Humanitarian Intervention and Other International Initiatives to Enforce Peace

Milton Leitenberg

Contents

DRAFT
February 22, 1993

"At what point does an intolerable wrong within a sovereign state's borders require forming a UN posse to aid victims and punish wrongdoers?

At what point does the world stop depending on posses and institutionalize a system of international law enforcement?"

"Peace on Earth, by Posse," New York Times, editorial, December 28, 1992

B. Walters. "...a reporter in Sarajevo tearfully asked you how many deaths there had to be before the United Nations would send help. 12,000, it was asked; 15,000; 30,000? And you answered, 'I understand your frustation, but your situation is better than at least 10 other places in the world.' Do you really believe that, sir?

United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. "Yes, I can give you a list of situations that deserve United Nations intervention."

ABC-TV "Nightline," January 4, 1993

[The number of war-related dead and missing in Yugoslavia for the period 1991-92 is estimated at 150,000.]

'The whole question of sovereignty needs to be addressed for Sudan as in Iraq. If a regime has proved absolutely intransigent, has used food as a political weapon, and is incapable of feeding its own people, the option of the international community should not be abdication and indifference, but intervention. The precedent set in Iraq should be applied to Africa, where the situation is more grave."

Kosti Manibe, Deputy General Secretary of the Sudan Council of Churches, May 1991

In 1971, Idi Amin came to power in Uganda through a military coup. He held power for eight years, and in that period, his "state security services" and his army slaughtered some 300,000 Ugandans; the numbers may have been higher than that.1 The military coup had been carried out

1 The following description is largely derived from several sources: "Fall of Idi Amin," Economic and Political Weekly 14:32 (May 26, 1979):907-910; Martha Honey and David B. Ottaway, "Foreigners Kept Amin Terrorism Going," International Herald Tribune, June 4, 1979; and James

with aid from Israel and Great Britain. Amin's army rapidly developed into a mix of Southern Sudanese mercenaries, immigrants from Rwanda and the Nubian area in Sudan, and his own minority Muslim tribal group.

Amin's state security services, "The State Research Bureau," obtained its communications equipment from US, French, and British firms. Some of its personnel were trained in the United States and in Britain. East Germany--which was also involved in establishing "internal security" forces in Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique--sent advisors to train telecommunications, electronics, and computer specialists. Four hundred Pakistani specialists served in the same services, operating the computers and other sophisticated equipment. The Palestine Liberation Organization trained execution squads of the security services, as well as trained and organized Amin's bodyguard. The USSR--with small contributions from other WTO nations--supplied Amin with arms "...in the interest of peace and security of all peoples," according to the Soviet ambassador to Uganda.

All of this might be considered a bizarre hypertrophy of the more typical "foreign military intervention" that was standard over most of the post-WWII decades. During the eight years of Amin's rule, as many as ten nations were involved in Uganda at different times, many of them

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McManus, "Bending the Rules to Get Rid of an African Barbarian," Guardian, April 7, 1979.

simultaneously. In this characteristic,, it was analogous to events in Nigeria during its civil war and to events in the more extended civil wars in Ethiopia and Angola. The Ugandan army was largely imported, its instructors were imported, its weapons and supplies were imported, entire portions of the government infrastructure were imported. There could scarcely be a greater--or more atrocious--caricature of national political "legitimacy," but despite this ultra-mercenarization, and despite Amin's slaughter of a significant portion of the Ugandan population without any context of civil war or insurrection, the United Nations did and said nothing for all of the eight years. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) also said and did nothing, in respect of the same alleged "sovereignty." Independent states in Africa looked on quietly; many of them even hailed Amin.

In late 1978, after falsely claiming that Tanzania had invaded Uganda, Amin invaded the Kagera area in northern Tanzania. Tanzania repelled the Ugandan troops, and continued military operations by invading Uganda in force. It did <u>not</u> do so on humanitarian grounds. In March 1979, Libya rushed several thousand combat troops and equipment to Amin's aid, and several hundred Palestinian combat troops also fought on behalf of Amin. In July 1979, when Amin had been defeated, the OAU condemned Tanzania for invading Uganda. Tanzanian forces left Uganda within a year. Idi Amin lives safely in sanctuary in Saudi Arabia to this day.

In April 1975, Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge toppled the US-supported Lon Nol regime in Cambodia and took power. From 1975 to 1979, between 700,000 and 1,000,000 people died of forced starvation and disease, and between 70,000 and 100,000 were executed directly.2 A more recent estimate attributes the deaths of 2,400,000 people--or 31 percent of the population at the time--at the hands of the Pol Pot regime.3 Small-scale fighting between Khmer Rouge and Vietnamese forces also began within days after the Khmer Rouge entered Phnom Penh. Cambodian forces were responsible for increasingly severe incursions into Vietnamese provinces on the Cambodian-Vietnamese border in 1977 and 1978. In December 1978 Vietnam invaded Cambodia in force. Again, Vietnam did not invade due to the unquestionable genocide that had been taking place in the previous years, about which it was informed.

Had Vietnam called for a United Nations force to replace it, and withdrawn immediately following its invasion, it would have set an important international precedent. It would also have been impossible for other

2 Kampuchea in the Seventies. Report of a Finnish Inquiry Commission, Helsinki, 1982, and Kampuchea: A Demographic Catastrope, GC 80-10019U, National Foreign Assessment Center, May 1980. See also, Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy. The War After the War: A History of Indochina Since the Fall of Saigon (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986), and Elizabeth Becker, When the War War Over: The Voices of Cambodia's Revolution and its People (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986).

3 R.J. Rummel, "The Hell State: Cambodia Under the Khmer Rouge," manuscript, July 20, 1991.

powers to continue to support the Khmer Rouge under those circumstances. Vietnam did not withdraw, however, and remained in Cambodia for its own political advantage. Vietnamese military forces also occupied Laos, peacefully, after 1975. The Khmer Rouge fled to Thailand, where they continued to be supplied with weapons by China for a decade, with Thailand's assistance. The United States continued to support the Khmer Rouge's claim to international legitimacy as the government of Cambodia (Kampuchea), and to its seat in the United Nations--as did other Western states--and supplied its forces in Thailand with "humanitarian assistance." The Khmer Rouge were effectively revived and rehabilitated by an alliance of China, Thailand, and the United States.

The international community did nothing to remove either Idi Amin or Pol Pot from power or to end the tenure of their governments. Unquestionably, that should have been done. Any government that slaughters its own citizens in the tens and hundreds of thousands, and in the millions, renounces any claim to its "sovereignty," just as it would if it killed such numbers of the inhabitants of another state. The state may be sovereign, but the government certainly is not. Both governments were in fact deposed only as a consequence of invading the territory of another state.

There were no lack of more recent examples during the 1980s of civil wars and conflicts resulting in literally

astronomical mortality, Sudan, Angola, and Mozambique in particular. Between 1983 and 1990, as many as one million people died in Sudan in "war and war-induced calamities," a war of the northern Muslim government against black African tribes in southern Sudan. UNICEF estimated that at least 1.3 million people were killed or died in war-related deaths in Angola and Mozambique between 1980 and 1988.4 At least 850,000 of these were children below the age of five. Other estimates of mortality in Mozambique alone for about fourteen years of civil war up to 1992 reach one million or more; one in every fifteen Mozambicans. (In 1989, the United Nations stated that 900,000 had died in the war.)5 The Renamo movement--officially the "Mozambique National Resistance," which was fighting the government--clearly followed practices so similar to the purposeful slaughter and gratuitous torture and maiming exhibited a few years before by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, that it led high-

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4 UNICEF, Children on the Frontline: The Impact of Apartheid, Destabilization, and Warfare on Cildren in Southern and South Africa, UNICEF, 1989, pp. 10, 24-25. A more recent estimate published in January 1993 by Thomas Ohlson stated that 1.7 million people died "directly or indirectly" due to warfare in Angola and Mozambique between 1980 and 1988. Thomas Ohlson, Conflict, Conflict Resolution, Security and Development in Post-Apartheid Southern Africa, A Report Commissioned by the Planning Secretariat (PLAN) of the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA), Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, January 1993.

5 William Finnegan, A Complicated War: The Harrowing of Mozambique, University of California Press, 1992; J. Perlez, "A Mozambique Formally at Peace is Bled by Hunger and Brutality," New York Times, October 13, 1992.

ranking officials of the U.S. Department of State to compare Renamo with the Khmer Rouge and to describe the situation in Mozambique as "one of the most brutal holocausts against ordinary human beings since World War II."6 The conflicts in Angola and Mozambique also displayed the massive displacement of civilian populations that had taken place during the wars in Indochina, Afghanistan, and Ethiopia. More than 11 million people--roughly half the rural population in both countries--were displaced from their homes. Some 9 million people were displaced within the two countries, and 1.5-2 million crossed borders as refugees to neighboring countries.7

The "cold war," the competition between the United States and the USSR, which was totally irrelevant to the essential question of what response the international community should make to the kinds of circumstances described above, nevertheless made the consideration of any concerted international action impossible until 1990. Then everything changed, and what was not conceivable before

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6 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Roy Stacy, speaking at a donors' conference in Maputo; quoted in James Brooke, "U.S. Assails 'Holocaust' by Mozambican Rebels," International Herald Tribune, April 26, 1988. The reference to the Khmer Rouge was made by Assistant Secretary of State Charles Freeman during a visit to Brazil in March 1989; quoted in Noticias (Maputo), March 14, 1989. I would like to thank Thomas Ohlsson for supplying these references.

7 UNICEF, Children on the Frontline, p. 20. Other figures appearing in the press state that between 4.5 and 5 million Mozambicans fled their locations, with 1.5 million of those as external refugees.

became possible. Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, a coalition of nearly 30 states, led by the United States and under the sanction of a series of United Nations Security Council resolutions, invaded Iraq and liberated Kuwait. In addition, when it became clear that the Iraqi government was pressing a military campaign against the Kurdish population in northern Iraq, United Nations forces established territorial sanctuaries under international armed protection for the Kurds.

It is the position of this paper that the international community must intervene militarily in any cross-border invasion and in any genocide, across or within borders, and of course, without the consent of all local participants. The critical task at this juncture in history is to determine the criteria or thresholds for such intervention. This will be examined below. The paper will also take a brief look at post-WWII UN peacekeeping to date, consider the question of whether military forces of Germany and Japan should participate in United Nations international peacekeeping and "peacemaking" forces, and review the status of several ongoing crises: Liberia, Cambodia, Rwanda, Haiti, Iraq, Somalia, Mozambique, Angola, and the former Yugoslavia. (The selection was arbitrary; others that could have been included are Afghanistan, Azerbaijan-Armenia, Columbia, Israel-Palestineans-Arab neighbors, Kashmir, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Western Sahara.)

Finally, it will examine the nature of the response to these crises by the United Nations and major international actors.

Peacekeeping and the United Nations

Over the long decades of the cold war the international community virtually forgot that the United Nations had been intended, in its original establishment, to use force to repel aggression and "threats to the peace."

> *"In 1945, with the grim lessons of six years of world war in mind, the San Francisco conference set out, in the United Nations Charter, a blueprint for a system of international peace and security. The pillars of this system were the renunciation of the use of force by governments in their relations with each other, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the collective use of force to deal, when necessary, with threats to the peace and acts of aggression. The Security Council would be the supervisor and executor of the process, and the international Court of Justice would be the arbiter of the legal aspects of disputes."*[1]

Tables (o) to (o) list the past and current UN peacekeeping operations. Between 1945 and 1988, the UN undertook 13 such missions, and in a dramatic indication of its increased activity in the post-cold war period, it undertook another thirteen between 1988 and mid-1992. Over 550,000 UN troops have been deployed since 1948, and over 800 have been killed in these operations.

Writing before the 1991 war against Iraq, Brian Urquhart described the tentative behavior which had become UN practice in the previous decades

> *"Over the years, agreement has crystallized on the following essential, interconnected basic assumptions for peace-keeping operations:*

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[1] Brian Urquhart, "Beyond The Sheriff's Posse," Survival, 32:3 (May-June 1990), 196-205.

-the consent of the parties involved in the conflict to the establishment of the operation, to its mandate, to its composition and to its appointed commanding officer;
-the continuing and strong support of the operation by the mandating authority, the Security Council;
-a clear and practicable mandate;
-the non-use of force except in the last resort in self defence - self defence, however, including resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent the peace-keepers from discharging their duties;
-the willingness of troop-contributing countries to provide adequate numbers of capable military personnel and to accept the degree of risk which the mandate and the situation demand;
-(less often noted) the willingness of the member states, and especially the permanent members of the Security Council, to make available the necessary financial and logistical support."[2]

The difficulties that some of this deferential behavior have given rise to - aside from the notorious case in which U Thant removed the UN interposition force in the Sinai in 1967, which unquestionably contributed to the outbreak of war in the Middle East in 1967 - is exemplified by other examples from the Middle East:

"In the case of MNF II, the Lebanese Government spoke on a number of occasions towards the end of 1982 about the possible quadrupling of the Force and an expansion of its role. Press reports suggested that about a dozen countries had been approached for troop contributions, and Morocco was reported to have offered 2000 - only to be vetoed by Israel. The Dutch Government firmly declined to participate, preferring a United Nations force, and Sweden took the same line. Britain, after having initially declined to contribute on the ground that is was already participating in the MFO (with 35 men), and reportedly having received strong military advice to stay out, eventually came up with a reconnaissance unit... In UNDOF, and also in the UN force which was in Sinai from 1973 to 1979, contingents from

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[2] ibid. See also Henry Wiseman, "Peace keeping and The Management of International Conflict," Background Paper No. 15, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, September 1982.

states not in diplomatic relations with Israel were included. But, because of Israel's refusal to co-operate with such contingents, they could only be used on the Syrian and Egyptian sides of the cease-fire lines and disengagement zones, which gave rise to operational difficulties.... It might be added that where the disputant's wishes are consulted in this way it is also less likely that they will view any of the contingents with contempt which Israel has shown for one or two of those in UNIFIL, on account of such matters as the length of hair and alleged drug taking of participants."[3]

Even after promulgating the pathbreaking report, Agenda For Peace, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali reiterated perhaps the most crucial reservation of all which hobbled UN action, aside from the inability of the members of the Security Council to themselves decide on action:

"Mr. Boutros Ghali, United Nations Secretary-General, said at the weekend that there was no question of the UN intervening unasked in conflicts, unless they were the result of an aggression by one country against another...he rejected the growing view that the UN should be allowed to intervene in some internal conflicts without the consent of all the participants, if the threat to peace and security was particularly serious. "Like it or not, that is the reality," he said. "Unless all the protagonists in an internal dispute ask for our intervention, we will not intervene, except in the case of an aggression."[4]

Unfortunately, the office of the Secretary-General continued this crippling policy in Somalia for months in the middle of 1992, and only after great delay and the sacrifice of thousands of lives per day, finally discarded it when it was clear that it made impossible any remedy of the situation. An important break in practice, if not yet in determined policy, occurred during the

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[3] James. op. cit.

[4] Robert Mauthner, "No Intervention, UN Chief Insists," Financial Times, September 21, 1992.

combined effort to aid the Kurdish population in Northern Iraq in the winter and spring of 1991. Now, in an article entitled "Sovereignty vs. Suffering: Obsolete Values Victimize The Kurds," Urquhart wrote

> *"....The UN deplores and condemns but cannot act at the political and military levels. UN and voluntary relief agencies must wrestle with political obstacles when all their energies and resources should be concentrated on getting immediate help to the afflicted. And UN peace-keeping operations have, so far, little or no standing in humanitarian matters.... The standoff between national sovereignty and concern for human rights is sickeningly familiar.... The plight of Iraq's Kurds and Shiites is particularly paradoxical since they are the victims of a Government that was recently outlawed and militarily defeated as a result of UN decision. The immediate task is to bring them help by the most effective and speediest means possible. When that is done, is it totally naïve or irresponsible to suggest that UN members put the more basic question on their agenda?"*[5]

He also pointed out that ".... in a development inconceivable a few years ago, The UN recently supervised national elections in Nicaragua and Haiti," which is so, but such activities are simple and peaceful, and do not involve combat and the need to exercise force by the United Nations. Several years earlier Urquhart had written

> *"Due largely to the limitations imposed by the relationships of the permanent members of the Security Council, current methods of conflict control are a pale shadow of what was envisaged in the Charter. Although much time is now spent on Chapter VI procedures for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes, we rarely hear much about Chapter VII - Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression - the once famous 'teeth' of the United Nations which everyone was so proud at the Organizations' birth.... It is absolutely necessary to meet the security needs of the*

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[5] Brian Urquhart, "Sovereignty vs. Suffering; Obsolete Values Victimize The Kurds," New York Times, April 17, 1991.

Third World by collective responsibility. These needs are closely intertwined with efforts to safeguard peace and improve relations between the nuclear powers."[6]

Now, following the war against Iraq and the UN authorized operations to provide sanctuary for the Kurdish population within the territory of Iraq, Urquhart returned again to "The more basic question...Sovereignty vs. Suffering"

"At the moment, the UN has basically two military options. The first is traditional peacekeeping -- that is, forces that can only be deployed after a cease-fire is in place, that are accepted by the parties to the conflict and that may only use force in self defense. The second option is a large scale collective enforcement action like that in Korea in 1950 or, under Chapter VII of the Charter, in Kuwait in 1991 -- both under the leadership of the United States.

A third category of international military operation is needed, somewhere between peacekeeping and large-scale enforcement, it would be intended to put an end to random violence and to provide a reasonable degree of peace and order so that humanitarian relief work could go forward and a conciliation process could commence. The forces involved would be relatively small, representatively international and would not have military objectives as such. But, unlike peacekeeping forces, such troops would be required to take, initially at least, certain combat risks in bringing the violence under control. They would essentially be armed police actions.

In 1945, after six years of war, Article 43 of the Charter was considered to be an important practical innovation. It provided that UN members would "make available to the Security Council...armed forces, assistance and facilities...necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security." Thus the Council would have the means to enforce its decisions, and the UN members would participate in this process according to their capacity. Paralyzed by the cold war, the Council never activated Article 43.

Perhaps, Article 43's time has now come, although in a broader context than originally intended by the words "international peace and security." The aim would be to enable the Security Council to deploy an international force

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[6] Brian Urquhart, "The Role of the United Nations in Maintaining and Improving International Security", Survival 28:5, (September - October 1986) 382-398.

quickly in a situation where the cycle of violence could not be broken except by firm intervention. Such a situation now exists in Somalia and perhaps in Yugoslavia. It existed in Liberia until the military intervention earlier this year by the Economic Commission of West African States. Such situations exist or can be expected in a number of other places.

As with all innovations, there will be plenty of arguments against intervention by a new type of international force. There is one large argument in favor of it. The unraveling of national sovereignty seems to be a feature of the post-cold war period. In more and more situations, only firm and even-handed intervention from the outside is likely to put an end to self-perpetuating bloodshed and the progressive ruin of once peaceful human societies.

Can the United Nations do something to meet this challenge? Or must the world continue to stand by and watch the carnage on television?"[7]

In the war between Iran and Iraq, the United States, Great Britain, France, The Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and Australia sent naval contingents of varying sizes and combatant strengths to the Gulf in 1987 and 1988.[8] Spain, Norway and West Germany would do no more than replace NATO vessels in the Mediterranean or the English channel that had been posted to the Gulf. Participation in the Multi-national force against Iraq in 1991 was much broader: 36 countries sent ground, air or naval forces

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[7] Brian Urquhart, "Who Can Stop Civil War? A New UN Force Could Police Cease Fire," New York Times. For more extended discussions by Urquhart of the same issues see "Learning From The Gulf," New York Review of Books, 38:5 (March 7, 1991) 34-37. See also Sadruddin Aga Khan, "UN Guards Can Help Contain Gulf Conflict," New York times, January 15, 1992, and "What Kind of World Order and Whose," (Roundtable, Thomas Franck et. al.) Peace and Security, 6:1 (Spring 1991) 2-7.

[8] Ronald O'Rourke, "Persian Gulf: US Military Operations," Congressional Research Service, Issue Brief IB 8745, January 19, 1989.

or support units to the Gulf region during the crisis.[9] (See Table -) Several additional countries provided "in-kind support," materials or supplies, in addition to funding. The contributed forces took part directly in combat or provided logistic or other support, including interdicting ships suspected of violating the embargo imposed by the United Nations, and deploying medical personnel or chemical detection equipment. However, faced with the series of ongoing wars in Yugoslavia for a period of two years, the Western and European nations have been ignominiously and totally unable to fashion a joint response to end the killing, despite the most direct parallels with World War II: direct invasion, purposeful targeting of civilians, mass population expulsions, concentration camps, and systematic and organized killing and rape of civilians. This holds for the CSCE and its "Conflict Prevention Center," despite a direct appeal from the UN Secretary-General to the CSCE in July 1992, [10] and for the WEU and NATO."[11]

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[9] "Persian Gulf: Allied Burden Sharing Efforts," US General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD - 92-71, December 1991; Steven Bowman, "Persian Gulf War: Summary of US and Non-US Forces, Congressional Research Service, 91-167 F, February 11, 1991.

[10] Theresa Hitchens, "European Groups Map Military Options on Yugoslav Strife," Defense News, August 10-16, 1992.

[11] Michael Brenner, "The EC in Yugoslavia: A Debut Performance," Security Studies, 1:4 (Summer 1992) 586-609.
Jane Sharp, "IF Not NATO, Who?," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 48:8 (October 1992), 29-32.
James Goodby, "Peacekeeping in The New Europe," The Washington Quarterly, 15:2 (Spring 1992) 153-171.
"NATO Weighs New Role in Peacekeeping," BASIC Reports, #22 (June 1992).
Dennis Sandole, "The Conflict Prevention Center and

As the number and size of peace-keeping missions initiated by the United Nations in the past five years grew, they required increasing amounts of financing for their support. At the moment there are thirteen peace-keeping operations being fielded, involving a total of 53,000 troops, and at an annual cost of over three billion dollars. The total cost of UN peacekeeping operations between 1948 to 1985 was only $3 billion.[12] If the UN Security Council were to authorize forces in the near future for additional conflicts - Sudan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, or anywhere else - the requirement for funds would increase still further. UN member nations are assessed for a separate peace-keeping budget in addition to their annual membership payment, and numerous members states - not least of them the United States - are frequently in arrears in their payments. Assessments of the amounts occurred as follows:[13]

(Percent of Total)

		Regular Budget Assessment	Peacekeeping Assessment
(Group A)	Permanent Security Council Members (China, France, Russia, UK, USA)	46.20	56.155
	of these, the US alone	25.00	30.387
(Group B)	22 Developed Industrial Countries	41.43	41.422
(Group C)	82 Developing Countries	11.85	2.369
(Group D)	54 Poorest Developing Countries	0.54	0.054

Cooperative Conflict Resolution in Europe," Peace and The Sciences, (June 1991) 9-18.

[12] Henry Wiseman, op. cit. (#3 billion is also only twice the daily cost of the war against Iraq in 1991).

[13] "United Nations: US Participation in Peacekeeping Operations," US General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD - 92-247, September 1992.

The UN's regular budget assessment is revised every three years, but the peace-keeping assessment has remained the same since 1973. Given the change in the comparative national and per-capita incomes of UN member states since then, particularly of Germany, Japan, and the Gulf oil states, a revision of the peace-keeping assessment scale is decades overdue. It should also be revised on a regular schedule in the same way as is done for the membership assessment. The costs of supporting the military operations against Iraq in 1991, and of the recent operations in Somalia are shared by the participating states themselves, since the forces are not under the command of the UN Secretary-General. The United States bore all the initial costs of the operations of it forces in Somalia that began in December 1992, estimated at roughly three quarter of a billion dollars. By February 1993, with the participation of contingents from about twenty other nations, US costs amounted to about 80 percent of the total being incurred. The UN peacekeeping budget has been so pressed that in 1991 UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar sought to raise funds from commercial corporations and private donors for a special peacekeeping fund.[14]

The new international political environment following the

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[14] Paul Lewis, "UN Asks Billions for Peace-keeper Fund," New York Times, November 25, 1991; Paul Lewis, "UN's Fund Crisis Worsens as Role in Security Rises; Peacekeeping Cost Grows," New York Times, January 27, 1992.

end of the cold war stimulated the appearance of at least a dozen excellent studies suggesting a way to strengthen United Nations peacekeeping and peacemaking abilities. The recommendations of four of the more important ones will be briefly summarized here. All four were published in 1992.[15]

The stage was set by UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar in his annual report to the 45th General Assembly session in September 1990. Anticipating the possibility of requests for UN forces to be posted to Cambodia, El Salvador and Western Sahara, he asked UN member states to authorize:

- the earmarking of military personnel,
- an increase in funding for peace-keeping,
- authority to establish peace-keeping operations in advance,

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[15] Other recent and useful studies not specifically discussed include the following:

- William J. Durch and Barry Blechman, Keeping The Peace: The United Nations in The Emerging World Order, The Henry L. Stimson Center, March 1992.
- James Goodby, "Peacekeeping in The New Europe," The Washington Quarterly, 15:2 (Spring 1992) 153-171.
- F. T. Liu, "United Nations Peacekeeping: Management and Operations," International Peace Academy, Occasional Paper No. 4, 1990.
- I. J. Rikhye, "The Future of Peacekeeping," International Peace Academy, Occasional Paper No. 2, 1989.
- I. J. Rikhye, "Strengthening UN Peacekeeping: New Challenges and Proposals," United States Institute of Peace, May 1992.
- "United Nations Peacekeeping," Survival [Special Issue] 32:3 (May -June 1990).
- E. C. Luck and T. T. Gati, "Whose Collective Security," The Washington Quarterly, 15:2 (Spring 1992) 43-56.
- T. G. Weiss and M. A. Kessler, "Resurrecting Peace-keeping: The Superpowers and Conflict Management," Third World Quarterly, 12:3 (July 1990) 124;

- the establishment of a reserve stock of basic equipment and supplies.[16]

Things still moved slowly, and there was no immediate response, but a year later, Heads of State meeting for the July 1991 G-7 Summit released the following statement:

> *"We believe the conditions now exist for the United Nations to fulfill completely the promise and vision of its founders. A revitalized United Nations will have a central role in strengthening the international order. We commit ourselves to making the UN stronger, more efficient and more effective in order to protect human rights, to maintain peace and security for all and to deter aggression. We will make preventive diplomacy a top priority to help avert future conflicts by making clear to potential aggressors the consequences of their actions. The UN's role in peacekeeping should be reinforced and we are prepared to do this strongly."*[17]

In January 1992 the very first meeting of the United Nations Security Council held at the level of Heads of State took place. It requested the UN Secretary-General to prepare by July 1992 "an analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping." The Secretary-General's response came in a report to the UN in June 1992, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping. It contained three major recommendations: The deployment of peace-

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[16] "UN Chief Urges Standby Peace-keeping Force," Washington Post, September 19, 1990.

[17] Quoted in Richard N. Gardner, "Practical Internationalism: The United States and Collective Security," SAIS Review, 12:2 (Summer-Fall 1992) 35-49.

keeping forces to pre-empt potential inter or intra-state conflicts, the use of "peace-enforcement units" when conflicts occur, and the creation of a rapid reaction force of troops from member states which the Secretary-General could use at short notice. Specifically he asked all UN member states to make up to 1,000 troops available for use within 24 hours.[18]

> *"It is the essence of the concept of collective security as contained in the [U.N.] Charter that if peaceful means fail, the measures provided in Chapter VII should be used on the decision of the Security Council, to maintain or restore international peace and security in the face of a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression."*
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> *The Security Council has not so far made use of the most coercive of these measures--the action by military force foreseen in Article 42. In the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, the council chose to authorize member states to take measures on its behalf. The Charter however, provides a detailed approach which now merits the attention...*
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> *Under Article 42 of the Charter, the Security Council has the authority to take military action to maintain or restore international pace and security.*
>
> *While such action should only taken when all peaceful means have failed, the option of taking it is essential to the credibility of the United Nations as a guarantor of international security.*
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> *This will require bringing into being, through negotiations, the special agreements foreseen in Article 43 of the Charter, whereby member states undertake to make armed forces, assistance and facilities available to the Security Council...*
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> *Under the political circumstances that now exist for*

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[18] In addition to the Secretary General's report, see also:
- Paul Lewis, "UN Chief Asks for 1,000 Troop Units," New York Times, June 20, 1992.
- John Goshko, "UN Chief Stresses Need For Money," Washington Post, November 22, 1992
- "Peace-making at the UN," Financial Times, August 5, 1992.
- "The New World Cops," New York Times, June 28, 1992.
- Joseph Nye Jr., "Create a UN Fire Brigade," New York Times, February 1, 1992.
- "A Foreign Legion for the World," New York Times, September 1, 1992.

the first time since the Charter was adopted, the long standing obstacles to the conclusion of such special agreements should no longer prevail."

Boutros-Ghali also pointed out that 279 vetoes had been cast in the UN Security Council in past decades, crippling its ability to deal with wars and conflicts. At the end of August 1992 the UN Security Council established a working group to study the Secretary-General's proposals.[19] At the end of October it recommended that UN members" express their willingness to contribute troops on short notice to its peace-keeping missions. The Council also asked member nations to loan military and civilian specialists to the UN to help it create a long-term peace-keeping plan."[20] At the September 1992 UN General Assembly session, virtually every national leader who spoke either endorsed the idea "in principle," or stated that the proposal for designated forces to be assigned to the UN merited serious consideration. French President Mitterrand offered to place 1000 combat troops at the UN's disposal within 48 hours of request and an additional 1000 in another 48 hours.[21]

Dr. Richard Gardner, an international law specialist who served in the Carter administration, proposed three measures "to

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[19] Paul Lewis, "UN Set to Debate Peace-making Role," New York Times, September 6, 1992.

[20] Frank Prial, "UN Seeks Signal On Troop Notice," New York Times, October 30, 1992.

[21] John Goshko and Barton Gellman, "Idea of a Potent UN Army Receiver a Mixed Response; Pentagon, Third World War, Logistical Questions Abound," Washington Post, October 29, 1992.

make the UN's peacekeeping operations more effective." One of these dealt with finances, the back payments owed by members states and a suggestion to establish a peace-keeping emergency fund. The other two dealt with military operations:

> *"First, units of national armed forced earmarked for UN service should be prepared in advance for the complex tasks that now characterize peacekeeping operations. They should undergo common training programs and, where possible, participate in joint exercises. The military assistance programs of the United States and other donor countries could finance some of the cost.*
>
> *Second, equipment needed in those operations--jeeps, trucks, radios and other communication gear-should be stockpiled in key locations for emergency use. The UN estimates that some fifty members are now able and willing to supply a battalion (600-700 men) for a UN peace-keeping operation, but adds that in the case of many Third World countries the needed equipment is lacking.*
>
> ....
>
> *A central question to be considered by the next Administration is whether the UN's system for deterring and defeating aggression should rely exclusively on ad hoc coalitions assembled and led by the United States, or whether an institutionalized system should now be created as provided for in Article 43 of the Charter. That Article provides that "all UN member undertake to make available tot he Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security." Although Article 43 declares that these agreements "shall be negotiated as soon as possible," efforts to negotiate them were abandoned in the early postwar years due to the Cold War. ....*
>
> *A more modest proposal could now be the subject of discussions among member of the Security Council and other interested UN members. The five Permanent Members of the Council could enter into Article 43 agreements, designating units of brigade strength (2,000 men) for a standby UN Rapid Deployment Force (UN-RDF) to deal with threats the peace and acts of aggression. Thirty other UN members could commit smaller units of battalion strength (600-700 men) pursuant to such agreements. This would provide a force of up to 30,000 men that would be prepared in advance of a crisis with common training, standardized or inter-operable equipment, and joint exercises under a UN commander. When a crisis occurred, those national contingents most suited for the purpose would be called up--which in most cases would be*

far less in number than the total potential force of 30,000.

It is often forgotten that the negotiation of Article 43 agreements is not merely an option available to UN member: it is a legal obligation of membership in the world organization. If it were activated, Article 43 could provide a way of securing contributions from two key countries that resisted making human (as opposed to financial) contributions to the Gulf War for domestic political and constitutional reasons--Japan and Germany. With the creation of a UN-RDF, the governments of these two countries could argue that their Constitutions should be interpreted to permit fulfillment of Article 43 obligations and, failing such an interpretation, that their Constitutions should be amended accordingly. The Japanese Socialists, and German Social Democrats would not be able to claim any longer that sending armed forces abroad would be caving into U.S. demands or encouraging the revival of militarism. A basic advantage of the Article 43 approach is that it would provide a degree of legitimacy for UN peace enforcement actions that is not available when they result from coalitions dominated by one country."[22]

The suggestions made in the third study, prepared by the United Nations Association (UNA) of the United States, reinforced nearly all of the above suggestions and enlarged on some of them.

"1. Nations should act now to establish a U.N. Military capability, with the Security Council negotiating special agreements, pursuant to Article 43 of the Charter, with the United States and other member states to make designated troops, bases, and facilities available to the U.N.

2. Special agreements for these forces would be tailored for the specific circumstances and constitutional processes of each nation; some nations might earmark facilities only, and not troops.

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[22] R. N. Gardner op. cit., See also Sen. David Boren," The World needs An Army on Call," New York Times, August 6, 1992. Gardner's proposals also contain specific suggestions on the sharing of intelligence by UN member states with the office of the UN Secretary-General, and this idea was supported by Sen. Boren, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee, to allow the United Nations to anticipate problems and to take preventative action.

3. An effective U.N. force structure should be built around the units of a relatively small number of major troop contributors ready for U.N. deployment in any theater, augmented by units earmarked by a larger number of states primarily for crises within their region.

4. Multinational military planners should devise an overall force capability with three tiers of response time:

- *a standing ready force--a small, rigorously trained force under permanent U.N. command, composed of several battalions from at most two states;*
- *a rapid deployment force--composed of national units from a few states, principally Security Council members, earmarked for U.N. service promptly at the Council's call, totaling several tens of thousands of troops and undergoing regular joint training and exercises; and*
- *contingency forces--pledged by a much wider range of governments, on a larger scale and with slower response time, that could augment the rapid deployment force if needed.*

5. As NATO's experience shows, multinational forces need: a common set of procedures and terms for military communications; shared information systems, logistics, and intelligence; an integrated military command; mutually compatible military doctrine; inter-operable equipment; and common training.

6. A command structure should be pre-designated, like NATO's, to be activated at the Council's call in a crisis, and operations should be run by commanders and staff in the field.

7. The Security Council should now ask the Military Staff Committee to draft options for organizing U.N. military forces. It might then invite the Committee to assist in negotiating special agreements, and maintain data on the military capabilities of member states.

8. As a U.N. military capability is established, the Military Staff Committee will need a strengthened, continuous military staff at U.N. headquarters in New York.

9. The Council should consider the desirability of changes in the structure of the Military Staff Committee. The composition of the Committee might appropriately reflect the largest contributors to U.N. stand-by forces.

10. The Council should establish subcommittees of military chiefs of staff in each region to oversee training, undertake planning, and evaluate the capabilities of units earmarked for contingency forces by member states in the

region."[23]

The proposals made in the last of the studies reviewed here were entirely supportive of the kinds of suggestions made in the Gardner and UNA proposals, but were directed specifically to policies that should be adopted by the US government in particular in order to facilitate their coming to pass. The study recommended that the US

government "start a process of enhancing US support for UN peacekeeping and peace-making" by instituting four initiatives:

> *"1. Focus and upgrade responsibility for U.N. and other international peace-keeping/peace-making efforts at the Under Secretary level of both the State Department and the Defense Department. Strengthen the staff capabilities of both Departments in this area;*
>
> *2. Move the funding for the American contribution to U.N. peace-keeping effort from the [Department of] State budget to Defense.*
>
> *3. Establish a new military command, headed by a three or four-star officer, to support U.N. military operations and, if necessary, U.S. participation in them. This new command would have the responsibility for planning, establishing doctrine, and training U.S. forces that might be used in U.N. efforts.*
>
> *4. Designate one or two U.S.-based brigades for support of U.N. operations. The current force structure is easily capable of supporting this additional mission"*[24]

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[23] Partners For Peace: Strengthening Collective Security For The 21st Century, A Report of the United Nations Association of the USA, 1992.

[24] "Global Concerns and Peace-keeping, in "Memorandum To The President-Elect: Subject, Harnessing Process to Purpose," The Carnegie Endowment For International Peace and the Institute for International Economics, 1992. See also, "Help The UN Arm For

The suggestion that US financial contributions to the UN peace-keeping budget should be drawn from US Department of Defense funds had been suggested earlier by the US diplomat who previously served as UN Under Secretary-General for Special Political and General Assembly Affairs,[25] and it seems to have also been accepted by Secretary of State Christopher in the incoming US administration in January 1993.

It is clear that there is a large degree of agreement and even duplication among these four groups of proposals. It is also of interest that a substantial number of them are similar to a series of proposals that the USSR made between September 1987 and 1990 regarding enhanced peace-keeping capabilities for the UN:

> *"1. Allow the Security Council to set up special observer stations in potentially explosive areas.*
> *2. Use special missions of the Security Council to evaluate problem areas and make on-the-spot recommendations.*
> *3. Use UN personnel to safeguard member states from external interference by stationing them in one state's territory at the request and consent of that nation alone.*
> *4. Establish a system to train personnel for UN field operations.*
> *5. Create a reserve of UN military observers and peace-keeping forces.*
> *6. Prepare a list of approved experts in advance for peace-keeping missions to ensure the dispatch of such missions without delay.*
> *7. Establish a UN naval peace-keeping force.*
> *8. Use UN peace-keepers in international drug control efforts and to prevent terrorist incidents.*
> *9. Use Soviet personnel in UN operations.*
> *10. Convene an international conference on the elaboration of guarantees to implement the accords achieved on the*

Peace," New York Times, November 27, 1992.

[25] Ronald Spiers, "Time to Get Right With The UN," Washington Post, May 19, 1992.

question of Cambodia and to ensure the independence of Cambodia and peace in Southeast Asia."[26]

Given the combination of greatly increased levels of UN peace-keeping operations in the past few years, the Secretary-General's promulgation of his mid-1992 Agenda For Peace which called for the enforcement of UN mediated peace agreements, and the plethora of ongoing wars and conflicts demanding international action, the present moment is clearly a time of enormous significance for the development of UN peace-keeping practices. Despite this - or even to a notable degree in marked contrast to it - officials of the UN Secretariat, from the Secretary-General on down have been exceedingly reluctant to use the opportunity to fashion new initiatives and policies. At times, in fact, they have acted as a definite brake at moments of possible change, and at other times they have appeared to be contradictory, recommending a policy in one place that was rejected in another. Several of the more significant examples are provided below:

> *"....On July 17, the Security Council, with Mr. Boutros-Ghali absent, accepted a cease-fire accord for Yugoslavia hammered out by Lord Carrington of Britain and a European Community team of negotiators in London. The accord, which failed to stop the fighting, would have placed a significant burden on the United Nations by sending its forces into the combat zone to locate and collect the dueling artillery batteries in Bosnia and Herzegovina. When Mr. Boutros-Ghali learned of the Security Council's action, he objected,*

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[26] Richard Falkenrath Jr. and Edmund Piasecki, "Perestroika at the United Nations: A Summary of Soviet Proposals and Positions," in Soviet-American Relations After The Cold War, Robert Jervis and Seweryn Bialer, Editors, (Durham: Duke University Press) 1991.

> *arguing that collecting the guns would take three months and 1,100 men. He also feared that such actions would draw United Nations forces into a what he termed "a new Vietnam" that would strain United Nations resources at a time when they were needed elsewhere, particularly in Somalia."*[27]

At the same time UN officials "negotiated" with the heads of local military forces in Somalia for months in mid-1992 for permission to carry out operations in Somalia. Humanitarian aid was delayed for all that time with estimated daily death tolls of up to 3,000 people per day due to starvation. No reprisals were suggested against the same military factions for theft of up to 80% of all the aid being brought into Somalia, and a handful of UN troops were literally kept isolated in their quarters by local forces. When the United States finally spearheaded an international military intervention in Somalia, the Secretary-General's office wanted all the forces to be under United Nations command. When the United States insisted on its own initial command, the Secretary-General's office then resisted the early transfer of the rapidly internationalized forces to UN command, demanded that the US forces disarm local military groups, which it would have avoided doing itself and clearly still does not want to do, and it remains to be seen if it will apply more forceful rules of engagement for UN forces when it does assume command in Somalia.

On January 31, 1993, a UN spokesman said that "The UN does not have and should have a 24 hour a day, seven days a week

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[27] Patrick E. Tyler, "UN Chief's Dispute with Council Boils Over," New York Times.

operations room for peace-keeping."[28] US officials had been urging for some time that the UN Secretariat establish such an infrastructure. But only a few weeks before, Marrack Goulding, then UN Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping operations stated that he did not need such a capability.[29] Mr. Goulding also frequently seemed more concerned to emphasize that UN mandates do not extend to peace enforcement rather than to endeavor to have them so extended when it would be useful for that to be the case. Neither Mr. Goulding nor the Secretary-General wanted the UN to be involved in Yugoslavia - although the Security Council overruled their recommendations - and Under Secretary-General Jonah did not want the UN mandate in Somalia to be extended to enforcement.

Now that UN forces in Bosnia have been authorized to use force to deliver humanitarian aid, they rarely use that authority even when fired upon by artillery, mortars or automatic weapons. There is no mandate to immediately clear out concentration and

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[28] Julia Preston, "UN Faced with A Crisis of Credibility; Enforcement Capability, Peace-keeping Role at Issue," Washington Post, February 1, 1993. See also
- Paul Lewis, "UN Busier Than Ever Globally, Struggles With Peace-keeping Role," New York Times, January 25, 1993.
- William Branigan, "Missteps on the Path to Peace: Problems Mount and Budgets Soar," Washington Post, September 22, 1992.
- Stanley Meisler, "Peace: Is it Mission Impossible for UN Forces," Los Angeles Times, November 16, 1992.
- Stanley Meisler, "UN Peace-keepers Face a Crisis of High Expectations," Los Angeles Times, November 18, 1992.
- Douglas Berenson, "UN Peace-keepers Face New Hurdles As Missions, Responsibilities Expand," Arms Control Today, 22:9 (November 1992) 27, 33-34.

[29] Paul Lewis, "UN's Top Troop Official Sees No Need For War Room," New York Times, December 27, 1992.

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death camps even following documented evidence of mass killing taking place in them, and they remain in operations for months. There is no UN action to enforce signed agreements, such as the cantonment of tanks and artillery (mainly Serb), the repatriation of forced emigres agreed to by the transgressing parties - again, being prevented by Serbia for the most part - made over a half year ago. In Cambodia as well there is no UN response to the deliberate shelling of its personnel, and in this case, a recommendation for military action was rejected by the administrator of the UN's UNTAC mission. In Yugoslavia, the first UN military commander Canadian Brig. General McKenzie blatantly and grossly misrepresented World War II military experience in Yugoslavia to justify a hands-off and do-nothing policy. When faced with problems that could only be solved by force, as in Angola and then in Bosnia, the Secretary-General's response is to request the withdrawal of UN forces, rather than to call for swift enforcement of the existing UN mandate and standing agreements made under it.

Finally, economic sanctions were mandated against Serbia, without any enforcement provisions, and then when they were clearly and continuously violated, enforcement was mandated, but still not carried out. German companies supplied Iraq with materials for producing conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction even after UN sanctions were voted; Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, and several other nations have continued to supply Serbia with oil for a year despite sanctions, Russia and (?)

the Ukraine supplied Serbia with arms despite an arms embargo, etc. One wonders if these measures are intended by the United Nations as meaningful attempts to end aggression, or if it is all meant to be a comic opera.

The Organization of African Unity and Peacekeeping

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) has had a particularly miserable history of attempts at peace-keeping in particular, and in general at efforts to resolve the numerous wars both internal and across borders that have plagued Africa in the post-colonial independence period.[1] Mediation attempts by African heads-of-state, on the contrary, are quite common, although they have not been particularly effective in any of the serious conflicts. And the mediation efforts are virtually always as far as things go. Not even in as bizarre an event as the Libyan annexation of the northern portion of Chad, in which Libya justified its action by reference to the Mussolini-Laval pact of 1935, did the OAU make any attempt to redress the situation.

The OAU has nevertheless "dreamed of a pan-African peace-keeping force since its founding,"[2] but even lesser tasks were carried out by other international collaborative efforts:

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[1] For general background see, "The OAU and African Conflicts," Chapter 3 in The OAU After Twenty Years, A. Sesay, et. al. (Boulder: Westview Press) 1984; W. J. Foltz, "The OAU and The Revolution of African Conflicts," in F. M. Deng and I. W. Zartman, (Eds) Conflict Resolution in Africa, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution) 1991; Z. Cervenka and C. Legum, "The OAU in 1978: The Challenge of Foreign Intervention," in Africa Contemporary Record, C. Legum (Ed.) (New York: Holmes & Meier 1980; Z. Cervenka and C. Legum, "The OAU in 1981; A Crucial Testing Time for Peace-keeping," in Africa Contemporary Record, C. Legum (Ed.) (New York: Holmes and Meier) 1981; Nora McKeon, "The African States and The OAU," International Affairs, 42:3 (July 1966) 390-408.

[2] M. C. Dunn, "Chad: The OAU Tries Peace-keeping," Washington Quarterly, 5:2 (Spring 1982) 182-188.

"...the February 1980 election which prefaced the independence of Zimbabwe was watched over by a non-UN Monitoring Force of about 1500 men. The majority - 1250 - came from the British Army but they were supplemented by small detachments from Australia, New Zealand, Kenya and Fiji. The election was also watched by a civilian Commonwealth Observer Group drawn from eleven countries, observers nominated by thirteen states and two international organizations, and a number of independent and non-governmental observers."[3]

Several efforts to organize OAU multi-national forces in particular crises, such as the three-nation force that the OAU proposed for Chad in 1979-1980, failed to get off the ground. The first effort that was actually deployed was the Inter-African Peacekeeping Force (IAF) that did reach Chad late in 1981. Dunn presents an exquisite portrayal of the endless political squabbles among African states as to whose troops should make up the force, who should lead it and why or why not, and what they should do when they were in Chad, given that the "central government" and various contending parties had been exchanging places for the past decade. In addition, a Libyan military expeditionary force had been fighting in Chad for most of the time, on one side or the other, and also frequently switching its allegiance.[4] In the end, only Nigeria, Zaire and Senegal actually sent troops, from among the seven nations that were supposed to, yet others sent or were to have sent observers, and only the three states that actually contributed troops paid their

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[3] Alan James, "Options For Peace-keeping," in Armed Peace: The Search For World Security, Josephine O'Connor Howe (Editor) London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1984; and in H. Manning, (Ed.) Peace-keeping and Technology: Concepts For The Future, New York: International Peace Academy, 1984.

[4] Dunn, op. cit.

financial obligations for the support of the operation:

> *"The Organization of African Unity decided to send an African peace-keeping force to Chad to monitor an earlier agreement that the country should be governed transitionally by a regime of national union. Six states initially offered to contribute forces, but in the event, only Nigeria (the largest contributor), Zaire, and Senegal provided contingents which made up the 3250 strong force. The United States, France, Britain and Algeria helped with money or supplies, and by the end of 1981 the force was in place. Additionally, Kenya, Zambia, and Guinea-Bissau sent observers on behalf of the OAU. Both the force and observers were withdrawn half-way through 1982. President Goukouni was overthrown during the presence of the OAU force - which promptly left once his successor had taken office."*[5]

For the rest of the 1980s, wars raged in Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia, killing millions, in addition to Liberia and the Western Sahara. The OAU did nothing other than to now and then send its customary missions offering the "good offices" of its Secretary-General. When, after two years of warfare, the horrors in Somalia finally produced an international outcry in early 1992. the first public reaction was to criticize the "white" West - Europe and the United States - for watching and doing nothing. Somalia is a member of both the Organization of African Unity and the Conference of Islamic States. The criticism was made both by Africans in the West. Neither black Africa nor the Muslim states, both closer to the scene and for whom it should presumably have been more painful, had so much as raised a finger to introduce aid or to suppress the warring parties, neither as regional multi-national organizations or as

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[5] James, op. cit.

individual states. It was the United States that eventually did intervene.

In June 1992, largely prompted by the ongoing and very visible debacles in Somalia and Liberia, OAU Secretary-General Salim Salim presented a "Proposal for an OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and Resolution" to the OAU's Council of Ministers.[6] It suggested...a possible inter-African peace-keeping force which may be identified at national level for possible deployment in conflict situations." The redundant "possibles" were notable. Without much surprise, the Muslim government of Sudan, years into a war of extermination against its black population in the southern half of the country, "raised the thorny issue of sovereignty, deeming the idea of a supra-national peace-making body a danger to national decision-making." No doubt it would! But the proposal also noted that "within the context of general international law as well as humanitarian law, Africa should take the lead in developing the notion that sovereignty can legally be transcended by intervention of outside forces." For decades Africa has seen civil wars producing massive population displacements into neighboring countries, one of the more obvious cross-border consequences of "internal" wars.

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[6] Peter Da Costa, "Combining Against Conflict," Africa Report, (September - October 1992) 21-26; Keith B. Richburg, "Africans Debate Permanent Peacekeeping Force", Washington Post, July 10, 1992.

Humanitarian Intervention: Proposals and the Consideration of Criteria

The introductory section to this study referred to the massive death tolls that occurred in Cambodia, Uganda, the Sudan, Mozambique, Angola, and Indonesia in recent decades. When the United Nations Security Council established "safe haven" zones for the Kurdish population in Northern Iraq in the spring of 1991, international law specialists noted that the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide provided a basis for their establishment. Article I of the Convention, which had been signed by Iraq, required all signatory states to regard genocide "whether committed in time of peace or time of war" as a "crime under international law which they undertake to punish." Article 8 states that any signatory of the convention "may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppresion of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III." (Article III lists, in addition to genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide, and complicity in genocide.)

The Genocide Convention should unquestionably have been applied to Cambodia, Uganda, the Sudan, Indonesia, Mozambique, and Angola (although Renamo and Unita, the

responsible parties in these latter two cases are not signatory governments), and not only to these. Indonesia, again, in East Timor (1975-76), Pakistan in Bangladesh (1971), and Burundi (1972-73) would certainly qualify, though there are no numerical criteria for what establishes a genocide.1 Barbara Harff, in several recent studies, itemizes 44 "Genocides and Politicides" since 1945.2 (See Table .) Data accumulated by this author indicates that 125 wars or conflicts caused over 40 million deaths between 1945 and 1990.3 (See Table .) By 1993, the figure has reached 41 million dead.

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1 Some of the more important studies of genocide are the following: I.W. Charny, ed., Toward the Understanding and Prevention of Genocide, Boulder: Westview Press, 1984; Helen Fein, "Scenarios of Genocide: Models of Genocide and Critical Responses," in Charny, ibid.; Helen Fein, ed., Genocide Watch, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992; F. Chalk and K. Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analysis and Case Studies, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990; M.N. Dobrowski and I. Walliman, Genocide and the Modern Age: Etiology and Other Case Studies of Mass Death, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1987; F. Chalk and K. Jonassohn, "A Typology of Genocide and Some Implications for the Human Rights Agenda," in Dobrowski and Walliman, ibid.; L. Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981; and L. Kuper, "Types of Genocide and Mass Murder," in Charny, op. cit.

2 Barbara Harff and T.R. Gurr, "Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: Identification and Measurement of Cases Since 1945," International Studies Quarterly 32 (1988):359-371; and Barbara Harff, "Recognizing Genocides and Politicides," in Fein, 1992, op. cit. It seems clear that there is no numerical lower limit as a criterion for inclusion in Harff's categorization.

3 The criterion for inclusion in this compendium was that each event caused at least 1,000 deaths. These figures do not include the loss of life in the two largest individual national calamities in the post-WWII period: the estimated 27 to 29 million Chinese who died of starvation in the

In addition to the Genocide Convention, the precedent of the Nuremburg Tribunal and the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, also dating from 1948, should also have changed the basic provenance of international law; it was no longer the case that an individual state could do whatever it pleased with its own citizenry, even if it did so under national legislation.

Two categories of events should then unquestionably demand international intervention. First, the massive, gratuitous murders such as in Cambodia, Uganda, Iraq (against Kurds in 1988), and as at present by Serbia in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The 1993 U.S. Department of State global human rights report described the Serbian campaign as being of a "cruelty, brutality, and killing" unrivaled since Nazi times.4 Second, cases in which massive starvation is a result of civil war, or in which one of the parties in a civil war restricts food and/or external food aid in order to deliberately cause starvation of the civilian population.

"Great Leap Forward" in 1960-61, and the number of Soviet citizens who died in the Gulag camp system between 1945 and 1955, which may be as high as an additional 10-20 million, although it is extremely difficult to obtain even rough estimates in this case. The figures also do not include estimates of deaths due to "structural violence" in developing nations. See Milton Leitenberg and Charles Zimmerman, "The Concerns of Developing Countries: I. A Measure of Structural Violence, Nuclear Weapon Equivalents of Deaths in Developing Countries," Mazingira (UNEP), no. 9 (1979):60-65.

4 Elaine Sciolino, "Abuses by Serbs: The Worst Since Nazi Era, Report Says," New York Times, January 20, 1993. The U.S. Department of State report is the annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, for the year 1992.

This has taken place in recent years in Ethiopia and the Sudan, in both cases through actions taken by the central government against the parties that it was fighting, and in Mozambique by Renamo. The phenomenon is not new. In 1977, a report issued by the United Nations Association of the United States noted that in one third of 89 major natural disasters between 1972 and 1976, there had been serious allegations of political interference with efforts to deliver relief aid to people in the respective countries. One of the countries guilty of this behavior in the early 1970s was again Ethiopia. A third group of cases, such as in Liberia and Mozambique, in which the insurgent group responsible for massacring civilian population is not a signatory of any of the relevant international conventions should nevertheless qualify for international intervention against the guilty party.

For this author, it would be a sufficient and satisfactory beginning if the international community could agree on these three categories. It has become clear to many, however, that the examination and establishment of criteria for international intervention is long overdue. Following India's invasion of East Pakistan in 1971, Thomas Franck and Nigel Rodley wrote,

> Is the Bangladesh incident to be seen as creating a new common law, one which accords priority to human rights and self-determination over other norms of international conduct, including legal restraints on the unilateral use of force?
> . . .

> What kinds of acts against which human rights, under what circumstances and on what scale are hereafter to be sufficient in law to warrant the use of miltiary force, by which outside power or powers, and under what safeguards and controls?5

The same question has been asked in many instances since: "The problems are: who will judge when a threshold is passed that calls for international action, and who will decide what should be done and who should do it."6 The remainder of this section will examine several of the recent proposals which put forward criteria for humanitarian intervention.

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5 Thomas M. Franck and Nigel S. Rodley, "After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intevention by Military Force," American Journal of International Law, 67 (1973): 275-305.

"The Indian argument at the United Nations, following the invasion by Delhi's army of East Pakistan, was that the duty not to use military force unilaterally did not apply in these circumstances...." India, of course, also had not felt them to apply in its invasion and incorporation of Goa. The irony is that the Indian government has always been the fiercest champion of national "sovereignty" when international action is discussed. In Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's address to the 40th Session of the U.N. General Assembly in 1985, he warned that nations "not aligned with either of the power blocs face new and sinister threats of intervention, interference, and pressure."

For only a few of the basic discussions in international law regarding humanitarian intervention, see: Richard B. Lillich, ed., Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations, Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1973; Ian Brownlie, "Humanitarian Intervention," and Richard B. Lillich, "Humanitazrian Intervention: A Reply to Dr. Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives," in Law and Civil War in the Modern World, John Norton Moore, ed., Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974; and R.J. Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974. For additional sources, see the footnotes in the paper by David J. Sheffer, 1992, footnote 27 below.

6 "Collective Security and the United Nations: An Old Promise in a New Era," The Stanley Foundation, 26th U.N. of the Next Decade Conference, June 1991.

A major break in practice took place in April 1991 with the establishment of "safe heavens" for the Kurdish population inside Northern Iraq, over the objections of the Iraq government. Nevertheless, it still remains to be seen how durable this precedent was. It is crucial to take into account that the passage of Resolution 688 followed directly on the very particular circumstances of the UN-mandated military defeat of Iraq. French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, arguing in the United Nations on behalf of French sponsorship of UN Resolution 688, stated that "The break in a longstanding and rigid doctrine permits the hope today that the international community will find the means to intervene in similar cases, and first of all the Kurds."7 He also recalled that France had in 1945 proposed an amendment to the United Nations Charter to punish countries that violated fundamental human rights by withdrawing recognition of their sovereignty. Britain was another major supporter of this proposal, and Foreign Minister Hurd commented that

> "The division between external and internal affairs is not absolute. Many internal policies have external manifestations. A country cannot pursue policies which result in the flight of one million people and expect the world to sit by meekly.8

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7 James Hoagland, "What Price Unity," The Washington Post, May 14, 1991. Cuba, Yemen, and Zimbabwe voted against Resolution 688, while China abstained from voting.

8 Robert Mauthner, "Major Presses His Case for Kurdish Safe Haven," Financial Times, April 11, 1991. In the fall of 1991, German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher repeated very similar sentiments in a speech to the UN General Assembly: "Today sovereignty must meet its limits in

Neither Britain nor the United Nations, however, had adopted a similar standard for events in Ethiopia or Sudan in the past, or in Sudan and former Yugoslavia at present.9

In November 1988, Francis Deng, a former Foreign Minister of Sudan, had proposed the establishment of "peace havens" in the Southern Sudan.10 Between 1986 and 1988, the Sudanese government had frustrated international efforts to reach civilians in insurgent-controlled areas in Southern Sudan, even expelling UN aid officials and private relief agencies. It is estimated that half a million civilians died as a result.11 Despite this, it remained the

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the responsiblity of states for mankind as a whole....When human rights are trampled underfoot, the family of nations is not confined to the role of spectator....It must intervene." Tad Daley, "Can the UN Stretch to Fit the Future?," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 48:3 (April 1992):38-41.

9 Another British commentator wrote that "For much of the time, the United Nations has little to say about these and dozens of other similar examples of human rights abuses and, accordingly, even less to do." Roger Matthews, "Little Help for the Oppressed: Saddam's Attack on the Kurds Shows the Limits of International Authority," Financial Times, April 15, 1991.

10 Francis M. Deng and Larry Minear, The Challenges of Famine Relief: Emergency Operations in the Sudan, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992, pp. 131, 150-51.

11 Larry Minear, "Humanitarian Intervention in a New World Order," Policy Focus (Overseas Development Council), no. 1 (1992). See also Politics of Hunger in the Sudan, Joint Hearing, Select Committe on Hunger and House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 101st Congress, First Session, March 1989, and Raymond W. Copson, "Angola: War and Famine," IB-91030, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, April 11, 1991.

traditional conviction of specialists in humanitarian aid in conflict situations that "Military forces should not be committed without a clear agreement from both sides of the conflict."12

UN Resolution 688 broke new ground in international law, approving for the first time "the right to intervene," or the "duty to intervene," on humanitarian grounds in what would have previously been argued to be the "internal affairs" of member states. Some 2 million people, mostly Kurds, had fled their homes in Northern Iraq in a period of approximately two weeks in April 1991.13 Nevertheless, Meissner and Scheffer argue strongly that Resolution 688 was not "...a manifesto for military intervention in the name of human rights.

> The character of the right to interfere is a peaceful one. Iraq is required to permit humanitarian agencies to operate in its territory. Nothing in the history of debate of 688 suggested the right of any government or the United Nations to deploy troops to that end. There is no code language for the use of force, as there was in the resolution authorizing enforcement of the trade embargo against Iraq or the war itself.

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12 Frederick C. Cuny, "Dilemmas of Military Involvement in Humanitarian Relief," pp. 52-81, in L. Gordienker and Thomas G. Weiss, Soldiers, Peacekeepers, and Disasters, New York: St. Martins Press, 1991. For an earlier study, see Morris Davis, ed., Civil Wars and the Politics of International Relief, New York: Praeger, 1975.

13 Lois McHugh and Susan Epstein, "Kurdish Refugee Relief and Other Humanitarian Aid Issues in Iraq," Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, IB91077, May 31, 1991; Sadrudding Aga Khan, "UN Protection Born of Necessity," The Washington Post, June 12, 1991; Neil Lewis, "Legal Scholars Debate Refugee Plan, Generally Backing US Stand," New York Times, April 19, 1991.

...
The recent arrival of lightly armed guard forces--500 are slated to replace 20,000 allied troops--is probably as far as the U.N. can go under 688 beyond relief activities. Even the [Bush] administration now acknowledges that sending armed U.N. peacekeeping forces would require another resolution.
...

Indeed, 688 enlarges the envelope of international law where hitherto internal affairs are concerned. The prospect of reaching victims inside their countries, or resolving problems to prevent the reasons for refugee flows is a historic breakthrough. But a new right of unilateral or even multinational armed intervention for humanitarian purposes has decidedly not been established.

Moreover, the precedent of humanitarian intervention in the Iraqi case could jeopardize, not strengthen, arrangements for protecting refugees in the future. After all, the dilemma of helping the Kurds in Iraq resulted from Turkey's determination to close its border to them. In refusing to provide first asylum, Turkey successfully challenged a fundamental, longstanding international responsibility. For Turkey, sovereignty and the integrity of its borders overrode the principle of first asylum, and the United States radically revised its plan to protect those borders.14

The Soviet Union and China were concerned about the precedent of a blue-helmeted humanitarian force deployed without a host government's consent....The idea of creating a U.N. "force" to replace Western troops in northern Iraq was rejected in favor of sending U.N. "guards"--a hastily-recruited group of headquarters security officers and retired police--to be visible symbols underwritten by Western soldiers and firepower. After the withdrawal of Western forces from Kurdistan, an eight-nation rapid deployment force of some 2,500 troops remained in southeastern Turkey to deter fugure actions against the Kurds by Saddam Hussein.15

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14 Doris Meissner and David J. Scheffer, "No Manifesto for Armed Intervention," The Washington Post, May 28, 1991.

15 Thomas G. Weiss and Kurt M. Campbell, "Military Humanitarianism," p. 56, in Larry Minear et al., Humanitarianism and War: Learning the Lessons from Recent Armed Conflicts, Occasional Paper no. 8, Providence, RI: T.J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 1991.

The concept of the "right to intervene" was formulated by Dr. Bernard Kouchner, a minister in the French government of President Mitterrand. Kouchner had served in 1968 in a medical aid mission during the Nigerian-Biafran war. Following that experience, he founded the organization Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF). Dr. Kouchner and MSF were active in wars and conflicts all over the world in the years that followed. The essence of the organization was that it refused to be bound by the wishes of host governments as to where they might go or to whom they could provide medical assistance. MSF frequently entered a country and operated in portions of it against the wishes of the government, and these occasions were virtually all during civil wars. MSF argued that "a request from those who are suffering is sufficient to justify crossing a boundary without authorization from a nation's leaders: the humanitarian imperative takes precedence over non-interference and sovereignty."16 Dr. Kouchner formulated the phrase "the right to intervene" for this concept at a conference in Paris in January 1987.

It is possible that Dr. Kouchner's phrase owed something to the discussion which followed the reports in 1977 previously referred to, which noted that governments had impeded aid to victims of natural disasters occurring in their own countries. These studies proposed the adoption of

16 Dr. Jonathan Mann, "No Sovereignty for Suffering," New York Times, May 12, 1991.

> an international convention, akin to the Geneva conventions on the rules of war, specifying the rights of disaster victims and the obligations of governments. Relief would thus become an essential human right. Getting governments, especially those of developing countries, to accept such a convention that might seem to imply infringement of national sovereignty will not be easy.17

The New York Times editorial on the subject was entitled "A Right to Disaster Relief." The irony of the problem was particularly galling: it was developing nations which under "normal" conditions constantly pleaded for increased aid and redistribution of resources from the "north" that were, in circumstances of particular emergency, frequently massive starvation that raised political problems, impeding disaster relief in the name of "sovereignty."

In December 1988, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 43-131, sponsored by France, which formally recognized the role of non-governmental organizations in "natural disasters and similar emergency situations--[in providing] in particular food, medicines and health care for which access to victims is essential."18 In 1990, the United States and the USSR co-sponsored Resolution 45-100, which provided for the establishment of specific access corridors for humanitarian aid workers in crisis situations. This too was passed by the UN General Assembly. In 1989, the United Nations was able to obtain agreement from the

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17 "A Right to Disaster Relief," New York Times, September 8, 1977, and "Study Says Nations Tend to Hamper Disaster Aid," New York Times, August 7, 1977.

18 Mario Bettati, "The Right to Interfere," The Washington Post, April 14, 1991.

Sudanese government and its opponents in the south of the country to establish "corridors of tranquility" through which relief convoys could pass without interference, and similar corridors have been used to reach people, when permitted, in Angola, Ethiopia, Iraq, and Yugoslavia.19

Resolution 688 built on these antecedents--or preceded some of them--but clearly far surpassed them in its mandate. Nevertheless, the practice that it mandated in the specific instance of Iraq is clearly neither honored nor was enforced by the UN in numerous other instances, for example in 1991 and 1992 in the conflicts among the successor states to Yugoslavia. The UN is still willing to condition the supply of mandated humanitarian aid on the sufferance of the parties to that regional conflict. Despite the fact that this choice of behavior was broken again by the US force that entered Somalia in December 1992, it continues to be followed in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.

When arguing on behalf of the "right to intervene" in 1991, French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas stated that the international community "should be prepared to violate national boundaries to alleviate human suffering resulting from repression, civil disorder, interstate conflict, or natural disasters."20 However, as many have noted, UN

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19 Larry Minear, Policy Focus, 1992, op. cit. See also, UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182, "Strengthening the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United Nations," December 19, 1991.

20 Weiss and Campbell, "Military Humanitarianism," op. cit.

Security Council Resolution 688 chose to link internal repression with refugee flows to define "a threat to international peace and security," thereby relying on explicit language in the UN Charter, rather than emphasizing new precedents. But this only pointed to yet another inconsistency: In 1991, in addition to 17 million refugees, there were an additional estimated 24 million displaced persons who did not fit the definition of "refugee."21

There have been calls for "a formal declaration that human rights concerns should override sovereignty whenever a government uses denial of food as a weapon."22 Durch and Blechman add that the "dissolution of public authority in the wake of civil war (as in Somalia) is a second potential scenario for humanitarian intervention."23 Helman and Ratner carry this further, invoking "...the failed nation state, utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community." They refer to

> Civil strife, government breakdown, and economic privation...violence and anarchy--imperiling their own citizens and threatening their neighbors through refugee flows, political instability and random warfare....The massive abuses of human rights--including the most basic rights, the right to

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21 Erskine Childers and Brian Urquhart, "Strengthening International Reponse to Humanitarian Emergencies," October 1991.

22 Jessica Matthews, Giving Way to Global Concerns," Washington Post, August 22, 1991.

23 William J. Durch and Barry M. Blechman, "Keeping the Peace: The United Nations in the Emerging World Order," The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1992.

> life....The international community should now be prepared to consider a novel, expansive--and desperately needed--effort by the UN to undertake nation-saving responsibilities.24

The notion of "dissolution of public authority" was echoed by Knudsen in summarizing a conference on "Sovereignty and the Right to Intervene,"

> New approaches to peacekeeping are required by the decline of the state as such in many parts of the world, with consequence massive human suffering. Glaring distress cannot be alleviated by collective international action without colliding with governments over "sovereignty" and "intervention."25

In summarizing yet another conference, Weiss and Holgate wrote,

> Perhaps the UN's recent forays into election-monitoring could also be expanded in the name of assuring legitimate sovereignty in countries like Haiti.... Potential UN responses to conflict can be conceived on a spectrum: ranging from observation, to armed fact-finding, to classic peacekeeping, to remaining after host-nation approval has been withdrawn, to enforcing broken cease-fires, to preventing international genocide, to punitive wars against aggressors.... Moves towards a full enforcement capability must be considered carefully to make sure that abandoning some of traditional peacekeeping's tenets--agreement of the parties, neutrality, non-intervention, non-use of force except in self-defense--is worth the risk of losing some of the UN's accumulated legitimacy.26

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24 Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States," Foreign Policy, no. 89 (Winter 1992-93):3-20.

25 Olav F. Knudsen, "Intervention, Prior Consent and Preventive Peacekeeping: Comments and Reflections from the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Workshop on Sovereignty and the Right to Intervene, Morocco, May 1992," NUPI Paper #464, May 1992.

26 Thomas G. Weiss and Laura S.H. Holgate, "Collective Security in a Changing World," Report on a World Peace Foundation Project, September 1992.

But they add that "Legitimacy also requires consistency of reaction," and point to the "...inconsistency...between the rapid and forceful response to 1.5 million persons displaced by Iraq's civil war [i.e., the Kurds] and about the same number who were threatened by Liberian civil strife." Precisely the same could be said in regard to Mozambique, Sudan, or Angola. Similarly, Minear notes that "Until late January [1992]...the [UN] Security Council did not even review the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, though it has been comparable since late 1990 in scope and extremity to that in Iraq."27

That search for consistency, and hence legitimacy, is the basic reason for the establishment of criteria. In a series of recent studies, David Scheffer has attempted to set out criteria for humanitarian intervention. He first states

> A modern doctrine of humanitarian intervention should establish the legitimacy of certain types of non-forcible and forcible intervention undertaken without the express consent of the target country's government, but with collective authorization or, in some limited circumstances, unilaterally or multinationally for the purpose of defending or alleviating the mass suffering of people for whom no other alternative realistically exists. That general purpose may be further detailed as intervention:
>
> (1) To rescue or protect citizens abroad and other aliens whose lives are at risk.
> (2) To protect religious or ethnic minorities from genocide or violent oppression.
> (3) To end internal aggression or human rights atrocities.

27 Minear, Policy Focus, 1992, op. cit.

(4) To contain mass migration of people, to return large numbers of displaced people to their rightful homes, to repatriate large numbers of refugees and other migrants or to protect refugeees and migrants from life-threatening circumstances.
(5) To respond to mass human suffering caused by man-made or natural disasters.
(6) To support anti-totalitarian rebellions or other movements of self-determination for independence from oppressive regimes that violate human rights on a large scale.28

Scheffer notes that the first three of these reasons had been standard precedents for intervention. He then poses four questions, and suggests criteria which would serve to answer each:

> (1) Must there be a threat to international peace and security for the Security Council to consider either non-forcible or forcible humanitarian intervention?...
> The historical record establishes all too often that massive violations of human rights within a country or man-made or natural disasters that initially occur in one state inevitably have an impact on regional or international affairs. These "internal" events lead to (1) large refugee migrations, (2) internal armed conflicts, (3) dangerous pressures on the avilability and distribution of regional resources, or (4) transnational environmental and health problems. At a minimum, regional stability is threatened...
> (2) What circumstances should give rise to a right of non-forcible intervention in a nation-state?
> The right of non-forcible humanitarian intervention by international aid agencies should arise when the following criteria are met:
>
> * A man-made or natural disaster occurs and places large numbers of people at risk for their lives in terms of adequate food or shelter, or an act of internal aggression leads to mass killings or

28 David J. Scheffer, "Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention," University of Toledo Law Review 23:2 (Winter 1992):253-293. See also, David J. Scheffer, "Challenges Confronting Collective Security, Humanitarian Intervention," in "Three Views on the Issue of Humanitarian Intervention," D.S. Scheffer et al., United States Institute of Peace, June 1992.

casualties among the civilian population. The commencement of refugee migrations or displacement of large numbers of people within a nation's borders would constitute prima facie evidence of such events.

* The local government is incapable of meeting or is unwilling to meet the humanitarian needs arising from the disaster or act of internal aggression.

* The local government does not seek to forcibly prevent and therefore acquiesces in a non-forcible humanitarian internvention on its territory.

* The Security Council authorizies the intervention, perhaps insisting that the local government permit such action, and, where appropriate, cooperate with U.N. officials in the distribution of aid....

(3) What circumstances should give rise to a right of forcible humanitarian intervention in a state?...

If the people within a country require immediate humanitarian aid, economic sanctions may only exacerbate their plight. In some cases, action will be required within hours or, at most, days. Economic sanctions and anything else short of forcible intervention simply will not work....

One could argue that in those cases in which the humanitarian crisis arises from an act of genocide, the right of forcible humanitarian intervention already is established by the Genocide Convention. It is a right, however, that requires U.N. authorization....

(4) Is collective authorization required to legitimize forcible humanitarian intervention?

In his annual report to the United Nations in September of 1991, then-Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar recommended three criteria for the protection of human rights. First, the principle of protection of human rights must be applied consistently. Second, any international action for protecting human rights must be based on a decision taken in accordance with the U.N. Charter. "It must not be a unilateral act," he wrote. Third, the international action must be proportional to the wrong.29

Scheffer sums up the criteria that should be satisfied in order to justify a unilateral or multilateral humanitarian intervention in the absence of a collective authorization:

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29 D. Scheffer, ibid.

(1) The Security Council is deadlocked indefinitely on the issue and has not explicitly prohibited intervention to meet the humanitarian crisis....
(2) Alternative peaceful remedies, including economic sanctions, have been exhausted within the period of time during which the humanitarian need has not reached crisis dimensions.
(3) The severity of the human rights violations is apparent.
(4) Every effort is made to diversify the intervening forces among many nations. A unilateral intervention can only be justified if efforts to create a multinational force have failed.
(5) The humanitarian purpose and objective of the intervention is paramount.
(6) The intervention will have a convincingly positive effect on human rights in the target country. In other words, more good than harm will come of the intervention.
(7) The long-term political independence and territorial integrity of the target state will not be imperiled by the intervention.30

Scheffer then suggests two tasks for the United Nations to undertake:

to establish the criteria, consistently applied, for non-forcible and forcible humanitarian interventions authorized collectively under the U.N. Charter;

to explore a very narrow range of circumstances in which multinational or unilateral humanitarian interventions might be legitimate.

but adds that the UN should

limit such interventions strictly to humanitarian purposes unless the United Nations or the relevant regional organization has guaranteed a democratic form of government in the target country; [and] ...recognize that a humanitarian intervention might unlease domestic forces that would overthrow the repressive government....31

30 D. Scheffer, ibid.

31 D. Scheffer, ibid.

In a subsequent more popular presentation, Scheffer reduced his discussion to three points:

> * There must be a threat to international peace and security determined by the U.N. Security Council. Such threats now easily encompass humanitarian calamities and can fall far short of genocide, as demonstrated by the Council's own record. Massive violations of human rights within a country can lead to large refugee migrations, internal armed conflicts spilling over national obrders, dangerous pressures on the availability of regional resources, devastated economies with aid burdens stretching far into the next century or transnational environmental catastrophies.
> * The violation of collective human rights must be egregious, unconscionable and so pervasive as to affect thousands of individuals. This internal aggression can include "ethnic cleansing," widespread denial of food and shelter, unjust incarceration of thousands of civilians indetention or concentration camps, rampant torture and rape, indiscriminate shelling and military assaults on civilian populations, and mass casualties and killings of civilians....
> * The local government lacks the capacity or willingness to address humanitarian needs and withholds its consent for or obstructs international humanitarian assistance. Various economic and diplomatic sanctions fail (or there is no time for them to succeed). The military intervention should be collective, authorized under the U.N. Charter, and executed to do more good than harm.32

32 David J. Scheffer, "Drawing the Line Short of Genocide," Washington Post, December 29, 1992.

. Genocides and politicides since World War II.[a]

Country	Duration of episode	Victimized groups	Number of victims[b]	Type of episode
USSR[c]	1943–47	Repatriated Soviet nationals	500–1,100	Repressive
USSR[c]	Nov. 1943–Jan. 1957	Chechens, Ingushi, Karachai, Balkars, Kalmyks	230	Hegemonial
USSR[c]	May 1944 to 1967–68	Meskhetians, Crimean Tatars	57–175	Hegemonial
China	Feb.–Dec. 1947	Taiwanese nationalists	10–40	Repressive
USSR[c]	Oct. 1947–?	Ukrainian nationalists	?	Repressive
Madagascar	Apr. 1947–Dec. 1948	Malagasy nationalists	10–80	Repressive
Malaya	1948–56	Chinese	5–20	Repress./hegem.
PR China	1950–51	Kuomintang cadre, rich peasants, landlords	800–3,000	Revolutionary
N. Vietnam	1953–54	Catholic landlords, rich and middle peasants	15	Revolutionary
Sudan[d]	1952–72+	Southern nationalists	100–500	Repressive
Pakistan[d]	1958–74+	Baluchi tribesmen	?	Repress./hegem.
PR China	1959	Tibetan nationalists, landowners, Buddhists	65	Hegemonial
Iraq[d]	1959–75	Kurdish nationalists	?	Repress./hegem.
Angola	May 1961–62	Kongo, Assimilados	40	Repressive
Algeria	July–Dec. 1962	Harkis, OAS supporters	12–60	Retributive
Paraguay	1962–72	Ache Indians	0.9	Xenophobic
Rwanda	1963–64	Tutsi ruling class	5–14	Retributive
Laos	1963–65	Meo tribesmen	18–20	Revol./repress.
Zaire[e]	Feb. 1964–Jan. 1965	Educated Congolese, missionaries, Europeans	1–10	Revolutionary
S. Vietnam	1965–72	Civilians in NLF areas	475	Repressive
Indonesia	Oct. 1965–66	Communists, Chinese	500–1,000	Repress./xeno.
Burundi[d]	1965–73+	Hutu leaders, peasants	105–205	Repressive
Nigeria	May–Oct. 1966	Ibos living in the North	9–30	Xenophobic
PR China	May 1966–75	Cultural Revolution victims	400–850	Revolutionary
Guatemala	1966–84+	Indians, leftists	30–63	Repressive
India	1968–82	Naxalites	1–3	Repressive
Philippines	1968–85	Moro nationalists	10–100	Repress./hegem.
Eq. Guinea	Mar. 1969–79	Bubi tribe, political opponents of Macias	1–50	Repress./hegem.
Uganda	Feb. 1971–79	Karamojong, Acholi, Lango, Catholic clergy, Amin's political opponents	100–500	Repress./hegem.
Pakistan	Mar.–Dec. 1971	Bengali nationalists	1,250–3,000	Repress./hegem.
Chile	Sept. 1973–76	Leftists	5–30	Retributive
Ethiopia	1974–79	Political opposition	30	Revolutionary
Kampuchea	1975–79	Old regime loyalists, urban people, disloyal cadre, Muslim Cham	800–3,000	Revolutionary
Indonesia	Dec. 1975–present	East Timorese nationalists	60–200	Repress./hegem.
Argentina	1976–80	Leftists	9–30	Repressive
Zaire[d]	1977–83+	Opponents of Mobutu regime	3–4	Repressive
Burma	1978	Muslims in border region	?	Xenophobic
Afghanistan	1978–present	Old regime loyalists, rebel supporters	1,000	Revolutionary
Uganda	1979–Jan. 1986	Karamojong, Baganda, Madi, other Amin supporters	50–200	Retrib./xeno.
El Salvador	1980–present	Leftists	20–70	Repressive
Iran	1981–present	Mujahedeen, Kurds, Baha'is	10–20	Revol./repress.
Syria	Apr. 1981–Feb. 1982	Muslim Brotherhood	5–25	Repressive
Sri Lanka	1983–87	Tamil nationalists	2–10	Repress./hegem.
Ethiopia	1984–85+	Victims of resettlement	?	Revol./repress.

[a] Episodes carried out by or with the complicity of political authorities, directed at distinct ethnic, national, religious, or political groups. In a number of episodes several distinct groups have been victimized. The types of episodes are defined in the text.

[b] As explained in the text, the victims include all civilians reported to have died as a direct consequence of regime action, including victims of starvation and exposure as well as those executed, massacred, bombed, shelled, or otherwise murdered. Numbers of victims are seldom known with any exactitude, and sometimes no reliable estimates of any kind are available. The numbers shown here represent the ranges in which the "best estimates" or guesses lie.

[c] The first three Soviet episodes all began during and as a consequence of World War II but continued well past the war's end, hence are regarded as postwar episodes. The second, third, and fourth Soviet episodes all involved the rapid, forced deportation of national groups to remote areas under conditions in which many died of malnourishment, disease, and exposure. Few of the victims were directly murdered. The terminal dates for the second and third cases represent the dates on which rights of citizenship were restored to the survivors.

[d] These episodes are discontinuous, including two or more distinct periods of mass murder, typically initiated in response to renewed resistance by the victim group.

[e] Killings by the short-lived Congolese People's Republic between February 1964 and the recapture of its Stanleyville capital in January 1965.

Appendix I. *Wars and Conflicts in Developing Economies and Estimates of Related Deaths since the End of World War II*

Region	*Conflict*	*Deaths*[a]		
		Civilian	*Military*	*Total*
Latin America				
Argentina				
1955	Armed forces vs. Peron	2,000	2,000	4,000
1976–79	"Disappearances"	12,000	3,000	15,000
1982	Falklands/Malvinas	0	1,000	1,000
Bolivia				
1952	Revolution vs. government	1,000	1,000	1,000
1955–67	Guerrilla insurgency	. . .	. . .	200,000
Brazil				
1980	Rightist terrorism	. . .	. . .	1,000
Chile				
1973	Military coup vs. Allende government	. . .	. . .	5,000
1974	Executions by military junta	20,000	0	20,000
Colombia				
1948	Conservatives vs. government	. . .	. . .	1,000
1949–62	Liberals vs. conservatives	200,000	100,000	300,000
1980–89	Government vs. left opposition	8,000	0	8,000
Costa Rica				
1948	National Union vs. government	1,000	1,000	1,000
Cuba				
1958–59	Cuban revolution	2,000	3,000	5,000
Dominican Republic				
1965	Civil war/U.S. intervention	1,000	2,000	3,000
El Salvador				
1979–89	FMLN vs. government	50,000	23,000	73,000
Guatemala				
1954	Conservatives vs. government/ U.S. intervention	. . .	. . .	1,000
1966–89	Government vs. URNG vs. military opposition	100,000	38,000	138,000
Honduras				
1969	Soccer War with El Salvador	3,000	2,000	5,000
Jamaica				
1980	Election violence	1,000	0	1,000
Nicaragua				
1978–79	Civil war vs. Somoza government	25,000	10,000	35,000
1981–89	"Contras" vs. Sandinista government	15,000	15,000	30,000
Paraguay				
1947	Liberals vs. conservatives	. . .	. . .	1,000
Peru				
1981–89	Sendero Luminoso vs. government	10,000	5,000	15,000

Appendix I. *Wars and Conflicts in Developing Economies and Estimates of Related Deaths since the End of World War II (continued)*

Region	Conflict	Deaths[a]		
		Civilian	*Military*	*Total*
Middle East				
Cyprus				
1974	National Guard/Turkish invasion	3,000	2,000	5,000
Egypt				
1956	Suez invasion/France, Israel, U.K.	1,000	3,000	4,000
1967–70	Six-Day War; War of Attrition	50,000	25,000	75,000
Iran				
1979–89	Government vs. opposition (esp. Kurds)	. . .	0	17,000
Iraq				
1959	Shammar tribe vs. government	1,000	1,000	2,000
1961–74	Kurds vs. government	. . .	. . .	200,000
1980–88	Iran–Iraq War[b]	. . .	. . .	600,000
1980–89	Government vs. Kurds (KDP, PUK)	. . .	. . .	67,000
Israel				
1948	Arab League vs. Israel	0	8,000	8,000
1973	Yom Kippur War vs. Egypt, Syria	0	16,000	16,000
1987–91	Intifada[b]	3,000	0	3,000
Jordan				
1970	Palestinians/Syrians vs. government	1,000	1,000	2,000
Lebanon				
1958	Civil war	1,000	1,000	2,000
1975–89	Civil war/Syrian and Israeli interventions	. . .	. . .	131,000
Syria				
1982	Government massacre of Muslim Brotherhood at Hamah	10,000	0	10,000
Turkey				
1984–89	Government vs. Kurdish Workers' Party	. . .	. . .	2,000
Yemen, Republic of				
1948	Yahya family vs. government	2,000	2,000	4,000
1962–69	Civil war, including Egyptian intervention	. . .	. . .	101,000
Yemen, PDR				
1986	Civil war	. . .	. . .	10,000
South Asia				
Afghanistan				
1978–89	Civil war/Soviet intervention[b]	. . .	. . .	1,000,000
Bangladesh				
1971	Civil war/Indian intervention	1,000,000	500,000	1,500,000
1975–89	Autonomy struggle in Chittagong	. . .	. . .	1,000

Appendix I. *Wars and Conflicts in Developing Economies and Estimates of Related Deaths since the End of World War II (continued)*

Region	*Conflict*	*Deaths*[a]		
		Civilian	*Military*	*Total*
India				
1946–48	Partition-related strife	800,000	0	800,000
1947–49	India vs. Pakistan over Kashmir	1,000	2,000	3,000
1948	India vs. Hyderabad	1,000	1,000	2,000
1962	Sino-Indian War	1,000	1,000	2,000
1965	India vs. Pakistan/Rann of Kutch War	13,000	7,000	20,000
1971	India vs. Pakistan (associated with Pakistani civil war)	0	11,000	11,000
1983	Assam election violence	3,000	. . .	3,000
1983–89	Ethnic and political violence (largely Sikh autonomy campaign)	. . .	. . .	16,000
Pakistan				
1973–77	Baluchis vs. government/Afghan intervention	6,000	3,000	9,000
Sri Lanka				
1971	Maoists vs. government	1,000	1,000	2,000
1983–89	Government vs. Tamil separatists/Indian intervention/Singhalese People's Liberation Front intervention	. . .	. . .	15,000
Far East				
Burma				
1948–51	Karens vs. government/Chinese intervention	. . .	. . .	8,000
1980	Burma Communist Party vs. government	. . .	. . .	5,000
1981–88	Government vs. opposition (mostly Karen)	0	6,000	6,000
Cambodia				
1970–75	Civil war/Indochina conflict	. . .	. . .	156,000
1975–78	Pol Pot government vs. civilians	1,500,000	500,000	2,000,000
1978–90	Vietnamese invasion and civil war	20,000	50,000	70,000
China				
1946–50	Civil war[b]	5,000,000	1,200,000	6,200,000
1949–54	Land reform movement[b]	4,500,000	0	4,500,000
1949–54	Suppression of counterrevolutionaries[b]	3,000,000	0	3,000,000
1950–51	Takeover of Tibet	0	1,000	1,000
1956–59	Tibetan revolt[b]	. . .	. . .	200,000
1965–75	Cultural Revolution[b]	1,613,000[c]	537,000	2,150,000
1983–84	Government executions	5,000	0	5,000
Indonesia				
1945–46	Independence struggle	4,000	1,000	5,000
1950	Moluccans vs. government	. . .	. . .	5,000
1953	Darul Islam vs. government	. . .	. . .	1,000
1956–60	Communists vs. government	. . .	. . .	30,000

Appendix I. *Wars and Conflicts in Developing Economies and Estimates of Related Deaths since the End of World War II (continued)*

Region	Conflict	Deaths[a]		
		Civilian	Military	Total
Indonesia (continued)				
1965–66	Massacres following attempted coup	500,000	0	500,000
1975–89	Annexation of East Timor	90,000	11,000	101,000
Korea				
1948	Yosu Rebellion	0	1,000	1,000
1950–53	Korean War[b]	3,000,000	1,500,000	4,500,000
Laos				
1960–73	Civil war/Indochina conflict	12,000	12,000	24,000
1975–87	Government/Viet Nam vs. National Liberation Front[b]	30,000	10,000	40,000
Malaysia				
1950–60	UK intervention in civil war	. . .	. . .	13,000
Philippines				
1950–52	Hukbalahop vs. government	5,000	4,000	9,000
1972–87	Muslims (MNLF, MILF)/New People's Army vs. government	20,000	15,000	35,000
1988	Muslims (MNLF, MILF)/New People's Army vs. government	. . .	. . .	2,000
Taiwan (China)				
1954–55	Civil strife	. . .	. . .	5,000
Viet Nam				
1945–54	Independence struggle vs. France[b]	300,000	300,000	600,000
1960–75	N. Viet Nam vs. S. Viet Nam/ United States[b]	1,200,000	1,158,000	2,358,000
1979	China vs. Viet Nam	9,000	21,000	30,000
1980–88	China vs. Viet Nam/border	0	1,000	1,000
Sub-Saharan Africa				
Angola				
1961–75	Independence struggle vs. Portugal	30,000	25,000	55,000
1980–88	Civil war/Cuban-South African intervention[b],	. . .	. . .	500,000
Burundi				
1972	Hutus vs. government/massacre	80,000	20,000	100,000
Cameroon				
1955–60	Independence struggle vs. France	. . .	. . .	32,000
Chad				
1965–89	Government vs. opposition/ Libyan intervention	. . .	. . .	28,000
Ethiopia				
1978	Somalian invasion[b]	. . .	. . .	150,000
1962–89	Eritrean and other opposition vs. government[b]	. . .	. . .	1,000,000
Ghana				
1981	Konkomba vs. Nanumba	. . .	. . .	1,000

Appendix I. *Wars and Conflicts in Developing Economies and Estimates of Related Deaths since the End of World War II (continued)*

Region	*Conflict*	*Deaths*[a]		
		Civilian	*Military*	*Total*
Guinea-Bissau 1962–74	Independence struggle vs. Portugal	5,000	10,000	15,000
Kenya 1952–63	Independence struggle vs. UK	. . .	. . .	15,000
Madagascar 1947–48	Independence struggle vs. France	3,000	2,000	5,000
Mozambique 1965–75	Independence struggle vs. Portugal	. . .	. . .	30,000
1981–88	Civil war[b]	. . .	. . .	900,000
Namibia 1967–89	SWAPO independence struggle vs. South Africa	. . .	. . .	13,000
Nigeria 1967–70	Civil war	1,000,000	1,000,000	2,000,000
1980–81	Fundamentalist Muslims vs. government	. . .	. . .	5,000
1984	Fundamentalist Muslims vs. government	. . .	. . .	1,000
Rwanda 1956–65	Tutsis vs. government/massacre	102,000	3,000	105,000
Somalia 1980–90	Civil strife	5,000	5,000	10,000
South Africa 1985–89	African National Congresss vs. Inkatha[b]	5,000	0	5,000
Sudan 1955–72	Civil war[b]	. . .	. . .	750,000
1983–90	Civil war[b]	500,000	10,000	510,000
Uganda 1966	Bungandans vs. government	1,000	1,000	2,000
1971–78	Idi Amin massacres	300,000	0	300,000
1978–79	Tanzanian invasion	. . .	3,000	3,000
1981–85	Obote government massacres[b]	300,000	0	300,000
1981–89	National Resistance Army vs. government/NRA vs. opposition	100,000	6,000	106,000
Western Sahara 1975–89	Polisario vs. Morocco	4,000	8,000	12,000
Zaire 1960–65	Civil war	. . .	. . .	100,000
Zambia 1964	Civil strife	. . .	. . .	1,000
Zimbabwe 1972–79	Struggle for majority rule	. . .	. . .	30,000
1979–87	Government vs. ZAPU, MNR	20–30,000	0 ~	15,000

Appendix I. *Wars and Conflicts in Developing Economies and Estimates of Related Deaths since the End of World War II (continued)*

Region	Conflict	Deaths[a]		
		Civilian	*Military*	*Total*
Northern Africa				
Algeria				
1954–62	Independence struggle vs. France[b]	. . .	. . .	1,000,000
1962–63	Rebel leaders vs. government	1,000	1,000	2,000
Morocco				
1953–56	Independence struggle vs. France	3,000	0	3,000
Tunisia				
1952–54	Independence struggle vs. France	3,000	0	3,000
Total				40,144,000

Note: Wars are defined as conflicts that result in the death of at least 1,000 individuals and include inter- and intrastate conflicts. While every attempt has been made to include all relevant conflicts, some events meeting the criterion for inclusion may inadvertently have been excluded.

a. The data on war and war-related deaths must be considered approximate. In some cases, particularly those in which large numbers of people have been killed, the estimates can vary substantially. Although data published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute attempt to *exclude* war-related deaths due to famines and disease, an effort has been made to include war-related deaths wherever possible in this list.

b. The estimates for these conflicts have been derived from the private archives of Milton Leitenberg, University of Maryland (see 2 below).

c. Excludes the approximately 6 million deaths in labor camps that occurred during this period.

Source: This list was compiled by Nicole Ball with the assistance of Milton Leitenberg from three major sources:

1. William Eckhardt's table, "Wars and War-Related Deaths, 1700–1987," in Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures: 1987–1988*, Washington, D.C.: World Priorities, 1987, pp. 29–31.

2. The private archives of Milton Leitenberg, University of Maryland, including: R. J. Rummel, *China's Bloody Century: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900*, Transaction Books, (forthcoming), chapters 7, 9, 10, 12 and appendix II; Joseph Eaton, "35 Years After Warsaw, and Genocide is Thriving," *New York Times*, April 19, 1978; United Nations, Africa Recovery Programme/Economic Commission for Africa, *South African Destabilization: The Economic Cost of Frontline Resistance to Apartheid*, New York: October 1989, p. 6; Bernard Brodie, "The Test of Korea," *War and Politics*, New York: Macmillan, 1973, p. 106; Jon Halliday and Bruce Cuming, *Korea: The Unknown War*, New York: Pantheon Books, 1988, p. 200; Larry Minear, "Civil Strife and Humanitarian Aid: A Bruising Decade," in *World Refugee Survey, 1989*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1990; and *Kampuchea in the Seventies. Report of a Finnish Inquiry Commission*, Helsinki, 1982, p. 32.

3. The annual compilations of major armed conflicts published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute since 1987: G. Kenneth Wilson, and Peter Wallensteen, "Major Armed Conflicts in 1987," pp. 285–98, in *SIPRI Yearbook 1988. World Armaments and Disarmament*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988; Karin Lindgren, G. Kenneth Wilson, and Peter Wallensteen, "Major Armed Conflicts in 1988," pp. 339–55, in *SIPRI Yearbook 1989. World Armaments and Disarmament*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989; Karin Lindgren, G. Kenneth Wilson, Peter Wallensteen, and Kjell-Ake Nordquist, "Major Armed Conflicts in 1989," pp. 393–419, in *SIPRI Yearbook 1990. World Armaments and Disarmament*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.

THE PARTICIPATION BY THE ARMED FORCES OF GERMANY AND JAPAN IN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT

With the dramatic increase in the use of peacekeeping by an awakened United Nations following the end of the Cold War, there has been a sharply increased requirement for national contributions of military forcees. One of the more contentious issues that it was possible to overlook before is whether German and Japanese military units should participate in UN or other collaborative international military operations. Both Japan and Germany are among the handful of wealthiest states in the world, and both have superbly armed and trained military forces. On the other hand, both states invaded and conquered numerous neighboring states during WWII, and even carried out military operations thousands of miles from their shores. There is no one, anywhere, who wants a repetition of that experience. In the case of Japan, many of these countries have expressed their opposition to the participation of Japanese troops in peacekeeping operations.

Germany and Japan have constitutions that limit the use of their armed forces outside national territory. The limits were imposed after World War II, as part of a concerted effort to demilitarize German and Japanese society. That effort has succeeded, perhaps beyond anyone's expectations at the time and, indeed, to such

an extent that both countries' governments have a difficult time convincing legislators and publics that their military participation in even so clearly a multilateral, peace-oriented, and constructive endeavor as UN peacekeeping is a good idea. Evidently there are fears in those countries that sending military units to far away lands might reawaken some atavistic imperial urge or re-stimulate German or Japanese forces to dominate their societies.1

The basic questions appear to be as follows:

(1) Should these two states have military forces at all: That has already been decided in both cases, long ago. Since there is no question that this decision will be reversed, it is not discussed further here.

(2) The significance of the precedent of the use of German and Japanese forces beyond the borders of each state: For Germany, due to its long membership in NATO, that too has been determined, at least in part. For Germany, then, the question is whether the geographically permitted area of operations should be extended: (a) only in peacekeeping operations of the United Nations, (b) or in combat

1 William J. Durch and Barry M. Blechman, Keeping the Peace: The United Nations in the Emerging World Order, Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, March 1992, p. 90.

operations of the United Nations as well, (c) or in either sort of operation under ad hoc non-UN international coalitions. For Japan, it is the basic precedent plus its possible elaboration under these various possible frameworks that is at issue.

(3) If one is interested in the greatest likelihood that the armed forces of these two states should never again manifest the behavior that they did during WWII, as many are both within the countries in question and in neighboring states, is that more likely to be achieved if they participate in United Nations or other international coalitional peacekeeping or combat operations, or if they do not? Which carries the greatest risk of the resumption of undesired behavior 25, 50, or 100 years hence?

(4) Finally, are there differences in the situation of Japan and Germany in facing these choices? And if there are, which I think is definitely the case, to what degree should that difference decide on which policy should be selected for the country in question?

The evolution of recent political changes in Germany and Japan regarding these questions is examined below.

Germany

In January 1980, following the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan, Helmut Schmidt, then Chancellor of Germany, stated in a televised interview that the United States responses to the Soviet invasion were too quick, too excessive, and that Afghanistan was "a small country, far away." It was a grotesque reminder, now spoken by a German Social Democratic chancellor, of Neville Chamberlain's 1938 comment that Nazi Germany's demands of Czechoslovakia concerned only "a quarrel in a far-away country, between people of whom we know nothing."2

The United Nations' actions against Iraq in 1990 precipated the requirement in the governments of both Japan and Germany to decide on policies that had not been pressed previously. "Gulf War Sets Off Crisis for Germans" and "Germany Goes to War With Its Conscience" were typical newspaper headlines.3 In 1990-91, it was no longer the Social Democratic party, now in opposition, that was dragging its feet, but the government. "Japanese and German

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2 Schmidt was not alone. French officials as well as German ones fought to make detente "divisible" in order to isolate improved Soviet-West European relations from deteriorating US-Soviet ones.

3 Stephen Kinzer, "Gulf War Sets Off Crisis for Germans," New York Times, February 17, 1991; Robin Gedye, "Germany Goes to War with its Conscience," Sunday Telegraph, February 16, 199?; James Hoagland, "Jitters in Bonn and Tokyo," The Washington Post, March 21, 1991; and Robert Mauthner, "Germany Finds it Hard to Strap on a Helmet," Financial Times, March 20, 1991.

financial and other aid for the Gulf War was grudging, forthcoming only after unremitting arm-twisting."4

Several years before, when Iran threatened Kuwait's oil tankers at the height of the Iran-Iraq War, European allies invoked a Western European Union (WEU) resolution to justify joining US-led naval forces in the Gulf, and Germany contributed several minesweepers. They were only posted to the Mediterranean, however, to replace the ships of other European nations that left their NATO positions to enter the Gulf. In August 1990, when the WEU proposed a new naval task force for operations aimed at Iraq, the German government again sought to participate and did, but again sent ships only to the eastern Mediterranean.5 Germany did eventually send combat aircraft to Turkey, an operational area within its permitted NATO bounds, to defend Turkey from possible air attack. When Chancellor Kohl proposed a constitutional amendment in March 1991 that would have permitted German forces to participate in multinational operations sanctioned by the United Nations, it was opposed

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4 Hobart Rowen, "Japan and Germany Must Take Bigger Military, Policy Making Roles in World Affairs," The Washington Post, March 3, 1991. There was also substantial public opposition in Germany to the war against Iraq. Former Schmidt assistants and senior political commentators such as Theo Sommer and Christoph Bertram expressed their hesitancy and reservations in Die Zeit. See Timothy Garton Ash, "The Gulf in Europe," The New York Review of Books, 38:5 (March 7, 1991):16-18. There were also numerous street demonstrations against the UN operations.

5 Joseph Fitchett, "Bonn, in a Shift, May Send Ships to the Gulf," International Herald Tribune, August 15, 1990.

by both the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and by German Foreign Minister Genscher's party, the Free Democrats.6

Italy, whose post-WWII constitution is far more restrictive than the German one, managed to send troops to fight against Iraq.7 Just exactly what does the Germany constitution say? It states that the Federal Republic "may enter into a system of mutual collective security...to secure a peaceful and lasting order in Europe and among the nations of the world." It bans the preparation for wars of aggression, and it limits the use of the German armed forces to defensive purposes. Ambiguities are substantial.8

The constitution does not specifically name NATO as the exclusive "system of mutual collective security" to which it applies, and one might have thought that an international UN collective security system would take priority over a regional NATO one. Nonetheless, those who insist that the Bundeswehr cannot be used "out-of-area"--that is, beyond the area defined by the NATO Treaty--claim that, historically, the German constitutional provisions were meant to apply only to NATO despite the fact that the text does not establish that explicit geographic restriction. As for

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6 Stephen Kinzer, "Genscher at Eye of Policy Debate," New York Times, March 22, 1991.

7 Michael Lind, "Surrealpolitik," New York Times, March 28, 1991.

8 Oliver Thranert, "Germans Battle Over Blue Helmets," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 48:8 (October 1992): 33-35. The constitutional articles in question are Articles 24, 26, and 87.

political considerations, one might also have thought that with the emphasis that so prominent a Social Democrat as Egon Bahr has given to conceptions of "common security" for over a decade,9 the SPD in particular would have been in the forefront of support for German collaboration in international peacekeeping. That has not been the case.

In May 1991, Willy Brandt, still honorary chairman of the SPD, came out in favor of positions more advanced than those of his party. He stated that he supported military intervention in a country's affairs in cases of gross abuses of human rights, and that he supported changing the German constitution to allow the Bundeswehr to be used outside of NATO in all military operations which were mandated by the United Nations.10 The SPD Party Congress the same month, however, did not follow this recommendation; it voted in favor of allowing German forces to participate in UN peacekeeping efforts, but not participation in military actions carried out under UN command or with UN approval.11 In the spring of 1992, they proposed three further qualifications to any change in the national law:

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9 During the 1980s, Bahr devoted virtually the entire effort of an institute that he heads in Hamburg to producing a series of reports on "common security."

10 David Marsh, "Brandt Presses Europe to Set up Intervention Force," Financial Times, May 10, 1991.

11 Thranert, op. cit., and Katherine Campbell, "SPD Backs German Role in UN Military Missions," Financial Times, May 1-2, 1992.

- A resolution by the UN Security Council mandating the particular deployment would be necessary.
- The consent of the warring parties would be required before German soldiers could serve in peacekeeping units. Service in Somalia, for example, would therefore have been excluded.
- The Bundestag would have to approve each particular commitment of German forces, by a simple majority.12

These qualifications were the result of intra-party compromises; most of the party leadership apparently approved of German participation in UN-commanded combat missions as well. Similar restrictive caveats were also insisted upon by the FDP and Genscher.13

After the 1991 ceasefire in the Gulf War, the German government sent army units to help the Kurds in northern Iraq, minesweepers to help clear Gulf waters, and helicopters to transport UN observers in Iraq. One hundred and fifty German troops were maintaining a hospital for UN forces in the UNTAC misison in Cambodia. In July 1992, the government decided to contribute a destroyer and three maritime patrol aircraft to join the UN and WEU exercise in the Adriatic Sea monitoring (but not enforcing) the economic

12 Thranert, op. cit.

13 "Genscher on FRG Soldiers in Non-UN Missions," and "Genscher Views Employing Blue, Green Helmets," in FBIS-WEU-992-058, March 25, 1992, pp. 14-15.

sanctions imposed by the UN on Serbia.14 This decision was made without consulting the Bundestag. The SPD demanded that these forces be withdrawn and said that it would take the case to the German constitutional court.15 The SPD party leader argued that "the mission was unnecessary and would be of no help to the people of the former Yugoslavia."16 Interestingly, the Adriatic is not outside the NATO operations area, which the SPD accepts.

The government supported its case by citing the use of German forces in non-interventionist supporting actions over the preceeding 30 years. These included participation in UNEF (Middle East) in 1973, UNIFIL (Lebanon) in 1978, UNTAG (Namibia) in 1988, UNOCA (Central America) in 1989-1991, MINURSO (Western Sahara) since 1991, UNSCOM (Iraq) since 1991, and UNAMIC (Cambodia) since 1991.17 The Bundestag, in an emergency meeting on the day after the SPD protest, supported the government's deployments with the WEU/UN monitoring group.18

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14 Francine Kiefer, "Germany Tiptoes Toward Greater Use of Military," Christian Science Monitor, July 16, 1992.

15 Christopher Parkes, "SPD Puts Embargo Monitoring in Doubt," Financial Times, July 22, 1992.

16 Christopher Parkes, "SPD Demands Destroyer Pull-Out," Financial Times, July 25, 1992.

17 "Fruhere Leistungen der Bundesregierung fur die VN," Informationen zur Sicherheitspolitik, Bundesministerium des Verteidigung, Bonn, June/July 1992, p. 9.

18 Marc Fisher, "Parliament Backs Kohl on German Naval Role; Opposition Fought Sending Ships to Adriatic," The Washington Post, July 23, 1992.

After the UN Secretary-General released his report An Agenda for Peace, requesting national contributions to a stand-by UN force, Mr. Boutros-Ghali said in an interview in August 1992, that he would welcome German troops in such a force. The new German Foreign Minister (who had succeeded Genscher) stated that he welcomed the participation of German troops, but he pointedly also commented on SPD calls that Germany seek a permanent seat on the UN Security Council by adding that such considerations required Germany to fulfill all responsibilities of a UN member nation. "These include readiness to take part in peacekeeping...and in peacemaking actions under UN auspices."19 In November 1992 the SPD reiterated its position; it would agree to German forces taking part in UN peacekeeping, with case by case approval etc., but not "peacemaking."20

In December 1992, Chancellor Kohl announced that the government would send a supply battalion of 1,500 troops, only after fighting had ceased--and if it survived an expected court challenge--to join the UN forces in Somalia.21 The SPD party leader immediately criticized the offer as unconstitutional and "clearly a provocation of

19 Christopher Parkes, "Kinkel Calls for SPD to Ease Stand on Military," Financial Times, August 7, 1992.

20 Steve Vogel, "German Party Ends Opposition to Peace-keeping Role for Army," The Washington Post, November 18, 1992, and Tyler Marshall, "Opposition Backs UN Role for German Troops," Los Angeles Times, November 18, 1992.

21 Steve Vogel, "Kohl Vows to Send 1,500 Troops to Somalia," The Washington Post, December 18, 1992.

parliament." At the same time, SPD leaders voiced support for using German troops in Somalia, and, in general, to permit involvement in the military protection of humanitarian aid convoys, but only after the constitution was amended to limit German participation to peacekeeping missions. On January 11, 1993, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali paid a two-day official visit to Germany, several days before a parliamentary vote on the peacekeeping/peacemaking issue. He stated during a press conference, "We need the full participation of Germany in peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcement, and peace-building operations if we want a strong United Nations."22 He added that German troops would be welcome in Cambodia (where they already were), Mozambique, and Somalia. The UN Secretary-General's appeal did not help. The Social Democrats refused to alter their position in the Bundestag vote several days later, although the government's proposal included the provision that any NATO or WEU "out-of-area" deployment would need a two-thirds majority approval in parliament on each individual occasion.23

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22 Craig Whitney, "UN Chief Asks Bonn for Troops, Underlining Constitutional Issue," New York Times, January 12, 1993, and Judy Dempsey, UN Set to Press Bonn on Greater Role for Military," Financial Times, January 11, 1993.

23 Quentin Peel, "Bonn Agreement on Asylum--But Not on Army," Financial Times, January 16-17, 1993.

Japan

The constitutional issue was clearer in Japan, despite its major amendments in past decades. Article 9 of Japan's 1947 Constitution--which was drafted by American officials in the Occupation Forces--states,

> Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

Nevertheless, the "Self-Defense Forces" (SDF) were established in 1954. Whatever they may be called, Japan has had an Army, Navy, and Air Force since that time, and they are among the world's best equipped and trained military forces. (Japan's military expenditure is the sixth highest in the world.) The 1954 Self-Defense Forces law and subsequent reintepretations of Article 9 did set out several clear constraints on the use of the SDF forces:

- They could not be sent to any other country.
- Defense cooperation was limited to the United States.1

1 Aside from the US-Japanese defense treaty, Japanese aid to the US was substantial in both the Korean and the Vietnam Wars. In the Korean War, logistics and supplies all

- Japan did not have the right to participate in other international military collective security arrangements.
- The SDF could be used only for the defense of Japan against an armed attack on Japanese territory.

The patrol area for the Japanese Navy was extended, however, to 1,000 miles from Japan's coast in recent years.

It was again Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the ensuing 1990-91 Persian Gulf crisis that precipitated over two years of political examination of the issue of Japanese participation in UN peacekeeping. Japan was severely criticized for the fact that its contribution to the allied effort was only in terms of financial support and was not very forthcoming. Seventy percent of Japan's oil comes from the Middle East, and in 1980, at the onset of the Iran-Iraq War, a Japanese minister had called on the United States Navy to maintain the freedom of oil supplies to Japan from the Gulf. In October 1990, before the outbreak of war, Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu presented a Peace Cooperation Bill to the Japanese Diet. This legislation would have permitted the government to send SDF forces to the Gulf in non-combat support roles.2 The bill was defeated but public

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essentially went through Japan, and much materiel repair and small munitions production took place in Japan. During the Vietnam War, US naval bases in Japan repaired and serviced portions of the US attack fleets that served off the Vietnamese coast in the South China Sea.

2 Larry A. Niksch and Robert G. Sutter, Japan's Response to the Persian Gulf Crisis: Implications for US-Japan Relations, 91-444-F (Washington, D.C.: Congressional

debate produced several suggestions of varying degrees of practicality.3

The first, an agreement between the governing party and two opposition parties, proposed the formation of a volunteer Japanese corps without participation of the SDF. Since 1988, Japan had participated in several UN peacekeeping operations, in the form of civilian election monitoring personnel. A second suggestion envisioned cooperative units combining Japanese forces with those from other Asian countries that already had peacekeeping experience: India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Nepal. In April 1991, after the war had ended, and with the Diet's approval, Japan did send four Navy minesweepers to the Gulf to aid minesweeping operations.4 During the Vietnam War, the Japanese government had rejected a US request to send minesweepers to Southeast Asian waters, and during the 1987-88 naval operation to protect Kuwaiti oil tankers from

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Research Service, Library of Congress, May 23, 1991; Eugene Brown, The Debate Over Japan's International Role: Contending Views of Opinion Leaders during the Persian Gulf Crisis, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, July 17, 1991; and Ian Buruma, "The Pax Axis," New York Review of Books, 38:8 (April 25, 1991): 25-28, 38-39.

3 T.R. Reid, "Kaifu Abandons Bill to Send Troops to Gulf," The Washington Post, November 8, 1990.

4 Naoki Usi, "Japanese Politicians Debate Country's Role in Post-War Gulf," Defense News, March 25, 1991; T.R. Reid, "Japan May Help Sweep Mines From Persian Gulf Waters," The Washington Post, April 12, 1991; Robert Delfs, "Japan: SDF May Be Given UN Peace-keeping Role," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 6, 1991;, and Don Oberdorfer, "Japan: Searing For Its International Role," The Washington Post, June 17, 1991.

attack during the Iran-Iraq War, a government suggestion to send minesweepers to the Gulf had been blocked by opposition parties. A second government proposal, to send Japanese transport aircraft to help ferry refugee workers from Iraq back to their homelands, had to be shelved for lack of parliamentary support. In 1990-91, public opinion shifted rapidly on the issue: in October 1990, only 23 percent of the public suported the Peace Cooperation Bill, but in April 1991, once a ceasefire was in effect, 75 percent suported sending the minesweepers.

In September 1991, Prime Minister Kaifu introduced a new "Peace-keeping Battalion Bill." The law authorized the deployment of up to 2,000 SDF personnel to carry out non-combat tasks such as refugee relief, construction, transport, medical care and clearing ocean mines--only as part of authorized UN peacekeeping missions and only after a ceasefire is in place.5 The bill could not be passed without the votes of two non-socialist opposition parties, Komeito and the Democratic Socialists. The Socialist and Communist parties remained adamantly opposed to any overseas deployment of Japanese forces under any circumstances, whether linked to UN peacekeeping or any other. (These parties also claimed that Japan's financial contributions to

5 T.R. Reid, "Japan May Let Troops Do Peace-keeping Duty: Leaders Agree on Bill as Opinion Shifts," The Washington Post, September 20, 1991; Steven Weisman, "Tokyo Debates Offering Troops to UN," New York Times, September 20, 1991; and Steven Weisman, "Japan May Send Forces Abroad," New York Times, December 4, 1991.

the costs of the war against Iraq also violated the Japanese constitution.)

After many months of debate, the bill was finally passed in June 1992. It contained additional constraints that had been required to gain the approval of the two non-socialist opposition parties. All missions involving more direct peacekeeping duties such as monitoring a ceasefire or collecting weapons would be postponed--"frozen"--for an indefinite period, but for at least three years. An additional act of Parliament would be necessary to end the freeze, and each subsequent deployment would have to be approved by Parliament.6 Participation in "peacemaking" operations or any direct military action under UN Security Council resolutions, such as the war against Iraq, was still out of the question. Prime Minister Miyazawa stated that such activities clearly violated the Japanese constitutional provisions against "using military force overseas."

The passage of the bill was opposed by most of the Asian countries Japan had invaded during WWII and earlier: China, Singapore, South Korea.7 (In July 1992, South Korea

6 David Sanger, "Tokyo Bid to Send Troops Overseas Suffers a Setback; Accord With Opponents, Peacekeeping Force Accepted, But Parliament Would Vote on Sending it Abroad," New York Times, June 1, 1992; T.R. Reid, "Japan to Dispatch Peacekeepers; Intense Upper House Debate Ends in Approval, Dropping Taboo Born of War," The Washington Post, June 9, 1992; "Japan As A Peacekeeper," The Washington Post, June 12, 1992; and "Japan's Healthy Military Allergy," New York Times, June 2, 1992.

7 David Sanger, "Japan's Troops May Sail, And the Fear is Mutual," New York Times, June 21, 1992, and Stefan Wagstyl,

had itself announced that it would contribute combat troops to UN peacekeeping operations, as well as non-combat personnel for observer and medical missions.)8 Japanese public opinion seemed to be split about 50:50. Opposition both at home and abroad arose out of the fear of a "toe in the door." In the words of a Chinese official at a symposium in Tokyo, "What we are worried about is not the present but the future. The fear is that the [peacekeeping troop dispatch] law is a start in a bad direction."9 Nonetheless, in October 1992, the first 200 Japanese military engineers joined the UNTAC mission in Cambodia and 400 more followed.10 (The entire UNTAC operation is, of course, headed by a Japanese UN official, Yasushi Akashi.)

Six months after the passage of the peacekeeping legislation, Japan's governing Liberal Democratic Party leaders decided to initiate a process that is expected to take years to complete. They suggested amending Article 9 of the Japanese constitution to permit participation in peacekeeping and they proposed establishing a commission to consider the question. They also called for the

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"Public's Mistrust of Militarism is Rekindled," Financial Times, June 17, 1992.

8 "Seoul Lets Its Forces Aid UN, With Limits," Reuters, July 24, 1992.

9 Sam Jameson, "Japanese Official Criticizes China's 'Fussing'," Los Angeles Times, September 8, 1992.

10 Peter McKillop, "Japan's G-Rated Adventure. Tokyo Sends Peacekeepers on Their First Mission," Newsweek, October 19, 1992.

"unfreezing" of the restricted portions of the 1992 legislation, and the procurement of long-range transport aircraft and ships to move Japanese forces to peacekeeping missions.11

The last suggestion is certainly unnecessary and strikes a troubling note. Such systems could easily be seen as giving Japanese forces greater potential long-range offensive capability. There are no apparent difficulties at present in moving Japanese peacekeeping contributions via commercial carriers or transport provided by other nations, in the same way that the peacekeeping contingents of many other nations whose military services do not own their own long-range transportare moved to the areas in which they are to serve. In short, there is no need to acquire longer-range hardware for Japan to participate in UN peacekeeping operations. After Japan has been contributing to UN peacekeeping missions to everyone's satisfaction for a decade, and if there is then an apparent need for long-range transport, the issue can be considered at that time.

In February 1993, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali unceremoniously jumped into the Japanese domestic debate,

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11 David Sanger, "Japanese Discuss Widened Military; Foreign Minister Wants Law Changed So Peacekeeping Role Can be Expanded," New York Times, January 10, 1993; Charles Leadbeater, "Tokyo to Review Future of Peace Constitution," Financial Times, January 14, 1993; David Sanger, "Japanese Debate Taboo Topic of Military's Role," New York Times, January 17, 1993; T.R. Reid, "Miyazawa Faces Revolt in Party," International Herald Tribune, February 3, 1993; T.R. Reid, "Reformers Eye Japan's Beloved Constitution," Washington Post, February 6, 1993.

apparently with little care or preparation, although perhaps under pressure from the failure of other governments to assign additional troops to peacekeeping operations in Africa. In advance of a trip to Japan, he suggested that Japan should change its constitution to permit it to join peacekeeping operations, adding that such an amendment would "facilitate" Japan's "greater political role in the UN."12 He thus joined the peacekeeping deployment issue and Japan's effort to obtain a permanent UN Security Council seat. Once in Japan, however, he felt compelled to withdraw the suggestion for constitutional change. He then requested Japanese troop participation in the UN forces serving in Somalia, withdrew that suggestion also, and replaced it with the sugestion that a Japanese deployment to Mozambique would be more suitable, since "There is a solid ceasefire agreement and operations are under way for rehabilitation of refugees."13 He also expressed the hope that Japanese forces could serve in UN mission in Latin America as well as in Africa.

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12 David Sanger, "UN Chief's Advice Stirring Japanese Criticism," New York Times, February 7, 1993.

13 "Boutros-Ghali Asks Miyazawa to Send Troops to Africa; Japan Cool on UN Peacekeeping Plea," Financial Times, February 17, 1993; T.R. Reid, "Boutros-Ghali Recruits Soldiers in Japan; UN Secretary-General Calls for 'More Participation' in Peace-keeping Missions," Washington Post, February 19, 1993; David Sanger, "UN Chief Presses Japan's Leaders to Widen Role in Peacekeeping," New York Times, February 19, 1993; and Charles Leadbeater, "Japan Closer to an Enhanced UN Role," Financial Times, February 19, 1993.

International law specialists such as Richard Gardner and John Ruggie have argued that,

> Japan has, like every other signatory of the United Nations Charter, a solemn obligation to negotiate an Article 43 agreement with the United Nations that puts fighting forces, not simply peacekeeping troops, at the disposal of the Security Council.14

Obligation or not, no member of the United Nations has yet entered into such an agreement, and none has done so since the Secretary-General's call for member nations to assign stand-by forces for use by the United Naitons. However, if enhanced peacekeeping by the United Nations is a desirable goal for the world, then German and Japanese forces should not be omitted from participating in them. If one were nevertheless absolutely convinced that it was in the best long-term interest of international peace that they should not, then the only alternative suggestion perhaps is that the two countries between them should share 50 percent of the international peacekeeping and peacemaking budget, which would include operations such as the war against Iraq. Japan's UN peacekeeping assessment is presently 12.5 percent and Germany's is 10 percent.

There are two major factors which do affect this question differently for Japan than for Germany. First, for

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14 John Ruggie, "Japan Had to Join in UN Peacekeeping Effort," (Letter to the Editor), New York Times, June 18, 1992. Gardner's inclusion of the same point is cited in the section on peacekeeping.

nearly four decades, Germany has been integrated into a military alliance with the European states it invaded during WWII. It is that integration of forces and parallel experience of common political decisionmaking at the government level that gives Germany's allies the confidence that they would not again face an independent resurgence of the German military into an offensive force that might invade its neighbors. It has been the German Social Democratic Party that has been the opponent of Germany military participation in expanded peacekeeping activities, not its NATO or WEU allies. Regarding Japan, the situation is quite different: precisely because of its postwar constitution, and for better or for worse, Japanese politicans and the Japanese military have not spent the past decades being acculturated in a common alliance with the states it invaded during WWII.15 Furthermore, those states still do not trust Japan and continue to fear and oppose its remilitarization.

Second, Japan has never, to the slightest degree, gone through the process of total societal acknowledgement of guilt and responsiblity for Japanese actions during WWII, either for its invasion of neighboring states (Burma, China, Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines) or for historic atrocities carried out in particular Asian cities (Manila,

15 In addition, in NATO, the United States was always present as the dominant partner, and the number of Germany's alliance partners--fifteen--established a substantial counterbalance to Germany.

Nanking, Singapore). Whether as complete as it might have been or not, by and large Germany, its political leadership, and its citizenry did go through such a process.16 This is perhaps the greatest danger of all. A single, euphemistic word or phrase, uttered once every few years by a Japanese official, does not substitute for a process of national understanding of responsibility. That national understanding is nearly totally absent in Japan despite the apparent continued desire of large portions of the Japanese population to maintain their "peace" constitution. There are too many senior politicians in the Liberal Democratic Party which has governed Japan for the past decades that appear so "unreconstructed" that they see little or nothing wrong in Japan's WWII activities. As long as that is the case, it is difficult to trust them not to be motivated to repeat expansionist policies.

Nevertheless, the basic question remains the same: for the long-term future, which process is more likely to lead to the peaceful evolution of Japan's role in the world and its avoidance of any future aggressive use of its military forces? Its present integration in UN peacekeeping operations, somewhat as a late analogue to Germany's NATO alliance experience, or leaving it permanently outside that structure? Either choice might work out well, and either

16 Former East Germans did not, but both the Bundeswehr and the German government remain inheritors of West Germany's postwar history.

choice could lead to undesirable results. Once the precedent of overseas deployment has occurred and has been legitimized, it is obviously easier to envision the beginning of a process with untoward restuls, in contrast to the absolute firebreak of "no overseas activities." Nevertheless, it would seem that integrating the Japanese government and its military into the framework of collaborative UN peacekeeping stands the better chance of producing the same long-term outcome as occurred in Germany via NATO. Should a collaborative regional security regime which included Japan begin to develop in Asia in the coming years, that would presumably help the same evolution. The past and present role of the United States in the Pacific theater is not likely to continue indefinitely. Interestingly, the Japanese government appears to have begun to talk to other Asian states, in very general terms, about such possibilities.17

17 Paul Blustein, "Japan Nudges Asia to Assume Larger Regional Security Role; Miyazawa Stresses Need to Keep US Forces," The Washington Post, January 17, 1993.

IRAQ

Due to the extensive public record on events in Iraq since its invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, little is said here. However, it is clear that for two years, the Iraqi government has followed a persistent policy of delay, interference, and repeated attempts at evasion and circumvention in regard to the United Nations Security Council resolutions to which it agreed at the end of the war. Examples of these policies have been:

- inaccurate declarations of its inventories and programs for producing weapons of mass destruction;
- impeding access of United Nations inspection teams in their search for materials in relation to such weapons and production complexes;
- continued refusal to supply all submissions that have been requested;
- military campaigns against the Kurdish population in the north of Iraq and the Shia population in the south and in the marshes;
- violations of various trade embargoes included in the UN sanctions;
- violation of the prohibition against flights of military aicraft;
- establishment of new Iraqi police posts on the Kuwaiti side of the border;

- physical harrassment, grenade and bombing attacks leading to the death and wounding of United Nations and relief personnel in the north; and

- in December 1992, the emplacement of explosives in trucks making up convoys of aid suplies to the Kurdish population in the north.

The UN reply to the last of these infractions was to halt the convoys and to demand that Iraq assure safe conditions for their resumption and continuance.1 The sorry response was precisely what Iraq presumably hoped to achieve, and it is difficult to imagine that Iraqi officials will be much troubled by the admonition. The United Nations had threatened military action on three previous occasions in order to force Iraq's compliance with UN resolutions following the end of the war:

- to force the withdrawal of Iraqi forces attacking Kurds in the North so that the Kurds could return from Turkey and Iran to safe havens within Iraq;

- to obtain access for UN inspectors to particular sites; and,

- to ensure the destruction of ballistic missile manufacturing equipment.

Iraq's general and persistent policy of non-compliance led the UN Security Council to renew economic sanctions on

1 "Aid Trucks Damaged," The Washington Post, December 1, 1992, and "UN Suspends Aid to Kurds in Iraq: Tells Baghdad to Insure that Explosives Are Not Put on Trucks Headed North, New York Times, December 20, 1992.

November 23, 1992 for at least an additional six months, and it reaffirmed that policy on January 25, 1993.

Iraq has been at war except for four years since Saddam Hussein assumed total political control of the country in 1979. That does not, however, motivate the present government towards a presently peaceful evolution. Iraq deliberately provoked--virtually invited--the bombing attack on its own air defense systems by allied forces on January 13, 1993. Saddam Hussein must therefore see political benefit in the policies that he has followed to interfere as much as possible with various United Nations operations, whether to split the 1990 UN coalition, to win the support of Muslim nations in lifting the UN embargo, or for other reasons.2 The policies can, therefore, be expected to continue.

It is also extremely important to recall that in the first half of 1988, Iraq carried out a genocidal campaign against its Kurdish population that received little international attention at the time, but was the cause of the panic with which the Kurds fled northern Iraq in 1991 when Iraqi government forces attacked them once again.3 The

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2 "Two insightful articles reviewing the motives of Saddam's policies are Roger Matthews, "Deadlocked in a Costly Embrace," and David White, "Uncertain Success," both in Financial Times, January 15, 1993.

3 J.W. Clay, "Iraq Crushes the Kurds," Cultural Survival Quarterly 13:2 (1989): 1; Cultural Survival Quarterly 12:2 (1988): 55-57; J. Miller, "Iraq Accused: A Case of Genocide," New York Times Magazine, January 3, 1993; Raymond Bonner, "Always Remember," The New Yorker, September 28, 1992, pp. 46-65; P.E. Tyler, "The Kurds: It's Not Genocide,

1988 "Al Anfal" campaign followed a general policy in which 1.5 million Iraqi Kurds had been forcibly removed from their homes and over 3,000 villages were destroyed since 1970. It was a classic extermination campaign in the WWII German style, with motorized extermination units systematically massacring men, women, and children in regional sweeps, village by village. There is no reason to think that Iraq's present government has given up these proclivities, aside from their forced inhibition at present by allied forces. It is also interesting that some of the old-style "intervention" has also been reinitiated involving Kurdish insurgent groups in the North. Both the Iraqi and Iranian governments are presently aiding the (Turkish) PKK Kurdish insurgents who have been fighting Turkish government forces in southeastern Turkey for the last few years.4

Members of the UN that participated in the coalition to expel Iraq from Kuwait in 1991 have found it difficult to agree on what military action to take in response ot Iraq's violation of particular UN Security Council resolutions. For example, France, the United States, and various Arab states have not agreed on when to respond, and if so, in what way to respond. In addition, the issue of glaringly

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But Iraq's Policy of Repression and Relocation is Still Horrific," The Washington Post, September 5, 1988; and J. Hoagland, "Make No Mistake--This is Genocide; Iraq's Final Solution for Its Kurds," The Washington Post, September 8, 1988.

4 "Iran is Reported to Aid Turkish Kurds in Iraq," New York Times, October 25, 1992.

inequitable enforcement by the UN of resolutions directed at other states--Serbia and Israel--is raised. These, together with the inability of members of the European Community as well as the UN Security Council to agree for two solid years on what action to take against Serbia for its wars against Croatia and then Bosnia, are probably unfortunate harbingers of what may happen if the United Nations becomes the determining source of international response to aggression or genocide, as it should be and as most hope that it will be.

The danger is that in most cases disagreement may lead to no action, even without the earlier US-USSR "cold war" division that made inaction a virtual certainty. Even in cases where states are more or less in basic agreement, problems of interpretation of legal niceties seem easily able to overcome action to redress blatant aggression. In part, this is a residue of the past 40 years of United Nations practice in passing resolutions that "condemn," "request," or even "demand" that a nation cease an activity that is in violation of particular portions of the UN charter, without including provisions for enforcement or specifying every possible activity that enforcement might subsequently require.

This is exemplified in the disagreements that arose regarding air attacks on Iraq in January 1993. UN Security Council Resolution 688 "demanded" that Iraq end its repression of minorities (the Kurds in the North and Shia in

the South) and "called on" the UN Secretary-General and member nations to take care of the humanitarian needs of these groups being attacked. But there were no enforcement provisions, nor any reference to no-fly zones, although it became obvious that such mechanisms--aside from destroying the Iraqi government--were the only way the UN's "demand" and "call" could be achieved.

The Iraqi government has never ceased to be in violation of significant portions of the UN resolutions that ended combat operations in 1991--most particularly its large-scale military operations against the Shia in the south--and therefore UN forces could (and should) have carried out punitive military responses at any time over the last two years. Nevertheless, while stating that "Since the end of August we have been committed to united action to protect the populations above the 32nd and below the 36th parallels," a French government official expressed dissatisfaction that a US attack on an Iraqi factory had produced "collateral damage"--perhaps a dozen civilian deaths.5 That overrode the absence of any UN response to the Iraqi government's year-long military campaign in Southern Iraq, which has very likely killed thousands of Shia. No less than eight Iraqi divisions have been destroying Shiite areas in the south for most of the year.

5 Sharon Wakman, "France Criticizes Attack on Iraq," The Washington Post, January 21, 1993, and Stanley Meisler, "Bush's Blows at Iraq Raise Troubling Questions," Los Angeles Times, January 21, 1993.

In the north, 750,000 Kurds are still displaced, and "the UN is still trying to enlist the consent and assistance of President Saddam Kussein's regime in relief operations aimed at helping people it has identified as victims of that same regime."6 The hypocrisy of the French statement is clear. Neither the French government nor the UN has taken any military action "to protect the populations . . . below the 36th parallel."

To complicate matters even further, at the end of January 1993, President Yeltsin began to criticize US policy on Iraq for a tendency to "dictate terms."7 Yeltsin had heretofore resisted Russian nationalist politicians who strongly opposed Russian collaboration in the UN Security Council with the United States and other Western governments regarding sanctions placed on both Iraq and Serbia. On January 26, 1993, Yeltsin signed a decree assigning coordination of foreign policy to the Russian Security Council, which includes military and internal security officials in addition to the Foreign Minister. This reversed a three-month old decree that had assigned the

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6 Edward Mortimer, "A Victim of Its Own Success," Financial Times, January 22, 1993, and Jonathan Randal, "Variety of Obstacles Keeping Food and Fuel From Iraqi Kurds," The Washington Post, January 22, 1993.

7 Serge Schmemann, "Yeltsin Critical of US Role in Balkans and Iraq," New York Times, January 25, 1993, and Fred Hiatt, "Yeltsin: US Likes to 'Dictate': Criticism Suggests Moscow Seeks More Independent Foreign Policy," The Washington Post, January 26, 1993.

leading role in establishing foreign policy to the Foreign Ministry.8

The end of US-Soviet antagonism in the Security Council has been critical to permitting the degree of UN activity that has been achieved in the past several years. Should President Yeltsin seriously begin to move Russia away from a policy of cooperation against aggression in the Security Council, UN capability to act under Chapter 7 provisions could revert to the state of paralysis that existed before 1989.

8 Serge Schemann, "Russian Sensitivities: As Choices Become Harder, Moscow Grows Skeptical About US Policies," New York Times, January 27, 1993.

LIBERIA

In December 1989, Charles Taylor, an American prison escapee, crossed into Liberia from Cote d'Ivoire with 100 men to begin an effort to topple President Samuel Doe.1 Doe had taken power a decade earlier in a military coup, and received US support for most of his tenure.2 During the fighting, the troops of Doe and Taylor both massacred members of opposing tribal groups in particularly ghastly fashion. Taylor's forces massacred Krahns and Mandignos, as these two tribes had been the basis of Doe's support. The United States Navy positioned ships off the Liberian coast, but only to evacuate Americans and other foreign nationals, not to get involved in the war.

> To many Liberians, it remained inconceivable that the trust they had in America to come to their rescue in times of such crisis could be callously betrayed....The

1 Taylor had escaped from a federal prison in Massachusetts. "An Avoidable African War," The Washington Post, November 9, 1992.

2 Doe had received more than $500 million in US aid during the 1980s. (K.B. Richburg, "Liberians Ask Why US Avoided Their War. Move to Intervene in Somalia Raises Questions About Policy Towards 'America's Stepchild'," The Washington Post, December 4, 1992.) Doe had also been friendly with Libyan Col. Muamar el-Qaddafi at the time that he carried out his coup in 1980. It is not inconceivable that Qaddafi's support for Taylor nine years later was his opportunity to compensate for having previously lost a postential ally to US largesse. (J.S. Kappia, "US Interference in Liberia Will Backfire," Letter to the Editor, New York Times, August 8, 1990.)

2,000 US Marines off the coast...did no more than keep vigil over the carnage playing before their eyes.3

The insurgency was successful, but one of Taylor's military subordinates established his own armed force and both men declared themselves President. Other contending forces were those loyal to an interim appointed president who nominally holds international recognition, and factions composed of Doe's former government armed services. Over a period of two years, these different factions formed, dissolved, and reformed shifting alliances too complex to detail here.4

Intermittent fighting during that period displaced 1 million Liberians from their homes--out of a total population of 2.5 million--and caused an estimated 60,000 deaths. Weapons for Taylor's forces are supplied by Libya via Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire.5 Fighting has been interpersed every few months with negotiations mediated by ECOWAS, the sixteen-member Economic Community of West African States. These negotiations have produced numerous

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3 B.F. Enoanyi, a Camerounian journalist, quoted in K.B. Richburg, op. cit.

4 These factional alliances and enemies are set out in detail on pages 444-446 in Birger Heldt, et al., "Major Armed Conflicts in 1991," SIPRI Yearbook 1992. World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

5 J.M. Goshko, "US Says Burkina Faso is Aiding Rebels," The Washington Post, November 11, 1992, and P. da Costa, "A Solution to the Liberia Quagmire," Africa Report, September-October 1992, p. 25.

agreements and truces, all eventually broken by the contending parties. In the late summer of 1990, a peace formula proposed by ECOWAS included the sending of a peacekeeping force to establish a ceasefire, an interim government, and preparations for elections.

What is of interest in the history of the Liberian conflict is the role of ECOWAS and the seven-nation military expeditionary force that it sent to Liberia named ECOMOG, and the participation of other regional intervening states. Nigeria, Guinea, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Mali, and Togo originally contributed forces to ECOMOG, and Senegal joined subsequently. The force is reported to presently number 12,000 men, and is commanded by a Nigerian general.6 The United States has supported the costs of the ECOMOG force by providing $28 million to ECOWAS.7

Taylor proclaimed himself president before ECOMOG troops could arrive, and when they did in August 1990, he attacked them. He was aided by troops from Burkina Faso. In March 1991, Taylor's forces and Sierra Leonean dissidents attacked Sierra Leone, one of the members of the ECOMOG mission. Nigeria and Guinea sent troops to aid Sierra Leone. Fighting in Seirra Leone continued until December

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6 The numbers available in the public press seem to be in dispute, variously given as 7,000, 11,000, and 12,000. See P. da Costa, op. cit, and "Rebels Driven Back," Jane's Defense Weekly, October 31, 1992.

7 "US Supports ECOWAS Peacekeeping in Liberia," Press Statement, US Department of State, October 16, 1992.

1991, unquestionably satisfying the established criteria of the United Nations as "a threat to international peace." Sierra Leone did call for UN involvement, and ECOWAS asked the Security Council to establish sanctions. Taylor controls nearly all Liberian territory except for the capital and his forces were managing a lucrative export of Liberian natural resources to European markets through Liberia's three major ports. ECOWAS wanted the three ports to be blockaded, which could easily have been done by a coalition of naval vessels from UN members, NATO, or the US.8

Early in October 1992, Taylor signed an agreement with the interim president and with ECOWAS negotiators. It called for encampment and disarmament of all Liberian fighting forces within 60 days, to be followed by elections within six months. Similar accords had been signed in October 1991 and in April 1992. The plan was supposed to take effect with a ceasefire on November 10. Despite signing the agreement, Taylor's forces never stopped fighting. Instead, they initiated an offensive on October 21 against the capital and the ECOMOG forces within it. On November 22, the UN Security Council unanimously approved a resolution imposing an arms embargo on the warring parties in Liberia.9 The request from ECOWAS to internationalize a

8 P. da Costa, op. cit.

9 Dan Oberdorfer and Andy Mosher, "Nigerian: UN Vote Seen as 'Beginning of the End' of Liberia's War," The Washington Post, November 22, 1992.

trade embargo was not taken up, nor is there any enforcement prvision to the arms embargo.

CAMBODIA

Led by the United States and the West, the United Nations had for a decade recognized the Khmer Rouge, the exiled perpetrators of genocide against the Cambodian population, as the legitimate government of Cambodia, on the basis of foreign military intervention by Vietnam and the establishment of a Vietnamese puppet government.

On October 23, 1991, after thirteen years of civil war and several years of negotiation, the "Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict" was signed in Paris between the four contending parties: the government, the Khmer Rouge, and two other factions that had fought the Vietnamese-established government but who also opposed the Khmer Rouge to varrying degrees. The settlement had been drafted by the United Nations Security Council at the end of 1990. It invited the Security Council to establish UNTAC, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, which would be the most complex and ambitious peacekeeping operation in the history of the United Nations. UNTAC would have responsibilities in seven areas: Human Rights, Electoral, Military, Civil Administration, Police, Repatriation, and Rehabilitation.

UNTAC's mandate calls for it to exercise control over all four Cambodian factions in the areas of defense, information, internal security, finance and foreign affairs. It is staffed by 15,900 military personnel, 3,600 civilian

police monitors, and 2,500 international civilian personnel--22,000 in all--in addition to tens of thousands of locally recruited staff, at an initial cost of $1.9 billion. Additional funds required for refugee resettlement and rehabilitation are to be supplied by voluntary contributions rather than through peacekeeping assessments, and are expected to raise the total sum needed to $3 billion. An interim UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) consisting of 1,380 peacekeeping personnel arrived in November 1991. UNAMIC had the additional task of establishing mine-clearance programs; it is estimated that as many as 3 million mines were emplaced in previous years, mostly by the Khmer Rouge. Some 30 UN members contributed military forces to the UN peacekeeping unit.

A key aspect of the peace agreement was the obligation to place all military forces in cantonments and to demobilize 70 percent of these forces. It is estimated that there are approximately 200,000 combatants among the four parties to the agreement. The cantonment process was to have been completed by July 11, 1992, and the demobilization by October 1, 1992. UNTAC's mandate was to have expired in eighteen months, following elections for a Constituent Assembly and the drafting and ratification of a constitution.

In June 1992, during the first week that troops were to begin reporting to cantonments, the Khmer Rouge announced that it would not comply with its prior agreement to

demobilize its forces. They repeated this position again in July. It also carried out an extended policy of additional violations:

- continuing military offensives, including some in early June 1992, to take new territory following the signing of the peace accord;
- refusal to send troops into cantonments;
- refusal to permit UNTAC access to Khmer Rouge-controlled areas in Western Cambodia, and attacks on UN helicopters flying over those areas (summer 1992);
- repeated capture of UNTAC personnel (beginning December 1, 1992);
- shelling and wounding UNTAC personnel (beginning December 14, 1992);
- killing Vietnamese (December 1, 1992); and,
- killing Cambodians working for UNTAC (January 14, 1993).

In the summer months of 1992, the Khmer Rouge demanded changes in the initial agreements before they would comply, essentially increasing their participation in the government. China had insisted on and the United States had accepted, the Khmer Rouge's participation on the twelve-member Supreme National Council that was established by the UN agreement to guide Cambodia until elections were held. It is now assumed that they never expected the peace accords to hold, or that they would comply with them. As early as June 10, 1992, the UN administrator of UNTAC, Yasushi Akashi

of Japan, stated that the Khmer Rouge refusal to place their troops in cantonments was a "clear breach of the Paris Accords," and undermined the peace agreement. As the above list indicates, the Khmer Rouge simply moved their violations into a more active phase in December 1992.

In a report to the UN Security Council on September 24, 1992, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali accused the Khmer Rouge of "seriously impairing" the UN's ability to carry out the peace plan, and insisted that the election schedule would be maintained nonetheless, and that he would exclude the Khmer Rouge from the elections unless it permitted its troops to be disarmed and admitted UN officials to the areas it controlled. The Security Council followed this with a new resolution on October 13, demanding that the Khmer Rouge carry out its obligations under the 1991 peace agreement. Up to this point, China had insisted that the elections could not take place without the Khmer Rouge's participation. The resolution also directed the Secretary-General to report on Khmer Rouge compliance by November 15. Should the Khmer Rouge remain in violation, the Council would consider "what further steps are necessary and appropriate."

In the summer of 1992, a French general serving with the UN in Cambodia had suggested that UN forces go on the offensive against the Khmer Rouge, adding that he did not think it would result in more than 200 UN casualties (including his own). Mr. Akashi's reaction was that a UN

military response would constitute "a failure, a bankruptcy of a peacekeeping operation," echoing the attitudes of the UN Office of the Under Secretary-General Marrack Goulding in many other contexts. Instead of seeking a strengthened mandate for peace enforcement, UN authorities show reluctance to use all of the authority they presently have at their disposal. (Whereas France and Britain have consistently opposed more militant use of UN forces in Bosnia by arguing that their forces presently serving in the area might suffer attack by Serbian irregulars in retaliation, Mr. Akashi suggested that some of the countries that have contributed contingents to the UN peacekeeping force in Cambodia might withdraw them if actual military operations were initiated.)

The response of the UN Security Council on November 30, 1992 was to impose a selective trade embargo on the Khmer Rouge, barring trade in oil and timber. The embargo essentially applied to the Thailand-Cambodia border and could not be enforced by the UN. In the days preceeding the vote, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali had said that sanctions should be delayed. China abstained from the vote. Within hours, Thailand barred UN flights from Cambodia; the UN was sanctioned instead of vice versa. For several years, Thai commercial interested have entered into extensive contracts for logging and mining gems in Khmer Rouge-controlled areas in Western Cambodia, with the collaboration of Thai military commanders in the border areas. Arms flows

to the Khmer Rouge are assumed to have ended; an agreement between the four Cambodian factions to end all arms deliveries took effect in June 1991. Until then, weapon supplies from China to the Khmer Rouge had presumably continued. The logging and gem contracts are the Khmer Rouge's last source of income. Thailand officially supports the UN peace operation, and contributed forces to the UNTAC group in Cambodia. But it was already obvious by the summer of 1992 that the Thai government would have to pressure its regional military commanders to end the trade and permit UN monitors to police the border before it could be ended. That did not happen, and the Thai government continued to oppose the sanctions.

In mid-January 1993, Mr. Akashi announced that UN troops would arrest those in Cambodia suspected of serious human-rights violations. This followed Prince Sihanouk's complaint that the Government was harrassing and killing members of the other two opposition groups, and that he would therefore no longer cooperate with UNTAC. At the same time, UNTAC continued to permit the capture of its own forces in the days that followed. On January 22, the Khmer Rouge announced that it "could not rejoin the peace process, and could not, as of now, participate in the elections." The UN representative offered his "hope" that the Khmer Rouge "would not actively disrupt the elections." If UNTAC is eventually withdrawn leaving the Khmer Rouge militarily intact and occupying the territory it presently holds,

Cambodia will remain divided into two portions, and the resumption of warfare is inevitable.

HAITI

On February 7, 1991, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was sworn in as President of Haiti following that country's first democratically held election, an election overseen by international observers. On June 5, 1991, the Organization of American States approved Resolution 1080, entitled "Representative Democracy," which instructs the Secretary General to call a meeting of the Permanent Council:

> in the event of any occurrences giving rise to the sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or of the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government in any of the Organization's member states, in order, within the framework of the Charter, to examine the situation, decide on and convene an ad hoc meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, or a special session of the General Assembly, all of which must take place within a ten-day period.

On September 30, 1991, the Haitian military carried out a coup and took political power. In line with its recently approved resolution, the OAS met quickly and decided on an economic boycott in the hope that this would force the military to permit President Aristide to return to Haiti and to resume his office. That did not happen, however, and no

further actions have been taken in the intervening sixteen months.

The embargo was not accepted by the entire international community--particularly European states--and it was even violated by some OAS members. Oil shipments to Haiti did not stop. Nevertheless, criticism of the embargo developed within weeks as being more harmful to Haiti's poor than to its military or the Haitian civilian elite. Various illegal import and export ventures, including drugs, that provided the wealthy local businessmen and the military with funds continued entirely unimpeded by the trade embargo. The OAS tried to negotiate an agreement with local politicians remaining in Haiti, but the military refused any compromise and thwarted the initial proposals for peace plans.

By early 1992, the possibility of creating an inter-American peace force had been raised. This proposal was supported by Argentina and Costa Rica, but opposed particularly by Mexico and others that oppose military intervention of any kind. The OAS was operating a civilian mission to reintegrate 28,000 former Contra troops in Nicaragua, supervised by the International Commission of Support and Verification/Organization of American States (CIAV-OAS).1 The Haitian Army is small and poorly armed, and a force that intervened forcibly could count on facing

1 Shirley Christian, "O.A.S. Goes in Peace," New York Times, July 1992.

little opposition. (Nevertheless, the 7,000-member military absorbs 40 percent of the nation's budget.) The plan under discussion in June 1992 provided for a political settlement and a negotiated entry by a peacekeeping force under the authority of either the OAS or the UN.2 The discussion produced no result.

For domestic political reasons, the outgoing and the new incoming U.S. administrations began to press for a political resolution of the impasse in December 1992-January 1993. On December 24, 1992, Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney called for a naval blockade of Haiti with the participation of naval forces from Canada, the United States, France, and Venezuela, among others.3 By January 1993, the OAS--whose human rights observer team had been confined to its hotel in the capital of Haiti by the military--had recognized that it had achieved nothing in over a year and asked the United Nations to collaborate in attempting to mediate a solution under the threat of a UN embargo.4 On January 13, 1993, President Aristide "formally requested that the United Nations send a large human rights observer team" to Haiti as part of its diplomatic efforts,5

2 Barbara Crossette, "US is Discussing an Outside Force to Stabilize Haiti," New York Times, June 6, 1992.

3 "Mulroney Calls for Naval Brockade of Haiti," New York Times, December 25, 1992.

4 Mary McGrory, "Finally, Movement on Haiti," The Washington Post, January 5, 1993.

5 Howard French, "Aristide Urges Big U.N. Observer Team for Haiti," New York Times, January 14, 1993.

and on January 17, the Haitian military apparently agreed to permit a UN Observer force of possibly 500 civilian members to work in Haiti.6 Within days of the announcement, the number of possible observers referred to was reduced, other uncertainties developed, and within a week it was clear that the Haitian government would not keep the agreement.7 Instead, the Haitian government demanded that it be recognized as the legitimate government, and that the embargo be rescinded immediately.8 One diplomat noted that since the Haitian government had "been able to string the Organization of American States out for 16 months," they presumed that they would "be able to do the same with the UN."

A week earlier, the UN negotiator had warned that "if either side negotiated in bad faith, sanctions would result." This was widely interpreted as meaning a complete embargo, including the cut-off of oil supplies. The UN Secretary-General did not recommend the internationalization

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6 Howard French, "Envoy Says Haiti's Military Agrees to Allow a UN Observer Force," New York Times, January 18, 1993.

7 John Goskho, "Monitors Could Be in Haiti by Month's End," Washington Post, January 22, 1993; Douglas Farah, "Prospects for Prompt Resolution of the Haitian Crisis Begin to Dim," Washington Post, January 24, 1993; "Haitian Premier Rejects UN Terms," Washington Post, January 28, 1993; and Howard W. French, "Haitian Leaders Object to a UN Plan for Deploying Observers," New York Times, January 29, 1993.

8 Howard W. French, "Mediation Effort in Haiti Collapses; UN Envoy Leaves as Rulers Renege on Pact to Deploy Hundreds of Observers," New York Times, February 5, 1993.

of the OAS regional trade sanctions, and after two weeks, Haitian military leaders defused further pressure by allowing 40 observers to arrive in the capital.9 There were no indications, however, that this would lead to the restoration of the democratically elected government, ostensibly the outcome sought by the UN and the OAS.

9 Michael Tarr, "Observers Arrive in Haiti," Washington Post, February 15, 1993.

ANGOLA

In May 1991, peace accords were signed in Portugal ending 16 years of civil war in Angola, at a cost of approximately half a million deaths. A UN verification operation (UNAVEM-2, the Second UN Angola Verification Mission), composed of 400 troops and 400 civilian election monitors, was in the country to observe and verify the implementation of the peace accords, and to determine that all stages of the process were free and fair. The two crucial processes were to be the encampment and demobilization of the military forces of the two sides, and the presidential elections that were held on September 30, 1992. The mandate that the Security Council accepted, however, had been negotiated between the government and UNITA, the conflicting parties, and their patrons, the United States, the USSR, and South Africa. It did not provide the UN mission with the authority to carry out the disarmament, only to observe and monitor it.

By May 1992 it was evident that the demobilization was not successful. Weapons were being cached, only about 65 percent of the 150,000 combattants reported to the encampments, those that did were not properly disarmed, and the rate of desertion from the camps was high. The larger portion of the forces demobilized belonged to the government. UNITA disarmed and demobilized less, and even those of its troops in the encampment areas maintained their

command structure and cohesion. In addition, each side created alternative military forces composed of their select units--the government's "anti-riot police" and UNITA's "special security corps"--which fell outside UN supervision.

In the six or so weeks preceeding the election, there were repeated military engagements between the government and UNITA forces, for the most part preciptated by UNITA. A week before the elctions, Jonas Savimbi, head of UNITA, told a British television interviewer, "If I lose, then the elections were rigged and I will send my men back to the bush to fight again. We will not accept defeat."1 The presidential election resulted in 49.57 percent of the vote going to the government party, a fraction of a percent below the 50 percent needed for an outright victory. Jonas Savimbi and UNITA obtained 40.07 percent. After slight delay, the United Nations stated that the elections had been fair. Savimbi refused to accept the electoral outcome and threatened to renew the civil war.

On October 13, a special UN delegation stated that "any resumption of armed conflict will be met with the strongest condemnation of the international community." Under pressure by the United States and South Africa, who had supplied UNITA with weapons and diplomatic support during the civil war, Savimbi agreed to negotiate with the government on the arrangements for the run-off election.

1 Andrew Meldrum, "Hungry to Vote," Africa Report, November-December 1992, pp. 26-29.

However, on October 30, UNITA's forces went on a nation-wide military offensive, which unquestionably must have been in preparation for some weeks. The US Department of State demanded "the immediate cessation of all acts of violence and all offensive military movements," adding

> We are deeply concerned by the reports that UNITA is trying to extend its authority over parts of the Angolan territory. If true, this would represent a major breach of the peace accords, which we would condemn....We will hold responsible any party which refuses to engage in dialogue to end the crisis.

The UN Security Council also demanded an end to the fighting, and said that any government imposed by force would not be recognized; a unanimous binding resolution stated that any party failing to abide by the peace accords "will be rejected by the international community." Western diplomats reportedly claimed that economic sanctions would be imposed if UNITA seized the government. With the aid of the UN, a tentative cease-fire was negotiated early in December 1992, but was subsequently broken by UNITA forces. Heavy fighting continued into January 1993, with reports that UNITA occupied 75 percent of the country.

UN officials now assume that they should not have permitted the elections to be held until the demobilization schedule was adhered to and completed. There have been no suggestions as yet from any quarter that military action should be taken against UNITA to force them to cease fighting and make them accept the election results, nor have

any economic sanctions been placed on the portion of Angola controlled by UNITA. On the contrary, in a report to the UN Security Council on January 23, 1993, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali acknowledged the "tragic breakdown" of the UN-sponsored peace process in Angola, and recommended that UN operations be sharply cut back immediately and totally withdrawn by April 30 unless fighting ceased. He bemoaned the attacks on UN monitors and the theft of much of the UN's equipment, but he did not request any increase in forces or any change in their rules of engagement to permit them to actively defend themselves and their equipment. (In theory, the UN troops should presently be able to return fire when attacked, but they are presumably too few in number at any particular location to offer meaningful defense.) The Secretary-General instead recommended that the 560-person UN staff in Angola be reduced to 64 immediately, leaving only 30 military observers in the capital city, Luanda.2 This recommendation was made in the face of a request by the Angolan government that the UN commission not only remain, but that its strength be increased.3

According to UN officials at the end of January 1993, "tens of thousands" had been killed in the fighting in the preceeding few weeks, "millions" were reportedly displaced

2 Julia Preston, "UN Chief Urges Pullback in Angola," The Washington Post, January 23, 1993.

3 Paul Lewis, "UN Chief Threatens to Pull Troops Out of Angola," New York Times, January 27, 1993; "UN Tries to Fix Angola Talks Date," Financial Times, January 26, 1993.

from their homes, and 1.5 million faced possible starvation, information which must obviously also have been available to the Secretary-General.4 Under these conditions, the UN Security Council rejected the Secretary-General's recommendation, at least for several more months. Should the UN forces be removed entirely, the effect would almost certainly be to produce a situation similar to that in 1967 when U Thant removed UN interposition forces in the Sinai at the request of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser: in this case, the continuation and widening of war. What should have taken place almost immediately after UNITA initiated fighting following the elections was the insertion under a new Security Council mandate of a sizable and well-armed airborne UN force to forcibly complete the demobilization and disarming of the combattants that did not take place earlier as it should have according to the mediated peace accords.

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4 Kenneth B. Noble, "A New Crisis Engulfs Angola as Rebels Make Big Gains," New York Times, January 29, 1993.

RWANDA

In 1959, before the country became independent from Belgium, the majority Hutu ethnic group were the victors in a civil war against the numerically smaller Tutsi tribe who had been politically dominant for decades under colonial rule. Some 100,000 people were killed, and hundreds of thousands of Tutsi fled into neighboring countries. In 1973, a military dictatorship took power in Rwanda following a military coup, and it has retained power ever since. Estimates of the number of Rwandan Tutsi living in exile in recent years in the neighboring countries of Uganda, Zaire, Burundi, and Tanzania range from 500,000 to 2,000,000, the lower estimate being the more realistic.

In October 1990, about 1,000 Tutsi who had been serving in the Ugandan army for years, and who had been armed in Uganda, invaded Rwanda. One-tenth of the country's population has been displaced, presumably for the most part from the northern region which the invading forces hold and which appears to have been virtually cleared of its previous civilian population, and from contiguous provinces.1 Mortality to date as a result of the fighting is unknown, perhaps several thousand.

Mediation by the heads of neighboring countries eventually led to a cease-fire. Negotiations between the

1 Catherine Watson, "War and Waiting," Africa Report (November-Decmeber 1992):51-54.

two sides are currently underway in Tanzania, with some fighting still taking place. The invading forces want refugees to be permitted to return to Rwanda, elections to be held, a new constitution written, reduced political powers of the president (a former general), and provisions for the observance of human rights.

The United Nations authorized a neutral military observer group (UNMOG) of 250 truce observers to be posted in Rwanda. The group is headed by a Nigerian general, with participating contingents from Mali, Zimbabwe, Senegal, and Nigeria. As in the case of the ECOWAS forces serving in Liberia, the United States is paying the costs of the Rwanda UNMOG group. French aircraft flew the members of the observer force to Rwanda. Financial support for the UNMOG group is obtained in a manner similar to the special United Nations fund from wealthier states that was established to support forces from African states participating in UN actions in Somalia. The costs in this case--$250,000--are trivial, and although it is a useful way for richer states to support developing nations, there is no reason that the OAU should not have been able to take on such responsibilities.

MOZAMBIQUE

In mid-1992, the United Nations World Food Program announced that a regional drought in Southern African threatened over 18 million people with famine. Over 3 million of these were in Mozambique and very likely ran the greatest risk; as a result of the war, the country was by then producing only one-tenth of the food needed to support its population, and it was estimated that Mozambique required as much as 500,000 tons of food on an emergency basis in 1992 alone. On July 18, 1992, the rightist rebel movement known as Renamo agreed for the first time to permit international relief agencies into the portions of Mozambique that they controlled.

On October 4, after a year of negotiations, a peace treaty was signed between the government and Renamo ending 14 years of civil war. Under the terms of the treaty, all weapons are to be turned over to the United Nations and all armed groups are to be disbanded. Both government and Renamo forces were to assemble within a month at predetermined locations. Estimates are that there are presently 110,000 armed personnel, and these are to be reduced to 30,000; 15,000 from each side. Military forces from Zimbabwe and Malawi which had been guarding rail lines that run from their countries through Mozambique to Mozambique's Pacific coast ports are to be withdrawn. These railroad guard forces had not been particularly effectual in

protecting the railroads against Renamo sabotage during the war, and by all rights, there should have been a sizable OAU expeditionary force in Mozambique all during the war to help in guarding the railroads, and in aiding the government in its war against Renamo as well. There are several striking similarities between Renamo and Idi Amin's Uganda:

> - particular reliance on gratuitous brutality, terror, and massacre;
> - total domestic illegitimacy;
> - reliance on a motly assemblage of foreign supporters. These included the Rhodesian security forces that first established the movement, the South African Defense Forces that then adopted it, and several non-state actors: dispossessed Portuguese expatriates, fundamentalist Christian groups based in the United States, and, when he was alive, Franz-Josef Strauss, the head of the CDU in West Germany.1

Western aid donors are to finance the demobilization of the armed forces and the resettlement of the approximately 5 million internal and external refugees. On October 15, a group of 25 UN cease-fire monitors entered the country. Within days, the government claimed that Renamo forces had violated the cease-fire and seized four towns. On December

1 Alex Vines, Renamo. Terrorism in Mozambique (London: James Currey, 1991).

7, 1992, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali asked the UN Security Council to approve the dispatch of a peacekeeping force consisting of between 7,000 and 9,000 personnel to Mozambique.2 This would make it the third largest UN force after those in Cambodia (19,000 troops) and the former Yugoslavia (15,000 troops).

2 Press reports are contradictory as to the numbers involved: 5,500 peacekeepers and 1,800 civilians for humanitarin relief and election monitoring (Trevor Rowe, "UN Force for Mozambique Sought," The Washington Post, December 8, 1992) or 7,000 soldiers and 1,200 civilian officers (Paul Lewis, "Mozambique Force Proposed at UN," New York Times, December 8, 1992).

Summary and Conclusions

The reason that the United Nations was founded was "...to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". But the role of the United Nations in war and conflict between 1945 and the present bears little relation to the provisions of the UN Charter. The United Nations had been intended to act - as the League of Nations did not - in every case "... with respect to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression". The means to do this was to be provided by the provisions of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, Articles 39 to 51. The 1947 Report of the Military Staff Committee elaborated the technical requirements for enforcement actions: trained units earmarked for UN service and provided with adequate support, with the capacity to deter war and enforce the peace. But the "cold war" was already on, the Military Staff Committee report was not accepted and its recommendations were never enacted.

Instead, the more limited endeavor of "peacekeeping" evolved, with numerous qualifications and constraints. Peacekeeping missions could only be deployed once a cease fire was agreed to in an ongoing war. Their function was to maintain a cease fire between the two warring sides along the line established as a result of fighting. They could not be initiated except with the consent of the warring parties. They required the mandate of the Security Council, which was vulnerable to the veto of any of the five permanent members, most often the USSR and the United States.

"International law" develops out of the practices that actually transpire in the world. The forced "norms" of international behavior of the past 48 years - the absence of

international intervention - were the result of the perverted conditions of the cold war. International law would appear very different from what it presently is if the provisions of the UN Charter had been consistently acted upon for the past 48 years. At the moment UN practices are in substantial evolution. The UN has authorized more peacekeeping operations in the last four years than in its previous forty. And while they have still for the most part fallen within the old constraints and taken place in post-conflict circumstances, they are expanding in authority and in the complexity of their tasks. Two of the more recent events have changed circumstances the most. The response to the flight of Iraq's Kurds in 1991, following directly on the reversal of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and the UN intervention in Somalia in December 1992 have produced significant changes in international behavior. Both of these, together with the proposals in the Secretary General's mid-1992 Agenda For Peace will presumably have a major impact on the assumption of the right of intervention by the international community, and perhaps begin the process of moving the United Nations back towards the original provisions of Chapter 7 of the Charter.

At the same time the failure of the UN and of European regional security organizations - the CSCE, WEU, NATO - to respond to the murderous debacle in the former Yugoslavia runs the risk of undoing in one event more than all the recent peacekeeping missions have achieved. Several of the other ongoing "peacekeeping" missions have not in fact succeeded in keeping the peace, and are

in serious danger of failure. The key issue is the reluctance of nations to fight on behalf of maintaining peace and reversing aggression. Durch and Blechman point out that if the UN "... cannot use force in such situations or is unwilling to do it, or if it does not revisit its handiwork when political backsliding occurs, then the era of UN peace-building may turn out to be rather short. ...the organization can afford neither the political nor the financial costs of sustained fighting".[1]

Particularly in this transition phase, international temporizing and inaction in the face of aggression could destroy the ability to act in comparable situations in the future. The report of UN Special Human Rights representative Tadeusz Mazowieki stated that the Serbian practices of "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia-Herzogovina in the face of UN cease-fire and human rights agreements is undermining the credibility and authority of the United Nations.

> "The continuation of this practice presumes the inability or unwillingness of the international community to enforce compliance with solemn agreements adopted under the auspices of the United Nations, and this undermines the credibility and authority of international institutions."[2]

Months of systematic massacres, pillage and destruction and concentration-death camps reminiscent of World War II have turned the suggestion of analogues to 1938, Munich, and to appeasement into

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[1] Durch and Blechman, 1992, op.cit.

[2] Trevor Rowe, "UN Report: Serb Actions Undermining World Body; Rights Agreements 'Systematically' Violated", Washington Post, November 25, 1992.

a stench of appeasement.

> "An inability to face down Serbs engaged in such obvious war crimes would demoralize the West. So reminiscent would it be of the failure of the League of Nations to meet the challenges posed by Germany and Japan that it would destroy the credibility of the United Nations just when post-cold war efforts were underway to build it up. The very notion of sanctions would be discredited by their failure".[3]

At the very same time another United Nations special rapporteur for Human Rights in Iraq reported to the UN General Assembly in November 1992 that the Iraq government continued with "indiscriminate bombardments and destruction of local marsh villages and hamlets, resulting in innumerable arrests and deaths".[4] UN authority is being undermined not only by Serbia, but by Iraq, by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, and by Jonas Savimbi and

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[3] William Colby and Jeremy J. Stone, "Break the Siege of Sarajevo", Washington Post, January 15, 1993. Almost the same position has been taken by other commentators: "The West's failure to confront this evil is worse than a blunder ... if we allow evil to triumph in ex-Yugoslavia, we will breed a cynicism so pervasive and profound as to corrode the very basis of western liberty and smash every hope of fashioning a better world; Leslie Gelb, "Never Again", New York Times, December, 13, 1992.
"The murder of Bosnia's Deputy Prime Minister last Friday symbolized the inadequacy of present international efforts to counter Serbian-sponsored violence. Serbian gunmen simply bullied aside a United Nations escort. ...Bosnian Serb militias, backed by Serbia's Government, shot and raped their way to these negotiations [in January 1993] while the rest of the world acquiesced through its shameful passivity. Worse, the UN still hobbles Bosnia's ability to defend itself... "What kind of Peace For Bosnia?", New York Times, January 12, 1993.
See also
George D. Kenney, "Bosnia-Appeasement in Our Time", Washington Post, August 30, 1992, and Anthony Lewis, "Beware of Munich", New York Times, January 8, 1993, Edward Luck, "Making Peace", Foreign Policy, No. 89, (Winter 1992-93), 137-155

[4] Edward Mortimer, "Need For a US Lead", Financial Times, January 20, 1993.

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UNITA in Angola.[5]

There is the additional real risk that changes in Russian politics may end Russian cooperation in the UN Security Council. If that should happen, it would force collaborative initiatives in peace enforcement and humanitarian intervention to take place outside the framework of the United Nations. Equally bad, a turn to a regressively nationalistic and conservative Russian government would also make the likelihood of conflicts, including armed conflicts, between the former republics of the USSR itself very much more likely. There would be extremely little chance of seeing any international intervention in an armed conflict to which Russia was a direct party.

The present transition phase in UN practices is a formative and evolutionary period in which nearly every event stands the chance of establishing new precedents, for good or for ill. Unfortunately it finds nearly all the major actors hesitant, ambiguous, timorous, not least of all, in the office of the United Nations Secretary General. In late-January 1993, half a year after photographs of Serbian concentration camps flooded the world, Secretary General Boutros Ghali, with consummate diplomatic logic, feared that forcible efforts to close the camps would "undermine the role of the UN or the Geneva peace conference".[6] For months

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[5] "Face Down The Other UN Outlaw", New York Times, July 31, 1992; Barbara Harff, "Bosnia and Somalia: Strategic, Legal, Moral Dimensions of Humanitarian Intervention", Philosophy and Public Policy, 12:3-4 (Summer-Fall 1992) 1-7.

[6] "Bosnias Brutal Camps", New York Times, January 26, 1993.

there had been demands that a UN Security Council ultimatum insist on immediate access to all camps by the Red Cross and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Even that was not put forward by the Secretary General or the Security Council.

National and military leadership have been equally recalcitrant. In the summer of 1992 the US Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed involvement in a airlift relief operation proposed for Somalia.[7] The UN has been able to obtain only 100 or so of the 7,000 troops that are supposed to be sent to Mozambique, and major nations are being slow to contribute forces to the UN commanded mission that is to replace the US forces in Somalia.

The most cursory look at what has transpired in Bosnia and in Somalia establishes the inadequacy of the international response.

- Estimates of dead and missing in Bosnia since April 1992 are at least 150,000.[8] The overwhelming majority are civilian. There are 2 million internal and external refugees. For probably a majority of these, their homes have been either totally destroyed or expropriated.
- In January 13, 1993, UN officials stated that 250,000 shells had been fired on Sarejevo since the siege of the city began. Each one is a justification for destroying the artillery firing the shells. In effect, the decision has

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[7] Don Oberdorfer, "The Path to Intervention; A Massive Tragedy We Could Do Something About", Washington Post, December 6, 1992.

[8] John F. Burns, "Bosnia 1992: The Paradox of Swords to Plowshares", New York Times, December 31, 1992; Refugee numbers are from a UN High Commissioner for Refugees report.

been made 250,000 times not to do that - simply to watch. On one single day (December 6, 1992) UN observers counted 1,500 shells falling on the Sarajevo suburb of Otage. They are duly "observed", recorded, filed, and are irrelevant to any UN action.

- On December 8, 1992, UN officials reported that there had been 100 Serbian air violations since the Security Council's resolution "imposing" a flight ban had been enacted. France and Britain have opposed all suggestions for air action against violating aircraft, on the grounds that their troops serving with UN forces on the ground would face reprisals. This position has been taken by France and Britain at least three or four times since the early spring of 1992. The safety of troops already deployed thereby becomes an argument against any more severe UN action, even though the troops present are patently unable to carry out their mission.
- There have been 17 or 19 "cease fires" negotiated in Bosnia, all violated. There had been an even greater number in the fighting between Serbia and Croatia. The killings go on all the while "negotiating" is taking place. The "negotiating" is frequently a method of stalling or preventing international intervention, just as Serbia forestalled international action by providing temporary and partial access to the concentration camps.
- The Security Council's embargo on fuel deliveries to Serbia

have been continuously violated by Bulgaria, Romania, The Ukraine and Greece. The violations are duly monitored. There is no effort to enforce the sanctions.

- There has also been an 18 month international arms embargo on Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia. Arms have been reaching Serbia from the Ukraine, and Croatia from South Africa, Chile, and various East European countries.[9] Some NATO member states - Britain in particular - claim that they have no responsibility to report arms sanctions violations that they are knowledgeable about to the UN Sanctions Committee on Yugoslavia. Obviously, reporting the violations would produce pressure to take action against the countries which were responsible for the violating the sanctions. (Similarly, the US government allegedly delayed providing authoritative information on the concentration camps, so as to avoid the pressure to eradicate the camps that would result following disclosure.) One long overdue matter for discussion, which should have been prompted by the open and recorded violations of the fuel sanctions, should be automatic sanctions on sanctions violators.
- Conversely, the UN arms embargo against Bosnia explicitly repeats the incredible error that the western world made in 1936-1939, in its "Non-intervention policy" which maintained an arms embargo against the legitimate Republican

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[9] Steve Coll, "Despite UN Embargo, Weapons Sneak Into Balkans", Washington Post, February 14, 1993.

government of Spain, while Germany and Italy armed Franco's invading armies. In the present case, Bosnia, the country recognized by the United Nations and invaded by Serbia, is denied arms to defend itself. Yet Ambassadors Owen and Vance argue against supplying arms to the country being invaded and already substantially conquered and destroyed, on the grounds that "it would widen the conflict".

- On January 10, 1993, French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas announced that France was "prepared to act alone if necessary to liberate by force Bosnian prisoner camps where civilians are reported to have been raped and tortured"; other French officials added, however, only under UN sanction.[10] No one else joined in the offer, the UN Secretary General expressed his opposition, and within a day or two France withdrew its proposal.
- On December 9, 1992, the UN Security Council unanimously stated that it was "particularly alarmed by reports that the Serb militia ... are forcing the inhabitants of Sarajevo to evacuate the city. If such attacks and actions continue, the Security Council will consider, as soon as possible, further measures against those who commit or support them.[11] It was the umpteenth such Security Council "warning": all

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[10] Robert Mauthner and Alice Rawsthorn,"Peace Talks Remain Deadlocked; France May Use Force Over Camps in Bosnia", Financial Times, January 11, 1993.

[11] Stanley Meisler, "Report by UN Chief Urges Sending Troops to Macedonia", Los Angeles Times, December 10, 1992.

lead to nothing but another Security Council "consideration", which takes several weeks of political organizing to achieve, and another empty "warning".

- All of this ineffectuality by the UN is matched only by the most brazen, disdainful lies on the part of the Serbian forces fighting in Bosnia. After 1,500 emaciated Muslim prisoners were found in a Serbian concentration camp that Serbian militia claimed did not exist, the Serbian camp commander said that "It is necessary for humanitarian purposes to protect these people ... they were in danger of being killed by their own people. ...Most of them are here as though they are on a picnic".[12] As late as February 1993, Serbian forces were claiming that the artillery on the heights overlooking Sarajevo was not theirs, or alternatively, not firing. Others learn that blatant lies are accepted by the United Nations: Croat forces in mid-February 1993, standing amid the burned out houses of a Muslim village in Bosnia that they had just taken over and which they had systematically razed, smiled coyly and claimed that the Muslims had burned down their own homes "...because they use candles".[13]

In Somalia, although less warfare took place directly in the

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[12] Peter Maars, "Illusory Serb Prison Camp Materializes; Hundreds Held at Bosnian Facility That Militia Said Did Not Exist", Washington Post, August 27, 1992.

[13] Recorded by Independent TV (UK); shown on PBS-TV in the United States.

presence and under the eyes of the United Nations, substantial avoidable death did, and it would have taken much less force on the part of the UN to stop it, a fact that was incontestably proved when intervention led by US forces finally did take place. By mid-December 1992, some 300,000 people had died in the previous two years, an estimated 250,000 by starvation, and the remainder in inter-clan warfare. 3,000 people were dying per day at the peak of starvation, and 80 percent of all food aid was being stolen from the aid being brought into the country. 1.5 million additional Somalis were estimated to be "at risk" of dying.

- in mid-November 1992 a CARE convoy from Mogadishu to Baidoa was ambushed and 40 killed.
- all relief agencies working in the country were subject to daily extortion under the guise of being "guarded".
- in Bardera, CARE workers dug a well, armed Somali units took over the well and "sold" the water back to the relief group.
- armed Somalis stole village grain stocks, penicillin and gauze from relief operated hospitals. In early December 1992 they attacked CARE facilities in Baidoa three days in succession.
- After months of negotiations which permitted the UN to place 500 Pakistani troops in Mogadishu, the United Nations was itself paying 2,000 Somalis belonging to clan armies, in effect, to keep the 500 Pakistanis under guard and confined to quarters.
- In the late fall of 1992 Italy, France and Britain in

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succession rejected direct appeals from the UN Secretary General to deploy troops under UN command to Somalia. Earlier in 1992 US government agencies squabbled over which would finance an airlift of food, US military forces did not want to carry out the proposed mission, and it did not take place.

Finally, in mid-December 1992, as US forces finally intervened, with scarcely any bloodshed, 30 nations suddenly promised to send forces and 17 of them had forces on the ground in Somalia in a matter of days.

Now that the cold war is over, the fashioning of a global security system is the central issue for the future. But that cannot be achieved by temporizing, play-acting, sham protestation and hypocracy. Yugoslavia demonstrates that the UN may fail as miserably and abjectly as Europe has, and as it did in 1937-1939. The UN is clearly capable of managing tasks that local forces permit, but not yet those - with the exception of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait - that it must fight its way through to achieve. If UN "peacekeeping" officials continue to be concerned only with preventing the Bosnian population from starving while it is killed off in the tens of thousands by Serbian high explosives, instead of stopping the Serbian aggression, there will be more Bosnias to come. "Aggression rages unanswered in the Balkans while Europeans dither over what they are willing to do about making 'collective

security' more than hollow rhetoric".[14] The world does change, but not enough, and then it forgets as well. Once again, as in the 1930's, it seems to have gone deaf. Even the shock of concentration camps in Europe and the indiscriminate murder of civilians has had no effect. Nations still have not taken the lesson that it is "in the national interest" of every nation to construct a global security system that protects all nations. The "national interest" is international peace, without aggression, genocide, massacre, death camps and tyranny. Aggression unpunished anywhere will encourage aggression elsewhere, and the United Nations will not be able to mobilize its membership to oppose aggression if it does not do this on all occasions uniformly, and at the earliest moment.

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[14] "Debate The Real European Issues", New York Times, July 30, 1992.

TABLES AND CHARTS

U.N. PEACE-KEEPING FORCES



UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCES	ANNUAL COST $U.S. MILLION	DATE DEPLOYED	CURRENT STRENGTH
U.N. Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) Set up to monitor Arab-Israel armistice agreement	$31	1948	300
U.N. Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)	5	1949	40
U.N. Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)*	31**	1964	2,200
U.N. Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) Between Israeli and Syrian armies in the Golan Heights	42	1974	1,300
U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	157	1978	5,800
U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM)	65	1991	549
U.N. Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II)	72	1991	440
U.N. Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)	52	1991	543
U.N. Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) Scheduled. Operation has run into political problems	200	1991	375
U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)	NA	1992	19,500
U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) Deployed in Serb-inhabited regions of Croatia	400	1992	16,000
U.N. Operation in Somalia, (UNOSOM)	23***	1992	550

* Only U.N. operation paid for by voluntary contributions instead of through assessments against all U.N. members
** Troop-contributing countries absorb an additional $60 million
*** For six months
SOURCE: United Nations

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FIGURE 6

Peace-keeping forces and observer missions, 1987–1992



Ongoing U.N. Peacekeeping Operations

Dollars in millions

Name	Date	Description	Funding method	Annual cost[a]
U.N.Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)	1948-present	Monitor cease-fires along Israeli borders and assist UNDOF and UNIFIL.	Regular budget	$31.5
U.N. Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)	1949-present	Monitor cease-fire agreements between India and Pakistan in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.	Regular budget	$5.6
U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	1964-present	Monitor buffer zone separating Greek and Turkish Communities.	Voluntary contributions	$30.8
U.N. Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	1974-present	Monitor separation of Syrian and Israeli forces in the Golan Heights.	Special assessment	$42.0
U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	1978-present	Establish buffer zone and facilitate peace between Israel and Lebanon.	Special assessment	$79.8
U.N. Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)	1991-present	Monitor cease-fire and administer free elections.	Special assessment	$42.9
U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM)	1991-present	Monitor buffer zone between Iraq and Kuwait following war.	Special assessment	$33.6
U.N. Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)	1991-present	Monitor cease-fire and hold referendum for independence or joining Morocco.	Special assessment	$143.0
U.N. Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)	1991-present	Monitor human rights and phased separation of forces.	Special assessment	$58.9
U.N. Temporary Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)	1992-present	Supervise government functions and eventual elections while rebuilding country & disarming factions.	Special assessment	$1,275
U.N. Protection Force in Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR)	1992-present	Monitor cease-fires between factions.	Special assessment	$620.7
U.N. Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)	Established May 1992	Monitor and protect U.N. relief activities.	Special assessment	$23.1

[a]Amounts shown are estimated costs for the most recent 12-month budget periods. Some figures are annualized from budget periods other than 12 months.

Source: United Nations.

Completed U.N. Peacekeeping Operations

Dollars in millions

Name	Date	Description	Funding method	Total cost
U.N. Emergency Force I (UNEF I)	1956-67	Supervise withdrawal of forces from Egypt and serve as buffer between Israel and Egypt.	Special assessment	$214.2
U.N. Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)	1958	Monitor infiltration of arms and personnel across Lebanese borders.	Regular budget	$3.7
U.N. Operation in the Congo (ONUC)	1960-64	Verify withdrawal of Belgian forces and restore order.	Special assessment	$400.0
U.N. Security Force in West New Guinea (UNSF)	1962-63	Maintain law and order in West New Guinea pending incorporation into Indonesia.	Other—paid by Indonesia and the Netherlands	$32.4
U.N. Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM)	1963-64	Supervise disengagement agreement between Saudi Arabia and United Arab Republic (Egypt).	Other—paid by Saudi Arabia and Egypt	$1.8
U.N. India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM)	1965-66	Supervise cease-fire along India-Pakistan border.	Regular budget	$1.7
U.N. Emergency Force II (UNEF II)	1973-79	Supervise cease-fire agreements and control buffer zones between Egypt and Israel.	Special assessment	$446.5
U.N. Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP)	1988-89	Monitor withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.	Regular budget	$14.0
U.N. Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)	1988-91	Supervise cease-fire following Iran-Iraq war.	Special assessment	$213.8
U.N. Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I)	1988-91	Monitor withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola.	Special assessment	$19.4
U.N. Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)	1989-90	Supervise transition of Namibia from South African rule to independence.	Special assessment	$383.5
U.N. Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)	1989-92	Monitor arms and troop infiltration and demobilize Nicaraguan Contras.	Special assessment	Not yet available
U.N. Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC)	1991-early 92	Monitor cease-fire and prepare for deployment of UNTAC.	Special assessment	$20.0

Source: United Nations.

Allied Participation in the Multinational Force

Country	Personnel[a]	Unit/equipment
Argentina	300	1 frigate and 1 destroyer
Australia	1,230	1 destroyer, 3 frigates, and 2 support ships
Bahrain	700	1 infantry company, 1 F-5 aircraft squadron, 1 F-16 aircraft squadron, and 1 helicopter squadron
Bangladesh	2,330	1 brigade and 1 battalion
Belgium	550	2 frigates, 2 minesweepers, and 1 support ship
Canada	1,370	1 CF-18 aircraft squadron, 1 signal squadron, 1 detachment, 1 destroyer, 1 frigate, and 1 support ship
Czechoslovakia	140	1 chemical weapons decontamination unit
Denmark	90	1 frigate
Egypt	39,160	2 battalions, 2 divisions, 1 regiment, and 1 logistics support command
France	19,330	11 aircraft detachments (Atlantique, C-135, C-160, Mirage 2000, Mirage F-1, Mystere-Falcon, Puma helicopter, Transall C-160, and Tristar aircraft), 3 aircraft squadrons (F-1 and Jaguar aircraft), 16 ships, 1 brigade, 1 battalion, 3 batteries, 2 regiments, 2 support groups, 1 section, and 1 countermeasure detachment
Germany	700[b]	8 ships (to the eastern Mediterranean)
Greece	210[b]	1 frigate (to the eastern Mediterranean)
Hungary	40	1 medical detachment
Italy	1,310	1 Tornado aircraft squadron, 2 corvette ships, 3 frigates, and 1 support ship
Korea	160[c]	Field hospital and 5 C-130 aircraft with crews
Kuwait	7,800	3 aircraft detachments (C-13, C-9, and Hawk aircraft), 4 aircraft squadrons (A-4, Gazelle, F-1 aircraft), 1 Puma helicopter squadron, 2 ships, 2 marine teams, 5 brigades and 1 battalion
Morocco	1,880	1 regiment and 1 battalion
Netherlands	1,000	4 frigates and 1 support ship
New Zealand	50[c]	1 C-130 aircraft detachment
Niger	480	1 battalion
Norway	60	1 frigate
Oman	940	1 brigade, 4 aircraft squadrons (Hunter, Jaguar and Strikemaster aircraft), 1 support aircraft detachment, 2 landing crafts, and 2 patrol boats
Pakistan	8,700	2 brigades
Philippines	300[c]	Medical team
Poland	200[c]	Medical team
Portugal	[d]	Medical team and field hospital
Qatar	1,580	1 helicopter squadron, 2 aircraft squadrons (Alpha and Mirage F-1 aircraft), 1 Hunter aircraft detachment, and 1 mechanized battalion
Romania	[d]	Field hospital
Saudi Arabia	137,160	Entire armed forces, including 4 aircraft detachments (F-15, F-5, and Tornado aircraft), 16 aircraft squadrons (C-130, E-3A, F-15, F-5, Hawk, KE-3A, RF-SE, Strikemaster and Tornado aircraft), 13 brigades, 37 battalions, and 23 ships
Senegal	500	1 infantry battalion
Sierra Leone	30[c]	Medical team
Spain	770	6 frigates
Syria	14,800	1 armored division, 1 special forces battalion, 1 brigade, and 1 regiment
Turkey	100,000[e]	[f]
United Arab Emirates	1,450	1 battalion, 2 aircraft detachments (C-130, Mirage III aircraft), 1 helicopter squadron, and 7 aircraft squadrons (Aeromacchi, Hawk, Marchetti, and Mirage aircraft)
United Kingdom	31,930	5 aircraft squadrons (Buccaneer, Jaguar, and Tornado aircraft), 7 aircraft detachments (BAE-125, C-130, Nimrod, Tornado, VC-10 and Victor aircraft) 3 helicopter squadrons (Lynx, Puma, and Gazelle helicopters), 1 CH-47 helicopter detachment, 2 brigades, 2 batteries, 1 division, and 21 ships

[a]Military personnel assigned in the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia, or other regional states unless otherwise noted.

[b]Assigned to ships in eastern Mediterranean.

[c]Medical personnel.

[d]Number not available.

[e]Military personnel located on the Iraqi-Turkey border.

[f]Number of units and description of equipment not available.

According to Defense and State Department reports, 36 countries sent ground, air, or naval forces or support units to the Gulf region during the crisis. These forces or units participated directly in the multinational force or provided support, including interdicting vessels suspected of violating the United Nations embargo, performing combat missions during Operations Desert Shield and Storm, and deploying medical personnel or chemical detection equipment

UN Peacekeeping Operations During the Cold War, 1945-1985

Name	Dates	Description
UN Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB)	1947-51	Investigate guerrilla border crossings into Greece
UN Good Offices Mission, UN Commission for Indonesia	1947-51	Observe decolonization
UN Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO)	1948-present	Monitor cease-fires along Israeli borders
UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)	1949-present	Monitor cease-fire in Jammu and Kashmir
UN Emergency Force (UNEF I)	1956-67	Separate Egyptian & Israeli forces in Sinai
UN Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)	1958	Monitor infiltration of arms & troops into Lebanon from Syria
UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC)	1960-64	Render military assistance, restore civil order
UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA)	1962-63	Keep order and administer W. New Guinea pending transfer to Indonesia
UN Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM)	1963	Monitor infiltration into Yemen across Saudi border
UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	1964-present	Maintain order; from 1974 monitor buffer zone separating Greek and Turkish communities
UN India Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM)	1965-66	Monitor cease-fire in 1965 India-Pakistan War
UN Emergency Force II (UNEF II)	1974-79	Separate Egyptian & Israeli forces in Sinai
UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	1974-present	Monitor separation of Syrian & Israeli forces on Golan Heights
UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	1978-present	Establish buffer zone between Israel & Lebanon

UN Peacekeeping Operations in the New Era, 1985-1991

Name	Dates	Description
UN Good Offices Mission to Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP)	1988-89	Monitor withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan
UN Iran-Iraq Observer Group (UNIIMOG)	1988-91	Monitor cease-fire in Iran-Iraq War
UN Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I)	1988-91	Monitor withdrawal of Cuban forces
UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)	1989-90	Supervise transition of Namibia from South African rule to independence
UN Mission for the Verification of Elections in Nicaragua (ONUVEN)	1989-90	Observe Nicaraguan elections
UN Mission in Central America (ONUCA)	1989-91	Monitor for arms and troop infiltration; demobilize Nicaraguan contras
UN Mission for the Verification of Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH)	1990	Observe Haitian elections
UN Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)	1991-present	Monitor general cease-fire and creation of new joint army
UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM)	1991-present	Monitor buffer zone after Gulf War; armed components
UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)	1991-present	Conduct referendum on independence vs. joining Morocco
UN Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)	1991-present	Monitor human rights violations, elections
UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) UN Temporary Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)	1991-present 1992-present	Supervise government functions and eventual elections while rebuilding the country and disarming the factions
UN Protection Force in Yugoslavia	1992-present	Advance mission late 1991; replace Yugoslav forces in Serbian areas of Croatia.

Sources of Peacekeeping Operations

Council Initiatives	**Brokered Requests**	
War for Palestine, 1948 (*UN Truce Supervisory Organization*)	West New Guinea, 1962 (*UN Transitional Executive Authority*, US mediated)	Conflict in Central America, 1989-91 (*UN Operation in Cent. America*, support Esquipulas II accord, demobilize Nicaraguan Resistance)
Suez Crisis, 1956 (*UN Emergency Force I*)	Yemen Civil War, 1963 (*UN Yemen Observer Mission*, US and UN mediated)	El Salvador Civil War, 1990- (*UN Operation in El Salvador*, UN mediated)
October War, 1973 (*UNEF II*, Sinai, UN and US also mediated)	October War, 1973 (*UN Disengagement Observer Force*, Golan, US mediated)	Angola Civil War, 1991- (*UN Angola Verification Mission II*, Portugal-US-Soviet mediated)
Operation Litani, 1978 (*UN Interim Force in Lebanon*)	Afghan Civil War, 1988 (*UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan*, UN mediated, Soviet withdrawal)	W. Sahara referendum, 1991- (*UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara*, UN mediated)
Iran-Iraq War, 1980-88 (*UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group*)	Angola Civil War, 1988 (*UN Angola Verification Mission I*, US mediated, Cuban withdrawal)	Cambodia Civil War, 1991 (*UN Advance Mission* and *UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia*, Perm Five initiative)
Gulf War, 1990-91 (*UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission*)	Namibian Independence, 1989-90 (*UN Transition Assistance Group*, Western Contact Group initiative, US mediated)	
Local Initiatives		
Greek Civil War, 1947 (*UN Special Committee on the Balkans*, Greece requests)		
Kashmir Dispute, 1948 (*UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan*, India requests)		
Lebanon Crisis, 1958 (*UN Observer Group in Lebanon*, Lebanon requests)		
Congo Crisis, 1960 (*UN Operation in the Congo*, Congo requests)		
Cyprus Dispute, 1964 (*UN Force in Cyprus*, Cyprus and UK request)		

Cost of UN Peacekeeping, 1989-1991

Mission and Starting Date	Cost ($US mil)			Outstanding ($US mil)	
	1989	1990	1991	To 1990	1991
UNTSO (1948, Israel's borders)	21	22	24	(a)	--
UNMOGIP (1949, Kashmir)	4	4	5	(a)	--
UNFICYP (1964, Cyprus)	26	28	29	(b)	(b)
UNDOF (1974, Golan Heights)	36	37	38	6	10
UNIFIL (1978, Lebanon)	141	142	152	167	98
UNGOMAP (1988, Afghanistan)	7	7	--	(a)	--
UNIIMOG (1988, Iran-Iraq)	95	44	8	1	--
UNAVEM I/II (1988, Angola)	9	5	52	1	14
UNTAG (1989, Namibia)	294	71	--	(c)	--
ONUCA (1989, Cent. America)	--	49	23	3	4
ONUVEN (1990, Nicaragua)	2	--	--	(a)	--
ONUVEH (1990, Haiti)	--	5	--	(a)	--
UNIKOM (1991, Iraq-Kuwait)	--	--	60	--	9
ONUSAL (1991, El Salvador)	--	--	13	--	6
MINURSO (1991, W. Sahara)	--	--	141	--	55
UNAMIC (1991, Cambodia, advance mission)	--	--	10	--	--
Secretariat Support Costs	3	3	4	(a)	--
TOTALS:	638	417	559	178	196

NOTE: Table includes payments outstanding as of 12/31/91. Table notes: (a) Regular budget; (b) Voluntary contributions, as of May 31, 1991, UNFICYP had a $188 million deficit; (c) Surplus, being distributed to other accounts as the creditor states direct.

SOURCE: Authors' estimates based on information from, Fred Schottler, DPI/CPMD/PSPS (Fax, October 4 & 14, 1991), *Proposed Programme Budget for the Biennium 1992-93, Vol. 1* (A/46/16/Rev.1), part II, *Report of the Secretary General on Cambodia* (S/23097/Add.1, September 30, 1991), and *Status of Contributions as at December 31, 1991* (Document ST/ADM/SER.B/364, January 8, 1992).

Impact of "Good" Initial Information on Mission Performance

OPERATION	PLANNING TIME	MISSION MILITARY OUTCOME
UNSCOB (Greece, 1947-51)	Months	Largely irrelevant.
UNTSO (Palestine, 1949-)	Weeks to months	Marginal impact after initial period; ignored by Israel.
UNMOGIP (India-Pakistan, 1949-)	Weeks to months	Marginal impact after initial period; ignored by India since 1971.
UNYOM (Yemen, 1963-64)	Weeks	Failure. Underfunded, undermined, circumvented.
UNFICYP (Cyprus, 1964-)	Days to weeks	Success for 10 years, overrun/reconstituted.
UNDOF (Golan, 1974-)	Weeks to months	Success.
MFO (Sinai, 1982-)	Months	Success.
MNF I (Lebanon, August 1982)	Days. Probably good intelligence from US and/or Israeli sources.	Success. Oversaw evacuation of Palestinian fighters.
UNTAG (Namibia, 1989-90)	Months to years	Success after rocky start.
ONUCA (Central America, 1989-91)	Days to weeks. Made new plans after deployment. Plans for securing and demobilizing Contras made on the fly.	Partial success.
UNIKOM (Iraq-Kuwait, 1991-)	Weeks to months. Not clear that lead time was well-utilized.	Likely success.
MINURSO (W. Sahara, 1991-)	Years	(New mission.)
ONUSAL (El Salvador, 1991-)	Months to years	(New mission.)
UNTAC (Cambodia, 1991-)	Months to years	(New mission.)

Impact of "Poor" Initial Information on Mission Performance

OPERATION	PLANNING TIME	MISSION MILITARY OUTCOME
UNEF I (Sinai, 1956-67)	Days. Units sent to Suez ahead of ground transport.	Success for 10 years, withdrawn at Egyptian request before June War.
UNOGIL (Lebanon, 1958)	Days. Borrowed staff from other nearby field missions.	Unable to verify arms infiltration; permitted early withdrawal of US Marines.
ONUC (Congo, 1960-64)	Hours to days. Units arrived before command structure, logistics or long-distance communications were set up.	Eventual partial success. Katanga secession ended, but not Congo's political instability.
UNTEA (W. New Guinea, 1962-63)	Months. Seconded observer group followed by Pakistani infantry.	Success after slow start. Political transition.
UNEF II (Sinai, 1973-79)	Days.	Success. Egypt-Israel separation of forces.
UNIFIL (Lebanon, 1978-)	Days to weeks. Initial deployments haphazard.	Marginal impact on military situation, useful in humanitarian terms.
MNF II (Lebanon, Sept. 1982-Spring 1984)	Days. Poor understanding of local political dynamics.	Failure. Elements came to be seen as partisan.
UNGOMAP (Afghanistan, 1988-89)	Days. Arrived without maps or knowledge of Soviet dispositions.	Success, but only as a withdrawal monitor, not as investigator of Afghan or Pakistani complaints.
UNIIMOG (Iran-Iraq, 1988-91)	Weeks. Two survey missions just prior to deployment.	Success, but due in part to pressure from Iraq's next war in Kuwait.
UNAVEM I (Angola, 1989-91)	Months. Mission lacked disposition data on Cuban forces until it deployed.	Success. Good cooperation from Cuba and Angolan government.

Terms of Reference

The U.N.'s long association with "peacekeeping" often leads to confusion about the roles the Organization might play in conflict situations. Two chapters of the U.N. Charter distinguish two very different approaches: Chapter VI, dealing with the "pacific settlement of disputes"; and Chapter VII, dealing with "action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression." As the architects of the Charter discerned, a comprehensive collective security system needs to perform both functions. Normally, the U.N. would handle most disputes and conflict situations in the first capacity, and rely on the second to provide for the common defense against willful and determined aggressors. The terms employed in this report differentiate between these two approaches, in accord with international usage.

Peacekeeping involves the use of military forces in a noncombatant capacity to monitor a cease-fire, serve as a buffer between adversaries, or help with disarming of rival forces pursuant to a wider peace agreement. The essential prerequisite of peacekeeping is the consent of the hostile parties; peacekeeping forces are stationed to help keep a precarious peace once the belligerents agree to stop shooting each other. Lightly armed, they may fire only in self-defense when fired upon. Because peacekeeping units are unequipped to defend themselves against a determined military opponent, their position is untenable when one party rejects their presence. They were accordingly withdrawn, for instance, from the Israeli-Egyptian border in 1967 when Egypt insisted they go (with ultimate results that Cairo had not foreseen). Absent a comprehensive settlement, peacekeeping forces may remain in place for years, even decades, as has been the case in Cyprus and in southern Lebanon.

Peacemaking, a term particularly subject to misinterpretation, refers to the full range of activities involved in the *peaceful* resolution of disputes: It is the process by which an outside agent helps warring parties to "make peace," i.e., to reach agreement not only on an end to the fighting but also on a settlement to resolve their dispute. Peacemaking involves a wide range of activities, such as mediation, conciliation, shuttle diplomacy, and confidence-building actions, as envisioned in Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter. A peace settlement will often call for the deployment of peacekeeping forces during its implementation.

Peace enforcement, by contrast, refers to actions taken to *compel* a recalcitrant belligerent to take steps demanded by the international body—the function dealt with in Chapter VII of the Charter. The means of coercion may be political or economic—the complete or partial interruption of economic relations, transportation and communications links, and diplomatic relations, as described in Article 41—or the means may be military, as envisaged in Article 42.

The distinction between peace-enforcing and peacemaking is usually quite clear-cut. Occasionally, however, a complex situation may blur the two. In the U.N. peacekeeping operation in the Congo (now Zaire) in the early 1960s, U.N. peacekeepers were forced to cross the line into enforcement when an armed faction's intransigence threatened to scuttle a laboriously negotiated settlement. Fortunately, the opposition had slight military prowess, and U.N. units were able to prevail with only a modest show of force. Three decades later, U.N. peacekeeping forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina would face a far more anomalous situation. Introduced into the region without a clear mandate in a situation where there was no cease-fire, yet still operating under peacekeeping rules of engagement, these troops began edging into an enforcement role to protect relief deliveries.

Table III

Peacekeeping Missions
Assessments in 1992 and Estimated Expenditures

Mission	Authorization: Assessment	1992 Cost
UNTSO (Middle East)	Authorized in Regular Budget	$25 million
UNMOGIP (India/Pakistan)	Authorized in Regular Budget	$6 million
UNFICYP (Cyprus)	Voluntary Contributions	$31 million
ONUCA (Nicaragua)	11/91 - 4/92: $12 million	$7 million
UNDOF (Middle East)	12/91 - 11/92: $35 million 12/92 - 5/93: $17 million	$39 million
UNIFIL (Lebanon)	2/92 - 1/93: $144 million	$153 million
UNIKOM (Iraq-Kuwait)	10/91 - 10/92: $60 million 11/92 - 4/93: $19 million	$68 million
UNAVEM II (Angola)	1/92 - 10/92: $56 million 11/92 - 2/93: $25 million	$67 million
ONUSAL (El Salvador)	1/92 - 10/92: $36 million 11/92 - 2/93: $8 million	$35 million
MINURSO (Western Sahara)	Authorized 9/91; not yet fully operational	$18 million
UNPROFOR (Yugoslavia)	1/92 - 10/92: $250 million 12/92 - 2/93: $298 million	$222 million
UNAMIC (Cambodia advance mission)	11/91 - 4/92: $33 million	$20 million
UNTAC (Cambodia)	5/92 - 10/92: $802 million 11/92 - 4/93: $313 million	$637 million
UNOSOM (Somalia)	5/92 - 4/93: $108 million	$39 million
ONUMOZ (Mozambique)	to be authorized in March, '93 at estimated cost of over $200 million	-
Total		$1.37 billion

Table IV
Growth in Biennial U.N. Expenditures
1982/1983 – 1992/1993

(millions of $)



*The U.N. spent approximately $1.4 billion on peacekeeping in calendar year 1992. This figure is based on appropriations granted through December 1992 plus estimates for new activities projected for 1993.

Table V Ratio of Military Expenditures to Peacekeeping Assessment, Selected States, 1991

Country	Military Spending	Peacekeeping Assessment	Ratio
I. Permanent Five			
Russia	$224.1 billion	$60,343,900	3,714 to 1
China	$12.0 billion	$4,762,700	2,520 to 1
United States	$304.5 billion	$151,031,600	2,016 to 1
United Kingdom	$42.3 billion	$29,361,800	1,441 to 1
France	$41.4 billion	$37,757,900	1,096 to 1
II. NATO			
Turkey	$5.0 billion	$314,240	15,911 to 1
Italy	$23.6 billion	$19,590,900	1,204 to 1
Spain	$9.0 billion	$9,574,500	944 to 1
Germany	$39.9 billion	$45,957,600	868 to 1
Canada	$12.1 billion	$15,171,900	798 to 1
III. Other Europe			
Poland	$2.2 billion	$549,920	4,001 to 1
Sweden	$5.5 billion	$5,941,100	926 to 1
Ireland	$588 million	$883,800	665 to 1
Czechoslovakia	$723 million	$3,240,600	223 to 1
IV. Middle East			
Syria	$4.5 billion	$39,280	114,562 to 1
Iraq	$12.8 billion	$117,840	108,622 to 1
Oman	$1.4 billion	$19,640	71,283 to 1
Israel	$4.5 billion	$206,220	21,821 to 1
Saudi Arabia(1)*	$15.2 billion	$1,002,640	15,204 to 1
United Arab Emirates	$1.6 billion	$186,580	8,760 to 1

(1) This figure may be higher than average due to increased expenditures during the Gulf War.

Table V, continued

Country	Military Spending	Peacekeeping Assessment	Ratio
V. South Asia			
Bangladesh	$301 million	$4,910	61,303 to 1
Pakistan	$2.8 billion	$58,920	47,522 to 1
Sri Lanka	$419 million	$9,820	42,668 to 1
India	$7.2 billion	$363,340	19,816 to 1
VI. East Asia/Pacific			
Burma (Myanmar)	$796 million	$4,910	162,118 to 1
Thailand	$2.9 billion	$98,200	29,532 to 1
Singapore	$2.1 billion	$108,020	19,441 to 1
South Korea	$9.8 billion	$677,580	14,463 to 1
Indonesia	$1.9 billion	$147,300	12,899 to 1
Australia	$7.3 billion	$7,708,700	947 to 1
Japan	$32.1 billion	$55,875,800	574 to 1
VII. Africa			
Ethiopia*	$896 million	$4,910	182,485 to 1
Sudan	$828 million	$4,910	168,635 to 1
Angola*	$703 million	$4,910	143,177 to 1
Zimbabwe	$292 million	$4,910	59,470 to 1
Morocco	$1.2 billion	$39,280	30,550 to 1
Kenya	$191 million	$9,820	19,439 to 1
Nigeria	$234 million	$196,400	1,191 to 1

Table V, continued

Country	Military Spending	Peacekeeping Assessment	Ratio
VIII. Latin America			
Honduras	$412 million	$9,820	41,955 to 1
Cuba	$2.2 billion	$88,380	24,839 to 1
Chile	$1.4 billion	$78,560	17,821 to 1
Brazil*	$4.9 billion	$1,423,900	3,441 to 1
Costa Rica	$19 million	$19,640	967 to 1
Mexico	$662 million	$923,080	717 to 1
IX. World Total	**$921.5 billion**	**$491,000,000**	**1,877 to 1**

* Denotes military spending figures are from 1990

Note: 1992 ratios would be significantly lower, since peacekeeping costs were about 2 1/2 times higher than in 1991.

Sources: Military spending figures are derived from estimates published in the SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) Yearbook 1992, and converted into U.S.$ according to exchange rates listed in the 1992 IMF International Financial Statistics Yearbook. It should be noted that military expenditres are difficult to measure with absolute precision. The purpose of this table is to compare orders of magnitude, in order to demonstrate the enormous disparity between military expenditures and the cost of peacekeeping.



Chart 3 Security Council resolutions passed and vetoed 1946–1992



Chart 5 UN peace keeping personnel deployed 1946-1993

PEACE-KEEPING FORCES AND OBSERVER MISSIONS



MAP NO. 3687.3 UNITED NATIONS
APRIL 1993

From IKK
Parliamentary Defence Comm. report

UN PEACE-KEEPING AND OBSERVER MISSIONS

A. United Nations Peace-keeping Operations established before 1987

1. United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO)
1948 to present.
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.
Authority and Mandate: Security Council: supervision of truce in 1948, supervision of General Armistice Agreements of 1949, ceasefires in the Suez and Golan Heights, and assistance to UNIFIL and UNDOF.
Maximum personnel: 572 (1948)
Fatalities: 28

2. United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)
1949 to present.
Authority and Mandate: Security Council: supervision of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir.
Maximum personnel: 102 (1965)
Fatalities: 6

3. United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I)
1956–67
First in the Suez sector and the Sinai peninsula. Then along the Gaza area and the international frontier in the Sinai peninsula on the Egyptian side only.
Authority and mandate: General Assembly: to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, including the withdrawal of the armed forces of France, Israel and the United Kingdom from Egypt territory, and after the withdrawal to serve as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces.
Maximum strength: 6,073 (February 1957)
Fatalities: 90

4. United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)
1958
Authority and Mandate: Security Council: to ensure that there was no illegal infiltration of personnel of supply of arms or other material across the Lebanon borders.
Maximum size: 591 (November 1958)

5. United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)
July 1960 to June 1964
Authority and Mandate: Security Council: to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces, to assist the Government in maintaining law and order and to provide technical assistance: to maintain the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Congo, to prevent the occurrence of civil war, and to secure the removal from the Congo of all foreign military, paramilitary and advisory personnel not under the United Nations command, and all mercenaries.
Maximum strength: 19,828 (July 1961)
Fatalities: 234

6. United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian) (UNSF)
October 1962 to April 1963
Authority and Mandate: General Assembly: to maintain peace and security in the territory under the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) established by agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands.
Maximum strength: 1,500 infantry personnel and 76 aircraft personnel.

7. United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM)
July 1963 to September 1964
Authority and Mandate: Security Council: to observe and certify the implementation of the disengagement agreement between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic.
Maximum strength: 25 military observers;
114 officers and other ranks of a reconnaissance unit;
50 officers and other ranks of an air unit.

8. United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)
March 1964 to present
Authority and Mandate: Security Council: in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent the recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions. Since 1974 this has included supervising the ceasefire and maintaining a buffer zone between the lines of the Cyprus National Guard and of the Turkish and the Turkish Cypriot forces.
Maximum strength: 6,411 (June 1964)
Fatalities: 159

9. Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP)
May 1965 to October 1966
Authority and Mandate: Security Council: to observe the situation and to report on breaches of the ceasefire between the two *de facto* authorities.
Maximum strength: 2 military observers

10. United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM)
September 1965 to March 1966
Authority and Mandate: Security Council: to supervise the ceasefire along the India/Pakistan border except in the State of Jammu and Kashmir where UNMOGIP operated, and the withdrawal of all armed personnel to the positions held by them before 5 August 1965.
Maximum strength: 96 military observers (October 1965)

11. Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II)
October 1973 to July 1979
Suez Canal and later the Sinai peninsula
Authority and Mandate: Security Council: to supervise the ceasefire between Egyptian and Israeli forces and, following the conclusion of the agreements of 18 January 1974 and 4 September 1975, to supervise the redeployment of Egyptian and Israeli forces and to man and control the buffer zones established under those agreements.
Maximum strength: 6,973 (February 1974)
Fatalities: 52

12. United Nations Disengagement Observation Force (UNDOF)
June 1974 to present
Syrian Golan Heights
Authority and Mandate: Security Council: to supervise the ceasefire between Israel and Syria; to supervise the redeployment of Syrian armed forces; and to establish a buffer zone as provided in the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian forces of 31 May 1974.
Maximum strength: 1,450
Fatalities: 31

13. United Nations Interim Force in Southern Lebanon (UNIFIL)
March 1978 to present
Authority and Mandate: Security Council: to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Southern Lebanon, to restore international peace and security and to assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area.
Maximum strength: 7,000
Fatalities: 190

B. PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS ESTABLISHED BEFORE 1987: COSTS IN CASH TERMS TO JANUARY 1993 AND METHOD OF FINANCE

UNIFIL	$	2,059,382,450	(Special Peace-keeping Account)
UNFICYP	$	691,400,000	(Voluntary Contributions)
UNDOF	$	525,467.000	(Special Peace-keeping Account)
UNEF II	$	446,487,000	(Special Peace-keeping Account)
ONUC	$	400.130.793	(Special Peace-keeping Account)
UNTSO	$	372.521.300	(Regular Budget)
UNEF I	$	214.249,000	(Special Peace-keeping Account)
UNMOGIP	$	81,709.000	(Regular Budget)
UNOGIL	$	3,697,000	(Regular Budget)
UNYOM	$	1,840,000	(States sharing costs in equal parts)
UNIPOM	$	1,713,280	(Regular Budget)
DOMREP	$	275,831	(Regular Budget
UNSF	$	costs unknown	(States sharing costs in equal parts)

C. GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS ESTABLISHED BEFORE 1987

Africa:
- ONUC

Asia:
- UNSF

Central America:
- DOMREP

Indian Subcontinent:
- UNMOGIP
- UNIPOM

Middle East:
- UNTSO
- UNEF I
- UNOGIL
- UNYOM
- UNFICYP
- UNEF II
- UNDOF
- UNIFIL

D. UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS ESTABLISHED SINCE 1987

1.	Afghanistan/Pakistan	UNGOMAP: UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (April 1988–March 1990) 50 military observers.
2.	Angola	UNAVEM I: UN Angola Verification Mission (January 1989–June 1991) 70 military observers.
3.	Angola	UNAVEM II: UN Angola Verification Mission (June 1991–present) 350 military observers, air section and 90 police.
4.	Cambodia	UNAMIC: UN Advanced Mission in Cambodia (October 1991–March 1992) 380 military and civilian personnel.
5.	Cambodia	UNTAC: UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (March 1992-present) 19,000–20,000 military, civilian and police personnel.
6.	Central America	ONUCA: UN Observer Group in Central America (November 1989–January 1992) 1,098 military observers and armed soldiers and naval personnel.
7.	El Salvador	ONUSAL: UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (July 1991-present) 135 civilian, police and military.
8.	Iran-Iraq	UNIIMOG: UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (August 1988–June 1991) 399 military observers.
9.	Iraq-Kuwait	UNIKOM: UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (April 1991–present) 300 military observers and 550 UN armed soldiers for first three months.
10.	Mozambique	ONUMOZ: United Nations Mission in Mozambique (December 1992–present) approximately 8,000 military planned.
11.	Namibia	UNTAG: UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (April 1989–March 1990) 4,650 military, 450 civilian. 1,350 election staff and 1,500 police.
12.	Somalia	UNOSOM: UN Operation in Somalia (April 1992–May 1993) 50 military observers, 500 UN armed soldiers.
13.	Somalia	UNOSOM II: UN Operation in Somalia (which took over from Unified Task Force (UNITAF)) (May 1993–present) 28,000 armed soldiers, 2,000 civilians.
14.	Western Sahara	MINURSO: UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (September 1991–present) 1,700 military observers, 450 civilian electoral staff and 300 police.
15.	Yugoslavia	UNPROFOR: UN Protection Force (March 1992-present) over 20,000 soldiers, military observers, police and civilians.

E. UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER ETC MISSIONS ESTABLISHED SINCE 1987

1.	Afghanistan/Pakistan	OSGAP: Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan (1990–present) personal representative and 10 military observers.
2.	Central America	CIAV: UN/OAS International Commission of Support and Verification (1989) 150 civilians.
3.	Haiti	ONUVEH: UN Observer Mission to verify the electoral process in Haiti (1990–1991) 250 civilians and a small number of military observers.
4.	Iraq	UN Civilian Guards (1991–present) 500 maximum.
5.	Nicaragua	ONUVEN: UN Observer Mission to verify the electoral process in Nicaragua (1989–1990) 207 civilian observers.

SUMMARY OF PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTIONS TO UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS BY COUNTRIES

	UNTSO	UNMO-GIP	UNFI-CYP	UNDOF	UNI-FIL	UNI-KOM	UNA-VEM	ONU-SAL	MIN-URSO	UNPRO-FOR	ONU-MOZ	UNO-SOM	UN-MIH	UNO-MIG	UNO-MIL	UNA-MIR	TOTAL
Mission	June	Jan	Mar	June	Mar	Apr	Jun	Jul	Sept	Mar	Dec	May	Jun	Aug	Sep	Oct	
Commenced	1948	1949	1964	1974	1978	1991	1991	1991	1991	1992	1992	1993	1993	1993	1993	1993	
Malaysia	--	--	--	--	--	7	4	--	21	1576	94	1127	--	--	25	--	2854
Mali	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	39	39
Mexico	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	29	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	29
Morocco	--	--	--	--	--	--	2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	2
Nepal	--	--	--	--	721	--	--	--	--	957	50	314	--	--	--	--	2042
Netherlands	15	--	--	--	--	--	4	--	--	1877	11	4	--	--	--	--	1911
New Zealand	7	--	--	--	--	--	3	--	--	275	9	6	4	--	--	--	304
Niger	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	43	43
Nigeria	--	--	--	--	--	5	5	--	9	50	40	799	--	--	--	271	1179
Norway	15	4	--	--	833	--	4	--	5	1058	9	--	--	--	--	--	1928
Rep. of Korea	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	42	--	--	5	--	--	--	--	47
Pakistan	--	--	--	--	--	7	--	--	3	3024	65	6882	--	--	41	--	10022
Philippines	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1	--	--	--	--	1
Poland	--	--	--	361	561	5	--	--	2	1183	--	--	--	2	--	3	2117
Portugal	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	55	184	--	--	--	--	--	239
Romania	--	--	--	--	--	7	--	--	--	--	--	236	--	--	--	--	243
Russian Fed	12	--	--	--	--	15	--	--	27	1444	18	--	--	--	--	15	1531
Senegal	--	--	--	--	--	6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	241	247
Singapore	--	--	--	--	--	7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	7
Slovak Rep.	--	--	--	--	--	--	5	--	--	581	--	--	--	--	8	7	601
Spain	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	68	--	1435	61	--	--	--	--	--	1564
Sri Lanka	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	11	--	--	--	--	--	11
Sweden	17	8	--	--	--	6	3	2	--	1248	58	--	--	3	--	--	1345
Switzerland	7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	15	3	--	--	2	--	--	27
Thailand	--	--	--	--	--	6	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	6
Togo	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	5	--	5	--	--	--	--	--	10
Tunisia	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	9	10	--	--	--	--	--	40	59
Turkey	--	--	--	--	--	6	--	--	--	1463	--	--	--	--	--	--	1469
Ukraine	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1141	--	--	--	--	--	--	1141
United Kingdom	--	--	419	--	--	15	--	--	--	3043	--	--	--	10	--	595	4082
United States	17	--	--	--	--	13	--	--	30	877	1	--	--	--	--	--	938
Uruguay	--	3	--	--	--	6	--	--	19	--	874	--	--	1	16	27	946
Venezuela	--	--	--	--	--	2	--	3	8	3	--	--	--	--	--	--	16
Zambia	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	842	6	--	--	--	111	959
Zimbabwe	--	--	--	--	--	--	7	--	--	--	--	998	--	--	--	26	1031
TOTAL	220	38	1237	1043	5240	1123	79	162	324	39922	5522	18525	16	67	295	4298	78111

SUMMARY OF PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTIONS TO UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS BY COUNTRIES

An unofficial tabulation compiled by P:IR from UN documents.
Numbers apply as of 30 September 1994

	UNTSO	UNMO-GIP	UNFI-CYP	UNDOF	UNI-FIL	UNI-KOM	UNA-VEM	ONU-SAL	MIN-URSO	UNPRO-FOR	ONU-MOZ	UNO-SOM	UN-MIH	UNO-MIG	UNO-MIL	UNA-MIR	TOTAL
Mission Commenced	June 1948	Jan 1949	Mar 1964	June 1974	Mar 1978	Apr 1991	Jun 1991	Jul 1991	Sept 1991	Mar 1992	Dec 1992	May 1993	Jun 1993	Aug 1993	Sep 1993	Oct 1993	
Argentina	6	--	391	--	--	56	5	2	7	890	48	--	--	--	--	--	1405
Australia	13	--	20	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	20	68	--	--	--	313	434
Austria	16	--	352	459	--	19	--	2	14	--	20	--	--	2	10	16	910
Bangladesh	--	--	--	--	--	782	--	--	7	931	1169	988	4	8	60	52	4001
Belgium	6	2	--	--	--	--	--	--	1	1055	--	--	--	--	--	--	1064
Bolivia	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	10	--	--	--	--	--	10
Botswana	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	767	423	--	--	--	--	1190
Brazil	--	--	--	--	--	--	24	5	--	43	264	--	--	--	--	--	336
Canada	14	--	10	223	--	5	--	--	--	2068	4	--	--	--	--	388	2712
Cape Verde	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	16	--	--	--	--	--	16
Chad	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	130	130
Chile	3	3	--	--	--	--	--	15	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	21
China	5	--	--	--	--	15	--	--	20	--	10	--	--	--	15	--	65
Colombia	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	23	--	12	--	--	--	--	--	--	35
Congo	--	--	--	--	--	--	2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	40	42
Czech Rep	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	920	19	--	--	--	15	--	954
Denmark	11	6	--	--	--	51	--	--	--	1290	--	--	--	6	--	--	1364
Djoubouti	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	2	--	--	--	2
Egypt	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	9	442	70	1688	--	4	15	--	2228
Ethiopia	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	804	804
Fiji	--	--	--	--	650	7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1	658
Finland	17	7	1	--	552	6	--	--	--	370	5	--	--	--	--	--	958
France	14	--	--	--	440	15	--	1	30	5824	--	--	2	--	--	--	6326
Germany	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	5	--	--	--	--	8	--	--	13
Ghana	--	--	--	--	783	6	--	--	11	32	40	6	--	--	--	899	1777
Greece	--	--	--	--	--	7	--	--	1	--	--	--	--	5	--	--	13
Guinea	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	15	16
Guinea Bisseau	--	--	--	--	--	--	2	--	--	--	102	--	--	--	16	39	159
Guatemala	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	2	--	--	--	2
Guyana	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	4	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	4
Honduras	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	16	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	16
Hungary	--	--	--	--	--	6	4	--	--	--	42	--	--	8	--	--	60
India	--	--	--	--	--	6	3	--	--	--	181	4953	--	--	20	--	5163
Indonesia	--	--	--	--	--	7	--	--	--	250	15	7	--	--	--	--	279
Ireland	17	--	44	--	657	7	--	--	9	29	20	3	2	--	--	--	788
Italy	8	5	--	--	43	8	--	8	6	--	232	11	--	--	--	--	321
Japan	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	53	--	--	--	--	--	53
Jordan	--	--	--	--	--	--	2	--	--	3476	80	--	--	8	37	--	3603
Kenya	--	--	--	--	--	7	--	--	7	975	--	--	--	--	17	6	1012
Malawi	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	177	177

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS PAST AND PRESENT

- **UNTSO**
  United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
  June 1948 - to present

- **UNMOGIP**
  United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
  January 1949 - to present

- **UNEF I**
  First United Nations Emergency Force
  November 1956 - June 1967

- **UNOGIL**
  United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon
  June 1958 - December 1958

- **ONUC**
  United Nations Operation in the Congo
  July 1960 - June 1964

- **UNSF**
  United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian)
  October 1962 - April 1963

- **UNYOM**
  United Nations Yemen Observation Mission
  July 1963 - September 1964

- **UNFICYP**
  United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus
  March 1964 - to present

- **DOMREP**
  Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic
  May 1965 - October 1966

- **UNIPOM**
  United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission
  September 1965 - March 1966

- **UNEF II**
  Second United Nations Emergency Force
  October 1973 - July 1979

- **UNDOF**
  United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
  June 1974 - to present

- **UNIFIL**
  United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
  March 1978 - to present

- **UNGOMAP**
  United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan
  April 1988 - March 1990

- **UNIIMOG**
  United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group
  August 1988 - February 1991

- **UNAVEM I**
  United Nations Angola Verification Mission I
  January 1989 - June 1991

- **UNTAG**
  United Nations Transition Assistance Group
  April 1989 - March 1990

- **ONUCA**
  United Nations Observer Group in Central America
  November 1989 - January 1992

Continued on page 11



MAP NO. 3709 Rev. 4 UNITED NATIONS
JUNE 1994