

Rwanda and Burundi Genocide:  
A Case Study of Neglect and Indifference

Milton Leitenberg

Introduction

Between April 6, 1994 and some 13 weeks later in mid-July, roughly three-quarters of a million people were murdered in a spasm of civil war and genocide in Rwanda. They were mostly members of one group, Tutsi, killed by members of a second, Hutu. Those killed amounted to roughly 10 percent of the nation's population. If an equivalent fraction of the American population had been killed, it would mean the killing of some 26 to 28 million people in just over three months. Over 2 million people fled or were herded into neighboring countries, and another million or more were displaced within Rwanda. The events will follow the Armenian tragedy in 1915, the Holocaust in World War II, Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Bosnia in the disasters of the 20th Century and in Western history.

What is of even greater significance is that by and large the events had been foreseen and forewarned. In the words of a (German) diplomat, "there are no 'unknown Rwandas.' We all know about the Rwandas. What we don't know is how the international community should respond." The events which preceded the outbreak of the killing were known, and what took place during the killing and after was known, yet it all continued. Nations, diplomats, and civil servants, European, American, African, the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, stood by and watched it all and did nothing.

Burundi and Rwanda were both German colonies--German East Africa--between 1885 and 1916. After Germany's defeat in WWI, the League of Nations gave Belgium trusteeship over both. Belgium granted independence to both in July 1962. Between independence and April 1994, violence between Hutu and Tutsi in both countries led to the killing of between 300,000 and 600,000 people. Elites maneuvering for political power had manipulated ethnic rivalries for decades, and they were directly responsible for the killings.<sup>1</sup> They never suffered any punishment for instigating the sequential massacres and counter-massacres.

The population of both Rwanda and Burundi is composed of the same proportion of the two groups, 85 percent Hutu and 15 percent Tutsi. These are usually described as separate "ethnic" groups. Before colonization, the terms "Hutu" and "Tutsi" included connotations of ethnicity, lineage, clan and social status: specific meanings varied in different regions of the countries.<sup>2</sup> A crucial distinguishing factor was ownership of cattle; owning cattle placed one in the category of "Tutsi." Passage from one group to the other was fluid; intermarriage was common, and both groups spoke the same language and practiced the same religion. However, the introduction of identity cards by the Belgian colonial administrators served to codify group membership. The Belgians additionally fostered the Tutsis as the ruling group.

## I.

The first truly large-scale slaughter in Rwanda took place in

1962-63: approximately 100,000 Tutsi were killed in civil strife. In Burundi it occurred in 1972-73. Estimates of those killed range from 80,000 to 200,000, the vast majority of them Hutu. On the government's side, the Army and the "Jeunesse Revolutionnaire," a paramilitary organization of young men attached to the Tutsi ruling political party, did the killing. A subsequent report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace excoriated the United States administration of President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger for "indifference, inertia, and irresponsibility" in its response to the massacres.<sup>3</sup> The Organization of African Unity declined to intervene on the grounds that the events were "a purely internal matter." A number of foreign states provided support to the parties doing the killing.<sup>4</sup>

In October 1993, fighting broke out again in Burundi, following an attempted Tutsi coup against the first democratically elected president of the country, a Hutu. Amnesty International estimates that around 100,000 people were killed in the three months between October and December 1993; other estimates of the number of dead vary between 50,000 to 200,000.<sup>5</sup> This preceded the events in Rwanda by only four to five months.

In October 1990, a group of Rwandan exiles, primarily Tutsi who had served for years in the Ugandan armed forces, had invaded Rwanda. For the next three years, a war between the Hutu government and the invading force, known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), partitioned the country, with the RPF holding only a strip of territory along the Ugandan border. French military forces had come to the aid of the government in 1990 and again in 1993, and France also supplied

arms to the government. Under strong pressure from the international community of aid donors, a peace agreement--the Arusha Accords--was brokered by emissaries from the United Nations and the Organization of Africa Unity (OAU) in August 1993, and a cease-fire was in effect from that time until mid-April 1994. However, the Hutu president continually delayed implementation of the peace agreement, and the governing Hutu party had been recruiting young men into two militias first created in 1992--the Interahamwe and the Impuzamugambi--and training them under Rwandan army supervision all through the early months of 1994. This process was under observation by the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) and was duly reported to the office of the UN Secretary-General in New York. By April 1994, 10,000 Hutu had been recruited into these militias, and arms had been distributed to them.

On April 6, 1994, the Presidents of Burundi and Rwanda were both returning to the Rwandan capital from a UN-mediated parley of the contending parties of both countries with other regional leaders. The Rwandan president was under strong international pressure once again, now to implement the 1993 peace agreement. The airplane in which they were travelling was shot down as it approached the capital's airport. It was apparently shot down by elements of the Rwandan president's own Presidential Guard. Both presidents died in the crash. In less than an hour, roadside barriers begin to go up in the Rwandan capital, and the killings began, carried out at first by the Presidential Guard.<sup>6</sup> It was not a spontaneous outbreak of violence; it clearly had been planned. The first victims were members of the political opposition, both Hutu and Tutsi. The Hutu officials or political elites killed were those willing to

see the Arusha Accord implemented and to move towards political power-sharing with the Tutsi. The killings were at first confined to the capital, but the response of the United States, France and Belgium was only to evacuate their own nationals in great haste. Presented with this Western "hands off" reaction, a major role in the massacres was passed on to the militias, who fanned out into the government-controlled portion of the country with the aid of the army.

Under the terms of the peace accord, UNAMIR--a 2,500-member UN observer force--was present in Rwanda at the time, without Chapter 7 provisions to use force.<sup>1</sup> Article 42 in Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter provides for the use of force: "...such action as may be necessary..." in any circumstance of "threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression." It provides for the use of "all necessary means," the diplomatic phrase which means the use of force. The UN had authorized such use sparingly in the postwar years: in the Korean war, in the Congo, for the US-led coalition that fought Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in 1990, in UN resolution 794 for the US-led coalition that went to Somalia in December 1992, as well as for the UN forces that replaced it. Force was also authorized for certain of the missions that UN forces were assigned in Yugoslavia, although for the most part it was not applied there. (Only when Serb military forces systematically overran the Bosnian cities which the UN had declared "safe havens" was a bombing campaign initiated against the Serbs, which led to the negotiated Dayton Accords.) On April 5, the very day before the president's aircraft was shot down, the UN Security Council had extended UNAMIR's mandate for six weeks, but threatened to end it

unless "...full and prompt implementation by the parties...of the transitional institutions provided for under the Arusha Peace Agreements..." took place.<sup>8</sup>

A week after the killing began, estimates of those massacred reached 20,000, then 50,000. At some point very soon after they began, General Dallaire, the Canadian commander of UNAMIR, requested the Office of the UN Secretary-General to provide him with new Rules of Engagement for his forces, so that he could protect innocent civilians. The request was rejected. It would later be learned that he had made the same request several months earlier as well, when he reported the arming of the Hutu militias. The request had been rejected then also. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Rwanda, an African diplomat, reported to UN headquarters in New York that the situation was a resurgence of "tribal warfare," and therefore the UN should not be involved. In mid-April, Belgium decided to recall the 440 troops it had serving with the UNAMIR force after ten of its disarmed soldiers were murdered on April 7 by members of the Presidential Guard who also assassinated a government minister whom the troops were protecting. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, with the support of the US administration, essentially recommended to the Security Council that the entire remaining UNAMIR force be withdrawn. He noted that with the withdrawal of the Belgian contingent, UNAMIR would be unable to carry out its mandate, and hence that "In these circumstances, I have asked my Special Representative and the Force Commander to prepare plans for the withdrawal of UNAMIR, should this prove necessary."<sup>9</sup> In the end, such a retreat was considered to be

too great an embarrassment, and the Security Council allowed 270 troops to remain.

The Organization of African Unity criticized the UN's decision to withdraw all but a symbolic and non-functional presence as "a sign of indifference or lack of sufficient concern" for Africans. Yet in a pattern of response typical of the OAU once killings begin in an African state, not a single African country sent new or additional troops to Rwanda (until the end of August), except for the small units from Senegal, Chad, and the Congo that accompanied the much-criticized French forces when these were deployed in June.<sup>10</sup> An Ethiopian battalion replaced the French troops when these were withdrawn at the end of August.

By April 29, three weeks after the killing had started, Mr. Boutros-Ghali reported that as many as 200,000 people had been killed--massacred--in Rwanda. By now having reversed his recommendation of early April to withdraw the peacekeeping troops, he proposed three options, the first of which was again prompted by General Dallaire and called for Security Council approval of a plan to send in 5,500 additional troops.<sup>11</sup>

It was understood by all that it would take months for the troops to be raised from member nations, equipped and actually deployed. Again, Security Council members from African countries and other developing nations favored forceful action. But no African nation actually volunteered troops, the US opposed this option, and, as a result, the Security Council asked the Secretary-General to "consult" with the OAU and to undertake new diplomatic steps. As could be

expected, the now-desperate "diplomatic" appeals from the Secretary-General to the parties in the Rwandan conflict produced nothing.

The major reason for Security Council inaction was the criticism and opposition by the United States. Rwanda became the first application of President Clinton's admonition in an address to the United Nations on September 27, 1993, that the UN must learn "when to say no." The UN needed to ask "hard questions" before sending peacekeeping forces to any additional sites, and it must recognize that it "cannot become engaged in every one of the world's conflicts."<sup>12</sup> The United States would only agree to a UN resolution that authorized sending a new force once Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali had reported back on various conditions adapted from those recently established for itself by the US administration, some of which are patently unachievable in the real world, or cannot be realistically determined in advance.

Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) was formally issued in May 1994, and listed seven factors that the US government would consider if required to vote on peace operations in the UN Security Council, six additional and more stringent factors to consider if the participation of US forces was involved, and three final factors if the US forces might be engaged in combat: 16 considerations in all. The document (drafting of which originally began in February 1993 as PRD-13) underwent a most extraordinary evolution from US Ambassador Madeleine Albright's statement of June 1993 on "assertive multilateralism." Instead, it evolved into a policy of stringent conditionality after the small number of casualties suffered by US forces in Somalia. This development was in large part a consequence of the



panicked and hasty US retreat from Somalia. Rwanda became the second and direct casualty of that event.

The great likelihood is that these conditions will most often be used to rationalize inaction, which is unquestionably their effect to date. *New York Times* editorials applauded the US "prudence."<sup>13</sup> Although she was not herself altogether in agreement with the administration's Rwanda policy, US Ambassador Madeleine Albright presented a disingenuous defense of the US opposition in a TV performance [on the MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour (PBS)] on May 19. She claimed that the United States was only "trying to help" the UN by calling for delay and reexamination<sup>14</sup> A secondary US consideration was the 30 percent of the UN peacekeeping costs that the US would have to bear for any new peacekeeping deployment while the US was already grossly in arrears for past assessments. US National Security Council officials stated that US involvement in Rwanda was "...not in our national interest," and that all UN forces should be withdrawn.<sup>15</sup> Up to late April, the US administration's position was to get the UN Security Council to approximate the strictures of PDD-25; after that, the US did put forward a military scheme for the disposition of a UNAMIR force that was an alternative to that favored by General Dallaire.

At some time during this period, General Dallaire also requested that the US military should jam the broadcasts of the Radio des Milles Collines, the radio station that the Hutu government had been using for months and continued to use during the genocide to urge and encourage Hutu to kill Tutsi, even identifying particular prominent individuals who should be killed. The jamming could have been carried out in complete

safety from an aircraft flying at high altitude, and it was a technical capability that US forces maintained. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense rejected the request.

On May 11, the Secretary-General formally asked that the new plan be approved, and on May 17, a Security Council resolution was finally passed. By this time senior aid officials in Rwanda were quoting a figure of half a million dead. After mid-May, the leaders of the genocide called on those doing the killing not to spare women and children. The Hutu army and militia additionally found time to rape thousands of women, at times directly after killing their families, at times killing them as well afterwards, and on other occasions, leaving them alive to face extended periods of rape.<sup>16</sup> On May 25, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali announced his defeat and failure in attempting to raise the contributions of military forces from UN member nations that would be necessary in order to fulfill the just-approved Security Council resolution. During all these weeks, the US government had instructed its spokesmen "not to describe the deaths there as genocide, even though some senior officials believe that is exactly what they represent."<sup>17</sup> Obviously, had US administration spokesmen openly referred to "genocide," it would have been more difficult to simply stand aside and watch the slaughter continue. Two days later (May 27), President Clinton met with the UN Secretary-General and declined to commit any US forces to Rwanda. In a Memorial Day address to the American public, Clinton stated, "...we cannot dispatch our troops to solve every problem where our values are offended by human misery, and we should not." He repeated the same sentiments almost verbatim

in a second Memorial weekend address at the US Naval Academy: "We cannot solve every such outburst of civil strife or militant nationalism simply by sending in our forces."<sup>18</sup> In contrast, as a presidential candidate in 1992, Clinton had said, "If the horrors of the Holocaust taught us anything, it is the high cost of remaining silent and paralyzed in the face of genocide." Only two years later, less than two dozen US casualties in Somalia had untaught him that lesson. The "high cost," the exchange ratio in 1994 for the US casualties in Somalia, was upwards of 800,000 Rwandan lives.

On June 3, the leaders of fourteen African states, stung by the UN Secretary-General's description of the situation as "a scandal," offered to send troop contingents--at some indeterminate time, after they were armed, supplied, etc., including, in one case, a request for 200 artillery pieces for a contingent of 1,000 men. On its side, the US Department of Defense consumed weeks in disputing with the UN the level of repayment that it should receive for supplying 50 armored personnel carriers. In mid-June it was still demanding that it be reimbursed \$15 million for the shipping costs to and from Rwanda, spare parts, etc. Estimates of those dead had now reached 500,000, even 800,000.<sup>19</sup> The 50 US vehicles did not arrive until mid-July.

In mid-June 1994, as the Rwandan Hutu government in Kigali that had carried out the genocide was nearing total collapse, the French government announced plans to dispatch 2,500 troops to Rwanda for humanitarian purposes. There was substantial skepticism expressed in the Security Council regarding French motives. The criticism was justified, both of past French support for the Hutu government and the

role that French forces might play while in Rwanda. However, had those nations who had been critical in the Security Council each agreed to send a contingent along with the French troops, the latter would not have had a free hand to support the government yet again. The description in a Human Rights Report in May 1995 said the following:

In June, the Security Council, having failed to find volunteers for a multinational force, authorized French military intervention in Rwanda, codenamed Operation Turquoise. French troops entered Rwanda ostensibly for humanitarian purposes, but soon moved beyond U.N. authorization to carve out a "safe zone" in the country's southwest. The U.N. then "took note" of the zone's existence, in effect giving it its blessing. It was to this zone that the Rwandan government forces, defeated by the RPF in Kigali, fled, along with the militias and much of the Hutu population. Under French protection, the militias were able to continue to incite Hutu to kill Tutsi, as they managed to bring along their radio station, and indeed the French permitted the genocide to continue in the areas under their control for about a week. They then began taking effective measures to protect the Tutsi, but they refused to take the next step of arresting the authorities, civilian and military, who had been carrying out the genocide. In fact, as the RPF pressed onward to victory, the French facilitated the departure of some of these

authorities from their zone to Zaire and continued to provide them with support and transport in Zaire.<sup>20</sup>

On July 20, with a cholera epidemic spreading among a portion of the three to four million Hutu refugees who had fled following the victory of the Rwanda Patriotic Front, some for fear of retribution for the months of slaughtering Tutsi and other Hutus but the greater number apparently forced along by the retreating army and militia, USAID Administrator Brian Atwood recommended that the UN now dispatch a large peacekeeping force. President Clinton asked for \$320 million of emergency relief funds, and, on July 22, suggested sending 4,000 US troops to the area, but primarily to the refugee camps in Zaire, rather than inside Rwanda. The governments of Britain, Canada, and Australia committed small contingents for humanitarian assistance missions also, before the United States did, but except for some of the Canadians, these troops did not reach the area until after US forces had arrived. The UN Secretary-General and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees stated that there were eight tasks which were beyond their capacity and those of the voluntary agencies to carry out, and the United States obligated itself to carry out four of them.<sup>21</sup> Now the *New York Times* editorial headline was "At Last, Rwanda's Pain Registers."<sup>22</sup> All of this four months after the troops and money could have prevented the catastrophe in the first place.

Nevertheless, US officials from the President on down remained adamant that the US military forces deployed to the area would be engaged only in humanitarian relief activities and would not do any

"peacekeeping." US Secretary of Defense Perry [interviewed on MacNeil-Lehrer, July 27,1994] explained that the United States military had "unique capabilities" for airlift and logistics--but not for peacekeeping: "It would not be the best use of our forces."<sup>23</sup> It was on this occasion that Perry also provided the US government estimate of four million Rwandan refugees. Four days later, while visiting the refugee camp in Goma, Perry explained that "The United States does not have combat forces here, therefore we are not providing peacekeeping" [National Public Radio, July 31, 1994.]<sup>24</sup> That was obvious. The combat forces were not there because they had not been ordered to be there by the President or by Secretary of Defense Perry. At the very moment that Perry was speaking, 2,000 first-line US Marine and Army personnel had been ordered to fight forest fires in Washington state.<sup>25</sup> The armed forces of the United States, the world's most thoroughly equipped, trained and ready military force, were suddenly unqualified for performing peacekeeping duties, and were only uniquely capable of logistics.

As of September 1994, the US Senate was only willing to authorize \$170 million of the \$320 million that President Clinton had asked for. In addition, the Senate wrote into the legislation the provision that all US forces had to be withdrawn from Rwanda by October 1 unless Congress specifically approved a longer stay.<sup>26</sup> As the US troops began to be withdrawn from the area, it became known that the Department of Defense had decided not to carry out some of the four tasks that the US administration had publicly announced that it would assume on behalf of the United Nations and the UN High Commissioner for

Refugees.<sup>27</sup> This was corroborated by an internal US administration evaluation of the mission.

As for Mobutu's government in Zaire, it did nothing to disarm the 40,000 soldiers of the former Hutu government's army that were on its territory and in the large refugee camps in Zaire. In fact, quite the opposite. An arms embargo had been announced by the UN Security Council on May 14, 1994. Nevertheless, France and Zaire continued to arm the government forces, first in Rwanda, and then in Zaire. The Hutu forces took over control of the refugee camps and actively prevented Hutu refugees from returning to Rwanda, to the point of actually carrying out small-scale massacres of Hutu refugees in order to enforce their control by terror.<sup>28</sup> UN human rights monitors had no access to the camps, in fact could not travel there for lack of security, while they were able to report on summary retribution against Hutu in the area surrounding the Rwandan capital. In October and November 1994, it became known that voluntary aid agencies distributing food in the refugee camps in Zaire did so by delivering the aid into the hands of the Interahamwe, the killers of several months before, and even paid these troops to do the food distribution.<sup>29</sup> By way of analogy, one should imagine the allied nations in Europe in 1946 and 1947 delivering UNRRA aid to displaced persons camps under the control of unreconstituted and armed German SS troops that had managed extermination concentration camps a few years before. Incomparable national and international irresponsibility and incompetence was stubbornly maintained to the very last moment. Several prominent NGOs withdrew from the camps when they realized the consequences of their

continued assistance to the Hutu military, but the majority stayed on and thereby perpetuated the control of the Hutu armed forces.

The first provisional budget drawn up by the UN authorities for the UNAMIR force mandated for Rwanda was estimated in August 1994 at \$37 million. This was revised to \$100 million in September 1994. As of November 13, a budget had still not been agreed upon by the UN General Assembly. Presuming that a force of this size had been mandated and deployed in April at the very outset of the genocide, the US financial responsibility--at 30 percent of the total peacekeeping assessment--would have been \$30 million. As of November 7, 1994, the US alone had spent \$237 million in support of humanitarian assistance in the Rwandan emergency, or roughly eight times more than its peacekeeping assessment would have been. Had a peacekeeping mission under Chapter 7 authority been immediately deployed, many or most of those killed might have been saved, a massive refugee exodus averted, and the destructive consequences to many future decades of Rwandan politics and intercommunal strife possibly also averted. Estimates are that emergency assistance to Rwanda by all OECD states--the United States included--exceeded \$1 billion for calendar year 1994, with none of the deaths and other longer-term consequences averted.

## II.

A series of invited meetings and conferences took place between mid-1995 and early 1996 designed to review the events that took place in Rwanda before and during the Genocide. Various of these meetings



were attended by General Dallaire, by members of the United States Department of State, the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the National Security Council and members of the UN Secretary-General's office, as well as by researchers.

In addition, two excellent book-length studies, as well as other reports and monographs, became available. These are Gérard Prunier's The Rwandan Crisis: History of a Genocide<sup>30</sup> and an internationally sponsored report, Lessons From the Rwandan Experience, an unprecedented joint evaluation undertaken by 20 donor governments, including the United States, and 18 international humanitarian agencies.<sup>31</sup> A summary of the multi-donor report prepared by the US Committee for Refugees begins with the following paragraph,

The report concludes that the United Nations Secretariat misinterpreted the first weeks of killings in Rwanda, that France continued to send arms to Rwanda after the genocide started, and that the United States bears special responsibility for the international community's failure to respond to the genocide. The report indicates that the then-U.S. ambassador to Rwanda downplayed the threat that Rwanda's hate radio posed to public safety. The evaluation concludes that early media coverage of the genocide, particularly in The New York Times, was generally "irresponsible."<sup>32</sup>

This constitutes a rather striking substantiation of the argument presented in the preceding pages, which were originally written and

published in the fall of 1994.

In the course of the meetings during 1995 and 1996 referred to above, three extremely significant pieces of information became available which amplified this analysis still further. They are as follows:

(1) Some time in the first month or two of 1994, a senior officer of the Interahamwe militia approached General Dallaire, the UNAMIR commander, and provided him with the following information:

- The Interahamwe militia were distributing and stockpiling weapons.
- They were exercising--practicing--the procedures to be followed for a genocide, and had calculated that they would be able to carry out killings at the rate of 10,000 people per hour.
- They had drawn up lists of those to be killed, which included Hutu members of the government and politicians who favored carrying out the Arusha Accords.

General Dallaire cabled this information to the Office of the Secretary-General at UN headquarters in New York, as well as a request by the Interahamwe informer that the UN bring him and his family out of Rwanda, and provide them with safe haven. (General Dallaire's cable has since become available to researchers.) Officials in the UN Secretary-General's office did not think that the information was reliable or that it should be acted upon in any way. They rejected the specific request for safe haven for the informant. A copy of the cable also reached officials in the US Department of State. It sat on the desk

of an Assistant Secretary for approximately one month before he read it, and when he did, although the Department of State accepted that some level of killing might eventually take place, he also judged the information contained in the cable to be "out of the ball park," that is, not credible. Local Rwandan human rights activists had also learned of these lists of names of people to be killed, and were telling Western diplomats and visitors of them. There was no reaction.

(2) General Dallaire also requested authority from the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations to have UNAMIR collect the weapons from the locations at which they were being deposited by the Rwandan government for the Interahamwe. The request was denied. There is no indication that the question was put to the members of the Security Council.

(3) In the last days of February and the beginning of March 1994, a USAID assessment mission was in Kigali, the capital of Rwanda. In several days of discussions with UNAMIR staff and with Rwandans, they obtained a general--and correct--understanding of what was taking place and became apprehensive of the danger of an outbreak of killing similar to that which had taken place in Burundi only a few months before. They returned to the US Embassy and suggested to the ambassador that they should discuss these developments, with a view to devising initiatives for the US government to intervene in what was otherwise taking place unimpeded. The US ambassador, sympathetic to the Hutu government, directed them to drop the issue and to summarily

return to Washington, which they did.

Subsequent developments have also borne out the error made by the UNHCR, which was touched on earlier, namely to maintain the refugee camps in Zaire, and in particular, to permit the former Hutu military to play a role in managing the camps and acting as the receivers and distributors of food aid. On July 23, 1994, the Economist published a letter from Alain Destexhe, the Secretary-General of Médecins Sans Frontières, who wrote:

In the 1980s, the Khmers Rouges were allowed to shelter in (and in some cases administer) the refugee camps on the Thai border. This tactic must not be allowed in Rwanda, or those responsible for the genocide will never be made to answer for their crimes--a fact that will be borne in mind by other potential tyrants.<sup>33</sup>

Yet, only one month later, that was precisely what was done. The decisions were made by the UNHCR in August 1994, and although recognized as errors within a few months, they were never undone, and led directly to the events of October and November 1996. For two years the former Hutu military dominated and terrorized the refugee camps and killed refugees desiring to return to Rwanda. What is more, permitted to rearm by the government of Zaire and permitted to profit from incoming aid, they mounted cross-border raids into both Rwanda and Burundi to kill Tutsi, and even began killing Hutu villagers inside Rwanda who either remained or returned to Rwanda and were willing to

seek accommodation with the new government. It also became clear that the massive exodus of Hutu in 1994 was not altogether spontaneous, but was in large part forced by the Hutu army and the Interahamwe as they retreated into Zaire.

An internal UNHCR report of June 1996 stated that

...the refugee population continues to be under the influence of the ex-leaders who organized their exodus, and find their own interest in keeping hostage a population that protects them against prosecution and serves as a justification for their objective of regaining power.<sup>34</sup>

The Hutu military even joined the Zairian armed forces to begin killing Tutsi who had settled in past centuries in the Masisi border region of Zaire.

International humanitarian law in fact requires the separation of combatants from refugees, and it is a violation of such law to supply humanitarian assistance to combatants.<sup>35</sup> This had been disregarded in the case of Cambodia, and it was disregarded again in the Rwandan case. The UNHCR itself did not have the means or the responsibility to separate armed combatants, but their repeated requests to the UN Security Council to perform the separation were rejected. The Secretary-General asked between 60 and 70 nations to provide troops for a UN force to distribute food in the refugee camps. All but one country declined, and that one country said it would consider the matter. The OAU did nothing. Part III of the International Response to

Conflict and Genocide commented that

Both inside Rwanda and in the camps of Goma, the humanitarian community was left to steer its own course, attempting to substitute for the lack of political and military action. At times, particularly in relation to the repatriation of refugees from Goma, this course was influenced by Western political figures...A key lesson, then, is that humanitarian action cannot serve as a substitute for political, diplomatic, and where necessary, military action.<sup>36</sup>

In November 1995, in the "Cairo Declaration," Zaire promised that it would prevent armed groups from operating in its territory and that it would remove "intimidators" from the refugee camps. In alliance with the former Hutu government, Zaire of course did nothing of the kind; in fact, it did precisely the opposite. Exactly a year later, in November 1996, the Human Rights Watch Arms Project released information contained in the Third Report of the UN International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda), which the UN Security Council had been withholding for months and would not publish. The report concluded that "...arms have continued to flow to the former Rwandan government forces, often from or through South Africa, Angola, Eastern Europe and the former Yugoslavia, and Kinshasa, Zaire."<sup>37</sup> Only a few days later, it became known that a British company had also sold arms to the Hutu forces in Zaire through a network of companies and officials in Zaire, Nigeria, Kenya, Israel, Eastern Europe, the Bahamas, and Egypt.<sup>38</sup> All were

guilty of violating the UN arms embargo. An earlier Human Rights Watch report in 1995 provided evidence that France and Zaire were the major arms suppliers to the Hutu forces. When the US, Germany and the UK had suggested in 1995 in the UN Security Council that UN monitors be stationed at Zaire's borders and airports to see that the arms embargo was not violated, Zaire's President Mobutu rejected the proposal as "an infringement of Zaire's sovereignty."

The cost of maintaining the Rwandan refugees for two years was estimated at \$1 million per day, or \$700-750 million between the fall of 1994 and the fall of 1996.<sup>39</sup> (\$750 million is equal to the sum of US development assistance to Africa--excluding Egypt--for a year.) During a UNHCR conference in July 1996, an excellent paper written by its own former Special Envoy for Rwanda reviewed the problem of relocating the refugee camps in Zaire to locations no more than 20 miles away inside Rwanda.<sup>40</sup> But the senior officials of the UNHCR could never bring themselves to take the step of simply ending food distribution in the existing camps, and announcing that it would henceforth be available 20 miles to the east. Such a step was considered a violation of the principle of "nonrefoulement," prohibiting the forcible repatriation of refugees as set out in the 1951 UN Refugee Convention. As for the UN War Crimes Tribunal that was supposed to bring to justice those who had carried out the genocide, it has been an absolute mockery. Following Operation Turquoise, France flew the most senior Hutu government officials who fled into Zaire further to locations in Cameroon and other African countries, and even to France.<sup>41</sup> Neither France nor any African country has responded to requests to extradite these

individuals. As of the end of 1996, proceedings had been initiated against only a single individual, and repeatedly postponed by defense maneuvers amid charges that the entire process was being impeded by the senior UN administrator.<sup>42</sup>

In mid-October 1996 fighting broke out in Eastern Zaire in the area immediately adjacent to the Rwandan Hutu refugee camps. Rwandan troops and irregular forces of the Banyamulenge, the resident Zairian Tutsi, attacked the Hutu regulars and Interahamwe guarding and operating from the camps. With fighting already in progress, and after two years of the situation described above, UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali's response was to appoint a temporary special representative with the task of preparing "emergency plans," to be delivered in one month's time. France campaigned fiercely in the UN Security Council for an international intervention force that would maintain the status quo: the international force should not disarm Hutu, should not separate armed Hutu from refugees, and there should be no forcible repatriation of refugees.<sup>43</sup> The combination of the obvious self-serving expediency of the French proposals, ongoing combat, and the antagonism of both Zaire and the attacking forces led to a deadlock. The situation was nevertheless resolved within two weeks by a military victory of the Rwandan and Banyamulenge forces, which concomitantly freed the greater part of the Hutu population in the camps from their captors, emptying some 40 refugee camps. The immediate result was a massive self-repatriation of more than two-thirds of the Hutu refugees, who walked back into Rwanda.<sup>44</sup> It made obvious the fact that they had been held captive for the two preceding years, rather than that they



had avoided returning for fear of retribution. In addition, a substantial number of the refugees that did not return were forcibly moved westward further into Zaire by the retreating Hutu military.

### III.

There is one significant difference between Rwanda and Burundi: In Burundi, the Hutu and Tutsi have been killing each other, although not in equal numbers in each instance. In Barnett Rubin's phrase, "Burundi is a tangled bloody mess of fear and distrust"--and continuous killing for three years. The official policy of the US Department of State is that genocide is being committed by both sides in Burundi.<sup>45</sup> Also in contrast to Rwanda, the Tutsi minority in Burundi had maintained control of the army and government since independence. Hutu-Tutsi conflict did not occur in colonial or precolonial Burundi. The traditional society was well integrated, and violent conflict between the two groups did not begin until 1965, although it reached catastrophic proportions almost immediately afterwards.<sup>46</sup>

In free elections in June 1993, the majority Hutu succeeded in electing a Hutu president. However, he was killed four months later in a failed coup attempt by a faction of the Tutsi military, on October 21, 1993. This unleashed a wave of killing of Tutsi by Hutu. In the weeks that followed, Tutsi military killed Hutu in retaliation. Within three months, 50,000 to 200,000 people were killed, and 600,000 to 800,000 fled the country as refugees. (The US Department of State variously quoted both the low and the high figure for the number killed.) The

population of Burundi, at the end of 1994 had been 6.1 million. In the week after the wave of killings began, James Jonah, UN Under-Secretary General, described Burundi "...as precisely the kind of conflict where the United Nations expects and has been expected to intervene."

However, in a UN Security Council meeting, "US Ambassador Albright made clear that the United States would oppose any UN peacekeeping operation in Burundi," and the Security Council rejected proposals to send UN troops.<sup>47</sup>

In the course of the year that followed, civil war developed in Burundi.<sup>48</sup> The Tutsi population was more concentrated in the capital; the Hutu predominated in the countryside. Reprisal attacks followed each other in succession with each side killing members of the opposite group in the areas in which they predominated, leading to further internal migration of those who survived. Civilians of both sides were the ones killed. Hutu irregular forces operated from bases and staging areas in Zaire, and received their arms from Zaire and the exiled Rwandan Hutu military operating in Zaire. They carried out sabotage against major infrastructure facilities in Burundi in addition to killing Tutsi civilians. Once again, a "hate radio" operated, from locations in Zaire, ironically calling itself the "Voice of Democracy."

Following the mid-1994 genocide in Rwanda, there was no lack of warning of the likelihood of an analogous possibility in Burundi. In fact there was an unceasing succession of warnings. The press was full of them.<sup>49</sup> Early in 1995, even the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative in Burundi publicly warned that a repeat of the Rwandan genocide could take place in Burundi, a position that was repeated a

year later in a confidential report to the UN Security Council by the Secretary-General. By early 1996, the estimates of the numbers being killed reached 100 per day--a rate of 36,500 per year--although these rates apparently dropped later in the year. In mid-1996, the rate of killing was perhaps "hundreds per week," and Barnett Rubin commented "If the international community cannot stand against this, what does it stand for?" The most frequent statistic quoted towards the end of 1996 was 150,000 killed in the preceding three years, including those killed in the immediate aftermath of the October 1993 coup attempt.

When the United Nations did develop proposals in August 1994 to deploy a peacekeeping force in Burundi, they were rejected by Burundi's military and political leaders.<sup>50</sup> That set a pattern which persisted for the next two and one-half years, while the civil war and killing continued. The more hardline, "extremist" factions among the Tutsi political parties in particular resisted any suggestion of a UN intervention force. Repeated attempts at mediation by UN officials, by OAU officials, and by Presidents Nyerere and Carter all failed.

The reason for the persistent deadlock was a total opposition of political goals of the two sides. The Hutu majority had been denied its rights and sought political power. The minority Tutsi-led Army and political parties--and the extremist elements within them even more so--were determined that they should not get it. They argued, at least after April 1994, that if they should relinquish control of the government and the military, the Hutu would massacre the Tutsis as they had in Rwanda. Following the October 1993 coup attempt and the massacres that followed them, a superficial power-sharing agreement had

been agreed to. A Hutu succeeded the assassinated Hutu President, while the Prime Minister was a Tutsi. However, the President's powers were substantially curtailed. In all the discussions regarding intervention in the next two years, the two sides of the government took opposite positions. The Tutsi Army and Prime Minister consistently opposed any intervention force, but additionally argued that if one ever materialized, its role should be to seal off the Hutu insurgents in Zaire. The Hutu military groups fighting from Zaire also opposed any intervention force. The Hutu President favored international intervention, and wanted it to stop the massacres by the Army.

The government was paralyzed, and domestic political participants were given to saying that only they could solve Burundi's problems. But, of course, they had not been able to and they could not. Neither side would compromise, and most moderates on both sides were in exile, since their lives were in jeopardy inside Burundi. Foreign aid to Burundi had been cut by the United States and the European Union as a means of pressuring the government, but to no avail. In July 1996, the Tutsi military toppled the Hutu President, and the OAU instituted Africa-wide economic sanctions on Burundi, to which even Rwanda formally acceded. Zaire continued to support the Hutu military groups.

In December 1995, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali suggested that the UN station a preventive force in Zaire that should be ready to intervene in Burundi. In February 1996, he urged the UN Security Council to consider creating a standby multinational force of up to 25,000 troops that would be ready to intervene in Burundi under Chapter 7 authority.<sup>51</sup> The United States said that it would not provide

ground troops for such a force, and would only provide airlift and logistical support. France opposed any intervention force whatsoever for Burundi. In May 1996 Boutros-Ghali submitted a report to the UN Security Council which called for a UN member nation to act as the "lead country" to organize his earlier proposed intervention force. The US rejected that role as well, saying that the UN peacekeeping department should do the planning and not a member nation.<sup>52</sup> In July, six regional heads of state, including those of Burundi and Rwanda, met and agreed on a vague proposal to introduce a military and police force into Burundi in the hope that the killings would then stop and peace talks could begin. There was no agreement on the size or mission of the proposed force.<sup>53</sup> By late August, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali recommended that a force of 50,000 be assembled to intervene in Burundi. At the same time, he acknowledged in a report to the Security Council that he had approached 50 nations asking them to lead the force or to contribute to it. Only 21 had replied; 11 to decline, and of the remaining 10, only three offered troops.<sup>54</sup> UN officials said that South Africa, with the continent's largest and best-equipped army, had not responded to repeated requests to lead or join the force.<sup>55</sup>

With neither the United States nor any European country willing to commit troops for an intervention force to be used in African conflicts, the United States then proposed an African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) of 10,000 troops to intervene in Africa's recurrent crises, with Burundi as its first application. The US would supply airlift and half the costs, but the plan could only come to pass with European (the European Union, probably most particularly French) and African

approval and support. The US government sent a team to Africa to attempt to get troop commitments from eight African nations, and another team to European capitals to solicit support.<sup>56</sup>

When US Secretary of State Christopher toured Africa in October 1996, he continued to seek support for the US proposal. The response was negative.<sup>57</sup> After over a year of discussions dealing with one or another proposal for an intervention force, President Mandela responded with some irritation, saying that the US had "surprised" the Africans with its sudden proposal, and that "he would have preferred to see the idea launched by the Africans themselves."<sup>58</sup> In addition, he thought that it would be better if an intervention force were organized by the UN and not by the US. The OAU, in which President Mandela had been the most influential figure in the preceding year, had of course made no offer of such an initiative in response to the UN Secretary-General's repeated pleas and proposals. An OAU proposal in 1994 to deploy several hundred armed observers was rejected by the Tutsi military and political leadership. In March 1995, the OAU itself rejected calls for an armed intervention in favor of diplomatic efforts. Since then, the OAU has had a 50-member human rights observer team in Burundi "to monitor the situation and help restore confidence." They have been totally inconsequential.

In early November, the US claimed that it had found seven "potential" African troop contributors and six Western co-funders for the proposed ACRF. At the end of November, President Mandela stated that South Africa "was ready to give any assistance required"--but only if regional leaders established the demand.<sup>59</sup> An estimated 10,000

additional civilians were estimated to have been killed between the coup on July 25, 1996 and the 90 days to the end of October. At the year's end, the civil war in Burundi continued.

#### IV.

The number of people who were murdered in Rwanda is now variously estimated at between 800,000 and "up to one million," in a period of three short months.<sup>60</sup> It is estimated that the core of Rwandans Hutu officials who planned and organized the genocide numbers between 100 and 300.<sup>61</sup> Estimates of the number of individuals who actually took part in the killings range from 100,000 to 250,000; they even included women.<sup>62</sup> Those who carried out the genocide systematically strove to involve as many as they could in the actual killings.

Much, if not all, was foreseen, and forewarned. The "international community" chose to do nothing, including after the Genocide had started, and while it was in progress. It is astonishing that major Western nations are willing to accept financial costs for humanitarian aid after the killing has taken place that are ten times higher than would be required to mount an early military intervention to prevent the killing, in order not to incur domestic political costs associated with deploying military forces. It is for that reason, in fact, that "Never Again" becomes "Again and Again."

A senior UNHCR official commented in mid-1996 that the UNHCR has no financial problems, as "...we are the fig leaf for nations not to do

anything: countries give [us] the money 'to save peoples' lives'....There is no political will in the international community to deal with Rwanda or Burundi." Eighty percent of the assistance for "Rwanda" was spent in Zaire; the refugee camps, a haven and recruiting ground for the Hutu military, were supported and maintained by UN agencies. The Burundi situation festered for two years, again with no international action. The senior legal advisor to the US permanent representative to the United Nations commented that "Amazingly, genocide has become a growth industry."<sup>63</sup>

MILTON LEITENBERG is a Senior Fellow at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland. He has worked on arms control and international security issues since the fall of 1966, fifteen years of that period in Sweden. Trained as a scientist, he was the first American recruited to work at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in 1968. Alongside the more traditional issues of arms control, he has from the beginning devoted part of his work to issues of ongoing wars, conflicts, and military interventions. Currently, he is writing a book on humanitarian intervention with the support of a grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.



## NOTES

1. Rwanda: Accountability for War Crimes and Genocide. A Report on a United States Institute of Peace Conference, Washington, DC, n.d.
2. John Prendergast, "Multi-Layered Conflict in the Greater Horn of Africa," Creative Associates International, April 1996. See also the writings of Catherine Newbury, René Lemarchand, and Gérard Prunier, some of which are cited below.
3. Roger Morris et al., *Passing By: The United States and Genocide in Burundi*, 1972, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1973.
4. René Lemarchand and David Martin, Selective Genocide in Burundi, London, Minority Rights Group, 1974.
5. Mary Gray and Sarah Milburn Moore, "Next Arena for Genocide?", *The Washington Post*, August 24, 1994; "The Great Fear in Burundi" [editorial], *New York Times*, August 23, 1994. In April 1995, the US Department of State used the figure of "50,000 or more."
6. "Genocide in Rwanda, April-May 1994," Human Rights Watch, Africa, 6(4) May 1994, 13 pages, mimeographed.
7. UNAMIR was created by UN Security Council Resolution 872, on October 5, 1993, and it deployed its first personnel on November 1, 1993. It evolved from UNOMUR, the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda. There had also been an OAU Neutral Military Observer Group, NMOG I, made up of 50 men from OAU member states, between July 1992 and July 1993, and NMOG II, 132 OAU member-state personnel after August 1993 which was absorbed by UNAMIR. The funds to support the two OAU NMOGs were supplied by the United States.
8. UN Security Council Resolution 909, April 5, 1994.
9. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, letter to the President of the UN Security Council, April 13, 1994.  
The Secretary-General must also have spelled out more detailed options in Security Council discussions, as his report of April 20 suggests:  
"The Council will recall that in response to its request I presented, on 14 April, two broad alternatives for dealing with this highly unstable and unpredictable state of affairs in Rwanda. Both options were predicated on the establishment of a cease-fire, without which it would be impossible for UNAMIR to continue to perform its responsibilities under its present mandate.  
"The first option was to retain UNAMIR at a reduced strength (that is, without the Belgian contingent) for a limited period of three or four weeks following the cease-fire. The parties would have been required to reach agreement on the restoration of the Arusha process within this period, in which case UNAMIR would resume its role under its mandate. Otherwise, UNAMIR would

resume its role under its mandate. Otherwise UNAMIR would be withdrawn in its totality.

"The second option, following the cease-fire, was to withdraw the bulk of UNAMIR, leaving my Special Representative and the Force Commander in Kigali to act as intermediaries for political negotiations for an indefinite period, subject to review by the Security Council, rather than the limited period envisaged in the first alternative. In order to ensure the security of this United Nations team, about 200 to 300 United Nations military personnel would also have remained in Kigali.

"The two options above were not mutually exclusive. If the efforts under the first had failed to succeed by the end of the stipulated period, it would have been possible to move to the second scenario, instead of withdrawing UNAMIR in its totality."

"Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda," UN Security Council, S/1994/470, April 20, 1994.

10. Speaking to the Africa Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, on June 16 1994, Solomon Gomez, deputy permanent observer of the OAU to the UN, explained that the OAU could not intervene since it was prohibited from doing so by the UN Charter. The UN Charter does precisely the opposite, and explicitly states that regional security organizations may take action under their own charters before the United Nations does or considers doing so.

11. "In the critical situation that continues to prevail, a decision must be reached on whether, and if so, how, the United Nations will maintain its efforts to help a people who have fallen into calamitous circumstances. I offer three alternatives for the Council's consideration.

"Alternative I.

The first alternative is predicated on the conclusion, described above, that there is no realistic prospect of the two opposing forces agreeing on an effective cease-fire in the immediate future. Without a cease-fire, combat between them will continue and so will the lawlessness and the massacres of civilians. This situation could only be changed by the immediate and massive reinforcement of UNAMIR and a change in its mandate so that it would be equipped and authorized to coerce the opposing forces into a cease-fire, and to attempt to restore law and order and put an end to the killings. This would also make possible the provision and distribution of humanitarian assistance by humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations not only in the capital, but in other parts of the country where the population has been displaced or subjected to deprivation as a result of the violence. Further, the restoration of stability in Rwanda would assist in preventing the repercussions of the violence from spreading to neighbouring countries and leading to regional instability. This scenario would require several thousand additional troops and UNAMIR may have to be given enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

....

"Alternative II. The second alternative would be an amended form of the second option presented to the Security Council on 14 April. In this scenario,

a small group headed by the Force Commander, with necessary staff, would remain in Kigali to act as intermediary between the two parties in an attempt to bring them to an agreement on a cease-fire,, this effort being maintained for a period of up to two weeks or longer, should the Council so prefer. Additional tasks would include assistance in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the extent feasible in this situation. UNAMIR has received assurances from both sides that they will cooperate in such operations, though there can be no certainty that this will be done.

"16. The team would require the support of an infantry company to provide security, as well as a number of military observers to monitor the situation, apart from civilian staff, the total being estimated at about 270. The remainder of UNAMIR personnel would be withdrawn, but UNAMIR, as a mission, would continue to exist. The Special Representative, with a small staff, would continue his efforts to resume his role as intermediary in the political negotiations, with the aim of bringing back the two sides to the Arusha peace process.

"The arrangements outlined above could be terminated at any moment should it appear that the parties were not cooperating at a political level, or if their activities compromised the safety and security of the UNAMIR group in Kigali.

"The parties are being reminded that, although the United Nations system and humanitarian agencies already have geared up to provide humanitarian relief and assistance, only a limited amount could be distributed in the scenario outlined above. A full relief effort would be impossible without a cease-fire.

"Alternative III. The third alternative, which I do not favour, would be the complete withdrawal of UNAMIR. If the Security Council were to decide on this option, every effort would be made by UNAMIR to obtain commitments from the two sides that they would take measures to ensure the safety of civilians in the areas under their respective control. However, in view of the extreme nature and dimensions of the violence and mass killings over the last two weeks, there is little ground for hope that effective commitments could be obtained and it must be kept in mind that the consequences of complete withdrawal, in terms of human lives lost, could be very severe indeed. There could also be similar repercussions in neighbouring countries where citizens of the ethnic groups found in Rwanda reside."

S/1994/470, op. cit., paragraphs 12-19.

12. "Clinton said that in U.N. Security Council deliberations lately, the United States had begun asking tougher questions about new peacekeeping missions, such as: 'Is there a real threat to international peace? Does the proposed mission have clear objectives? Can an end point be identified...? How much will the mission cost?

" 'From now on, the United Nations should address these and other hard questions for every proposed mission before we vote and before the mission begins,' Clinton said. 'The United Nations simply cannot become engaged in every one of the world's conflicts.' " Ruth Marcus, "Clinton Seeks Limits on Peace Keeping," *The Washington Post*, September 28, 1993.

It is interesting to note that with such criteria requiring answers in

advance, the United States would never have entered World War II had it not been attacked first.

13. "Horror in Rwanda, Shame in the UN," *New York Times*, May 3, 1994; "Look Before Plunging Into Rwanda," *New York Times*, May 18, 1994. When the *New York Times* finally published a guest editorial sharply critical of the US administration's "prudence" that it had been supporting, it published two additional editorials reaffirming its own position, one on the same day and on the prior day.
14. MacNeil-Lehrer interview with US Ambassador Madeleine Albright, PBS-TV, May 19, 1994.
15. Alison des Forges, Lecture, "The Tragedy of Rwanda and Burundi," US Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, D.C., August 11, 1994.
16. Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence During the Rwandan Genocide and Its Aftermath, Human Rights Watch Africa, September 1996; James C. McKinley Jr., "Legacy of Rwanda Violence: The Thousands Born of Rape," *New York Times*, September 23, 1996.
17. "Officials Told to Avoid Calling Rwanda Killings Genocide," *New York Times*, June 10, 1994.
18. Douglas Jehl, "US Policy: A Mistake; Tragedy for Rwanda Seen as Preventable," *New York Times*, July 23, 1994.
19. "Preliminary Report of the Independent Commission of Experts Established in Accordance with Security Council Resolution 935 (1994)," UN Security Council, S/1994/1125, October 4, 1994, para. 43.
20. Joost Hiltermann, "Human Rights Abuses and Arms Trafficking: Successes and Frustrations in Sounding the Alarm in Central Africa," Washington, D.C., Human Rights Watch, November 14, 1996, unpublished paper, pp. 6-7. See also, Rwanda/Zaire: Rearming with Impunity; International Support for the Perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide, Human Rights Watch Arms Project, vol. 7, No. 4 (May 1995); Arming Rwanda: The Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in the Rwandan War, Human Rights Watch Arms Project, vol. 6, No. 1 (January 1994); and S.D. Goose and F. Smyth, "Arming Genocide in Rwanda," *Foreign Affairs* 73:5 (September-October 1994), pp. 85-96.
21. The eight specific tasks were:
  - "1. airport maintenance, security, off loading and storage;
  2. maintenance, fuel, and repair of the U.N. truck fleet;
  3. road construction, maintenance and security in the relief area;
  4. camps construction;
  5. delivery and management of cooking fuel;
  6. drilling and maintaining 60,000 latrines;
  7. providing, organizing, and managing water tanker operations; and
  8. air lift management."

In his announcement of July 22, 1994, President Clinton obligated the United States to carry out tasks 1, 3, 7, and 8 on this list.

"Remarks by President Clinton at a White House press conference, Washington, D.C. July 22, 1994," *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, August 8, 1994, p. 537-538, and Lois McHugh, "Rwanda's Humanitarian Situation and the U.S. Response," CRS Report 94-617 F, Washington, D.C., August 1, 1994.

22. "At Last Rwanda's Pain Registers," *New York Times*, July 23, 1994.
23. MacNeil-Lehrer interview with US Secretary of Defense William Perry, PBS-TV, July 27, 1994.
24. Interview with US Secretary of Defense William Perry, National Public Radio, July 31, 1994.
25. "1,000 Marines are Called In to Help Combat Fires Raging in Northwest," *New York Times*, July 30, 1994; "Marines Join States' Battle Against Fires," *New York Times*, August 2, 1994.
26. "Appropriations: Defense Bill Adds \$170 Million for Relief to Rwanda," *Congressional Quarterly* (July 30, 1994), p. 2159.
27. R. Jeffrey Smith, "US Mission to Rwanda Criticized: Relief Officials Say Pentagon Has Avoided Some Commitments," *Washington Post*, September 5, 1994.
28. Kevin Fedarko, "Rwanda: The Swagger of Defeat," *Time*, August 15, 1994, p. 25.
29. Raymond Bonner, "Rwandans Who Massacred Now Terrorize Camps," *New York Times*, October 31, 1994.
30. Gérard Prunier, The Rwandan Crisis: History of a Genocide, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.
31. The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons From the Rwanda Experience, Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, March 1996, 5 volumes. [Hereafter, The International Response.]
32. "Lessons of Rwanda and Its Genocide: Major New Report Appears Largely Ignored," News from the U.S. Committee for Refugees, Washington, D.C., n.d., p. 1.
33. Letters: "Genocide and Justice," The Economist (July 23, 1994) 331:7873.
34. Carrol Faubert, "Rwanda: Voluntary Repatriation and Reconciliation," Geneva, UNHCR, June 17, 1996.
35. "According to refugee conventions, persons 'with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that [they have] committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity...' cannot be considered as refugees and are therefore not eligible for UNHCR's protection and assistance."

Faubert, *ibid.*

36. This section of the international report went on to recommend that in the future "UN peace missions" should have the "authority and the appropriate means to ensure protection...of camp populations...[and] work with host governments to take other measures, such as disarming camp residents, separating genuine refugees from those not entitled to refugee status, barring arms trading, preventing military training of residents, expelling hostile leadership from camps, halting the operations of hate media, and splitting up large camps into smaller ones at a greater distance from the border" [Recommendation 17].

The Hutu military not only controlled all of the refugee camps in Zaire, but some of those in Tanzania as well, and they not only were able to divert food aid to their own uses but even to extort funds from camp inmates to support their continued military activities.

37. "Human Rights Watch Calls on the UN to Release Report on Arms Flows in Central Africa, Act on Its Findings," Press Release, Human Rights Watch, November 11, 1996.

38. Antony Goldman and Michela Wrong, "British Company Sold Weapons to Rwandan Regime," Financial Times, November 18, 1996; James Blitz, "Inquiry Launched After Rwanda Arms Claims," Financial Times, November 20, 1996.

39. This is the most widely used figure, for example in The International Response, *op. cit.* Some estimates in print quoted a higher figure of \$ 2 million per day, or just twice as much.

40. Carrol Faubert, *op. cit.*

41. Michela Wrong, "The Days of France's Hunting Ground May be Ending; Paris's Discomfort over its Rwanda Policy," Financial Times, November 14, 1996.

42. Barbara Crosette, "Former Rwandan Officer Focus of Atrocity Inquiries," New York Times, March 28, 1996; "Rwanda Genocide Trial Hears First Two Suspects," New York Times, May 31, 1996; John Goshko, "UN Probing Irregularities at Rwanda War Crimes Unit," Washington Post, October 31, 1996; "First Trial for Genocide is Delayed," New York Times, September 28, 1996.

43. Media misrepresentation was still common even at this point. After a two-year process of clearly identifiable instrumental political acts by a variety of parties that produced the current circumstances, a Christian Science Monitor correspondent on Public Radio International on October 30, 1996, still attributed events to a "...decades-old, centuries-old conflict based on ethnic hatreds...."

44. The Hutu military and Interahamwe had prevented the UNHCR for two years from conducting a census of the refugees in the camps--obviously facilitating their fraud and manipulation--with the result that no one had any real figure for the number of people who had still not returned to Rwanda. Estimates varied by over 300 percent. See also, Michela Wrong, "Killing With Kindness in Central Africa," Financial Times, December 3, 1996.

45. Meeting Report, Burundi Policy Forum, Washington, DC, June 18, 1996.
46. Some of the excellent background sources available on Burundi are:
- René Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, London, Praeger Publishers, 1970.
  - René Lemarchand and David Martin, Selective Genocide in Burundi, op. cit.
  - René Lemarchand, Burundi: Ethnocide As Discourse and Practice, Washington, DC, Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press, 1994.
  - René Lemarchand, "Ethnicity and the Genocidal State," in P.L. van den Berghe, ed., State Violence and Ethnicity, University Press of Colorado, 1990.
  - Jason S. Abrams, "Burundi, Anatomy of An Ethnic Conflict," Survival 37:1 (Spring 1995):144-164.
  - Transition in Burundi: The Context for a Homecoming, US Committee for Refugees, September 1993.
47. Julia Preston, "No Mission to Burundi, UN Says; Peace Deployments Apparently on Hold," Washington Post, November 3, 1993.
48. - Burundi's Uprooted People: Caught in the Spiral of Violence, US Committee for Refugees, August 1995.
- Burundi: Armed Groups Kill Without Mercy, Amnesty International, June 22, 1996.
  - Burundi: Policy Report, London, International Crisis Group, April 4, 1996.
  - Burundi: Briefing, London, International Crisis Group, August 1, 1996.
  - Jean-Pierre Chrétien, "Burundi: The Obsession With Genocide," Current History (May 1996), pp. 206-210.
  - Barnett R. Rubin, "Burundi: There is No Exit Strategy," The Brookings Review 14:2 (Spring 1996):46.
  - United Nations, Security Council, "Report of the International Commission of Inquiry Concerning the Assassination of the President of Burundi on 21 October 1993 and the Massacres that Followed," S/1996/682, 22 August 1996, 82 pages.
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