous security environment competes with constrained defense resources to create challenges and difficult tradeoffs in three major areas that, together, are the cornerstone for the 21st-century Navy:
  • Force Readiness
  • Force Structure
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  • Force Transformation
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    The security environment has changed. The Navy is drawing upon the vitality and innovation of its people and leveraging new technological opportunities to create a transformation strategy that will ensure tomorrow’s Navy can continue to meet its mission requirements and attain higher levels of operational effectiveness. While the recapitalization of resources is one possible solution to current funding concerns, a broader strategic context is essential if we are to avoid undue interim risk. Today’s readiness must not suffer as we look to the future. This, alone, will demand the best, most enlightened stewardship of the Navy’s fiscal and physical resources.

    The Navy will continue to develop new operational concepts that leverage current forces while exploiting our asymmetrical advantages and technological superiority. The Navy will continue to turn to industry and Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) technologies and will privatize non-core functions when feasible. Additionally, we will pursue solutions with other U.S. Armed Services and our allies.

    Within this context of critical trade-offs and innovative solutions, broad planning objectives have been identified to guide our efforts to build the 21st-century Navy:
    These objectives are examined in more detail in the following sections.

    21st Century Force Structure

    The Navy’s force structure comprises the hardware — ships, aircraft, weapons, and systems — and, most importantly, highly skilled, motivated, and dedicated people required to operate and maintain it in active and reserve service. The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) addressed current and Projected force structure and force mixes within the contexts of strategy, operational concepts, and threats to U.S. interests. The force-structure outcomes of the QDR’s assessments are outlined below.

    Force Mix Goals

    Force structure requirements depend on the roles, missions, and tasks the Naval Services must perform. After careful and comprehensive assessments of current and future operational needs, the Navy is committed to sustaining a force structure including:

    The number of nuclear-powered attack submarines provides a good illustration of the planning challenges for tomorrow’s force structure. A force of 50 SSNs in 2003 will allow on-average 11 SSN-years of deployments for the conduct of national missions, theater tasks, and peacetime forward-presence operations annually. This is compared to 16 SSN-years in 1998. (Figure 3 [use "back" key to return here] shows the decline in U.S. SSN force levels since the early 1990s, and projections to 2015.) The submarine force is entering an asset-limited period rather than the requirements-driven environment of the past. The choice is stark: Either the number of available submarines must increase, or the days-at-sea goals will almost certainly be exceeded, creating even more challenges for the stewardship of the Navy’s people and their equipment. This relationship is inescapable. Although a 1991 Joint Chiefs of Staff submarine force-level assessment concluded that some 67-71 SSNs were needed to meet likely peacetime and projected crisis-response, submarine force levels are again being addressed in light of emerging requirements — routine deployments, frequent contingency operations, and unplanned operational commitments — for the mid- and long-term future.

    Similar dynamics affect America’s aircraft carrier force. The unparalleled combat power of the Navy’s aircraft carriers and their multi-mission air wings provides the President with a wide range of options for quick and effective response to crisis or conflict, making them a critical component in America’s national security and military strategies. But to ensure America’s strategies are successful in these operations, sufficient numbers of aircraft carriers must be sustained to meet operational requirements without over-burdening the Navy’s Sailors or their ships, aircraft, and equipment.

    Real-world operational experience during the 1990s and numerous studies have confirmed that a force of 15 carriers is needed to satisfy the requirement for full-time carrier presence in critical world regions. That force level, however, is simply unaffordable in today’s and future fiscal environments, and the Navy has determined that 12 aircraft carriers enable presence and war-fighting needs to be met at an acceptable level of risk. Fewer than 12 carriers, and operational needs go unmet or we over-tax our people and forces. (Figure 4 [use "back" key to return here] shows the Navy’s plan for sustaining the 12-carrier force objective.)

    Likewise, the Navy’s multi-mission surface warships are in constant demand in peacetime and crisis. The 116 surface force limit set by the QDR represents the minimum required to meet the regional commanders’ operational requirements, especially in the critical mission area of Strike Warfare, where the Tomahawk missile has become the “weapon of choice” in recent military operations. Furthermore, given just 12 aircraft carriers, more and more of the day-to-day presence requirements are being levied on the Surface Force. For these reasons, the Surface Navy has commissioned a surface combatant force level study to reassess future needs. This situation has also generated a highly innovative proposal for a “National Fleet” comprising Navy and Coast Guard surface warships and major cutters.

    For these reasons, the QDR force levels and mixes are the minimum essential force to satisfy the needs of America’s security and military strategies. They serve as the foundation for meeting today’s commitments as the Navy continues its transformation for 21st-century operations. Although the President has directed the Defense Depart ment to allocate additional resources in real, after-inflation terms throughout the FY 2000-2005 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), and the Navy has restructured its FY 2000 FYDP shipbuilding program, it must soon be increased further and sustained well into the future to meet the long-term needs of the nation. By the middle of the next decade, we must craft and support a long-term building program of approximately ten new-construction warships per year. A commitment to adequate and stable funding of such a program will help to ensure that we do not over-burden our Sailors and their families and that we can introduce the modern ships, sensors, and weapons that will protect America’s interests and friends throughout the world.

    The Navy’s People

    Since the end of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Navy active duty end strength has been cut by almost 188,900 officer and enlisted personnel — a 33% reduction through FY 1998. (Figure 5 [use "back" key to return here] shows this and other force structure trends.) By the end of FY 2003, the drawdown will largely be complete, including implementation of the Quadrennial Defense Review’s recommendation for reductions of another 18,000 active-duty personnel. (The Navy’s civilian work force has similarly been restructured, and the QDR called for additional cuts of 8,400 civilian jobs.) Only 15% of the total end-strength reduction between FY 1992 and FY 2003 will have come from funded force-shaping tools such as the exit bonus program — Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI) and Selective Separation Bonus (SSB) — and the Temporary Early Retirement Authorization (TERA). Another 2% will have come from the Selective Early Retirement (SER) of officers and enlisted with more than 20 years of service. Because the Navy stood fast in its commitment to avoid an involuntary Reduction in Force (RIF), the vast majority of the drawdown was accomplished through typical personnel behavior such as regular retirements, end of contractual obligations, and attrition-related losses.

    Despite the drawdown, the Navy continues to hire, and achieving recruitment goals is critical for the future readiness of the Fleet. The Navy’s transition to a steady-state force with the desired skill and experience mix in the active-duty component has been a significant challenge. Maintaining a stable end- strength target, fine-tuning force profiles, and improving retention will require increased officer and enlisted retention incentives (such as special pays and bonuses) and training support for higher officer and enlisted accession requirements. Large groups of both officer and enlisted personnel will reach retirement eligibility during the next several years. Additionally, smaller accession-groups will be reaching their first career decision point. A stable end strength in FY 2003 and beyond means that every single loss, either planned or unplanned, will have to be replaced by an offsetting gain to the active duty force.

    Naval Reserve Contributions

    Consistent with the measurable trend that has characterized the 1990s, the Naval Reserve continues to be relied upon in ever- greater ways. Twenty percent of the Navy’s uniformed personnel are in the Naval Reserve. The increased professionalism of the Reserve Force, flexibility, and the needs of the Fleet have been the primary driving forces in this transformation of the Naval Reserve in helping to meet the daily peacetime, crisis, and wartime needs of America.

    Although a small portion of overall Naval Reserve, one area that clearly demonstrates the increased reliance the Navy has on its Reserve is the use of Reserve Flag Officers for many full-time Flag leadership positions throughout the Navy. During FY 1998, nine Naval Reserve Flag Officers filled critical leadership positions. Also, the flexibility of the Reserve team was best demonstrated by our Naval Reserve C-9 transport aircraft detachment in the Mediterranean, which delivered 50 Fast-Action Security Team (FAST) Marines to Dar Es Salem, Tanzania, within 20 hours after the terrorist bombings of our two embassies in Africa. These were the first U.S. military personnel to arrive in-country after the embassy bombings. A macro-level indicator is the total amount of contributory support the Naval Reserve has provided for the Active Fleet in FY 1998 — some 2.3 million work days of direct mission support. This represents more than a 100% increase since 1991, despite a corresponding 40% decrease in reserve personnel.

    Naval Reservists are found in virtually every area in the Navy. In fact, many critical mission areas are 100% covered by Reservists. Those areas are: fleet air logistics, harbor defense and mobile inshore-undersea warfare units, adversary fighter aircraft, and naval control of merchant shipping. Also, many mission areas have most of their capability in the Reserve, including construction battalions, cargo handling, and military sealift personnel. (Figure 6 [use "back" key to return here] shows the percentages of these and other Naval Reserve contributions to essential Navy capabilities.)

    Approximately 70% of Naval Reservists are assigned to augment active “gaining commands,” to which they provide additional wartime manning and capability, as well as a peacetime contributory support. Almost all major areas within the Navy have augmenting Reservists. The remaining 30% of Naval Reservists are assigned to stand-alone commissioned units. These units include 26 ships, 35 aircraft squadrons, construction battalions, mobile inshore-undersea warfare units, fleet hospitals and cargo handling battalions. In all cases, these augmented and commissioned units receive their funding from resource sponsors which are responsible for funding active programs as well.

    Moreover, Naval Reservists are no longer “tied” to the continental United States to perform their services. For example, half of the Naval Reserve Force Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class guided missile frigates deployed last year for more than four months, to operations such as CARAT and counter- drug operations. This trend will continue into the near term future years.

    As a result of the QDR, the Naval Reserve will be restructured, resulting in a reduction of 4,100 people. While some additional reserve personnel will be required to support the transition of Combat Logistics Force (CLF) ships to the Military Sealift Command (MSC), other reserve positions will be eliminated as a result of the accelerated reduction of surface combatants and submarine tenders as well as the early withdrawal of the SH-2 helicopter from service. Additionally, the Navy has recommended reductions in overseas activities that will decrease the requirements for reservists assigned to base support. All said, however, the seamless integration of Navy active and reserve forces is no longer a distant concept, but an immediate reality unmatched in any other service. In 1999, the Naval Reserve is an active partner and full participant in the Navy’s worldwide operations, and the Naval Reservist of tomorrow will be a truly indispensable part of the 21st-century Navy.

    Preserving Core Capabilities

    While maximizing return on our long-term investment, America’s naval expeditionary force structure must reflect enduring requirements for forward-deployed operations and the emerging naval strategic vision and operational concept for the 21st century. New threats to shore-based forces and novel operational maneuver concepts for joint operations will expand the Navy’s requirements in four significant ways:

    Naval expeditionary forces provide a host of essential capabilities to the joint commander. Broadly, these fall into four categories: Network-Centric Warfare, Sea and Area Control, Power Projection, and Force Deployment and Sustainment.

    Information Technology for Network-Centric Warfare

    Information Technology for the 21st Century (IT21) is the Navy’s overarching concept for achieving revolutionary, force-wide information superiority and enabling robust operational capabilities. Central to every aspect of the Navy’s continued operational primacy, IT21 derives its power from the robust and reliable networking of a force with diverse and distributed capabilities. By tying sensors, shooters, and commanders together in a shared information scheme, IT21 raises operational potential to a new level. This scheme makes our forces smarter, smoother, and more responsive through shared situational awareness, increased collaboration, closer coordination, and faster operational processes.

    The IT21 scheme is often viewed in levels of information usage or grids: Network-Centric Warfare, which encompasses Tracking and Control, Coherent Tactical Picture, and Common Operational Picture; and Navy-Wide Intranet. IT21 provides the information backbone and Intranet that allows information sharing among all afloat and ashore users. As first steps toward meeting these requirements, the Navy has begun fielding several C4I programs. The Global Command and Control System — Maritime (GCCS-M) program provides for the common operational picture and collaborative planning in the near term. Link 16 provides a portion of the Coherent Tactical Picture. Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) for air and missile defense and the Naval Surface Fire Control System (NSFCS) for naval surface fire attacks provide portions of the target tracking and weapon control grid.

    IT21 is a vital first step toward implementation of Network- Centric Warfare. The information systems backplane provides the warfighter critical end-to-end capability that extends from personal computers (PCs) on local area network (LAN) segments connected to wide area networks (WAN) and key ship-to-shore interface sites. These ship-to-shore sites will provide the critical information system management functions. The centralized core of IT expertise that will reside at these sites and other Information Technology Service Centers will provide a comprehensive Information Management/Information Technology support infrastructure. Other backplane components such as the shore gateways, space segments, and network security systems are essential for providing the PC-to-PC connectivity (End-to-End) requirement for users located anywhere on the globe.

    This revolutionary implementation strategy embraced under IT21 should fundamentally change the process of warfighting by leveraging the use of IT as a force multiplier. Without the IT21 Information Backplane, Network-Centric Warfare cannot occur. IT21 is important to the Navy because it enhances information superiority for combat operations and reduces work force requirements. Information superiority is achieved on several fronts. Effectiveness of command is improved by transferring comprehensive operational, intelligence, and logistics information to the right place at the right time via protected pathways. As a result, the implementation cycles for commanders’ directives are accelerated, gaining operational initiative over an adversary and increasing probability of mission success. IT21 portends notable savings in work force accounts by modernizing methods in which information is accessed, processed, and subsequently disseminated in support of mission execution. This enables ashore and afloat manning reductions, while other benefits realized with IT21 implementation (e-mail, Direct TV, and Sailor Phone) greatly improve quality of life and morale for our deployed people.

    The Navy has already achieved significant success in harnessing available commercial technologies and systems for naval use. Ships and aircraft equipped with the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) and its follow-on Multi-functional Information Distribu tion System (MIDS) have the capability to receive and distribute near-real-time tactical data. The Global Command and Control System-Maritime (GCCS-M), formerly called the Joint Maritime Command Information System (JMCIS), is the cornerstone of the Navy’s afloat command-and-control programs and is the maritime version of the Defense-wide Global Command and Control System (GCCS). This system can process sensor information and communications for all warfare mission areas. It supports all levels of command and can be integrated with other services systems and remain interoperable with those of our allies, as well.

    The Navy’s revolutionary “Ring of Fire” concept for naval fire support coordination is a perfect example of NCW, linking a wide variety of platforms — aircraft, surface ships, and submarines — into a single battle group LAN. Ring of Fire automatically matches requests for fire with available assets, saving both manpower and time, while ensuring the correct ordnance is on target when and where needed. In 1997, for example, the U.S. Third Fleet successfully tested an early prototype of the Ring of Fire during Fleet Battle Experiment (FBE) Alpha, held in conjunction with the Marine Corps Hunter Warrior Advanced Warfighting Experiment. In FBE Bravo, later in 1997, the Third Fleet expanded the concept to include tactical aircraft and land-based Marine artillery units. Bravo also demonstrated the Ring’s ability to receive data from external sources, such as Air Force Joint STARS surveillance aircraft. Fleet Battle Experiments continue at an approximate rate of two per year, with continued focus on developing network-centric capabilities, increasingly in forward-area Joint operational environments.

    The first such forward-area experiment, FBE Delta, was conducted in conjunction with Foal Eagle ‘98, a joint and combined theater exercise, during October and November 1998. The Delta experiments include the most futuristic test yet of theater combined-arms coordination, using E-2C Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft, nuclear submarines, surface warships, Special Operations Forces (SOF), and Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft to address specific theater concerns: counter-SOF, counter-fire, and joint theater air defense. In FBE Echo, scheduled for March-April 1999, the Navy and Marine Corps will explore further naval operations in the urban environment, including netted naval sensors and fires, command and control, and theater air defense. FBE Echo will also address several entirely new concepts for undersea warfare to deal with the anticipated full range of asymmetric maritime threats.

    The Navy is advancing its NCW ability by improving its technologies and doctrine to support Information Warfare (IW). This allows disruption, neutralization, and deception of enemy forces, while providing friendly forces with superior intelligence and robust defenses against an adversary’s own IW systems — all in support of Joint Vision 2010’s concept of information superiority.

    When fully developed, NCW will provide naval forces with superior understanding of complex operations and the means to collaborate better and coordinate more closely. The commander is more in tune with key details of the ongoing operation. Commanders and their forces share an accurate, timely awareness of the operational situation. Superior knowledge and coordination are fundamental force multipliers, which when coupled with certain capabilities can create quantum leaps in operational effects. The emergence of NCW permits the complementary evolution of new capabilities and the improvement of existing capabilities of enduring value.

    Sea & Area Control

    Only a few major powers will have the capability to provide a sustained, long-range threat to maritime supremacy and thereby challenge the Navy’s concept of dominant maneuver from the sea. That said, future adversaries unable to match U.S. military power head-on may attempt to intimidate our regional allies and friends before the full weight of U.S. power can be brought to bear, in an attempt to delay or deny our access to critical areas of operations. Indeed, they may seek to block the projection of U.S. military power into crisis areas by attacking the ports, key logistics hubs, and airfields necessary for operations by land-based forces; concentrations of U.S. and allied forces; and ships and aircraft in transit to the areas. Both conventional and WMD attacks could well come from individual terrorists or a broad spectrum of land, sea, and air area-denial forces.

    Nevertheless, even regional adversaries could make the investments necessary to extend the range of their area-denial forces out to sea, beyond the chaos of the littorals, by relying on a mix of dispersed sensors and various weapons platforms, including submarines and long-range air power. Such scenarios envision an adversary’s reliance upon asymmetric warfare to inflict a disproportionate injury against a U.S. capability or friend, in the expectation that U.S. leaders may make a political decision not to proceed. The threat of naval mines in the 1991 Persian Gulf War provides a good example of one such scenario. Two U.S. warships, the USS Princeton (CG-59) and USS Tripoli (LPH-10), suffered mine-strikes on the same day. The two ships sustained more than $125 million in damage, with several crew-members injured. Princeton was essentially taken out of action for repairs. Had either or both been sunk with a significant loss of life, the domestic U.S. public reaction might have had a similarly significant political affect on subsequent military decisions, despite our overwhelming superiority. As it was, the presence of more than 1,300 Iraqi naval mines and surf-zone obstacles served to constrain the multi-national coalition’s operational alternatives in the northern Arabian Gulf.

    The ability to dominate sea and air lanes and then to defeat an adversary’s sea, littoral, and air capabilities throughout a broad theater of operations will be a fundamental naval strength that undergirds a credible U.S. forward presence. The increasing reach and lethality of area-denial threats will require that America’s naval expeditionary forces be fully capable of establishing control against sophisticated opposition at sea, ashore, and in the information realm.

    Sea and area control are thus prerequisites for theater battlespace dominance — the heart of naval warfare — and are essential elements of the naval expeditionary mission. Throughout its history, the Navy-Marine Corps Team has excelled in establishing sea control and dominating the littoral battlespace. This has entailed blue-water operations against an opposing force, as well as clearing mines and suppressing shore defenses. Navy and Marine Corps forces deny access to a regional adversary, interdict the movement of its supplies, and control the littoral sea and air space. In the near future, naval forces will also be able to establish theater-level command and control and to spearhead joint efforts to defeat hostile air, cruise, and ballistic missile threats. The Navy will ensure that reinforcement and resupply reach naval expeditionary forces ashore and follow-on heavy land-based ground and air forces. As innovative operational concepts evolve in response to the reality of regional and possible global threats, ground force operational and logistics support will increasingly be sea- based. That will be possible only if U.S. naval forces control the maritime and littoral battlespace.

    Together, these forces can control an area extending from the open ocean to the shore and inland to that area that can be directly supported and defended from the sea. Aircraft carriers and their multipurpose air wings, submarines and surface warships, amphibious forces, and supporting naval forces are the backbone of the U.S. military’s ability to dominate regional and littoral battlespaces, which is the sine qua non of the nation’s ability to project credible military power from the sea.

    Power Projection

    Power projection requires agility, mobility, flexibility, and technology to project strength against weakness. The Navy accomplishes this through implementing innovative littoral and amphibious maneuver warfare strategies, doctrines, and operational concepts, and using all available capabilities and assets, including:

  • Aircraft carriers and sea-based tactical air-power to strike at critical targets and to support directly ground forces ashore

  • Surface warships to provide precision land-attack with responsive, lethal naval “fires” in conjunction with missile strikes and multi-layered air defense against aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles on both an area- and theater- wide basis

  • Nuclear-powered submarines to provide covert intelligence, surveillance, and indications and warning; to land and recover SOF troops; and to launch surprise, long-range tactical missile attacks

  • Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) operating from amphibious assault ships to enable follow-on entry of heavy land-based air and ground forces — should they be needed

  • Naval Construction Battalions (Seabees) and the Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Combat Service Support (CSS) assets to support forces operating ashore

    • The nation’s naval expeditionary forces can project decisive military power from the sea, in the face of even the most determined adversary. Precision operations conducted from surface warships, attack submarines, and carrier-based aircraft will provide massive, sustainable fires from the sea. Naval forces can generate high-intensity offensive power and Marines can quickly achieve critical objectives to enable the follow-on introduction of U.S. and allied forces. Joint operations, using both Navy and Air Force strike assets, are becoming a standard means of rapidly delivering significant firepower to remote targets, such as the joint Desert Strike operation in September 1996 and Desert Fox two years later.

    In the early years of the next century, the Navy-Marine Corps Team will be able to project sea power in a way that Alfred Thayer Mahan, the late-19th century naval strategist and historian, could not even imagine. For example, designed from the keel up with the land-attack mission in mind, the 21st- century Land Attack Destroyer (DD-21) is a revolutionary approach to warship development. DD-21 will be the first fully integrated ship with warfighting, control, and maintainability supported by a single, open-architecture computer operating environment. The integration of joint C4ISR systems will permit DD-21 to maintain the real-time joint tactical picture needed to respond to calls for fire — long-range, gun-launched guided munitions and land-attack missiles —from troops ashore in a timely and accurate manner, far beyond what is capable today.

    Advanced joint and national information and targeting systems will multiply the impact of the Naval Services’ long reach — some 80% of the world’s population centers can today be the focus of naval “littoral” operations — and enable us to mass the effects of distributed but precise fires from the sea wherever they will have the greatest influence on events ashore. A new dimension of sea power will result in naval campaigns that combine highly mobile Marine operations deep into the littoral with responsive close air and fire support and long-range precision strikes. This focused, precise firepower will be sustained entirely from the sea, fully supported by advanced sea-basing concepts and platforms — accomplishing the effects of massed firepower without the need to mass forces physically.

    Force Deployment & Sustainment

    The Navy’s ability to move and sustain U.S. forces overseas by strategic sealift is another unique role. Equipment, ordnance, and supplies needed to conduct any sizable projection of joint military power must move by sea. During the 1990-1991 Gulf War, nearly 95% of all material, supplies, and equipment sent to the combat theater — and returned to the United States once peace was restored — was carried in ships. Sealift is vital to Army and Air Force regional operations, as these services are almost totally dependent upon the “steel bridge” of sealift ships to deliver everything a modern fighting force requires to accomplish its missions. Similarly, the Marine Corps Assault Follow-On Echelon (AFOE) is carried exclusively by sealift. Forward-deployed and prepositioned ships continue to be an essential alert force, constituting a valuable tool for deterrence as well as for an initial ground assault. Follow-on surge sealift ensures timely deployment of U.S.-based units, while sealift sustainment forces will resupply deployed forces for as long as needed.

    The Navy’s ability to protect sea lanes and ports of debarkation, and thus to ensure the unfettered flow of supplies and equipment, is a critical factor in the success of an expeditionary operation. As the number of U.S. bases overseas continues to decline, reliance on sealift will expand commensurably. The continued ability to move and sustain forces in forward areas increasingly will be a critical gauge of the Navy’s ability to meet joint overseas commitments.

    Tomorrow’s Navy-Marine Corps Team will continue to be called upon to sustain a meaningful presence in important world regions. Force sustainment encompasses the comprehensive and responsive logistic support system that includes air and sealift, replenishment ships, mobile repair facilities, and advanced logistics support hubs. This capability underpins the Navy’s future ability to operate worldwide. Assets and capabilities that provide the ability to move and sustain naval and other U.S. forces at great distances from America’s shores include:

    Under the Large Medium-Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off (LMSR) program, the Navy is building or converting a total of 19 heavy sealift ships, which will preposition Army heavy combat equipment in forward areas and provide additional surge sealift capability in time of crisis. The Navy is also pursuing the Maritime Prepositioning Force-Enhanced (MPF-E) program, which will add two ships to the current force of 13 MPF ships.These ships will expand the capabilities of the current Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons, adding a fleet hospital, Seabee battalion assets, expeditionary airfield, MEF headquarters, and additional sustainment.

    Through the National Defense Features Program, the Navy is paying to install militarily useful features on commercially owned and operated merchant ships. In return, ship operators agree to make these ships immediately available for Defense Department use in a contingency.

    Nearly 100% of the Navy’s Expeditionary Logistic Support Force (ELSF) resides in the Naval Reserve. This mission has been successfully addressed with Naval Reservists, providing a highly cost-effective and flexible capability. For example, Advance Base Functional Component (ABFC) Units are capable of loading and unloading equipment and material at ports of embarkation and debarkation. Also, our Navy medium-airlift squadrons, which reside completely within the Naval Reserve, provide all of the Navy’s intra-theater airlift of critical supplies and personnel, on an every-day basis. As we continue to “right-size” the Navy for the current and likely future environment, the assignment of much of this mission area within the Naval Reserve has allowed us to maintain this critical capability in a most cost-effective manner.

    To evaluate new logistics concepts, the Navy and Marine Corps created the Naval Logistics Wargame in 1994. The most recent game, played in 1997, looked out to 2007 and emphasized support for Operations Other Than War (OOTW) and multiple Smaller-Scale Contingencies (SSCs), culminating in reconstituting and redeploying forces from these operations to respond to a Major Theater War (MTW). The wargame also assessed the emerging Expeditionary Sea-Based Logistics concept and the Focused Logistics concept from Joint Vision 2010. As part of the Joint Vision 2010 process, the Naval Logistics Wargame has now evolved into the joint Focused Logistics Wargame (FLOW), which will be played for the first time in 1999. The results of these and future assessments and wargames will continue to shape the Navy’s force-sustainment programs and initiatives.

    Ensuring Quality of Life

    The transformation of today’s Navy to meet the challenges of the future will be accomplished by our Sailors. The Navy’s men and women — with their deeply held values of honor, courage, and commitment — will be the cornerstone of the Navy of the 21st century. Faced with the demand for a leaner but more capable Navy, we fully understand that we rely on the innovation and dedication of our people to ensure that the Navy of tomorrow can indeed meet the demands thrust upon it.

    To that end, the Department of the Navy must attract, train, and retain dedicated, career-minded men and women for the arduous tasks ahead. The Navy’s Quality of Life programs have a direct impact on the readiness of the Total Force and, as such, are essential to the Navy’s mission. Thus, the Navy will continue to request adequate funding to support several important initiatives.

    Health Care

    All Navy and Marine Corps families must be provided with quality medical care. Managed-care initiatives have been extremely successful at increasing access to care, ensuring the highest quality, and managing costs. The Navy recognizes the commitment its men and women make to serve our nation, and will continue to support these and other Quality of Life programs to address unique and compelling needs of service members and their families. These programs provide a high return on investment and contribute to preserving the readiness of the Navy’s Sailors to meet the daunting professional and personal demands placed upon them.

    Educational Services

    The Navy has redesigned its recruitment training program and is taking an innovative approach to leadership training. From the first day of boot camp, the Navy instills pride in the service’s core values — honor, courage, and commitment — and builds the warrior spirit in each recruit. To guarantee today’s recruits become tomorrow’s leaders, the Navy has added a new Leadership Training Curriculum program with eight structured blocks of training. The courses are taught by Navy Sailors willing to make a serious commitment to leadership training. The Navy is thus laying the groundwork for every Sailor to make a difference and take pride in his or her service to the nation.

    The Navy also continues to support Voluntary Education fully, recognizing that Sailors who improve themselves through further schooling increase force readiness, in addition to enjoying more productive and satisfying military careers. In recognition of the role of voluntary continuing education, the Office of the Secretary of Defense instituted a uniform tuition assistance policy across the Armed Services on 1 October 1998. The Navy has further demon strated its support for continuing education through two major achievements:

    Finally, the Navy is increasing educational opportunities with the addition of upper-division and graduate-level courses. Through its investment in educational technology, the service is making it possible for every Sailor to continue advancing academically, regardless of mission or duty location. An educated Sailor is better able to meet the challenges of the coming decades. Thus, the investment in this important Quality of Life program is not only an investment in recruitment and retention, but an investment in readiness as well.

    Family Service Centers

    The Navy’s 62 Family Service Centers offer a variety of personal support services to single and married Sailors and their families. They provide proactive family support in improving life skills and coping with inherent stresses of Navy life. By providing information and referral services, education, training, and counseling, these centers help prevent family problems or minimize their impact, allowing service-members to focus on assigned duties.

    These centers also support the Family Advocacy Program, which identifies, prevents, treats, and follows up on a wide range of child and spouse abuse situations. New-Parent Support (NPS) is our primary prevention program for child abuse, ensuring that new parents get off to a safe and healthy start at naval installations world wide. Today’s children will be tomorrow’s Sailors. NPS services, including home visitation, are available at more than 30 locations.

    Bachelor & Family Housing

    Through the Neighborhoods of Excellence Program, service-members are provided with secure living environments comparable to private communities. Additionally, housing allowances are continuously reviewed to enable Sailors to own their own homes or rent housing in safe and clean communities. Unmarried first and second-class petty officers on sea duty are now eligible for off-base housing allowances in many home ports.

    The Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) and the Variable Housing Allowance (VHA) have been combined into a single, enhanced housing allowance — the Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH). This new allowance will be more accurate and responsive to every Sailor’s needs. There is, as well, an extensive program in place to upgrade government-owned quarters, concentrating on comfort, security, and privacy.

    Morale, Welfare & Recreation

    The Navy Department’s Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs focus their energies on meeting the fitness, leisure, and community activity program needs of our Sailors and their families. In addition, MWR serves reservists, retirees, and civilian employees. Quality MWR activities make major contributions to the mental, physical, and social well-being of our entire Navy family and are fundamental elements in the Navy’s efforts to maintain a ready force.

    MWR offers a broad array of programs, ranging from basic physical fitness and constructive off-duty recreation to family support and personal development activities designed to meet the needs of the Navy community. Fitness programs include afloat activities as well as outdoor recreation events, such as rafting and rock climbing. The explosive growth in information technologies has also enabled the Navy to provide its forward- deployed Sailors with e-mail and other direct links to their families at home.

    Family support programs primarily encompass youth and child care. Child Care Programs are designed to meet the needs of the Navy and Marine Corps work force by assisting working parents in locating affordable, full-time child care. The school-age care program works in conjunction with local school systems to provide quality programs before and after school hours.

    MWR programs enhance readiness by promoting teamwork, retention, fitness, a positive mental outlook, improved morale, and a healthy alternative to substance abuse. Surveys confirm a strong correlation between the quality-of-life support MWR provides and the Navy’s success in retaining a quality force.

    Outsourcing Functions & Reducing Infrastructure

    Consistent with the Vice President’s National Performance Review and the results of the QDR, the Navy and Marine Corps continue to pursue several important outsourcing initiatives that involve privatizing non-core functions currently performed by Navy Department civilian and military activities. Such outsourcing will reduce infrastructure and produce savings that can be allocated to critical readiness and recapitalization needs, as well as to support current operations.

    Efforts are continuing in Navy concentration areas to consolidate or “regionalize” installation management unctions. Regionalization reduces Base Operating Support (BOS) costs through the elimination of unnecessary management layers, duplicative overhead, and redundant functions. Regionalization also facilitates better workforce usage, development of most efficient organizations, opportunities to conduct regional public/private competitions, standardization of processes, interoperability, and regional planning and prioritization.

    In conjunction with regionalization, the Navy is also reducing the number of its Major Claimants involved in the installation management business. As regional installation management organizations are created, BOS resources and responsibilities in Navy concentration areas will transfer to a single major claimant. Simultaneously, installation management responsibilities will transfer from specific claimants, permitting these claimants to concentrate on their primary mission.

    These important cost-reduction efforts are changing the fundamental nature of installation management and support service delivery. Regionalization and claimancy consolidation provide Navy concentration areas a means to apply state-of-the- market, best-business practices, employ broad-based competitive sourcing and privatization studies, pursue regional business process reengineering initiatives, and continue to provide quality support at less cost.

    The Navy’s FY 1998 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) identified several key outsourcing and privatization initiatives that will realize some $3 billion in savings through FY 2003, with another $1.4 billion annual savings projected in FY 2004. These initiatives continue to be pursued:

    It is imperative that the Navy properly balance the size and cost of its support establishment relative to its operating forces: a lean Navy “tail” must support a mean warfighting “tooth.” The Navy is thus continually searching for new, innovative, and less-expensive ways to keep our forces in top readiness and supplied with the best equipment available.

    The commercial world has long been the primary source of defense innovation. To make best use of this national resource, the Navy is working to simplify its research, development, and procurement processes through acquiring less-costly, easily upgradable, commercial products. In so doing, the Navy will save resources and obtain modern, “leading-edge-of-the-shelf” equipment.

    There will continue to be a requirement to test and evaluate many weapons and platforms that are procured. To reduce infrastructure and increase efficiency, the services have increased the extent to which they share ranges and other test facilities. The Naval Air Warfare Center maintains an Aircraft Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) facility at Patuxent River, Maryland; the weapons RDT&E facilities at China Lake and Point Mugu, California; and the Undersea Warfare Testing facility at Andros Island, The Bahamas. These facilities comprise the Navy’s contribution to the Defense Department’s Major Range Test Facility base.

    As a result of the final deliberations of the Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) in 1995, eight additional major installations are scheduled for closure by 2001; the Navy will ultimately close or realign a total of 178 bases. In 1999, 11 additional facilities will be added to the 162 closures or realignments already completed.

    To accommodate this and previous BRAC reductions in support infrastructure, the Navy is closing bases and consolidating maintenance facilities for aircraft, ships, and equipment into regional activities, reducing the number of facilities and operating costs while causing no reduction in readiness. Supply support functions are being consolidated into regional Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers (FISCs), which are assuming greater responsibility for inventory management, contracting, and hazardous material management. Some of these initiatives may have sizable up-front costs, but long-term savings and benefits will be significant and will go a long way in helping to recapitalize the Navy’s operating forces. We anticipate recurring savings of $2.6 billion per year after all 178 bases are closed or realigned.

    Nevertheless, reductions in the Navy’s infrastructure have not kept pace with the reductions in force structure. While the number of ships and Sailors were reduced by 40% and 30%, respectively, since 1988, the Navy’s infrastructure decreased by only 17%. Additional BRAC rounds are therefore critical for the future readiness of the Navy.

    The Navy thus continues to seek ways to streamline and reduce the costs of shore infrastructure. The number of claimancies that own shore bases has been reduced and consolidated in an effort to reduce overhead without adversely affecting mission. In addition to claimant consolidation, emphasis is being placed on regionalization in fleet concentration areas to reduce the cost of shore infrastructure. Through a newly instituted regional planning initiative, redundant functions and base operations will be identified and eliminated. Regional planning is expected to include other Defense Department, federal, and community agencies.

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