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

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ASPECTS OF FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE POST WORLD WAR II YEARS

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INTRODUCTION

This study examines the subject of foreign military intervention between the end of World War II to the mid-1980s. It can be considered an introduction and a guide to some of the most important aspects of international political behavior dealing with war and peace. Dealing with a large number of different countries and nearly 10 subtopics, it does not presume to be a definitive global survey or a thorough quantitative assessment of various types of military interventionary behavior.

There were of course major military interventions in the period between the two world wars: the United States in Central America (in the 1920s); Japan in Manchuria (1931); Italy in Ethiopia (1936); Italy, Germany and the USSR in Spain (1936-1939); Germany in Austria (1938); the USSR in Sinkiang, China (1934 and 1938); Japan in the USSR, in Siberia (1938) and, finally, the German invasion of Czechoslovakia and Poland that began WWII in the European theatre. This is far from a complete listing of external military interventions in the interwar period. There seems, however, to be two noticeable developments in the post-WWII period:

- There appears to be very much more war and conflict.
- Foreign military intervention appears to be an activity which is spreading in several different ways.

The complexity of foreign military interventionary activities is increasing and there are more gradations in the interventionary process and in its methods. There are new foci of military capability, sophisticated arms transfer, external interventionary capabilities, as well as strong interest among a widening population of states to find or to make opportunities to use these means.

This was not the initial expectation in the immediate post-WWII years. It was thought that the newly independent states would deter foreign military intervention, thereby reducing its extent compared to the colonia era. Several well known books have argued that intervention was a thing of the past, and as recently as 1982 John Kenneth Galbraith argued that the new "imperial ambitions of the United States and the Soviet Union" had failed and that their interventionary efforts had declined.[1] That is not quite what has happened, and Galbraith, ordinarily acutely observant, was in this instance perhaps describing what he hoped for rather than what was. There are more opportunities, more situations in which intervention can and does take place,

rather than less. And if the activities of several major states appeared to have decreased – which is open to question if one examines activities other than wholesale invasion – a large number of new states in the developing world itself began to adopt interventionary behaviors. Written in 1975, R.J. Vincent's assessment is a much more accurate representation of reality:

> The idea that both the utility and legitimacy of force have declined is a Western one which has small correspondence with experience outside the West, and has, furthermore, to be severely qualified in order accurately to render Western experience.[2]

In 1982, Dimitri Simes wrote that "international relations and politics in general is an art ... of operating under circumstances of continued tragedy." One of the more noteworthy consequences of this study was the discovery of striking historical parallels between practices dating from hundreds and even thousands of years ago to current practices and interactions. One surprising example dealt with military assistance and arms transfer. When Sir Walter Raleigh first reached the Orinoco around 1590, the Indians of the region had already suffered the ravages of the Spaniards for many years. Returning to England, Raleigh and one of his captains wrote a treaties, *Of the Voyage for Guiana*, which summarized four offers that should be made to the Guianans on a return trip.

> 1. That we will defend them...
> 2. That we will help them to recover their country of Peru.
> 3. That we will instruct them in liberal arts of civility.
> 4. And lastly that we will teach them the use of weapons, battle manoeuvre, armour, ordnance and the use of horses.[3]

Some 3,000 years before "...the Mycenaens obtained a great quantity of gold from Egypt, in exhcnage of military aid offered by them to Pharaon, in order to enable Egyptians to fight the invaders Hyskos."[4] The American major who said of Ben Tre in South Vietnam on February 7, 1968, that "It became necessary to destroy the town to save it" had been anticipated by Calgacus in 85 AD in his description of the Romans (as quoted by Tacitus): "To plunder, to slaughter, to steal, these things they misname empire, and where they make a desert, they call it peace." The destruction wrought in Vietnam by the United States and in Afghanistan by the USSR was similarly anticipated by the Requirement, an extraordinary document that all Spanish explorers were supposed to read to newly contacted tribes whose territory they invaded:

> The Requirement was the product of a debate that had long been raging in Spain over the moral and theological right of Spaniards to conquer foreign lands. Some Spanish ecclesiastics told the King that his soul was endangered by these conquests in his name. Fighting infidel Moors was a valid crusade; but the occupation of lands of innocent tribes

> that had never heard of Christianity was not. The answer was the Requirement. This proclamation was to be read aloud, through interpreters if possible, before the Spaniards launched an attack. The Requirement contained a brief history of the world, with descriptions of the Papacy and Spanish monarchy. The native audience was required to accept the King as its ruler, on behalf of the Pope. It must also allow the preaching of Christianity to its people. Failure to comply immediately made the listeners liable to Spanish attack, enslavement of wives and children, and looting of property, and – in the words of the Requirement – "we protest that any deaths or losses that result from this are your fault...". This absurd document was read in strange circumstances: to empty villages, to Indians already enslaved, or from the decks of ships approaching unknown shores. Bartolomé de las Casas confessed that he did not know whether to laugh at its ludicrous impracticability, or weep at its injustice.[5]

This was in the year 1532.

The following excerpt from a paper in a 1933 issue of *Foreign Affairs* is as interesting for its demonstration of one line of argument in Japan's justification for its territorial expansion as it is for the transparent provincialism of the rejection by a US author of the parallel drawn by the Japanese to US behavior.

> The Japanese insist that their military action in Korea and in Manchuria and northern China has also been similar to the military action of the United States in the Caribbean. They maintain that they have merely been applying the "police power doctrine" of President Theodore Roosevelt. They claim that in overthrowing the Chinese Government in Manchuria, Japan was abating a neighborhood nuisance, as the United States did when it overthrew the Spanish Government in Cuba; that in recognizing the independence of Manchukuo, they were following the example of the United States in its recognition of Panama; and that their entire course of action in Manchuria has been in line with the American policy in the Caribbean region as manifested by American military interventions in Mexico, Nicaragua, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Although there are certain similarities between the respective positions, policies and actions of the United States and Japan, there are decided differences. The position of Japan in Asia in certain important respects fails to parallel that of the United States in America. The United States is a vast territory with a great population vis-à-vis a dozen Caribbean republics, each with a relatively small area and population. Japan, on the other hand, is a country with a relatively small area and population vis-à-vis the vast territory and great population of China. An attitude which therefore appears natural for the United States to take toward the Caribbean states does not appear natural for Japan to take toward China.[6]

One would assume that 50 years later, the American justification would be as transparent and unacceptable as the Japanese. But perhaps not.

On April 9, 1940, the German Foreign Ministry announced that due to the prior violations of Danish and Norwegian neutrality, Germany had assumed the responsibility for defending the neutrality of the two countries. In more ordinary language and from the point of view of everyone except the invader, Germany had invaded Denmark and Norway. When the USSR

invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, it announced that it did so on the basis of "fraternal solidarity and support." No less an astute observer than Raymond Aron titled a chapter on the international engagements of the United States in the post-war years "The Thankless Role of a Great Power." The page adjacent to this title showed a photograph of a strike-aircraft from the aircraft carrier USS *Coral Sea* taking off to bomb Vietnam in 1968.[7]

This study will attempt in its various sections to answer the following questions: What is "intervention"? What (even) is "aggression"? How much war and conflict has there been in the post-WWII period? In how much of that has there been intervention in addition to, or aside from, the states directly involved in an open war? Who has intervened and what forms have their interventions taken? These questions establish the context for the kinds of international behavior examined in the pages that follow.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DEFINITIONS

The question of the legal definition of intervention in international law can only be alluded to, and the reader is referred to a large body of relevant literature (1). United Nations Resolution 2131, the "Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty" (see Appendix, page) acts as a basic definitional text. Other basic United Nations statements that serve as definitional sources are UN General Assembly Resolution 2225, December 12, 1965, and UN General Assembly Resolution 2625, October 24, 1970 (2). The United Nations definition of "Aggression" appears in UNGA Resolution 3314, December 14, 1974. In a review essay on the concepts of intervention used in social science, Brauch has presented the forms of intervention prohibited by the charters of various international organizations or other special compacts (see Table 1) (3). Various international agreements have been the bases of "... the development of certain modern legal norms — regrettably not always respected — which prohibit the use of force in international relations and intervention in the internal affairs of states..." (4). The focus in this study, however, will be on the "rules of disregard" — a phrase I have borrowed from Michael Walzer — or on some of the categories of events of disregard, rather than on the legal norms (5). The dominant impression in the post-war period is certainly that, whatever the international legal norms and definitions may be, nations disregard them and wage war on one another, send expenditionary forces either openly or disguised in one way or another, under various rationales. Nations rarely have much difficulty in finding a public excuse even when they invade another state. Perhaps a classic case and a useful reminder, since it has relatively recent echoes in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, is the German Foreign Ministry announcement of April 8, 1940, already referred to, on the occasion of the invasion of Denmark and Norway.

In an insightful paper published in 1964, Karl W.Deutsch avoided the more typical attempts to establish abstract definitions and instead focused on practices and behaviors. He implicitly equated "external involvement" with intervention and referred to

> ... such drastic forms of intervention as infiltration of individual agents, of larger numbers of guerrilla troops, or of technical specialists to make such troops more effective — sometimes together

> with considerable technical equipment like weapons, ammunition, or communications gear... From such only nominally clandestine acts of intervention it is only a small step to the overt intervention of foreign troops in domestic conflict — and only another small step to such open foreign intervention in countries where domestic conflict although invoked as a pretext, is in fact insignificant or absent and the true aim is naked foreign conquest.

He asked

> How can judgment of the domestic or foreign-controlled character of an internal war be made more precise and more clearly comparable, by introducing some simple measurement of at least some of their relevant aspects?
>
> ...
>
> For purposes of comparison with the duration and extent of the internal war, the duration and extent of outside intervention on each side may be measured. This measurement might be taken in terms of manpower, money, material, and specialized services.

He also defined a "war by proxy" as

> ... an international conflict between two foreign powers, fought out on the soil of a third country; disguised as conflict over an internal issue of that country; and using some or all of that country's manpower, resources, and territory as means for achieving preponderantly foreign goals and foreign strategies (6).

Before coming across Deutsch's paper, the classification proposed on the following pages was devised (7). Clearly, it follows a line of reasoning very similar to that of Deutsch.

Table 1.

(I) Militärische Einwirkungsarten

Klassifizierung	Völkerrechtliche Normierung	Einwirkungsakte, Tatbestände	Anmerkungen
Gewaltverbot	**Art. 2, 4 UN-Charta** **Prinzip I, Friendly Relations** **Prinzip II, KSZE-Akte** **Definition der Aggression**	**— Invasion oder Angriff der bewaffneten Streitkräfte eines anderen Staates** **— Bombardement, Blockade der Häfen, Küsten** **— Entsendung bewaffneter Banden** **— bewaffnete Repressalie**	
Interventionsverbot	**Art. 2, 7 UN-Charta** **Prinzip III, Friendly Relations** **Prinzip VI, KSZE-Schlußakte** **GA-Res. 2131 (XX)** **Art. 15, 16 OAS-Charta (Bogota)**	**— „Armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political economic and cultural elements, are in violation of international law." (FRD, 1. Abs., 2. Satz)** **— (Die Teilnehmerstaaten) „werden sich ... jeder Form bewaffneter Intervention oder der Androhung einer solchen Intervention gegen einen anderen Teilnehmerstaat enthalten." (KSZE, 2. Abs.)** **— „Sie werden sich ... jeder militärischen Zwangsmaßnahme enthalten." (KSZE, 3. Abs.)** **— militärische Machtdemonstration (show of force)** **— Bereitstellung von Waffen für eine nichtlegitimierte Konfliktpartei in einem Bürgerkrieg**	

(II) Ökonomische Einwirkungsarten

Klassifizierung	Völkerrechtliche Normierung	Einwirkungsakte, Tatbestände	Anmerkungen
Gewaltverbot	FRD, KSZE	nicht erfaßt	
Interventionsverbot	Art. 2, 7 UN-Charta FRD, KSZE, GA-Res. 2131 (XX) OAS-Charta, Art. 16	— „No State may use or encourage the use of economic ... measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind." (FRD, 2. Abs., 1. Satz) — „Every State, has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural systems, without interference in any form by another State." FRD, 3. Abs.) — „Sie werden sich jeder ... wirtschaftlichen Zwangsmaßnahme enthalten." (KSZE, 3. Abs., 1. Satz) — „No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic ... character in order to force the sovereign will of another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind." (OAS, Art. 16)	

(III) Politische Einwirkungsarten

Klassifizierung	Völkerrechtliche Normierung	Einwirkungsakte, Tatbestände	Anmerkungen
Gewaltverbot	FRD, KSZE	nicht erfaßt	
Interventionsverbot	Art. 2, 7 UN-Charta FRD, KSZE, GA-Res. 2131 (XX) OAS-Charta, Art. 15, 16	— „No State may use or encourage the use of ... political measures to coerce another State ..." (FRD, 2. Abs.) — „Sie werden sich ... jeder politischen Zwangsmaßnahme enthalten ..." (KSZE, 3. Abs.) — „No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of ... (a) political character ..." (OAS, Art. 16) — alle Formen des diplomatischen Drucks mit dem Ziel einer Verhaltensänderung beim Interventionsobjekt	

(IV) Subversive Einwirkungsarten

Klassifizierung	Völkerrechtliche Normierung	Einwirkungsakte, Tatbestände	Anmerkungen
Gewaltverbot	FRD, KSZE	— „Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of another State." (FRD, 8. Abs.)	
Interventionsverbot	FRD, KSZE, GA-Res. 2131 (XX)	— „No State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State or interfere in civil strife in another State." (FRD, 3. Abs.) — „Dementsprechend werden sie sich u. a. der direkten oder indirekten Unterstützung terroristischer Tätigkeiten oder subversiver oder anderer Tätigkeiten enthalten, die auf den gewaltsamen Umsturz des Regimes eines anderen Teilnehmerstaates gerichtet sind." (KSZE, 4. Abs.) — Ausbildung von Revolutionären, Guerillas, Widerstandsgruppen — Ermordung fremder Regierungsmitglieder — Unterstützung von Destabilisierungsmaßnahmen durch die Finanzierung von Brückenköpfen	umstritten

(V) Propagandistische und sonstige Einwirkungsarten

Klassifizierung	Völkerrechtliche Normierung	Einwirkungsakte, Tatbestände	Anmerkungen
Gewaltverbot	FRD, KSZE	— „In accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, States have the duty to refrain from propaganda for wars of aggression." (FRD, 3. Abs.)	
Interventionsverbot	FRD, KSZE, GA-Res. 2131 (XX)	„No State may use or encourage the use of any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights." (FRD, 2. Abs.) — „Sie werden sich ... jeder ... sonstigen Zwangsmaßnahme enthalten, die darauf gerichtet ist, ihrem eigenen Interesse die Ausübung der Rechte eines anderen Teilnehmerstaates, die dessen Souveränität innewohnen unterzuordnen und sich damit Vorteile irgendwelcher Art zu verschaffen." (KSZE, 3. Abs.) — Aufruf zum Widerstand gegen eine legitime Regierung — Aufruf zu Sabotageakten	

Table taken from Hans Günter Brauch, 1979.

A PROVISIONAL CLASSIFICATION

The common use of the term "intervention" is too restrictive, since it leads people to overlook many forms of the projection of military power other than gross invasions or the deployment of large expeditionary forces. The phrase "foreign military presence", which is sometimes also used, similarly lacks detailed definition. This paper, therefore, employs a broader definition which also includes other means of projecting military force beyond one's own borders. It includes a panoply of actions ranging from the movement of military forces in international waters and air space, the alerting of strategic forces, the acquisition of foreign bases, arms transfer and other forms of "military assistance". This paper is not primarily concerned with setting the ultimate limits of a definition or classification, but in highlighting the degree of these other activities. On the assumption that the legal definitions are insufficiently descriptive of the kinds of international interactions that are taking place, the following schema is presented in an attempt to draw up an operational list of types of events that in my estimation should be counted as <u>de facto</u> interventionary behavior, beginning with open wars and proceeding through foreign deployment of military forces, nuclear threats, and various forms of military assistance:

1. Invasions of one country by another.
2. Any crossing of a state border, entering a foreign state by military forces. Presence on the territory of an allied state is simply a subset of these, which is often sanctioned or unquestioned and therefore at times overlooked. It is nevertheless a foreign military presence. Whether it should be considered an "intervention" or not depends on the role of the foreign military force, the nature of the inter-state alliance under which it is present, and the character of the government of the host nation: its political legitimacy and independence. Thus, the routine presence of the military forces of NATO member-states on each other's territory is not considered a military intervention. Even the presence and participation in a peacekeeping force technically fits such a broader definition of foreign military presence, however it is internationally sanctioned.
3. Military threats, particularly in a crisis period: troop movements, weapon deployment, mobilization, etc., any actions intended to precipitate a war.

4. Foreign military personnel actively involved in conflict (i.e., active battlefield operations), as advisory or as auxiliary forces for a second state, either in combat or in special roles such as overall field commanders, pilots, tank operators, communications, radar or air-defence weapon operators, maintenance or logistic specialists, etc.
5. Foreign military personnel filling the same roles, but without active fighting taking place.
6. Foreign military personnel serving as "praetorian guards" for a head of state, on loan from foreign states.
7. The involvement of "volunteers", as distinct from private mercenaries. In most writings on international relations, the term "military assistance" is equated with arms transfer and is usually not considered an aspect of military intervention. I have, however, selected three particular components of military assistance for inclusion in this list:
8. Supply of arms just prior to or during a conflict.
9. Direct payment to the seller for the purchase of weapons by a second state, or supplying funds with which to buy weapons.
10. Training of regular or irregular armed forces by foreign nations, either in the instructor's country or in that of the recipient.

All of these activities should be considered forms of military intervention because they are ways in which one state uses its military forces (or even in the case of item 9, funds) to affect the military or political situation in another state.

In several papers published earlier, in 1976, 1979 and 1985 (1), I had emphasized that the term "military assistance" was also rather imprecise and could include a wide variety of activities, some of which overlap with the above:

- arms trade
- arms aid (with item 8 and 10 above)
- supplying money with which to purchase weapons (with item 9)
- building logistical infrastructure: airbases, naval bases, etc.
- paramilitary construction, aid or training — harbors, railroads, rolling stock, roads, border police, internal security forces; the categorization will depend on the usage.
- training officers and troops in the recipient country (with item 10)
- training officers and troops in the donor country (with item 10)

- supplying active duty military personnel for operations in recipient countries; advisors, "special forces", pilots, radar operators, air-defence system operators, etc. (with items 4, 5)
- supplying volunteers, under government arrangement (with item 7).

In their 1985 study, Soviet Military Interventions Since 1945, Schmid and Berends added one or two components to these two categories and placed them side-by-side for purposes of comparison (2).

THE MAGNITUDE OF WAR AND CONFLICTS SINCE WW II

Estimates of the numbers of wars or conflicts that have taken place between 1945 and the present vary considerably, depending on the criteria used for selection by different researchers and studies. Brecher and Wilkenfeld identify 90 "international crises" between 1945 and 1975 (1), Kende roughly 130 "Local Wars" or "wars" between 1945 and 1976 (2), and in more recent publications 148 "Armed Conflicts" between 1945 and 1982 (3), Butterworth 310 "interstate security conflicts" between 1945 and 1974 (4), and so on. A survey of all available comparative studies of post WW II wars, conflicts and military coups was attempted several years ago (5). The number of events in different studies varied by more than a full order of magnitude, from around 30 to over 350. The wide range in the estimates, despite the fact that the authors of all of these studies described them as being of nominally complete sample populations, is due to the different criteria for the selection of events used by the different researchers. Virtually none of the studies surveyed used a common set of events. Hardly any two authors used the same definitions, criteria or data base. The word "conflicts" was used in the title of the survey since very few "wars" since WW II have been declared wars by the countries involved. Cumulative mortality in these conflicts since 1945 appears to be around 25 million (6).

The most significant point for this study, however, is that among these 90 studies only a few paid even the most cursory attention to foreign military intervention, and none at all to its more sophisticated — or less obtrusive — forms. One recently published study which does deal with foreign military intervention simultaneously demonstrates the problem with overly exclusive criteria. Tillema and Van Wingen carried out an analysis of some 70 military interventions by the USA, USSR, UK and France since 1946. Their criteria for the inclusion of events was the following:

> A military intervention was counted each time (beginning January 1, 1946) regular combat troops under control of central governments in Britain, France, the Soviet Union or the United States were deployed in another country and conducted such military activities as combat patrol, offensive maneuver, riot quelling, or battle. In addition, a military intervention was counted when regular military units under central government control bombed, shelled or fired upon targets in another country. Excluded were military alerts, shows of force or troop movements not involving the actual use of force as defined above, naval engagements outside territorial waters, operations not involving regular armed forces and forms of military assistance not entailing direct use of regular military forces " (7).

Under such a definition, the commitment by the USSR in early 1970 of 20,000 combat troops to Egypt to man Egyptian air-defense systems or the deployment in subsequent years of smaller Soviet contingents to Angola, Ethiopia and Syria with similar functions in full-scale combat is omitted, presumably because these were not "regular" troops. This cannot be considered a useful or a satisfactory definition.

With the above portions of the paper to establish the context of the problems and a suggested approach, we can turn to surveying post-WWII military interventions. The review will be organized in four sections:

- the activities of the major powers: the US, USSR, France and Great Britain; and discussion of particular aspects of their interaction in foreign military interventions: so-called "surrogate war" and "rules of the game";
- the activities of a secondary group of interventionary states: Cuba, Libya, Israel, South Africa, Vietnam and the German Democratic Republic, and others with still lesser degrees of external involvement;
- particular kinds of important military-political activities: threat of use of nuclear weapons, acquisition and use of foreign military bases, and arms transfer;
- brief discussions of several relevant considerations: the question of the advisability of humanitarian intervention, and internationally sanctioned intervention ("peacekeeping").

THE MAJOR POWERS

The U.S.A.

The record of US military intervention in the post WWII-period is to a substantial degree in the public record and available for analysis. There have been several important comparative studies, in some cases surveying an even broader category of behaviors, the use of force as a political instrument.

Two US Congressional sources contain compendia of the post-WWII use of military force by the United States. The first lists six "Major US Armed Actions Overseas between 1945 and 1975", plus 20 "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad" during the same years (1). The second source shows higher numbers of events, based on different criteria, the highest in number being 27 "US Military Hostilities Abroad without a Declaration of War" between 1945 and 1972 (2). Atkeson studied the involvement, or avoidance of involvement, of the US Army in 28 post-WWII "International Crises" (3). In 23 of the 28 events, some demonstration of force or military intervention was made by the United States. In ten of those events, US Army forces were involved: engaged in combat, deployed in a show of force, or alerted. An official history of the US Strategic Air Command — one branch of the US Air Force — lists nine occasions in which its force or portions of it were placed on strategic alert before 1970, though the list clearly omits several major strategic alerts during that period (4). In 1970, two extensive official lists became available indicating the number, time and place of US attack-carrier deployments in times of crises. One of these presented a list of "Wars/Near Wars Since 1946" in which the list represented "only major/minor conflicts or crises where US Naval units were involved as prime factors, alerted, or redeployed". A total of 73 events were listed between 1946 and 1970, including 36 deployments of attack carriers (5). The second list was of the "instances in which aircraft carriers were used in support of foreign policy since the Korean War" up to 1969 (6). There were 49 such deployments, though again there were several identifiable omissions. Since 1969-70 when these lists were prepared, there have probably been over twenty additional deployments of US attack carriers, and one can roughly estimate that altogether there have been some 80 or more such deployments to date.

Table 2 *Level of Force Uses by Type of Force*

Level of force	Type of force: Naval	Ground	Land-based air
Major	Two or more aircraft carrier task groups	More than one battalion.	One or more combat wings
Standard	One aircraft carrier task group	No more than one battalion, but larger than one company	One or more combat squadrons, but less than one wing
Minor	No aircraft carriers included	No more than one company	Less than one combat squadron

Next, these levels of conventional force were combined with the strategic nuclear factor in an intuitive fashion, resulting in the scale shown below.

Level of force scale, in descending order of magnitude

1. Use of strategic nuclear unit plus at least one "major" force component (naval, ground, or air)
2. Two or three "major" force components used, but not strategic nuclear units
3. Either one "major" force component *or* strategic nuclear unit used
4. At least one "standard" component of force used, but no "major" components and no strategic nuclear units
5. "Minor" components of force used only, and no strategic nuclear units

Table 3 *Level of Effort in Descending Order of Magnitude*

Level of effort	Number of incidents	Percentage distribution of incidents
1	15	7.0
2	18	8.4
3	46	21.4
4	64	29.8
5	72	33.5

Table 4 *U.S. Level of Military Effort, by Region and Time Period*

Number of incidents

Region or time period	Military level of effort: 1	2	3	4	5	Total incidents
Western Hemisphere	2	2	6	18	32	60
Europe	5	3	12	19	4	43
Middle East	4	4	7	7	16	38
Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia	0	0	0	6	7	13
Southeast Asia	0	6	17	8	10	41
East Asia	4	3	4	6	3	20
Total incidents	15	18	46	64	72	215
Time period						
1946–48	2	1	6	11	4	24
1949–55	4	1	7	7	5	24
1956–65	7	10	27	33	43	120
1966–75	2	6	6	13	20	47
Total incidents	15	18	46	64	72	215

Table 5 *U.S. Level of Military Effort as a Function of Soviet-Chinese Participation*

U.S. level of effort	Percentage of instances in which USSR/China: Used force	Threatened to use force	Participated, but did not use force	Did not participate
1. Nuclear weapons plus major component	53	27	0	20
2. Two or three major components	39	6	11	44
3. Nuclear weapons or one major component	15	4	22	59
4. Standard components only	16	9	13	63
5. Minor components only	11	7	15	67
All levels	19	8	14	59

Tables taken from Blechman and Kaplan, Brookings, 1978.

In one of the most comprehensive studies available of the post-war period, Blechman and Kaplan studied 215 instances in which the United States used its armed forces "as a political instrument" between 1946 and 1976 (7). The authors considered five elements necessary for an incident to be regarded as a political use of the armed forces:

1. A physical change in the disposition (location, activity, and/or readiness) of at least a part of the armed forces had to occur.
2. There had to have been a certain consciousness of purpose. A specific political impact had to appear to be a significant objective of the national command authority — e.g., a member of the National Security Council — in initiating the action.
3. Decision-makers must have sought to attain their objectives by gaining influence in the target states, not by physically imposing the U.S. will. That is, decision-makers must have tried to attain their objectives by influencing the behavior of another actor — i.e. causing an actor to do something that he would not otherwise do.
4. Decision-makers must have sought to avoid a significant contest of violence. That is, "although a war may result from a use of the armed forces which otherwise meets the terms of the definition, the initiation of the war must not have been the intent of the action."
5. Some specific behavior had to have been desired of the target actors. To be included, a use of the armed forces had to have been directed at influencing specific behavior in a particular situation, or, at least, to have occurred because of concern with specific behavior.

The kinds of military uses of the armed forces that were excluded were also indicated. Specifically excluded from this study were any events in which US forces actually became engaged in combat. A "political use of the armed forces" was defined as occurring "when physical actions are taken by one or more components of the uniformed military services as part of a deliberate attempt by the national authorities to influence or to be prepared to influence, specific behavior of individuals in another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence." The study included only "those instances in which the armed forces were used in a discrete way for specific political objectives in a particular situation." Participation in the incident by the USSR, China, or other nations was also identified, as was the type of US force involved (naval, air or ground combat units) and the level of force used (8). Some of the results of this study are indicated in Tables 2 - 5.

The study also presented a list of nineteen incidents in which US strategic nuclear forces were involved. (See further discussion of this subject below.)

If we turn away from comparative surveys intended to display patterns and numerical frequencies of events over a period of 40 years and look more specifically at particular US interventions and military operations, there are three major aspects to be noted:

- the nature of some of the larger scale wars,
- the role of covert operations as "small wars", or antecedents to war,
- the role of the US Central Intelligence Agency in directing military coups in developing nations.

Following the experience of World War II, and with the Korean War as the first example, there developed the convention of referring to "limited war" in the post-war period (9). Despite identifiable limitations, the phrase has never seemed a very accurate description of the nature of major post-WW II conflicts. The essential point of "limited war" theory was the assumption that local conflict could be kept localized, and that it would not escalate into world war. This meant, in effect, no geographic spread and no direct US-USSR combat engagement. More specifically, "Limited War" meant no use of nuclear weapons, no interdiction of incoming shipping — including military supplies — to the combatant nation(s), and somewhat variably, no mass urban bombing. Beyond these, there were few other "limitations". Estimates for combined military and civilian deaths in the "limited" Korean War range from 3,800,000 to approximately 7,000,000 (10). Writing in 1968, Samuel Huntington could argue that

> ... in comparison to the Korean war the Vietnamese war has been a relatively limited and undestructive conflict. In one year of fighting almost every major city in North and South Korea was virtually leveled to the ground. Up to mid-1968 the only major Vietnamese city which has received anything like this treatment was Hue. In Korea somewhere between two and three million civilians were killed directly or indirectly by the war (11).

In addition to massive bombing in the Korean War, the United States attacked North Korean irrigation dikes, a practice that had been condemned as a war crime during the Nuremburg Trials when carried out by Germany in the Netherlands during WW II (12).

In Vietnam the United States used gas warfare, herbicidal crop and forest destruction, weather modification, large-scale mechanical land clearings and the purposeful initiation of forest fires.

Bombing and "free-fire" zones were used to cause purposeful popula-

tion displacement; 15,000,000 people or one-third of the total population of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia fled from their home areas. Munitions expenditure, both bomb and artillery, was enormous, several times the tonnage used in World War II. Multiple anti-personnel and area weapons were used (13). By the end of the war, other middle-sized Vietnamese cities, such as Vinh, had also been "leveled to the ground". The following description in a recent RAND study must be labeled as fatuous nonsense:

> In all Third World conflicts in which American forces have engaged, U.S. decisionmakers have sought to minimize friendly and enemy civilian casualties. In the main, this traditional concern has been motivated by deeply rooted American humanitarian and moral convictions, adherence to the law of war, and the desire to retain domestic and international support for continued U.S.involvement in a conflict by demonstrating that the United States was fighting a moral and just war. Thus, U.S. leaders have shunned strategic options that would have generated high noncombatant casualties and, in combat, have adopted rules of engagement and other precautionary measures to hold down enemy as well as friendly civilian casualties...
>
> The United States has sought negotiated solutions to the conflicts in which it has been involved...
>
> American decisionmakers as a rule have proved willing to lift constraints on U.S. operations in a Third World conflict, or to override usually observed political-military prohibitions, when strong U.S. action has been required to (1) preserve the safety of U.S. forces and/or other Americans and (2) gain leverage with an adversary to break out of a strategic bind. Such escalations to gain leverage, however, have occurred only after the United States had already made its maximum feasible concessions at the negotiating table and was confronting an adversary that was clearly stalling for better terms. Escalations were designed to secure only limited objectives, namely, to terminate exhausting conflicts under terms already demanded of the enemy. In neither Korea nor Vietnam was escalation used to win a traditional military victory (14).

Whatever the "rules" of engagement may have been, the practices of engagement followed by the United States throughout the Indochina theater were gross and exorbitant and caused extremely high non-combatant mortality. Hosmer's language matches the level of reality in the recorded "humanitarian" order of a German Corps Commander during the siege of Leningrad that provided for the use of artillery "... against civilians in case they tried to escape from the city, so that the German infantrymen would not be compelled to shoot women and children". Ten years after the war's end, George W. Ball, US Undersecretary of State from 1961 to 1966, wrote that "... the Vietnam catastrophe has left its evil mark on many aspects of America's national life and critically diminished its international effectiveness."

Vietnam was also described, perhaps somewhat optimistically, by the President of the US Council on Foreign Relations as "... the last spasm of one way of looking at the world". This is hopefully so, at least for the United States, as the USSR has been repeating many of the same excessive forms of combat in somewhat reduced scale against the majority of a civilian population in Afghanistan from 1980 to the present. After Vietnam, the phrase "limited warfare" was used less often and was replaced "non-nuclear conflict", "low intensity conflict", and other equally amorphous terms (15).

The importance of covert operations is the fact that these often were small wars, ran the risk of becoming larger wars, and in at least one instance in the 1964 Tonkin Gulf incidents, served as the precipitating event for eleven subsequent years of full-scale warfare.

From the time of the introduction of Chinese ground troops into the Korean War, raids by Chinese nationalist forces from the offshore islands to the Chinese mainland were carried out without interference from the US Navy. Instead they came to be actively supported by the CIA. They were the undoubted cause of the subsequent shelling of the Amoy islands by China, from which many of the raids were staged, which led in turn to the 1954 and 1958 Taiwan Straits crises (16). The second of these events, also known as "the Quemoy-Matsu crisis", involved the US Seventh Fleet, overt nuclear threats against China, and the exchange of nuclear threats between the United States and the USSR in an exchange of letters between Eisenhower and Khrushchev. By 1971 Allan Whiting could write that "The Chinese Nationalists have, with the knowledge and support of the United States, carried out clandestine air, sea, and land operations against Mainland China and neighboring areas for twenty years" (17).

An additional aspect of these activities was the support of the Khamba rebellion in Tibet. These Tibetians had begun a campaign against Chinese government troops in 1952. In 1956 the CIA began supply flights over India to these tribesmen, which contributed to the large-scale revolt in 1956-1959 (18). After the flight of the Dalai Lama in 1969, India collaborated in the supply deliveries, and in 1966 the USSR also was reportedly supplying airdrops to the Khambas as well as to Kazakh rebels in the neighboring Chinese province of Sinkiang. L. Fletcher Prouty, a former US military officer who held the office of Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACSA) in the US Joint Chiefs of Staff for eight years, described the military support involved in these operations, in this case an abortive CIA effort to overthrow Indonesia's President Sukarno through an army rebellion in Sumatra in 1968:

> By the time the Agency was ready to participate in an operation as large as the Indonesian campaign of 1958, it had the resources to open foreign bases, to create an entire supporting Tactical and Transport Air Force, and to demand the services of naval supporting forces. A former World War II air base on a remote Pacific island was reopened and put into commission, and a whole fleet of aircraft was put into major overhaul bases in the States to create an attack force of substantial capability. A rather considerable Air Transport force was able to deliver deep into Indonesia tens of thousands of weapons and the ammunition and other equipment necessary to support such a force, all by airdrop.
>
> ....
>
> A headquarters was established in Singapore and training bases were set up in the Philippines ... and other airstrips on remote Philippine territory were prepared for bomber and transport operations. Vast stores of arms and equipment were assembled in Okinawa and in the Philippines. Indonesians, Filipinos, Chinese, Americans, and other soldiers of fortune were assembled in Okinawa and in the Philippines also. The U.S. Army took part in training the rebels, and the Navy furnished over-the-beach submarine back-up support. The Air Force provided transport aircraft and prepared the fleet of modified B-26 bombers (19).

President Eisenhower eventually ordered the termination of this operation after the disclosure that US Air Force officers on active-duty were serving as the B-26 pilots. He also ended the operations supporting the Khambas in Tibet, and another in Laos. Prouty describes covert operations — at times small-scale wars — in ten different countries prior to 1970. One CIA intervention which came too early to be considered for cancellation was the "successful" coup against Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954 (20). Another that Eisenhower neglected to cancel was the "Bay of Pigs" invasion of Cuba which would take place in the Kennedy administration in 1961. In 1964, CIA-supported Cuban exiles were still shelling locations in Eastern Cuba from boats based in Nicaragua, a covert operation that was disbanded in 1965. The CIA was also active in Africa. The US Air Force flew four-engined C-97 Boeing transport aircraft on behalf of, first, Kasavubu and, later, Tshombe in Katanga province (21). In 1964, CIA operations were important in defeating the Zairian rebellion against Mobutu (22). Cuban-exile pilots, enlisted though the CIA, were one of the means of support (23).

Without sufficient documentary evidence to provide quantitative estimates, one can nevertheless estimate that this period was also the height of US responsibility or involvement in military coups in various third world countries:

- against Mossadegh, in Iran (1953)
- against Arbenz, in Guatemala (1954)
- probably, by Kasavubu in the Congo, on September 5, 1960, against

Patrice Lumumba, and definitely in Mobutu's coup of September 14, 1960,
- against Diem (1963) and Minh (1964) in Vietnam (24)
as well as others. In at least one case, in Laos in the 1960s, the US went out of its way to put down a coup by rightist generals against the neutralist government. British intelligence services were also responsible for several coups and attempted coups in the Middle East (in Iraq and Syria in particular) during the same period. Beginning in the mid-1950s, the CIA also developed a program of training special élite military units to guard heads of state. This program reportedly trained such units in Ethiopia, Indonesia, Jordan, Laos, Somalia, South Korea, South Vietnam and Thailand and operated continuously for two decades at least through 1975 (26). This was an activity that was widely taken up by other intervening states in the 1970s: Cuba, the German Democratic Republic, Libya, and even a non-governmental organization such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization. These, as well as several African states, either trained or themselves directly supplied élite units of "palace guards". Between 1975 and 1985, the United States provided "security training" to various foreign governments and in 1985, it was reported that the US was training "anti-terrorist" units "in about a dozen countries" (27).

One of the more significant covert operations led directly to the Tonkin Gulf incidents. The United States was carrying out two different covert operations in Vietnamese waters, the 34-A program and the De Soto patrols.

> The 34-A raids on coastal areas of North Vietnam were being carried out by high-speed boats manned by commandos from South Vietnam and other countries who had been recruited and were supported and led by the CIA. De Soto patrols, which had been approved by President Kennedy in 1962, were highly-classified missions off the coast of North Vietnam by destroyers of the US Navy equipped with specialized electronic gear which was manned by personnel from the National Security Agency (28).

None of these two operations had ever been held concurrently with the other. However, on the night of July 30, 1964, a 34-A raid was carried out on two North Vietnamese islands in the Gulf of Tonkin while 120 miles away the destroyer USS Maddox was headed toward the same area to perform a De Soto patrol on the following day, July 31. The commanders of the two operational groups did not know of each other's activities. The responsibility for the oversight of both of these covert operations, as well as all other US covert operations, was vested in the "303 committee", a name taken from National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 303 of June 2,1964. This senior executive group had previously been designated the Special Group.

The 303 committee, however, had delegated operational responsibility for both covert operations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which delegated each in turn to various other operational agencies. Oversight of both programs was theoretically supposed to have taken place at three locations: the 303 committee, the office of SACSA in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and in the CINCPAC - the Commander in Chief, Pacific. Nevertheless, no one seems to have noticed the conjunction of the two operations.

On August 2, the USS Maddox was attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats. The attack was repelled with aid from the aircraft carrier USS Ticonderoga. The Commander of the Maddox requested permission to break off the patrol, but his request was denied. An additional 34-A operation was scheduled for the night of August 3, and a second destroyer was sent to join the Maddox. On the evening of August 4, the destroyers intercepted radio communications ordering North Vietnamese torpedo boats "to prepare to attack". The two US destroyers began evasive manoeuvers and, on the basis of radar and sonar contact, reported that they were under attack. President Johnson decided on a retaliatory bombing campaign and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which served as the subsequent legal basis for the US military engagement in Vietnam, was quickly drafted and offered to the Senate for approval. By the morning of August 5, the commander of the Maddox informed both Washington and CINCPAC that a re-assessment of the evening's events led them to believe that there had been no actual engagement. It was not known to which boats the North Vietnamese radio communications were directed and the number of torpedoes reported during the alleged engagement exceeded North Vietnam's entire capability. An after-engagement experiment determined that the Maddox's sonar operator had been recording sonar reflections from his own ship during the sharp evasive maneuvers as torpedo echos (29). There had been no visual sightings. These doubts were manipulated away both in Washington and in the Hawaii headquarters of CINCPAC and had no effect on the President's decisions which appeared to have been taken largely irrespective of the evidence or lack of it. In a speech a few days later at Syracuse University, President Lyndon Johnson said, among other things: "The attacks were deliberate. The attacks were unprovoked." The Government of North Vietnam, he said, had committed an act of aggression against the United States:

> aggression-deliberate, willful and systematic aggression — has unmasked its face to the entire world. The world remembers — the world must never forget — that aggression unchallenged is aggression unleashed.

There can hardly be greater irony or hypocrisy in the rhetoric: it was the United States that was the aggressor, but it would be some years before it would be "unmasked", and Congressional documents demonstrate that the entire exercise had been a provocation from the start.

In addition to the covert operations, there were the overt wars, whatever their official designation. The United States did not intervene militarily in the Dominican Republic when, in 1963, a right-wing and expressedly anti-communist military junta overthrew the first democratically elected president, Juan Bosch, and rescinded the new constitution. The United States did invade the Dominican Republic in force, however, in 1965 on behalf of the military junta when anti-junta forces attempted to restore Bosch and the constitution (30). The American engagement in Vietnam has no doubt seen the most comprehensive examination, in the official "Pentagon papers" as well as in literally thousands of books, monographs and papers (31). The history of military operations in China, Tibet, Indonesia, Guatemala, and Cuba had produced little or no perceptible disturbance in American-government practices or the Congressional tolerance of them. It was only the excesses of the US war in Indochina — which included an entire "covert war" in Cambodia — that caused an extensive Congressional examination of covert military operations, the role of the Central Intelligence Agency (32), and the War Powers of the President (33). For a period of some years, it also led to some Congressional restraint on these activities. A turn in attitudes appeared as early as July 1967 when the Johnson administration sent three C-130 transports and 150 servicemen to support the Mobutu government in the Congo against an uprising of white mercenaries. The move was strongly opposed by important US Senators who supported the US engagement in Vietnam, as well as by ones who opposed it. In 1971, the Congress unceremoniously repealed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution which had abridged the balance of war powers that the US Constitution had bestowed on the Congress and the Presidency by stating that

> Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression ... The United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

Senator Wayne Morse, one of only two US Senators to vote against the Resolution in 1964, had said, "I believe that within the next century, future generations will look with dismay and great disappointment upon a Congress which is now about to make such a historic mistake." It had taken less

time than Senator Morse anticipated, only seven years, but that was long enough to do historic damage both to the international status of the United States as well as physically and to the potential political development of an independent Indochina.

In 1972 the Congress began to limit expenditure for the war in Vietnam, and in 1975 the Clark Amendment forbade the use of funds for any US military involvement in Angola. However, not everything was watched as carefully, and one of these instances provides us with an excellent example of the political decision-making processes which led to particular decisions to intervene, as well as the ramifications and consequences which are often unforeseen at the time decisions are taken.

> When the Shah of Iran asked in 1972 for secret American military aid to be given to the Kurdish rebels in Iraq, Kissinger agreed over the opposition of the CIA station in Teheran. When the Shah later embarked on a policy of conciliation with Iraq, the Kurds were abruptly cut off; at least 35,000 were killed and more than 200,000 refugees were created (34).

The "policy of conciliation with Iraq" consisted of the Shah's success in obtaining a treaty with Iraq on the disposition of their southern border in the Shatt al Arab, which Iraq felt compelled to sign under pressure of the Iranian-supported Kurdish insurgency. When the Shah fell, Iraq's attempt to regain the territories by military means in 1980 served to initiate the Iran-Iraq war which has raged since then.

Two other examples with international cross-border implications involved Thailand in 1976. The Thai military had been relatively unsuccessful in the counterinsurgency efforts in the north of the country. They contracted with Nationalist Chinese forces that had been in the area for many years to perform these operations with weapons supplied by Thailand, which were in turn obtained from the United States. In the second involvement, some 50,000 tribesmen from Laos, as well as portions of the Royal Lao troops, both of which had been supported by the United States for the previous ten years, withdrew back into Laos for the purpose of sporadic sabotage under a program run by the CIA. There followed incidents in which Vietnamese troops at times crossed the Thai border or shelled across the border in pursuit of these units. These incidents were reported in the United States as Vietnamese incursions against Thailand without any mention made of the prior military infiltration from Thailand into Laos.

In the post-Vietnam years the United States has had three presidents:

Ford, Carter and Reagan — and we can briefly review their policies.

The Ford administration was responsible for the bombing of Cambodia in the Mayaquez incident (35). Early in January 1975, directly following a tour of the US aircraft carrier Constellation in the Persian Gulf, and directly preceeding landing exercise of US marines in the Mediterranean (36) (on Sardinia and Southern France), US Secretary of State Kissinger released an interview in which he stated that the United States could not rule out the use of military force against oil-producing nations but that such an action "would be considered only in the gravest emergency" (37). The remarks stirred up a storm of controversy, both national and international, and the government denied that it was preparing any forces for such purposes (38). Congressional studies in 1975 which were repeated in 1979 pointed to the highly dubious consequences of attempting such a military exercise (39).

Secretary of State Kissinger chaired the "40 Committee", renamed but otherwise the same executive-level committee with responsibility for oversight of all US covert action programs as the 303 committee. Against the strong advice of the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Kissinger initiated a program to counter the Soviet-supported MPLA in Angola and to support the two other Angolan groups who had also fought against the Portuguese (40). The first funds were reportedly transferred in July 1974. Failed attempts were made to recruit French and Portuguese mercenaries, and arms were transferred to the Angolan groups via Zaire. With the involvement of Cuban and South African troops in the spring and summer of 1975, and the large increases in Soviet support for the MPLA, the US Senate put an end to Secretary Kissinger's requests for increased US involvement through the Clark Amendment, which forbade any funds to be used in Angola. The covert program was ended a little over six months after it began.

The Carter administration took office and maintained for the most part a conscious and determined policy against major external military intervention, that is, the deployment of US military forces (41). This was the strongly held personal position of the President and of Secretary of State Vance, in addition to being one effect of the intervention in Vietnam on public and Congressional opinions in the United States. It was all the more noteworthy because it occurred just as the character of Soviet military intervention underwent major qualitative changes as well as quantitative increases. It was a policy that did not outlive his administration essentially for that very reason.

By 1978, the Carter administration had already demonstrated its policies towards Panama as conciliatory, and it was doing very much more than any previous administration to obtain a resolution of the conflicts in Rhodesia and in the Middle East. When Somalia invaded Ethiopia and Soviet and Cuban forces came to the aid of Ethiopia, the US response was essentially to offer Somalia arms aid and simultaneously obtain its withdrawal from Ethiopia, at the same time as it obtained Soviet assurance that Ethiopian forces would not be permitted to invade Somalia as the Somalian invasion collapsed (42). (A more detailed examination of the interventions in the Horn of Africa in 1978 and 1979 is included in sections below.) The administration resisted the urgings of its National Security advisor, Brzezinski, to become more heavily involved in the Horn of Africa, and President Carter restricted himself to noting that Western nations "cannot be indifferent to Soviet and Cuban involvement in Africa (43).

In May 1978, when Zaire's Shaba province was invaded for the second time in a year by the expatriate Zairian FLNC forces based in Angola and trained and supplied by the GDR and Cuba, the United States supplied the air transport for French and Belgian paratroopers and, in June, for the 1,500 Moroccan troops which replaced them (64). In December, Soviet Secretary General Brezhnev warned the United States against any US military intervention in Iran (45). President Carter replied that the US had no such intention and in turn cautioned the USSR against any intervention in Iran. The administration again resisted suggestions by the National Security Advisor for greater involvement in Iran, particularly after the fall of the Shah. The disasterous rescue attempt of the US Embassy hostages in Teheran later in 1980 can be seen as more of a success for Vance's policies, despite his resignation, than their failure. In March 1979, the US aircraft carrier Constellation and its escort vessels were ordered to the Arabian Sea when 3,000 South Yemeni troops supplied with Soviet arms and supported by 900 — 1,000 Soviet and GDR military advisers and support personnel as well as additional Cuban and Ethiopian troops invaded North Yemen (46). The United States also deployed two AWAC aircraft from their bases in Okinawa to air bases in Saudi Arabia, and by October 1980 after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, they had been supplemented by two additional AWACs as well as KC-135 aerial refueling tankers (47). Three months after the aircraft carrier's deployment when the Yemen incidents had temporarily ameliorated, it was reported that the

Carter administration was discussing the "most significant military shifts since the Vietnam War", and it was added that

> Although there was no public acknowledgement of it, the White House was prepared to authorize the carrier's 85 warplanes to engage in combat if Soviet or Cuban pilots stationed in Southern Yemen joined the conflict (48).

There were reports that other military options may also have been considered (49), and these moves as well as a rapid consignment of arms to North Yemen were considered necessary to reassure Saudi Arabia of US support in the case of North Yemen's capture by pro-Soviet forces (50). The United States deployed AWACs on five occasions in 1979-80:

- to Saudi Arabia, in 1979, at the invasion of North Yemen by South Yemen;
- to South Korea, following the assassination of Park Chung Hee;
- to Egypt, in 1980, following the USSR invasion of Afghanistan;
- to Saudi Arabia, following Iraq's invasion of Iran;
- to West Germany, as Soviet troops maneuvered during the Polish crisis (51)

In October 1979, President Carter announced that he had directed the formation of a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), which was formally established in March 1980 (52). (In 1983 the name of the organization was changed to US Central Command.) In January 1980, President Carter enunciated what came to be known as the "Carter Doctrine":

> An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force (53).

Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and President Carter's pledge that the United States would use force if necessary to defend its interests in the Persian Gulf area, the RDF was increasingly the topic of discussion, though it remained essentially a paper organization. It was intended for use in the Gulf area and it implied the commitment of larger forces than the US Marine Corps, since these already existed and have always been intended for essentially similar purposes. The forces were to be drawn from ones assigned to NATO or presently in other US regional commands and to operate in collaboration with various states in the region but without permanent bases in the area.

The Carter administration gave no consideration to intervening on behalf of Somoza when the Nicaraguan dictatorship was toppled by the leftist Sandinista forces. (In 1978, the administration even authorized the CIA to support moderate opposition groups in Nicaragua opposed to Somoza.)

President Reagan and his administration took office with as different

a conception of international political developments and the role of the United States in the world — in particular regarding US military intervention — as was conceivable (54). These positions were reinforced by the opinions of Secretary of State Haig. They manifested themselves primarily in four events:

- support for Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 (discussed in the section on Israel);
- the creation and support of a war against Nicaragua;
- participation in the four-nation Multinational Force in Beirut, Lebanon;
- the invasion of Grenada.

The most important of these events is very likely the major US involvement initiated by the Reagan administration in Central America: in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, but above all against Nicaragua. "The Reagan administration is at war with Nicaragua. Like other wars the United States has fought since 1945 it is an undeclared war. It is also a small war" (55). The US CIA was responsible for financing and managing some 10,000 "contras", the largest paramilitary effort mounted by the CIA since the Vietnam war (56). Bases for these troops were established in neighboring countries, particularly in Honduras. The Nicaragua intervention was widely referred to as "the most public US secret war", as one covert preparation or plan after another was disclosed in the pages of the New York Times and The Washington Post. These have included the mining of Nicaraguan harbors, temporary naval blockades and large-scale maneuvers in neighboring Honduras (57). Administration officials have also warned Nicaragua "that if it acquired high performance aircraft such as MiG-21's, the United States reserved the right to use force to destroy the planes" (58).

The Reagan administration was able to continue its efforts to topple the Nicaraguan government with a surrogate army long after the entire program was throughly exposed, due to a definite change in Congressional opinion that accompanied the Reagan presidency from the one that had obtained between 1972 and 1980 (59). The US Congress was again far more tolerant of US engagement in external military operations, including covert, or semi-covert ones (60). In June and July 1985, both the Senate and the House of Representatives repealed the 1975 Clark Amendment, thus freeing the administration to support the UNITA forces in Angola (61). This was so despite the fact that Congressional opinion was more hostile to the Nicaraguan war than it had been to the war in Vietnam at an equivalent stage in its development in the early and mid-1960s. Republican Senator Goldwater, Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee called the mining of Nicaraguan harbors "an act of war".

The United States has been living down a long history of military interventions in Central America, the previous case being the invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965. In his recent historical study, Walter Lafeber has stressed that United States policy has repeatedly blocked normal social change and undermined progressive reformers in Central America (62). Lafeber demonstrates that US Central American policy has uniquely combined persistent intervention with persistent misunderstanding. Between 1898 and 1920 alone, the US landed troops in Central America some twenty times. During the 1920s, the US developed the practice in Nicaragua and in the Dominican Republic of replacing the increasingly unpopular US Marine occupation forces by National Guards led by pro-US officers.

This pattern of misunderstanding and opposition to the strivings for political and social justice in impoverished developing nations has plagued the political responses of the senior American leadership throughout the post-war period, however, and has not been restricted to Central America. Individual political figures such as Adlai Stevenson or Chester Bowles, and brief events such as the Alianza, the Alliance for Progress, may be theoretically interesting as indications that the problem has been understood at least in some quarters, but they were politically insignificant. There seems little doubt that the history of Iran would have been substantially different, with the present government not in power, if United States covert operations had not toppled Mossadegh's government in 1954 (63). In 1985 a Communist insurgency — which had been defeated with the aid of US counterinsurgency assistance in the mid-1950s — was reportedly again on the upswing in the Philipinnes (64). If so, it is hardly surprising. The functional dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos, supported for years by the United States, has left few alternatives. The government's murder of the opposition leader, Benito Aquino, simply enhanced the likelihood that political opposition would eventually move in the same direction as it did in Nicaragua and El Salvador: an armed uprising with communist support.

United States Marines, together with British and French forces, landed in Lebanon in 1982 to assure the withdrawal of the Palestinian forces after Israel's occupation of Southern Lebanon and Beirut. They then returned in September 1982 as part of the Multinational Force (MNF) after Israel invaded Muslim West Beirut following the assassination of the Lebanese President, Bashir Gemayel. The MNF was formed in response to a request of the new President, Amir Gemayel, and was composed of over 2,200 French, 2,000 Italian, 1,600 American and 100 British troops on the ground in Lebanon,

a total of 5,900 troops. They were supported by a US carrier task-force offshore (66). Their ostensible purpose was to obtain the withdrawal of all foreign occupying military forces in Lebanon: Syria and other Arab contingents which had invaded in 1976 and Israel which had invaded in 1982. Essentially, however, their purpose was to support the new pro-Phalangist government. There could have been no US contingent in Lebanon without the prior Israeli invasion, and US Secretary Haig's role in approving that invasion is discussed in the section on Israel. Another important issue resulting from the intervention, the Syrian attack on US aircraft supporting the MNF, with possible Soviet complicity in the form of advisors, and the potential escalatory implications, is discussed in the section on arms transfer.

Testifying before a US Senate Committee in 1978, after the Syrian invasion of Lebanon, Charles Malik, former President of the United Nations General Assembly said that "... some balancing force to that of the Arab Peacekeeping Force must be sought from outside... I doubt that the United Nations can supply that force. Therefore other avenues must be explored" (66). The Arab Peacekeeping Force is essentially the Syrian occupation army, supplemented by additional small contingents from a half dozen different Arab states, and has varied in strength in Lebanon from 60,000 to 120,000 men at different times. Its role is not that of a peacekeeping force either, however, and it has not intervened to separate fighting parties. Syria has supplied the PLO, Druse, Shia-Amal Milis, and other smaller Muslim armies in Lebanon with the most modern land weapons in abundant quantities, including surface-to-air missiles and antiaircraft artillery. It was these forces allied to and supplied by Syria that destroyed the Lebanese army after the beginning of the Israeli withdrawal in 1984. Had the Multinational Force been a true peacekeeping force, that would have been a quite significant precedent. But it was not and was not prepared to be. The rival armed Lebanese factions were neither interested in stopping their fighting nor in being disarmed, and the MNF was not prepared to fight 50,000 or so irregular but well-armed Muslim troops. In that case, their presence can only be assumed to have been little more than symbolic and was bound to result in the catastrophic failure that it did. As the fighting in and around Beirut continued, the US forces in particular increasingly came to play a role in support of Israeli policy. The US troops were withdrawn with the remainder of the MNF forces (67).

On October 19, 1983, a coup took place on the small island of Grenada in the Carribean. Grenada had become independent from Great Britain in 1974. Its first head of state, corrupt and repressive, had been toppled by a leftist coup in March 1979. The new leadership aligned itself with Cuba and the socialist bloc. The 1983 coup promised to increase that alignment (68). Two days later (on October 21, 1983), the heads of the six small island states in the Organization of Eastern Carribean States (OECS), all former or present British colonies, met in Barbados with American and British officials. The smaller states apparently unanimously requested a US intervention (69). This seemingly provided the catalyst, if not the cause, of the invasion. On October 25, 1983, 6,000 US troops invaded Grenada and replaced its government (70). There was early discussion of the rapid replacement of the US occupation force by a Commonwealth peacekeeping force, which would have been the most desirable alternative, particularly if had taken place almost immediately, or by civil police forces from the neighboring OECS members. However, a Commonwealth replacement force did not materialize and it was not until September 1985— nearly two years after the invasion — that the last of the US troops were scheduled to be withdrawn.

There appear to have been important differences of opinion among senior government officials in the Reagan administration, just as there had been in the Carter administration, regarding the desirability of intervention both as a general policy and in particular cases. Secretary of State Shultz, who replaced Secretary Haig, identified himself increasingly with the use of military force in the Middle East and the Caribbean. His main governmental adversary on these issues was Defense Secretary Weinberger, buttressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who were reluctant to fight anywhere unless a military action was popular and/or could be quickly concluded. The US intervention in Lebanon was a case in point: It had been opposed by Weinberger and by the Department of Defense. This pattern is not altogether unusual. In one of the most interesting studies of the use of military force by the United States in the post-WW II years, with a particular focus on policy process and policy formation, Richard Betts compared the positions taken by senior civilian government officials (in the Department of Defense, Department of State, and Office of the President) with those of the senior uniformed military officials during twenty international crises between 1948 and 1970 (71). He compared the degree of aggressiveness of the suggestions for action (or inaction) proposed by the two groups, and the results are indicated in Table 6.

Table 6. Military aggressiveness on intervention decisions versus that of dominant civilian advisers.

	More aggressive than civilians (*% of cases*)	*As aggressive as civilians* (*% of cases*)	*Less aggressive than civilians* (*% of cases*)	*No. of cases*
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff	11	79	11	(19)
Chief of staff, army	5	70	25	(20)
Chief of naval operations	43	50	6	(16)
Chief of staff, air force	25	63	13	(16)
Commandant, marine corps	10	70	20	(10)
Field, theater, unified commands	36	57	7	(14)
Other military	20	60	20	(5)

TABLE B. Military aggressiveness on tactical escalation decisions after intervention versus that of dominant civilian advisers

	More aggressive than civilians (*% of cases*)	*As aggressive as civilians* (*% of cases*)	*Less aggressive than civilians* (*% of cases*)	*No. of cases*
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff	67	33	0	(9)
Chief of staff, army	67	33	0	(9)
Chief of naval operations	67	33	0	(9)
Chief of staff, air force	67	33	0	(9)
Commandant, marine corps	100	0	0	(6)
Field, theater, unified commands	90	10	0	(10)
Other military	33	33	33	(3)

Table taken from: Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statemen, and Cold War Crises, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977.

The dispute in the Reagan administration became evident to the public in an exchange of major addresses by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State in November-December 1984. In a speech on November 28, 1984, Secretary of Defense Weinberger proposed "six major tests to be applied" when the United States weighed "the use of US combat forces abroad":

- The US should not commit forces to combat overseas unless it is "deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies."
- If troops are committed "we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning. If we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all."
- Troops should be committed only if there are "clearly defined political and military objectives."
- Conditions and objectives can change during a conflict, and "our objectives and the forces we have committed, their size, composition and disposition, must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary."
- Before combat troops are committed, "there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress."
- Forces should be committed to combat "as a last resort, when other means have failed or clearly have no prospect for success." (72)

In April 1984, Secretary of State Shultz, had stated in another major address that "power and diplomacy are not alternatives. They must go together or we will accomplish very little in the world". A week after Secretary Weinberger's speech, Secretary Shultz "replied" with a less specified statement but one intended to portray a position more willing to use military force without as clearly favorable calculations when it was felt that these were in the national interest (73). Nevertheless, the above description appears oversimplified, as the Departments of State and Defense and their respective heads seem to have both favored military action and diplomatic pressures at different times:

- In Lebanon, the Secretary of State favored military action and the Secretary of Defense strongly resisted it, arguing that escalation could lead to war with Syria;
- In Nicaragua, the Secretary of State favored negotiation while the Secretary of Defense argued for increased military pressures (74).

The USSR

It is not possible to understand a major portion of the external military interventionary behavior of the USSR in the post-WW II years without going back a half dozen years before the outbreak of that war.

Writing shortly after WW II, Louis Fischer stated that "Aggression against small countries is the beginning of all our woes", though in fact a large portion of WW II was aggression against states of an equivalent size or even larger than the initiator of the war. Fischer made this remark in the course of describing the history of what he termed "an excellent Soviet definition of aggression", drafted by Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov and embodied in a "Convention for the Definition of Aggression" signed in London on July 3, 1933, by the USSR and the governments of Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Turkey and Lithuania, and shortly thereafter by the USSR and Poland, Iran, Afghanistan, Finland, Esthonia and Latvia as well. The Convention stated in Article 2 that

> An aggressor... shall be considered to be that state which is first to commit any of the following actions:
>
> 1. Declaration of war upon another state.
> 2. Invasion by its armed forces, with or without declaration of war, of the territory of another state.
> 3. Attack by its land, naval or air force, with or without a declaration of war, on the territory, vessel or aircraft of another state.
> 4. Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another state.
> 5. ... support to armed bands formed on its territory which have invaded another state...

The Annex to this Convention is even more interesting and apropos than the Convention itself. It reads:

> No act of aggression within the meaning of Article 2 of this Convention can be justified on any of the following grounds, among others:
>
> A. The internal condition of a state, for example: its political, economic, or social structure, alleged defects in its administration, disturbances due to strikes, revolutions, counter-revolutions or civil war...

Fischer then pointed out that in the opening phase of WW II,

> According to this official Soviet government definition of aggression, the Soviet government has been the aggressor in Finland, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Iran — all of whom signed the Litvinov Convention (1).

In March 1939, Stalin had summed up Soviet foreign policy in an explicit, succinct program which included the following declarations:

> We stand for peaceful, close and friendly relations with all the neighboring countries which have common frontiers with the USSR... as long as they make no attempt to trespass, directly or indirectly, on the integrity and inviolability of the frontiers of the Soviet state. We stand for the support of nations which are the victims of aggression and are fighting for the independence of their country (2).

Yet within six months the Soviet Union invaded Poland, and annexed much of its territory. Within a year, the USSR attacked and defeated Finland. Within a period of eighteen months the Baltic countries and part of Romania were absorbed into the Soviet Union. Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov attempted

> ... to work out an understanding with German leaders which would permit the Soviet invasion of Poland to be explained according to ends of self-preservation. His first hope was to "declare that Poland was falling apart and that it was necessary for the Soviet Union, in consequence, to come to the aid of the Ukrainians and the White Russians 'threatened' by Germany." German objections resulted in a joint communiqué proposed by Berlin but rejected by Stalin on the basis that "it represented the facts all too frankly". Stalin's draft prevailed, explaining Soviet intervention as designed "to restore peace and order... and to bring about a new order by the creation of natural frontiers and viable economic organizations" (3).

Between 1939 and 1941 the USSR repeatedly expressed its displeasure with German troop deployments or activities in the Balkans, an area that it felt should be under Soviet domination.

> The Soviet Government had repeatedly called the attention of the Government of the Third Reich to the fact that it considered the territory of Bulgaria and the Straits as a security zone of the USSR ... it would consider the appearance of any foreign armed forces /there/ ... as a violation of the security interests of the USSR (4).

> The area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the centre of gravity of the aspirations of the Soviet Union ... Bulgaria geographically is situated inside the security zone of the Black Sea boundaries of the Soviet Union ... A base for land and naval forces of the USSR /should be/ within the range of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles by means of a long-term lease (5).

After the German invasion of the USSR in June 1941 and the alliance of the USSR, Britain and the USA, Soviet territorial demands remained the same.

> As early as December, 1941, Anthony Eden flew to Moscow, where Stalin made the following demands, among others, as Soviet objectives in the postwar world:

1. approval of the Soviet borders as of June, 1941, thereby sanctioning the annexations effected under the Nazi-Soviet alliance of 1939 to 1941, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and part of Romania (Bessarabia, and part of Bukovina) within the Soviet Union;
2. the Curzon line to demarcate the Russo-Polish boundary, a line (drawn by British representatives in 1919) roughly corresponding to ethnic divisions but refused by the Polish government as being inadequate;
3. Russian bases in Romania;
4. territory seized from Finland in the Russo-Finnish war of 1939-1940 and Russian bases on Finnish territory.

> This remained the consistent minimum program of Soviet policy throughout this period (6).

Significantly, when Mr. Molotov met with representatives of the Finnish government in the 1944 Armistice negotiations between the two countries, he informed them that

> The re-establishment of our frontiers is self-evident to us. The entire Russian people want it, and they regard the war from that point of view ...
>
> People would laugh at us if Finland could actually force us to sanction the new frontiers. The basic purpose of our war is to re-establish our old boundaries. Germany did not understand this, but after the present war she will remember it for many years to come. The Soviet Union's frontiers cannot be made the object of a business transaction. We have never concealed from you this fact. We cannot help it if you do not accept our standpoint. It is our minimum claim (7).

Notably, with the exception of Iran, all of the countries which the USSR invaded in 1939 despite the existence of the Convention on aggression between them had previously been Russian territory under the Czars before the end of World War I. After WW II Soviet territory was increased by some .274 million square miles and its population by almost one fourth in comparison to 1939. In the 1939 invasion of Finland, the USSR also used a device it would attempt unsuccessfully in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and successfully in Afghanistan in December 1979: the creation of an alternative, friendly government, in the Finnish case headed by the veteran Soviet Finnish leader Otto Kuusinin in Karelia.

The USSR showed a rather pronounced interest in acquiring foreign military bases immediately after WW II. In explaining to the Finnish negotiators in 1944 the insistence on a Soviet naval base at Hankö, on Finnish territory, Molotov commented that

> Great Britain has had Gibraltar in her possession for a couple of centuries, but no one, not even Spain, has considered this

> fact as being odd, although Britain's own security does not depend on Gibraltar as ours does on Hankö (8).

In July 1945 at Potsdam, Stalin demanded that at least one of the ex-colonies of Italy, Libya or Somaliland, be placed under Soviet trusteeship.

> At the July 1945 Potsdam conference the Soviet Union proposed that it establish a trusteeship over Tripolitania, one of the three Libyan territories. Two months later the Soviet Union repeated its proposal ... The Soviet Foreign Minister explained that the USSR desired an outlet on the Mediterranean Sea and demanded such a base in Libya (9).

Foreign Minister Molotov claimed "a right to play a more active part in the fate of the Italian colonies than any rank and file member of the United Nations" (10). The Soviet demands were, however, rejected by the Western powers. The USSR did not grant the allies any such rights in the Soviet-occupied East European states and the USSR was not permitted any active participation in the Allied Control Commission in Italy. Soviet demands were also made on Turkey for a naval base on the Dardanelles, similar to those of the United States in the Panama Canal Zone and of Great Britain at Suez, and for the Anatolian territories of Kars and Ardahan (11). The USSR also requested the revision of the Montreux Convention regulating the passage of ships through the Dardanelles and sought an exclusion from its restrictions. It did not, however, obtain any of these territorial concessions.

In August 1941, due to the pro-Nazi sympathies of the Shah of Iran, the USSR and Great Britain jointly occupied Iran. The Soviets occupied the north and the British the southern portions of the country. However, in November-December 1945, a separatist regime under Russian protection was established in Azerbaijan, the northern most area of Iran which contained one-fifth of Iran's total population and was its major grain-producing province. The USSR delayed in withdrawing its troops from the northern portion of the country beyond the March 1946 deadline, and the US consul in Northern Iran first reported large-scale Soviet troop movements in the area, and then "full-scale combat deployment" (12). The United States pressed the issue in the new United Nations Security Council and it was one of the first contested issues in the new "cold war" between the US and USSR. The Soviet troops were withdrawn in May 1946. A Soviet garrison of several thousand troops was also not withdrawn from the Danish island of Bornholm in the Baltic until the Spring of 1946.

There were two other important Soviet military expeditionary forces in the years before WW II. One was the support to the Spanish Republican government in the 1936-1939 Spanish Civil War. It was virtually the only international support that the Spanish government was able to obtain (13). The other is much less known. In 1931, the USSR signed a secret agreement to provide military assistance to Chin Shu-jen, the provincial governor of Sinkiang province in China. The USSR reaffirmed the agreement with General Sheng Shih-ts'ai, the warlord, who ruled Sinkiang from 1933 to 1943. In 1934 the USSR provided two brigades of troops and combat air support to relieve Urumchi, Sinkiang's capital and to fight off several opposing warlords (14). The USSR built an aircraft assembly plant in Urumchi which provided some 885 aircraft to support Chiang Kai Shek's Chinese nationalist armies between 1937 and 1941 in fighting the Japanese invasion forces. The USSR supplied the pilots. Between 1931 and 1941, there were hundreds of border incidents between regular Japanese and Soviet military forces in Manchuria. In 1938 and 1939, these developed into full-scale warfare involving thousands of tanks.

The bridge between these pre-war events and the period since 1945 is composed of two elements. The first is that the USSR was allowed to retain the territory it had conquered while formally allied with Nazi Germany between 1939 and 1941. The three Baltic states, nearly half of Poland, and sizable portions of Finland and Romania were all incorporated into the USSR. In addition, at Yalta the USSR was granted the preservation of the _status quo_ in Outer Mongolia *), special rights in Inner Mongolia and to Pacific ports in Northern China, and full possession of the Kurile islands and Southern Sakhalin. The second aspect is that the Soviet Union went on to occupy the major portion of Eastern Europe in 1945 and to maintain that military occupation until the present day, forty years later. It was that development and the nature of the formation and maintenance of communist governments in these states that established the Soviet Union as an expansionist power in its post-revolutionary period.

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*) The Mongolian Peoples' Republic was claimed by China as juridically a part of China, despite the establishment in 1921 of the Mongolian Peoples' Republic by a shadow government on Soviet soil which then requested Soviet military assistance.

The USSR has now been in existence for 68 years. When WW II ended in 1945, only 28 years had passed since 1917. In the 40 years since 1945, the USSR has held most of its nominal East European allies under military occupation. (Yugoslavia and Albania were unoccupied, Soviet troops were withdrawn from Romania, and Czechoslovakia not until 1968.) The USSR shows no indication of relieving that occupation in its own long-term interests, as some political analysts began to suspect by the mid-1970 that it might (15). Its repeated military interventions in Eastern Europe to maintain the status quo make that clear.

> Soviet military power is the ultimate — indeed, the only real — guarantor of the stability and the very existence of the East European Communist regimes. The USSR threatened or used military force or military ties in Eastern Europe for intra-bloc policing functions nine times between 1945 and 1980 ... Soviet forces guaranteed the Communist takeover of Eastern Europe in 1945-1947; indirectly supported the coup of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in 1948; exerted pressure on Yugoslavia in 1949-1952; suppressed worker demonstrations in East Germany in 1953; attempted to influence the choice of Poland's leadership in 1956; suppressed the Hungarian Revolution in 1956; sought to influence Albania in 1960-1961; forced a reversal of liberalization in Czechoslovakia in 1968-1969; and brought pressure to bear against Poland in 1980-1981 (16).

Only Yugoslavia and Albania, both of whose governments arose primarily from anti-Nazi resistance movements that fought the Germans throughout WW II, joined the Soviet bloc of their own free will. It was precisely these two who were able to leave it. Yugoslavia was alienated before the formation of the Warsaw Pact (17), and Albania withdrew from the Pact after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. On November 1, 1956, as Soviet invasion forces entered Hungary, the government called on the USSR for negotiations to withdraw all troops and announced to the United Nations its intention to become a neutral country (18). The Hungarian government was immediately replaced by the Soviet invasion forces. Only two weeks earlier, in mid-October 1956, when the Soviet armies in Poland under Marshal Rokossovsky were marching toward Warsaw, important segments of the Polish military forces warned that they would fight the Soviet troops if they were not halted, and Polish security chiefs began to arm the workers. These were certainly among the primary reasons that the Soviet forces were returned to their base areas. This was a period when the military organization of the Warsaw Pact probably still did not preclude major resistance by the national forces of member-states. Several impressively researched studies by Christopher Jones maintain that the primary function of the Warsaw Pact

is precisely to preclude national resistance by the armed forces of its smaller member-states to military interventions by the USSR (19). Yugoslavia remained independent above all because it was clear that it would oppose a Soviet invasion with the full complement of its own military forces.

The official Soviet chronology of international events notes for August 21, 1968: "Entry into Czechoslovakia ... of Soviet military units ... to help the working people of that country safeguard their revolutionary achievements against encroachments by internal and external enemies of socialism " (20). This is a complete reversal of the "Convention For the Definition of Aggression" which the Soviet Government had written in 1933 and which was signed between the USSR and Czechoslovakia on July 3, 1933. As already indicated, the Convention states that:

> No act of aggression within the meaning of this Convention can be justified on any of the following grounds, among others: The internal condition of a state, for example: its political, economic or social structure, alleged defects in its administration, disturbances due to strikes, revolution, counterrevolutions or civil war ... (21).

The USSR has signed other documents since 1968 which maintain the same essential point, although not spelled out in such explicit detail. Point 6, "Non-Intervention in Internal Affairs", of the first section of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed in 1975, states:

> The participating States will refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another participating State, regardless of their mutual relations.
>
> They will accordingly refrain from any form of armed intervention or threat of such intervention against another participating State.

The sentences are repeated in the section of the Final Act on "Matters Related to Giving Effect to Certain of the Above Principles". It is perhaps for this reason that, in the parlance of Soviet diplomatic language, military intervention, such as the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, is termed "fraternal solidarity and support".

From the late 1960s on, the Soviet policy of acute military intervention in its allied states has been justified by the so-called "Brezhnev doctrine", in which the USSR reserves the right to itself to intervene with military force in another socialist country so as to preserve a socialist system of government (22). However, as Richard

Lowenthal points out, "the subsequent formulation of a Soviet doctrine proclaiming the primacy of the common interests of the bloc over national sovereignty, known in the West as the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty, only spelled out what was already known" (23).

Soviet explanations of their own invasion of Czechoslovakia have often been thoroughly ridiculous, such as the charge that West Germany was responsible for the changes taking place within the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia:

> They /the "Bonn strategists"/ are not adverse to striving for their resolved aims not with frontal attacks but with roundabout maneuvers and a "hidden" war against the socialist countries. This is not just theory. It is well known that an attempt at a similar "maneuver" was undertaken by Bonn against socialist Czechoslovakia with the aim of tearing it away from the Warsaw Pact system, weakening the strategic positions of the socialist countries, and restoring the "old" Europe. Had it not been for the timely effective assistance of the five socialist countries to fraternal Czechoslovakia, the "hidden" war would have grown into a "hot" one (24).

The 1960s and 1970s saw the appearance of an excellent "revisionist" history regarding the contributions and degree of responsibility of the United States for the origin of the cold war (25). The time is now long overdue for the appearance of a similar critical historiography of the postwar occupation of East Europe by the USSR, perhaps all the more so since the legitimization of the status quo by the agreements concluded in 1970 and 1975 (26).

When Presidents Carter and Brezhnev met in July 1979, each cautioned the other against external intervention. Brezhnev read from a prepared statement:

> Improved relations can only come from a sense of equality between the two nations, a mutual sense of security, noninterference in the affairs of others ...
>
> We have broad global interests, and so do our allies, and those interests must be protected. The Soviet Union is dedicated to support the struggle for emancipation and solidarity. Revolutions, which the Soviets do support, emerge only within other nations. The instigation for them never originates with us" (27).

In replying, President Carter "... emphasized that we should avoid confrontation by refraining from intrusions into troubled areas, either directly or indirectly through proxies" (28).

A characteristic of Soviet military intervention similar to that of other states has been the USSR's efforts to claim that its activities are anything but military intervention.

> Ever since it came into existence the Soviet state has opposed interference with affairs of sovereign states ... It is a built-in feature of socialism, which is fundamentally opposed to any policy of expansion and recourse to war or the threat of force as an instrument of foreign policy, of interference in the affairs of other nations, and of imposing ones will on them (29).

At the time of the Warsaw Pact meeting in January 1983, appropriately enough in Prague, Konstantin Chernenko wrote that "the USSR doesn't try to impose the 'Soviet model' on any country. All the countries that are united in the Socialist community have a sovereign status" (30).

Soviet government commentators are also not remiss in drawing attention to military interventions by the United States. These vary from surveys of "The United States Intervention Policy Since World War II" (31), a rare academic study by Vetaly Zhurkin, Deputy Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada of the United States' "crisis policy" (32), Arbatov's depiction of the "Carter Doctrine" as "the revival of interventionism" (33), to the sulphurous excoriation of the policies of the Reagan administration.

> Since the time of Hitler's Reich, no government has intervened so persistently, so openly and brazenly in the internal affairs of sovereign states as has the Reagan Administration, utilizing all means at its disposal, including military force, to press for overthrow of lawful governments (34).

It is useful for a moment to point out that Soviet foreign policy is poorly understood in the West and that its interpretation is a source of continual debate. As late as 1978, R.J.Mitchell wrote that "Western scholarship has produced no consensually accepted model of Soviet behavior that would identify key variables or causative factors in the formation of Soviet foreign policy doctrine" (35). One has only to attempt to take into account the transformation of the opinions of George Kennan from the author of "the long telegram" in 1946 to his writings since 1980 on the foreign policies of the USSR to appreciate the magnitude of the problem (36). In the context of this study, a constant analytical problem is presented by the depiction of particular Soviet external interventions as "defensive", despite the fact that the USSR has acted outside its own borders. A mild example of such differences of interpretation is provided by recent statements by two former West German chancellors. Willy Brandt described the Soviet leadership as driven by an "exaggerated, patently obsessive, drive to achieve security" (37) while Helmut Schmidt was of the opinion that "there never has been a major change in Soviet foreign policy. Expansionism is still Russia's policy" (38).

One can examine these same contradictory themes in the recent monumental study of US/Soviet international relations from 1969 to 1984 by Raymond Garthoff. In a section entitled "Divergent Perceptions of Intervention in the Third World", Garthoff begins with the generous claim that "... Moscow views normalcy, or the status quo, not as a static condition but as a flow of progressive historical change", and that in specific cases "... the Soviets and Cubans saw their actions as justified not only by historical processes but by the political-military necessities stemming from Western initiatives" (39). A few pages further on, Garthoff describes Soviet policy in a chain of statements that gradually become contradictory. He begins by stating that "the Soviet leaders ... (see) the continuing class struggle in the world ... as an objective phenomenon not subject to their own or anyone else's control" (40). This immediately presents a problem since Garthoff has just noted that Soviet policy is repeatedly justified by the need to oppose United States or other Western efforts to impede that process, which therefore means that it is after all vulnerable to external control both in a way that they disapprove of as well as in the way that they prefer. Garthoff continues:

> The Soviet leaders saw the attainment of strategic parity as establishing a strategic stand off that would reduce the ability of the United States to resort to military means in efforts to stem the progressive drive of history ... The first policy issue this belief posed for the Soviet leaders was whether, when, and how this changed strategic situation permitted (or, required) more active Soviet support and assistance to revolutionary change ... The Soviet leaders do not, however, conceive of their role as passive and do not preclude an active role when the correlation of forces makes that prudent ... On a practical basis the question is posed in terms of possible Soviet support for specific national liberation and progressive revolutionary groups. The Soviet leaders consider several factors: opportunity, means, risks, estimated cost — and gains (41).

By the time we reach the end of this sequence the transition is complete.

Sir Curtis Keeble describes the USSR as

> ... a continental imperial power, newly risen to superpower status and faced with the need to consolidate the areas under its control, to sap the strength of its opponents and to develop the means for worldwide projection of power.
>
> ... a power which, over the centuries has sought security against the threat and the reality of invasion across open land frontiers by the constant extension of its power into areas beyond those frontiers. Having done so, it has found the need to secure tranquility within those areas newly brought under control, as well as stable, compliant administration in them adjacent to the imperial frontier (42).

The interpretation of Soviet foreign policy is made on the basis of an extremely confusing mix of components: national and territorial goals of pre-revolutionary Czarist regimes, the heritage of ideological and doctrinal statements from the time of the Soviet revolution and the writings of Lenin, the policies of the Comintern and Cominform, the post-war military occupation of Eastern Europe, assumptions of Realpolitik, and the visible evidence of Soviet external engagements. Particular additional problems compounding the interpretation of Soviet policies are the frequent major shifts in those policies — as occurred between 1939 and 1941 — and the very major role that "disinformation" plays in the functioning of the Soviet government, in some aspects virtually a necessity for its operation.

With the doctrinaire Soviet interpretation of most international events as a conflict between socialism and capitalism and the natural course of events being considered the triumph of socialism as a "logical consequence", any alleged interference with the natural course of events requires action on the part of "the peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union" to "promote... the triumph of the new and revolutionary over the old and obsolete" (43). In some cases, there may very well have been prior Western interference; in other cases the initial interference may have come from the Soviet Union and been carried out on behalf of a small minority political constituency. Marxist-Leninist doctrine provides a convenient justification for the use of Soviet power outside the boundaries of the Soviet state, and the 1933-1936 non-aggression treaties signed by the USSR with its neighbors are then to be interpreted as a Leninist change of tactics and flexibility. One is left with an interpretation of Soviet international behavior as a combination of historical tradition, post-revolutionary doctrinal precept, and the more recent acquisition of military naval and air capabilities which enable the USSR to carry out military activities further from its own borders when it decides to do so. The first and third factors are both essentially opportunistic; the second tends in the same direction.

In the course of this study, it was possible to obtain an interview which provided an example illustrating the very simple dynamics by which the USSR can itself contribute to the development of a situation — and in this case by completely legitimate means — which is unquestionably not the "flow of progressive historical change". It additionally demonstrates the superficial and unanalytic character of such rhetorical descriptive

language, which both overlooks policy process and policy determination and is grossly misleading. Perhaps nothing more can be expected from Soviet or Marxist publicists, but it is unfortunate to find it in Western presentations.

Nearly every book on the history of the post-WW II Middle East/ Arab-Israeli problem points out that the USSR was the very first country to recognize Israel's independence and that it arranged arms supplies (via Czechoslovakia) to Israel in 1947. The question is then raised as to what it was that altered USSR policy. The brief testimony that follows makes it clear, however, that there was no "change" in policy, that the initial Soviet votes in the UN and related moves were calculated to develop two contending parties in the area as a vehicle to subsequent Soviet penetration into the region, without any specific understanding of how or on whose behalf that penetration might ultimately take place.

An important vote on Israel in the United Nations General Assembly took place on May 1, 1948. This was the vote on the partition plan which, in effect, recognized the state of Israel. The members of the Polish delegation agreed that they were opposed to the resolution, but that they would nevertheless vote in whatever way the USSR did. The USSR intended to vote in favor of partition. One of the Polish diplomats met a member of the Soviet delegation with whom he was acquainted and during a conversation on other matters he brought up the Israeli question. He indicated that the Polish delegation could not understand the Soviet position on Israel and that they believed it to be mistaken. The Arabs were the very great majority in the region, the region was important — for oil and for other reasons — and the Marxist principles of supporting a proletariat clearly suggested favoring the Arabs. The Soviet delegate replied not only in totally unideological terms but in operational, instrumental terms which recognized the potential means of influencing or even directing events, rather than on relying on "historical processes". He replied:

> Look here, I always thought that you understood things, but clearly you don't understand. If we support the Arabs, they will evict the Jews and that will be the end of it. The only hope that we have of some entry into the region is if there is an unsettled situation. Then one of the two parties will turn to us for help. We don't know which one it will be, but it is the only chance.

There are indications that the USSR in fact expected that it might be the Israelis who would turn to the USSR for support, but events proved

Tables from Kaplan et al., Brookings, 1981

Table 7 *Percentage of Incidents by Region and Force Type*

Type of force	*Region*			
	Middle East-North Africa	*Persian Gulf-Horn of Africa*	*Sub-Saharan Africa*	*South and Southeast Asia*
Naval	81	70	56	33
Air	50	40	67	67
Ground	31	...	...	17
(Total number of incidents in region)	(16)	(10)	(9)	(6)

Table 8 *Coercive Activities of Soviet Armed Forces in the Third World*

Number of incidents[a]

Type of force and activity	*USSR supports third world nation against another*	*USSR supports third world regime*	*USSR opposes third world regime*
Ground units			
Firepower	1	...	...
Emplacement of forces	1	...	...
Exercise or demonstration	2	...	1
Air units			
Firepower	1	2	1
Emplacement of forces	4	5	2
Exercise or demonstration	5	2	1
Transport of equipment to actor	4	2	3
Transport of foreign forces	1	3	4
Other coercive action	3	...	...
Naval units			
Harassment or seizure of other ships	1	...	1
Establishment of presence at sea	8	...	2
Visit to foreign nation	5	6	...
Transport of foreign forces	1	...	1
Exercise or demonstration	1	...	1
Other coercive action	1	...	1

a. Excludes alerts; forces may perform more than one activity in an incident.

Table 9 *Coercive and Cooperative Political-Military Operations, by Subject of Soviet Concern*

Number of incidents; percentages of total in parentheses

Subject of Soviet concern	*Form of political-military diplomacy*	
	Coercive[a]	*Cooperative*
Expansion of territory or political authority	26 (16)	...
Maintenance of fraternal Communist regime	43 (27)	8 (25)
Security relations	45 (28)	19 (59)
Third world influence	41 (26)	5 (16)
Other	3 (2)	...
Total incidents	158	32

a. Percentages do not add to one hundred due to rounding.

Table 10 *Major Coercive Actions by USSR Forces since Stalin's Death*

Crisis in Hungary	November 1956
U.S. intervention in Lebanon	July 1958
Western presence in Berlin	July 1961
Cuban missile crisis	October 1962
Border dispute with China	? 1965
Border dispute with China	February 1967
Relations with Czechoslovakia	July 1968
Relations with Czechoslovakia	August 1968
Relations with Rumania[a]	August 1968
Security of regime in Czechoslovakia	October 1968
Border dispute with China	March 1969
Security of Egypt	February 1970
West Germany-USSR treaty[a]	October 1970
Relations with Rumania[a]	June 1971
Arab-Israeli war (1)	October 1973
Arab-Israeli war (2)	October 1973
Cyprus conflict	July 1974
Relations with China[a]	April 1978
China-Vietnam War[a]	February 1979

a. Definitional criteria possibly met.

otherwise. It was not until seven years later with the agreement for major arms transfers to Egypt in 1955-58 that the USSR actually became involved in the area in an important way.

The point is routinely made that the USSR is dependent for its role and influence in the Middle East on the existence of a conflictual situation. This narrative indicates, however, that the USSR did not simply wait to take advantage of a conflictual situation, but that its policies were designed from the beginning to select those instrumentalities that would help produce that conflictual situation.

As Soviet military intervention has markedly increased in recent years, a large and useful literature on the subject has become available (44). There are in additional several recent comparative studies that include quantitative elements. The most well known of them is the study by the Brookings Institution which parallels that done on the United States. This study examines the use of military force by the USSR in the post-WW II period as an instrument of political pressure short of war and recorded 190 relevant events between June 1944 and August 1979 (45). /See Tables 7-10_/ (The study of the US tabulated events between January 1, 1946, and October 31, 1975. The study of the USSR, which was carried out subsequently, covered a longer period of time, June 1944 to August 1979. This noticeably starts a full year before the end of WW II, and twenty of the incidents surveyed took place between June 1944 and January 1, 1946.) Frances Fukuyama also lists six occasions in which the USSR threatened military intervention in Middle East crises or conflicts: Suez - 1956, Syria-Turkey - 1957, Lebanon - 1958, June War - 1967, "War of Attrition" - 1970, and the October War - 1973 (46). One would now have to add a seventh occasion, at the time of Israel's invasion of Lebanon in June 1982. (See section on Israel, page).

In his study on <u>The USSR in Third World Conflicts,</u> Porter points out that

> The USSR has been much more conservative than the United States with regard to deploying its own armed forces abroad. From 1945 to 1979, regular tactical formations of Soviet ground troops never once participated in combat outside the boundaries of the Warsaw Pact (47).

The key words here are "regular tactical formations of Soviet ground troops", as relatively large numbers of Soviet military forces were actively engaged in combat in 1970-71 on behalf of Egypt during the so-called War of Attrition. Smaller groups of Soviet military personnel

Insert page 47-a : "USSR" chapter

A serious omission is the evidence provided by Soviet sources of very early post WWII use of Soviet military forces in specialist roles in other countries -- North Korea and China.

> ...the Borisov-Koloskov book on Soviet-Chinese relations contains a rare Soviet admission that Soviet fliers played an active combat role during the Korean War. According to this book:
>
> > "Close military cooperation was realized between the USSR and the PRC in the period of military operations in Korea. The Soviet Union uninterruptedly supplied the people's army of Korea and the Chinese volunteers with arms, military supplies, fuel, foodstuffs and medicines. There were Soviet military advisers in Korea including outstanding military leaders. Soviet fliers took part in battles against the aggressors."
>
> An earlier history declared that "in case after case of a worsening of the situation, the USSR was prepared to send into Korea five divisions to render the KDPR aid in repelling aggression". The context of this passage indicates that air divisions were what the USSR had in mind. Kapitsa twice has claimed that before the Korean War, Soviet air units shot down "tens of Nationalist Chinese planes which undertook mass flights over Shanghai and other parts of China. Nationalist air incursions were then said to have only been replaced by air units of the U.S. Seventh Fleet after the Korean War began." The dispatch to China of Soviet air "divisions" was said to have deterred the U.S. from such actions (1).

(1) Morris Rothenberg, Whither China: The View from the Kremlin, Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1977, p. 159. The first internal quotation is from O.B. Borisov and B.T. Koloskov, Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnosheniia, Moscow: Mysl'. 1972, p. 55. The second is from M.S. Kapitsa, KNR: Dva Desiatiletiia-Dve Politika (The PRC: Two Decades-Two Policies), Moscow: Politizdat, 1979, pp. 36-37. The third is from M.S. Kapitsa, Levee Zdravogo Smysla (Left of Common Sense), Moscow: Politizdat, 1968, p. 16. See also Kapitsa, KNR, p. 36.

had served in third-world conflicts earlier, for example also with Egyptian forces in Yemen in the mid-1960s. However, there clearly was a major shift in Soviet policy in response to Egyptian request for help in 1970 by the large-scale deployment to Egypt. As many as 20,000 Soviet military personnel helped to operate the Egyptian air-defense system surrounding major cities and facing the Suez Canal in 1970-71. A second stage in this policy change occurred with the introduction of Cuban ground forces in divisional strength in Angola in 1975-76 (48). The new pattern was maintained in the subsequent deployment of Cuban ground forces to Ethiopia and Soviet specialist personnel to Syria in roles similar to the ones they had 10-12 years before in Egypt. It in fact seems possible that if one omits the major military engagements of the United States (Korea, Vietnam, and the Dominican Republic) and of the USSR (Hungary, Czeckoslovakia, Afghanistan), smaller units of uniformed Soviet military personnel took part in a larger number of post-war military engagements overseas than did those of the United States.

As the Soviet military involvement in the third world grew, the decisions concerning intervention and the actual engagement of Soviet forces constantly became more complicated. Soviet military personnel served in combat roles — as pilots, operators of ground-to-air missile batteries and radar air-defense systems, tank commanders, overall combat commanders and so on over the years in Sudan, Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Cuba, Yemen and other countries. Some specific examples are:

- pilots, for Afghanistan, for Mig 15 or 17s, and IL-Beagles (these were not used in combat) in 1955;
- pilots, for Yemen, in the middle and late 1960s;
- SAM air-defence batteries, for Vietnam, in 1967;
- pilots, for Egypt, in 1970;
- SAM air-defense batteries, for Egypt, 1970;
- tank and artillery officers, for Syria and Egypt, 1970 and October 1973;
- pilots, for Iraq, against Kurdish forces, in 1974 and 1975;
- tank commanders, for Vietnam, in Cambodia, in 1978;
- helicopter pilots, for Afghanistan, in early 1979;
- air-defense systems, for Libya, in 1977 (49).

Soviet pilots also flew air-defense missions over Cuba in 1978-1979 as a replacement for Cuban pilots flying combat missions in Ethiopia. In 1979, it was realized that a Soviet combat brigade had been present for

some time in Cuba. These troops were in addition to the 1,500 or so Soviet military advisors that had been present since 1962, as well as the Soviet military personnel that operated a Soviet electronic-intercept facility, reconnaissance aircraft, and naval repair and supply facilities that were all based in Cuba. The function of the combat brigade was never precisely established and the disclosure of its existence in September 1979 raised major problems for the Carter administration's efforts to obtain the US Senate's approval of the SALT II agreement that had been signed with the USSR in July 1979 (50).

> The historical record suggests that the Soviet leadership felt increasingly cramped by its own restrictions in this regard as the post-war period progressed. The noncombat assignments given to Soviet advisers became increasingly varied and bold over time, going well beyond the routine roles of providing technical assistance to the client and politico-military intelligence to Moscow. In the Yemen, Soviet advisers supervised ammunition depots, assisted with the air transport of troops and equipment from Egypt, and helped plan the relief column that broke the corden around Sana. In Nigeria, the role of Soviets advisers was limited to technical assistance, probably as the result of a deliberate decision ... But in the Yom Kippur war, thousands of Soviet advisers in Egypt and Syria carried out an impressive and diverse assortment of tasks from extensive tactical planning to troop and weapons transport. In the Angolan civil war, the involvement of Soviet advisers was also extensive, particularly in the area of transport, though it paled before the vastly more extensive contributions of Cuban advisers and troops. In the Ogaden conflict, Soviet advisers made very significant contributions despite the presence of Cuban troops and advisers. Two Soviet generals and other high-level Soviet commanders virtually directed Ethiopia's winter counteroffensive, and Soviet advisers played a dominant role in logistics and communications. The Soviet presence reached well over 1,000 men, who performed a wide variety of combat-support functions. It is probably fair to say that between 1943 and 1979, Soviet advisors participated in virtually every wartime role except ground and naval combat (51).

Porter has illustrated the development in Soviet practice by a chronology of what he calls "firsts": the initial use by the USSR of a particular practice.

Egypt, 1955	First overt arms agreement with a Third World client
Yemen vs. South Yemen 1957-9	First military aid given to a country currently engaged in conflict
Sumatran rebellion, 1958	First military aid to a non-Communist country at war when the United States supported the opposing side with arms
Congo crisis, 1960	First Soviet military involvement in an African dispute. First Soviet-assisted transport of Third World troops into a war zone

Laotian civil war, 1960-1	First direct Soviet supply of front-line troops in a Third World conflict
Yemeni civil war, 1962-9	First confirmed participation of Soviet fighter pilots in combat First case of Soviet advisers remaining in center of combat
Nigerian civil war, 1967-70	First large-scale Soviet military involvement in a sub-Saharan conflict
Middle East war of attrition, 1969-70	First known case of Soviet advisers manning SAM installations
Middle East October war, 1973	First massive Soviet resupply effort to a non-Communist belligerent in the course of full hostilities First massive Soviet airlift of arms to a Third World country at war First deployment of Cuban troops in connection with a Soviet operation in a Third World conflict
Angolan civil war, 1975-6	First large-scale use of Cuban troops armed with Soviet arms in a Third World conflict. First massive Soviet intervention in sub-Saharan Africa
Ogaden war, 1977-8	First instance of high-level Soviet commanders being directly involved in planning a Third World military operation
Civil war in Afghanistan, 1978	First participation by Soviet ground troops in a Third World conflict First Soviet invasion of a Third World country (52).

Porter summarizes these developments in the table below.

Table II *The trend of Soviet military involvement in Third World conflicts*[a]

Precedent	Yemen-Aden	Indonesia	Congo	Laos	Yemen	Nigeria	War of attrition	Vietnam	Yom Kippur	Angola	Ogaden war	Afghan civil war
Soviet ground troops												X
Soviet commanders											X	X
Cuban troops										X	X	X
Massive scale							X	X	X	X	X	X
Soviets in combat roles					X		X		X		X	X
Soviet advisers in war zone					X	?	X	X	X	?	X	X
Direct supply of troops on the front				X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X
Transport of troops			X	?	X		X		X	X	X	X
Arms shipments	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

> The general trend has been one of increasing flexibility of policy combined with increasing magnitude of scale and latitude of type of military aid rendered. Insofar as the international order is defined by an unwritten set of "rules of the game" — thresholds, precedents, spheres of influence, lines demarcating acceptable and unacceptable behavior, trip-wires, and the like — the USSR's military activities in the Third World have been a series of incremented encroachments on those rules. Furthermore, a precedent, once set, has tended to become the norm in future conflicts, as illustrated in Table By advancing incrementally and by carefully choosing the places and times of its involvement in Third World conflicts, the Soviet Union has substantially increased its latitude of action in the world (53).

In a still more recent study, and following the suggestions presented in this study for the kinds of activities that should be included within the category of "military intervention", Alex Schmid divided Soviet military interventions into three groups:

- "intrabloc" (including China): Soviet interventions in Soviet allies
- "interbloc": interventions between the two alliances (NATO and WTO)
- "extrabloc": interventions essentially in developing nations (54).

His results are portrayed in tables 12 to 14 and are summarized in the small table below:

	Intrabloc (+ China)	Interbloc (+ extra-bloc with strong interbloc overtones)	Extrabloc	Total
1945-1955	13	2	0	15
1955-1965	3	5	3	11
1965-1980	5	0	13	18
Total	21	7	16	44

The Soviet Union has followed two other policies which has greatly enhanced its role in foreign military intervention. The first of these is that it has been the major and in most cases the only source of external support for a group of third-world countries all of whom are engaged in large-scale programs of external military interventions of their own:

- Vietnam, in Laos and Cambodia
- Libya, in Chad, Sudan, and elsewhere
- Syria, in Lebanon

Table 12 A Survey of Soviet "Interbloc" (NATO + 'Western') Military Interventions Since 1945

Event, Place, Year: / Type of Intervention:	Iran '42-'46	Greek Civil War '44-49	Berlin Blockade '48	Korean War '50-'53	Austrian Occupation '45-'55	Suez Conflict 1956	Syrian Turkish Crisis '57	Lebanon Iraqi Crisis '58	Berlin '58-'61	Cuba 1962	Vietnam 1965-	Other
1. Peacetime stationing of troops as deterrent against 3rd parties	(+)		(+)		(+)					+		
2. Providing body guards and palace guards to local government												
3. Military mission at headquarters for planning local operations	+?			+?								
4. Combat participation of foreign special forces (tank operators, pilots, radar, etc.)				+							+	
5. "Volunteers" serving in combat												considered in 1974/75 for Portugal (??)
6. "Regular troops" engaged in combat												considered in 1951 for Western Europe (+)
7. Providing naval or air protection in or near combat zone				+								
8. Mobilization, troops movements in border areas, deployment of special weapons into forward positions	+		+?	+			+	+	+	+		submarine intrusions into Swedish territorial waters in 1980-1982 (+ & +?)
9. Special weapons' supplies during combat phase				+							+	
10. Armed blockades to prevent weapons reaching opponent of supported party	+											
11. Providing logistics (air and naval transport) for combattants	+?		(+)									

Legend: + = verified; +? = probable but not verified; ? = possible; ?? = doubtful; ! = threat of intervention; (+) = not fully in accordance with definition

Table taken from Schmid and Berends, Soviet Military Intervention Since 1945

Table 13. A Survey of Soviet Intrabloc Military Interventions Since 1945 (including China)

Event, Place, Year: / Type of Intervention:	Bulgaria	Romania	Hungary	Czecho-slovakia	East Germany	Poland	Yugo-slavia	Lithuania	Latvia	Estonia	China
1. Peacetime stationing of troops as deterrent against 3rd parties		+ (1944-1958)	+ (1945-)	+ (1945) + (1968-)	+ (1945-)	+ (1945-)		+ (1944-)	+ (1944-)	+ (1944-)	
2. Providing body guards and palace guards to local government											
3. Military mission at headquarters for planning local operations	?? (1944-)	+? (1944-)	+? (1945-)		+? (1953)	+ (1945-1948) + (1956)		+ (1944-)	+ (1944-)	+ (1944)	
4. Combat participation of foreign special forces (tank operators, pilots, radar, etc.)								+ (1944-1953)	+ (1944-1953)	+ (1944-1953)	+ (1950)
5. "Volunteers" serving in combat											
6. "Regular troops engaged in combat			+ (1956)	(+) (1968) ! (1969)	+ (1953)		+? (1948-1951)	(+)	(+)	(+)	+ (1946/47) + (1960s)
7. Providing naval or air protection in or near combat zone											+ (1950-1953)
8. Mobilization, troops movements in border areas, deployment of special weapons into forward positions		+ (1968) + (1971)		+? (1948) + (1968)		+ (1956) + (1980-1981)	+ (1948-1951)				+ (1950-1953) + (1960s) + (1971)
9. Special weapons' supplies during combat phase											
10. Armed blockades to prevent weapons reaching opponent of supported party					+ (1953)			+	+	+	
11. Providing logistics (air and naval transport) for combattants											+? (1950-1953)

Legend: + = verified; +? = probable but not verified; ? = possible; ?? = doubtful; ! = threat of intervention; (+) = not fully in accordance with definition.

Table taken from Schmid and Berends, Soviet Military Intervention Since 1945

Table 14 : A Survey of Soviet Extrabloc Military Interventions Since 1945

Type of Intervention / Event, Place, Year:	Suez '56	Congo '60	Laos '60-'61	Indonesia '61	Cuba '62	North Yemen '62-'70	Algerian-Moroccan War '63	June War '67	Nigeria '67-'70	Canal War '70	Sudan '70-'71	Jordan '70	Guinea '70	Sri Lanka '71	Bangladesh '71	Dhofar '73	October War '73	Syria '73-	Iraq '74-'75	Angola '74-	Ethiopia '77-	Kampuchea '79	Yemen '79	Afghanistan '79	China-Vietnam '79
1. Peacetime stationing of troops as deterrent against 3rd parties					+																				
2. Providing body guards and palace guards to local government																									
3. Military mission at headquarters for planning local operations						+?						??						??		??	+	?	??	+	
4. Combat participation of foreign special forces (tank operators, pilots, radar, etc.)				(+)		+				+	+?			+?			+?	??	+		?			+	
5. "Volunteers" serving in combat	!																								
6. "Regular troops" engaged in combat								!									!							+	
7. Providing naval or air protection in or near combat zone						?				+			(+)							?	?				
8. Mobilization, troops movements in border areas, deployment of special weapons into forward positions					+			+							+		+	+							
9. Special weapons' supplies during combat phase							(+)		(+)						+		+	+		+	+				+
10. Armed blockades to prevent weapons reaching opponent of supported parties																									
11. Providing logistics (air and naval transport) for combattants		+	+			+?										+	+			+	+	+		+	+

Legend: + = verified; +? = probable but not verified; ? = possible; ?? = doubtful; ! = threat of intervention; (+) = not fully in accordance with definition

Table taken from Schmid and Berends, Soviet Military Intervention Since 1945

- Cuba, in Angola, Ethiopia, and elsewhere

In the 1960s, the USSR had also supported the Egyptian intervention in Yemen.

The second is the organization of contingents with contributions from a large group of countries which jointly perform various functions within a particular developing country. The most well known examples have been the use of Cuban ground forces in Angola and Ethiopia since these participated in very large numbers, up to the level of divisional strength (55). However, in other cases the contributing contingents are made up of smaller groups from a wider population of donor nations all allied with the USSR, with each national contingent often performing a different function. Some examples are

- the USSR, GDR, Cuba, Bulgaria and South Yemen in Ethiopia
- USSR, Cuba and GDR in Angola: GDR and Cuba particularly for the Katangan exile forces that reinvaded Zaire in the two Shaba province incidents
- Cuba, Libya, Iraq and South Yemen, in 1973-75, in support of the PFLO effort against Oman
- USSR, GDR, and PLO, in Libya
- Libya, GDR, and PLO in Uganda, under Idi Amin
- USSR, Cuba, GDR and Ethiopia, in South Yemen
- Cuba and North Vietnam to train the Polisario Front, in 1975
- GDR (and Cuba) in Afghanistan (after 1978)
- Cuba, GDR, Bulgaria, Libya, Nicaragua, North Korea, and PLO, in Grenada
- Ethiopian contingents have also been reported elsewhere in Africa.

In Yemen for example, the army was in large part commanded by Soviet officers, Cuba trained a popular militia and supplied combat pilots and ground crews for aircraft provided by the USSR, and East German advisers were responsible for the policy and security services. When these units have taken part in actual fighting, the practice has variously been called coalition, proxy, or surrogate warfare.

The use of surrogate forces in relatively small numbers and in the role of specialists, is a practice that was started by the United States when it supplied anti-Castro Cuban mercenaries to Zaire in 1964 to aid Mobuto. This was done on a much smaller scale, however, and mercenaries were employed rather than elements of the national armed forces of allies. Cuban and Taiwanese mercenaries were also used in other covert operations. The practice was greatly expanded by the USSR, however, and given a far more formal and established status. It is interesting that when the USSR made its initial large-scale contribution

of personnel to the Egyptian defense of Suez in March 1970, it not only was conscious of and sensitive to this issue, but it attributed the policy to Israel. "... Israel enjoys supremacy [and is] increasing it by recruiting Western mercenaries as pilots" (56) which was untrue then or at any other time after 1947. The use of surrogates was even recognized in a statement by Soviet General Epishev:

> Greatest importance is being attached to Soviet military presence in various regions throughout the world, reinforced by an adequate level of strategic mobility of its armed forces ... In those cases wherein support must be furnished to those nations fighting for their freedom an imperialist intervention, the Soviet Union may require mobile and well-trained and well-equipped forces ... Expanding the scale of Soviet military presence and military assistance furnished by other socialist states is being viewed today as a very important factor in international relations (57).

The numbers of these personnel are often quite large. In 1979 the USSR alone reportedly had approximately 3,000 "advisers" in Libya. Between 1977 and 1978, the number of Soviet, East European and Cuban military "advisers" in South Yemen increased from about 700 to 1,550.

It seems clear that the Soviet practices initiated in the mid-1970s of using the Soviet military base but surrogate forces, principally Cuban ground troops, was designed to avoid, if possible, any confrontation with the United States on either of two possible levels: the possibility of direct interaction with US or other Western military forces, and the risk of providing conservative political quarters in the United States with the means to argue against détente. It was hoped that these mechanisms would enable "détente" to be maintained.

> It seems likely that some compromise was reached by early 1973, whereby it was decided that direct Soviet involvement overseas would be limited to the provision of advisers, weapons and strategic logistic support, the combat role being delegated to the Soviet-equipped forces of 'revolutionary' states such as North Korea, Vietnam and Cuba. It can be argued that this policy ensures the USSR the best of all worlds; namely, being able to affect the outcome of an overseas conflict with direct battlefield support, while ensuring that political commitment and liability remain strictly limited. This is achieved by facilitating the arrangements and providing the lift to bring cobelligerents to the zone of conflict; by ensuring that the client state receives adequate military supplies in the course of battle; and by remaining relatively silent about Soviet involvement until after the event (58).

If we also go back and look more closely at the Soviet decision to provide the help requested by Egypt in 1970, two extremely important

TABLE 15 -MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM LDC'S TRAINED IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, 1955-78[1]

[Number of persons]

	Total	U.S.S.R.	Eastern Europe	China
Total	52,890	43,790	5,965	3,135
Africa	17,525	13,420	1,400	2,705
North Africa	3,735	3,385	335	15
Algeria	2,260	2,045	200	15
Libya	1,330	1,265	65	
Other	145	75	70	
Sub-Saharan Africa	13,790	10,035	1,065	2,690
Angola	60	55	5	
Benin	20	20		
Burundi	75	75		
Cameroon	125			125
Congo	855	355	85	415
Equatorial Guinea	200	200		
Ethiopia	1,640	1,190	450	
Ghana	180	180		
Guinea	1,290	870	60	360
Guinea-Bissau	100	100		
Mali	415	355	10	50
Nigeria	730	695	35	
Sierra Leone	150			150
Somalia	2,585	2,395	160	30
Sudan	550	330	20	200
Tanzania	2,855	1,820	10	1,025
Togo	55			55
Zaire	175			175
Zambia	130	85		45
Other	1,600	1,310	230	60
East Asia	9,300	7,590	1,710	
Indonesia	9,270	7,560	1,710	
Kampuchea	30	30		
Latin America	725	725		
Peru	725	725		
Middle East	18,115	15,630	2,485	
Egypt	6,250	5,665	585	
Iran	315	315		
Iraq	4,330	3,650	680	
North Yemen	1,180	1,180		
South Yemen	1,095	1,075	20	
Syria	4,945	3,745	1,200	
South Asia	7,225	6,425	370	430
Afghanistan	4,010	3,725	285	
Bangladesh	485	445		40
India	2,285	2,200	85	
Pakistan	430	45	NA	385
Sri Lanka	15	10		5

[1] Data refer to the estimated number of persons departing for training. Numbers are rounded to the nearest 5.

Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries, 1978. September 1979, ER 79-10412U, p. 5-6.

Table 16. Foreign Military Trainees in the USSR

	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
East Asia and Pacific	NA	NA	NA	NA	1,500
Latin America	2,000	2,000	2,050	2,000	2,010
Near East and South Asia	1,800	2,000	2,260	6,600	5,950
Africa	2,960	2,235	2,680	1,930	1,770
Third World	6,760	6,235	6,940	10,530	11,230

NA = Data not available.

TABLE 17 COMMUNIST MILITARY TECHNICIANS IN LDC'S, 1978[1]

[Number of persons]

	Total	U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe	China	Cuba[2]
Total	51,400	12,070	680	38,650
Africa	44,655	6,575	590	37,490
North Africa	2,975	2,760		215
Algeria	1,015	1,000		15
Libya	1,950	1,750		200
Morocco	10	10		
Sub-Saharan Africa	41,680	3,815	590	37,275
Angola	20,300	1,300		19,000
Equatorial Guinea	290	40	100	150
Ethiopia	17,900	1,400		16,500
Guinea	330	100	30	200
Guinea-Bissau	205	65		140
Mali	195	180	15	
Mozambique	1,130	230	100	800
Other	1,330	500	345	485
Latin America	160	150		10
Guyana	10			10
Peru	150	150		
Middle East	5,645	4,495		1,150
Iraq	1,350	1,200		150
North Yemen	155	155		
South Yemen	1,550	550		1,000
Syria	2,580	2,580		
Other	10	10		
South Asia	940	850	90	
Afghanistan	700	700		
Bangladesh	50		50	
India	150	150		
Pakistan	40		40	

[1] Minimum estimates of the number of persons present for a period of 1 mo or more. Numbers are rounded to the nearest 5.

[2] Includes troops.

Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries 1978. September 1979, ER 79-10412U, p. 4.

Table 18. Soviet Military Advisers and Technicians Abroad (minimum estimate)

	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
East Asia and Pacific	800	800	1,500	3,000	3,000
Latin America	2,100	2,100	2,100	2,085	2,000
Near East and South Asia	5,615	6,830	11,100	12,100	11,700
Africa	12,100	2,560	2,640	2,960	3,420
Third World	10,615	12,290	17,340	20,145	19,590

Table 19 SOVIET BLOC MILITARY/CIVILIAN ADVISERS IN MID-EAST AND AFRICA

COUNTRY	SOVIET	CUBAN	EAST GERMAN
MID-EAST AND NORTH AFRICA			
Algeria	8,500	170	250
Iraq	8,000	2,200	160
Libya	2,300	3,000	—
North Yemen	475	—	5
South Yemen	2,500	800	325
Syria	4,000	5	210
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			
Angola	700	18,000	450
Congo	850	950	15
Ethiopia	2,400	5,900	550
Guinea	375	280	125
Madagascar	370	55	—
Mali	635	—	20
Mozambique	500	1,000	100
Tanzania	300	95	15

Source: US Sec. of Defense Weinberger's Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 1983

Table 20. *Communist Military Technicians in Less Developed Countries, 1979*[1]

	USSR and Eastern Europe	Cuba
Africa	6,825	33,060
North Africa	2,835	15
Algeria	1,015	15
Libya	1,820	..
Egypt	–	–
Sub-Saharan Africa	3,990	33,045
Angola	1,400	19,000
Equatorial Guinea	40	200
Ethiopia	1,250	13,000
Guinea	85	50
Guinea-Bissau	60	50
Mali	180	–
Mozambique	525	215
Other	450	530

1 Including more than 30,000 Cuban troops in Angola and Ethiopia.

CIA, National Foreign Assessment Center, Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries, 1979 and 1954–79, Washington, October 1980, Table A-3

Table 21. *Communist Training of Less Developed Countries Military Personnel in Communist Countries, 1955–1979*

	USSR	Eastern Europe
Africa	14,420	2,345
North Africa	9,245	1,140
Algeria	2,195	200
Libya	1,310	285
Other	75	70
Egypt	5,665	585
Sub-Saharan-Africa	10,840	1,205
Angola	55	5
Benin	30	–
Burundi	75	–
Cameroon	–	–
Congo	505	85
Equatorial Guinea	200	–
Ethiopia	1,290	500
Ghana	180	–
Guinea	885	60
Guinea-Bissau	100	–
Mali	360	10
Mozambique	400	30
Nigeria	790	35
Sierra Leone	–	-
Somalia	2,395	160
Sudan	330	20
Tanzania	1,970	10
Togo	–	–
Zaire	–	–
Zambia	190	–
Other	1,085	290

CIA, National Foreign Assessment Center, Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries, 1979 and 1954–79, Washington, October 1980, Table A-4

points become evident. The decision on a military commitment to Egypt was almost without precedent in its size in the history of the Soviet regime, and definitely in the post-war years. It came, however, at a time of greatly heightened Soviet diplomatic activity toward the West. At the end of 1969, there was an improvement in the tense situation between the USSR and China along their border. Within four months, the USSR entered into the SALT talks and responded to Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik initiatives — at the same time as it decided on the military commitment to Egypt in January 1970. The second important point is that the Soviet units that operated in Egypt were independent military formations which functioned apart from the Soviet personnel present in Egypt, which were associated with Egyptian military formations as advisers.

> All these Soviet units operated independently of the Egyptian Army, yet in cooperation with it. They were not attached to any Egyptian units. The first independent Soviet surface-to-air missile sites became operational on 15 March. By 13 April, there was irrefutable evidence that Soviet pilots had assumed responsibility for the air defense of the Nile Valley. Initially, the Soviets tried to keep a low profile. Their fighters were painted with Egyptian markings.
> .....
> Besides the independent Soviet presence, there was also quite a large advisory buildup attached to the Egyptian Army. The Soviet advisory personnel were deployed in all branches of the Egyptian Army; there were reports of Soviet personnel assigned to every air and naval base, military training facility, and major maintenance depot in Egypt. Soviet advisers and technicians were also deployed in the operational ground units, where they penetrated down to the battalion level in artillery and armored units. ... The size of this advisory buildup was not affected by the War of Attrition, and there was no remarkable growth in its scope during that war. The unprecedented growth of the Soviet military presence in Egypt at the time resulted from the appearance of the independent units in Egypt and not from a growth in the size of the advisory buildup ... Soviet personnel penetrated to the battalion level in the ground forces, battery level in air defense units, and squadron level in the air force (59).

Karsh makes the additional point that the deployment of Soviet independent units has taken place in Syria in 1973 and 1983 as well.

> Consequently, the growth of the Soviet presence, between 4,000 and 5,000 personnel, in Syria during the first half of 1983 cannot be attributed to a growth in the advisory buildup, but rather to the appearance of new independent Soviet units in Syria.
>
> The installation of Soviet-manned SAM-5 missiles in Syria does not mark the first appearance of Soviet independent units in Syria. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, air defense missile units under exclusive Soviet operation and control were sent to Syria and deployed at Latakia and Damascus to protect ships and aircraft involved in massive sea- and airlifts (60).

It is important to understand that the Soviet Union also has a "Rapid Deployment Force" though it does not go under that name. Some analysts have chosen to refer to the Soviet coalition or surrogate forces as filling this role. For example in the first six months of 1978, the USSR carried out an airlift of approximately 5,000 flights — roughly 24 per day — ferrying 10,000 Cuban troops from Angola to Ethiopia, 15,000 from Cuba to Ethiopia, and 10,000 replacements from Cuba to Angola. 3,000 Yemeni troops were brought from Aden, and thousands of technical experts from the USSR, East German, Czechoslovakia and Hungary also were flown to Ethiopia (61). Perhaps more to the point however, or in addition to surrogate forces, are the Soviet Airborne Troops (Vozdushno-Desantnye Voyska) or VDV. Seven light divisions of 8,500 men each are kept at Category I readiness in peacetime (62). An eighth airborne division is used for training. Until 1982-83 these airborne forces were maintained directly under the Soviet High Command and the Ministry of Defence and not assigned to any of the branches or regional commands of the Soviet armed forces. The airborne troops have been exercised in divisional size, placed on alert in particular international crises, and used in combat. The 103rd Guards Airborne division seized the Prague airport in the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the 105th Airborne Division was the vanguard of the Soviet forces that entered Kabul, Afghanistan, in December 1979. On October 24, 1973, in response to requests from Egyptian President Sadat for Soviet help to deter further Israeli advance into Egypt, all seven airborne divisions were placed on alert and three were put on the highest stage of alert with troops placed at airfields with their weapons ready to take off. In addition, Soviet air transport massed for a possible airlift (63). This resulted in a world-wide alert of US military forces, including an alert of US nuclear forces. There were also large-scale troop movements reported in Southern Bulgaria during the Cyprus crisis in the summer of 1974.

It is impossible to tell in which cases alerts or maneuvers during ongoing crises, such as those prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 or during the Polish crisis of 1980-1981, are intended solely to apply political pressure and which may be preludes to invasion. In August 1979, the USSR carried out a large airlift exercise of the 106th Guards Airborne Division from bases in the Southern USSR to South Yemen and to Ethiopia. In 36 hours, two brigades — around 10,000 men — plus armored vehicles and artillery were flown to the two countries. After a short stay, they returned to the USSR (64). The exercise took place a few months

before the USSR invasion of Afghanistan in December and the nearly simultaneous establishment in January 1980 of an operational Soviet command headquarters in South Yemen. There has never been a clear explanation of this last event. In addition to Airborne forces, the USSR deploys some 12,000 naval infantry. The United States maintains only two airborne divisions (in comparison to the USSR's seven) and though the Soviet forces are still only one-third the strength of the US Marine Corps, the USSR's "rapid deployment forces" appear to be more rapidly deployable and are not inconsequential. Since the Soviet forces are primarily airborne, their deployment or exercise has required obtaining overseas refueling and staging facilities or, at least, landing rights to allow long-distance transit. For example Soviet aircraft from the Southern USSR attempting to reach the Gulf or the Horn of Africa must fly over either Turkey and Iraq or Iran, and possibly Syria and Egypt as well, depending on the route taken. In supplying airlift capability in December 1977 and January 1978 in support of the wars in Ethiopia and Angola, the USSR required refueling facilities in a dozen countries and frequently carried out unauthorized overflights of Yugoslavia, Egypt, Sudan, Niger, Chad and Pakistan (65). Soviet military equipment is often supplied extremely rapidly during third-world conflicts. The rapid response is due in part to the enormous overseas stocks of equipment that the USSR maintains in Libya, Syria and Yemen, maintained by Soviet or other East European military personnel. In part it is due to large airlift and sealift capabilities.

It is clear that Soviet intervention in several important cases has occurred at the request of the recipient nation: in Egypt in 1970, in Syria, in Sudan during the Anyanya insurgency in 1969, and in Iraq during the war against the Kurds in 1974-75. (In all of these cases, Soviet pilots and aircraft participated in combat.) In other cases, such as Ethiopia in 1978, in Angola, or the Egyptian campaign in Yemen in the 1960s, it is not known whether the USSR offered help or the recipient requested it and in what sequence such events took place.

The USSR has also rejected requests for intervention from nations to which it was supplying military assistance at lower levels. The Egyptian request for Soviet intervention in the 1956 Suez crisis and the Chinese request in the 1958 Taiwan Straits crisis were both rejected. The USSR has also opposed particular operations carried out by states in which it had substantial military advisory forces. The USSR opposed

Syrian intervention in Jordan in 1970 and in Lebanon in 1976. In both cases it withdrew its advisers at the height of the crises from the Syrian units which invaded the two countries. Soviet military advisory personnel nevertheless did return to assignments with Syrian forces in Lebanon after some years, and were apparently present inside Lebanon in large numbers in 1983. The USSR also played a role in obtaining Ethiopian agreement not to enter Somalia as the Ethiopian-Somalian war in the Ogaden drew to a close (66).

A very large number of the Soviet interventions in the third world have taken place during ongoing conflicts, and this has confronted the USSR with several situations in which it at least initially sought to maintain donor relations with two nations on the opposite side of a conflict, one or both of which have been major recipients of Soviet arms prior to the outbreak of war: the Yemens, Somalia and Ethiopia, and Iraq and Iran. In the Iraq-Iran case, the USSR continued to supply both sides with arms, directly or indirectly, after the war between them began in 1980.

Wherever possible the USSR has sought bilateral treaties as a means of legitimizing Soviet military intervention in third-world nations. Moscow pressed for the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of May 27, 1971, when it was making a major military commitment to Egypt. This treaty served as a model for subsequent treaties which were signed with India in August 1971, Iraq in April 1972, Somalia in July 1974, Angola in October 1976, Mozambique in March 1977, Ethiopia and Vietnam in November 1978, Afghanistan in December 1978, the PDRY (South Yemen) in October 1979 and Syria in October 1980. These eleven bilateral pacts signed by the USSR in the 1970s all contained a military clause patterned after Article 7 of Soviet-Egyptian treaty (67). The treaties with Egypt and Somalia were subsequently abrogated in March 1976 and November 1977.

The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

On April 27, 1978, a military coup toppled Afghanistan's King Daoud. Relations between Daoud and the USSR had cooled after 1975. Daoud was moving further toward the West in 1978 and the coup came the day after the arrest of the seven principal leaders of the Communist Party of Afghanistan, the PDPA. At their summit meeting in July 1979, Brezhnev informed President Carter "... that the Soviets had first heard of the revolution in Afghanistan on the radio and did not instigate the change

in government" (68). Some scepticism is permitted. The officers who made the coup were associated with various fractions of the PDPA and presumably were in continuous contact with members of the sizable Soviet military advisory establishment in Afghanistan. The remaining twenty months of Afghan affairs until December 1979 were stormy: internal coups within the communist government with the leadership favored by Moscow exiled or killed, the gradual transformation of the population into a nation under armed uprising in opposition to the government, a gradual buildup of Soviet military advisors in Afghanistan to approximately 5,000, and several major mutinies within the Afghan army, often directed against their Soviet advisors (69). By mid-1978 Soviet advisers were participating in combat operations. There were two long inspection visits by senior Soviet military officials to Afghanistan in 1979, in one case by the general who performed the same function prior to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Some Western guesses as to when the precise decision to intervene was taken are the end of November 1979 or as late as mid-December. It is assumed that by September 1979 at the latest, however, preparations must have been begun for an operation of the scale that followed. The USSR gradually brought in smaller numbers of airborne troop units from December 8 to 24 and on December 24 an airborne division landed in Kabul, occupied all government buildings on December 27 and killed President Amin (70). At the same time the main invasion force of approximately 50,000 men moved south into Afghanistan from the USSR by road. It was rapidly increased to 85,000, six full divisions.

Exactly one day before the full-scale invasion, Pravda reported that "... deliberately planted rumors about some sort of 'interference' by the Soviet Union in the internal affairs of Afghanistan /and assertions/ ... that Soviet 'military units' have been moved into Afghan territory ... are pure fabrications". The report continued:

> It is common knowledge that relations between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan are based on a firm foundation of good-neighborliness, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, and equal, mutually advantageous cooperation.
>
> ... The subversive anti-Afghan activities of the American and other intelligence-and-sabotage services constitute flagrant intervention in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. No efforts of American and Peking propaganda can camouflage those dangerous intrigues (71).

After the mutiny of the Afghan army garrison in Herat in March 1979, Pravda had began to charge that Pakistan, Egypt, China, and "some Western countries" — later identified as the United States, Great Britain, West

Germany and Iran — were responsible for the problems in Afghanistan (72). On June 1, Pravda accused the government of Pakistan of complicity in the insurgency and warned that it constituted "... a case of actual aggression against a state with which the USSR has a common border" (73). External military assistance to the Afghan resistance was, however, not a serious factor in the Soviet government's decision to intervene.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has been characterized by different authors as "the first overt use of Soviet combat troops outside the geo-political borders established at the end of WWII", "the first application of the Brezhnev doctrine in the third world", or "the first Soviet use of force against a nonaligned neighbor outside Eastern Europe after World War II". Most of these descriptive devices simply point to the irony that the previous large-scale Soviet invasions in the post-war years have been against its nominal allies. More precisely, the Soviet invasion was the first use of regular Soviet ground troops in divisional strength outside the borders of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Of course, when it is a matter of invading other states, every nation employs euphemisms. On December 29, 1979, on the fourth day of the occupation of Afghanistan, the Soviet government announced that it had been invited by the Afghan government to protect it against the counter-revolution supported by China, Pakistan, and the United States. The joint aim of these three governments was described as seeking to crush the Afghan revolution, and the Afghan groups allegedly armed by them, were said to constitute "... a serious threat to the very existence of Afghanistan as an independent state" (74). The similarity to German statements upon occupying Norway and Denmark during WWII is striking. On April 9, 1940, the German Foreign Ministry announced that due to the prior violations of Danish and Norwegian neutrality, Germany had assumed the responsibility for defending the neutrality of the two countries. Nevertheless, everyone — including very likely the invader — understood that Norway and Denmark had been invaded by Germany.

There are two contrasting Western interpretations of the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan. The "defensive" interpretation is presented by Raymond Garthoff.

> The Soviet leaders decided to intervene militarily in Afghanistan not because they were unwilling to keep it as a buffer, but precisely because they saw no other way to ensure that it would remain a buffer. Intervention was not the next in a series of moves to increase Soviet influence as in Angola, Ethiopia, and South Yemen, nor the first in a new series involving escalation to direct use of Soviet military power in the third world.
>
> .....

> The Soviet leaders did not see their decision to intervene militarily as an opportune option but as a security imperative; not as something they were free to do but as something they were regrettably bound to do. It was a decision forced by events, not an opportunity created by them (75).

The second interpretation is presented by former US Undersecretary of State, George W. Ball, who is not otherwise noted for overly hostile interpretations of Soviet foreign policy behavior.

> Moscow would not have accepted such high political costs if it were not playing for high stakes. Since the highest possible stakes would be dominance of the Gulf through which half the world's oil flows, we must act on the prudent hypothesis that, by seizing Afghanistan, the Russians are positioning themselves to pick up the pieces of an Iranian nation sliding inexorably toward ethnic fragmentation, coups and chaos (76).

Whatever one's conclusions may be regarding the USSR's ultimate goals in the Persian Gulf regions, Garthoff nevertheless presents more than enough argumentation in a detailed analysis to counteract thoroughly the more benign assessment he apparently holds. This seems clear from the following excerpts from his presentation.

> The Soviets saw Amin's increasingly desperate attempts to establish contact with President Zia of Pakistan in November and December as further confirmation of their suspicions that he was unreliable on socialism and desired to break away from the Soviet Union.
>
> The real Soviet fear was that Amin was neither reliable as a partner nor subject to Soviet guidance, and at the same time was ineffective in controlling the growing resistence. In desperation Amin might turn to the United States as Egyptian President Sadat and Somali General Siad had done. Alternatively, he would likely be swept away by a popular Islamic nationalist movement. In either case the Soviet Union would lose all its accumulative investment in Afghanistan — strategic, political, ideological, and economic...
>
> ... Amin's demonstrated independence and hostility compelled the Soviet leaders to consider how to deal with a nominally friendly socialist country headed by an opportunistic and hostile leader, and whether and how to remove that leader....
>
> The strongest argument for intervention ... was the absence of an acceptable alternative... The fundamental consideration in the Soviet's decision was the need to defend its security interests...
>
> The Brezhnev Doctrine... was above all the articulation of a rationale for Soviet action in cases where Soviet security needs were perceived as justifying direct action. In other words, it is a rationale to legitimize such action where it is deemed warranted. But it is not a mandate that the Soviets intervene where action is not considered necessary, prudent and feasible... Soviet decisions on direct intervention are made on the basis of national security requirements, including political but not ideological ones. The governing considerations are interests, costs, and risks, not doctrine...

> Amin's frantic efforts to establish contact with President Zia of Pakistan in December, even if his precise purpose was unclear, were another reason for urgency. In short, in November and increasingly in December, the Soviet leaders saw a need to act quickly before Amin took any of a number of possible preemptive actions, both within Afghanistan and internationally: /such as/ denunciation of the 1978 Soviet-Afghan Treaty... (77).

Garthoff clinches what can be considered a counterargument to his own preferred explanation by writing that

> The situation was, in the Soviet view, comparable to that involving American interests in the Dominican Republic, where the United States had intervened directly in 1965 without an invitation from a previously recognized government. And before departing, the United States established a responsive government. Soviet commentators did not publicly use that comparison because they did not want to admit that the Soviet Union resorted to imperialist-style military intervention (78).

The two phrases from US Secretary of State Vance that Garthoff quotes and equates, that the "immediate aim was to protect Soviet political interests in Afghanistan which they saw endangered" and the Soviet's "perceived threats to its national security", can hardly be considered identical. His further contention that

> The world, including the United States, had accepted the coming to power of the PDPA after the April 1978 coup and its subsequent more open identification with communism and closer alignment with the Soviet Union. Any Soviet measures to ensure continued communist rule in Afghanistan would but represent consolidation of the established _status quo_ with respect to international geopolitics (79)

is completely untenable. It equates recognition of a particular political regime with the right of a second country to invade it in order to maintain the specific political complexion of that regime forever.

Several of the statements by senior Soviet spokesmen expressing the government's motives in invading Afghanistan are also quite revealing. Secretary Brezhnev's first comments appeared in _Pravda_ on January 13, 1980. For the most part, they followed the official Soviet statement of December 31: US responsibility for counterrevolutionary activities in Afghanistan, Soviet innocence of any wrong-doing, and assertion of legal justification for their military intervention. He then added, however, that the Soviet action had been necessary because

> unceasing armed intervention and far-reaching implications of the conspiracy of the external forces of reaction created a real danger of Afghanistan losing its independence and being turned into an imperialist military bridgehead on our country's southern borders. ... Acting otherwise would have meant passively watching the creation on our southern border of a source of serious danger to the security of the Soviet state (80).

A Central Committee resolution in June 1980 repeated this theme: The Soviet invasion had prevented the establishment of "a pro-imperialist bridgehead of military aggression on the southern borders of the USSR". Leonid Zamyatin, the Central Committee spokesman, expressed a similar sentiment in slightly more abstract phrasing in an off-the-record briefing in New Delhi in December 1980, explaining that Afghanistan might have developed into "... a state that would be hostile to us, that would endanger our security — a state not thousands of miles away from us but that is right on our doorstep. Herein lies the crux of the matter" (81).

Several months after the invasion, Alexander Bovin, the political commentator of the Government paper Izvestia, offered an even bolder justification for the Soviet decision.

> The revolution was in a crisis. Amin manoeuvered, assuring Moscow of his friendly feelings towards the Soviet Union and demanding that the latter bring in troops to Afghanistan, while trying to establish contacts with the rebels, and ensure American support...
>
> The point is that the developments forced us to make a choice: we had either to bring in troops or let the Afghan revolution be defeated and the country turned into a kind of Shah's Iran. We decided to bring in troops...
>
> We knew that the victory of counter-revolution would pave the way for massive American military presence in a country which borders on the Soviet Union and that this was a challenge to our country's security. We knew that the decision to bring in troops would not be popular in the modern world, even if it was absolutely legal. But we also knew that we would have ceased to be a great power if we refrained from carrying the burden of taking unpopular but necessary decisions, extraordinary decisions prompted by extra-ordinary circumstances (82).

We can also quote three additional statements made by Soviet spokesmen in "off-the-record" circumstances that are even still more revealing. Bovin, whose published remarks are quoted above, commented in a private conversation in March 1983 in Stockholm at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, that the USSR had to invade — that is "... go in (to)... Afghanistan, things were getting out of hand, the Afghan government was losing control and the USSR faced an uncertain future with a neighboring country. It would all take time. The USSR had not pacified Central Asia until 1934. It was not only the 'bandits' (the armed opposition) in Afghanistan, it was also the people... but they will learn. It will take time." Bovin added that the USSR was "fighting the Americans" and everyone in between had to understand it; it was just unfortunate. Similarly, a Soviet official commenting to a Newsweek reporter in 1984 on the

animosity of the Afghan population to the Soviet occupation troops, remarked that "Time changes everything. In another ten or twenty years, the new generations of Afghans will view our presence differently" (83). Finally, Henryk Trofimenko, an important senior member of the USSR's Canada-America Institute, was quoted as arguing that, at least in part the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan "was a logical response to the US and Chinese encirclement of the USSR".

The suggestion that is implicit in Brezhnev's remarks and the Central Committee resolution, and explicit in Bovin's claim that "a massive American military presence" might have developed in Afghanistan without the Soviet invasion, is difficult to take seriously. There has been "massive" American military presence throughout the entire post-war period in Turkey and in Japan, both bordering directly on the USSR, and there was also a sizable US presence in Iran in the 1960s and 1970s. For the last twenty years, these US forces may have been an irritant to the USSR, but they were not "a challenge to /USSR/ security" in the sense that they posed a direct threat. For a variety of reasons — some based on estimates of the probable behavior of the United States, some on the Soviet Union, and some on Afghanistan — it is extremely unlikely that a US presence in Afghanistan would have developed under any conceivable circumstances to any greater degree than it exists in Pakistan or India (in both of which it is non-existent).

One of the most significant aspects of the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan in 1979 — as well as the decision to support the prior Marxist coup in 1978 — is precisely the indication of willingness to exchange a neutral independent buffer state for a highly unstable and bitterly hostile vassal under military occupation. If one calculates that the large-scale United States intervention in Indochina began in 1963 or 1964 and ended in 1975, the United States was occupied in a full-scale war in that theatre for eleven or twelve years. The USSR has now been involved on a somewhat smaller scale in Afghanistan for over five years. It is clear that the USSR is using many of the same techniques as the United States used in Vietnam, at lower rates of munition expenditures. A report published in 1984 recorded indiscriminate bombings, reprisals against villages and villagers, summary executions, the mining of inhabited areas and homes, the planting of grenades on corpses, destructing of agriculture, theft of civilian property, desecration of mosques, killing prisoners of war, wreckage of hospitals, assaults on journalists, training

children as spies, and the destruction of food production in opposition-held areas (84). All of these are violations of various Geneva conventions which the USSR has signed. There has apparently already been more than one "My Lai". Despite the forcible internment of rural population fleeing areas which are being bombed by the USSR, to prevent their migration within or outside the country, about 25 to 30 percent of the Afghan population — some four million people — have escaped to Pakistan (85). Soviet military forces apparently use the practice of "free-fire zones" similar to that followed by the United States in South Vietnam. A report prepared by the United Nations Human Rights Commission repeated many of these charges. The report referred to reprisals, indiscriminate bombardment, non-respect for hospital zones, maltreatment of prisoners, the use of torture and the destruction of the irrigation system in the southern region of Kandahar (86). By 1982 the United States, China, Egypt and Saudi Arabia were contributing light infantry weapons to the Afghan resistance (87), while defecting Afghan intelligence officers have reported participation of Cuban, Vietnamese, Bulgarian, Czechoslovakian, and GDR military personnel together with the Soviet forces (88).

The domestic pressures that helped force the United States out of Indochina do not exist in the USSR in regard to Afghanistan. The Soviet press portrays the Soviet forces in Afghanistan as fighting "American inspired aggression" (89). Similarly, international pressure on the USSR regarding its war is also far less significant. Since the Soviet Union and the Afghan government do not permit the press coverage of the war in Afghanistan that the international press could produce in Indochina, the international opposition to a similar war against virtually a total population is proportionately muted.

FRANCE

Much French overseas military intervention in the post-WWII period has been an outgrowth of the decolonization of former French territories. There are two surveys of French engagements in Africa, one in the French annual Arès (1),and the second in Africa Contemporary Record, (which appear virtually annually (2). There have also been a sizable number of excellent reviews of French intervention policies in Africa published in recent years (3). Table 22 presents a list of seventeen cases of the use of military force by France between 1957 and 1979 compiled by Catherine Kelleher (4). One would now have to add at least four more: French involvement in Chad from 1979 to the present, French paratroop support for the coup against Bokassa in the Central African Republic in 1979, French military deployments in support of the Tunisian government in January 1980 (following Libyan attempts at insurgency), and the French contribution to the Multinational Force in Lebanon, together with the United States and Italy in 1981 and 1985. (The French wars in Indochina from 1946 to 1954 and in Algeria are omitted since those took place when both areas were still French territories.) A second table, from Robin Luckham, lists ten "French Military Interventions in Black Africa" (5). France was also heavily involved in support of the attempted secession of the province of Biafra from Nigeria, which is not indicated in either Kelleher's or Luckham's lists.

France is the only Western nation to station military forces in Africa on a permanent basis, with troops located at five major facilities. France is second only to Cuba as a supplier of combat troops in Africa with almost 10,000 regular soldiers, apart from military advisers, stationed in Gabon, the Central African Republic, the Ivory Coast, Senegal, and Djibouti. There are French bases on two Indian Ocean islands still under French control — Réunion and Mayotte — and the French Air Force has Jaguar strike-aircraft stationed in Senegal and Gabon (6). More exact figures placing French military forces in Africa at 14,000 (and Cuban ones at 34-35,000) were given by Le Nouvel Observateur in May 1978, and approximately equal ones were released by the US Department of State at the same time (7). Luckham has described the evolution of these deployments and indicates about 30 percent fewer troops deployed in 1981-1982 than the figure quoted above.

> ... France has greatly reduced its direct military presence from over 60,000 troops in more than ninety garrisons in Black Africa and Madagascar in 1960 ... to over 23,000 in almost forty

Table 21. France: Use of Military Force, 1957–1979

Year	Country	Action
1960-64	Cameroon	Regime support
1961-63	Tunisia	Conflict over Bizerte Naval Base
1963	Brazil	Fishing dispute
1963	Congo Brazzaville	Regime support
1964	Gabon	Regime support
1965	Martinique	Civil crisis
1965-67	Chad	Regime support
1966-67	Somalia	Conflict over boundaries and insurgency in territory of Afars and Issas
1967	Guadaloupe	Civil unrest
1967	Central African Republic	Regime support
1968-78	Chad	Regime support
1973-78	Chad	Regime support
1976	Djibouti	Defense against Somali intervention
1977-79	Mauritania	Regime support, over Western Sahara
1977	Zaire (Shaba I)	Airlift of Moroccan troops for regime support
1978	Zaire (Shaba II)	Legion used for regime support
1978	Lebanon	Participation in UNFIL (UN force in Lebanon)

Note: Exclusively colonial conflicts with Algeria, Cameroons, Morocco, and Tunisia have been excluded.

Table from Catherine M. Kelleher, 1981 ( ).

Table 12: French Military Interventions[1] in Black Africa

Cameroun	1959-64	Counter-revolutionary war against UPC.
Senegal	1959-60 and 1962	Support for President Senghor during break-up of Mali Federation and attempted coup by Mamadou Dia.[2]
Congo	1960 and 1962	Suppression of riots.
Gabon	1960 and 1962	Suppression of riots.
	1964	Prevention of military coup against President Mba.
Chad	1960-63	Suppression of riots and minor uprisings.
	1968-75	Counter-revolutionary war against FROLINAT
	1977-80	Counter-revolutionary war against FROLINAT
Mauritania	1961	Suppression of riots.
	1977-78	Air support in counter-revolutionary operations against POLISARIO.
Niger	1973	Prevention of military mutiny/coup.
Djibouti	1976-77	Operations Lovada and Saphir against Somali irridentism.
Zaire	1977 and 1978	Suppression of Shaba rebellions.
Central African Republic	1979	French coup against Bokassa (Operation Barracuda).

Notes

1. This Table only lists the most overt and 'military' of the French interventions. There is room for dispute about what should or should not be included and about how to describe the French role in each case. Of course there is a whole range of situations in which France has intervened more covertly, or more or less openly condoned interventions by her own citizens: notably French participation in plots and attempted coups in Guinea (before relations were normalised); the co-operation between the SDECE and the CIA during the latter's attempts to destabilise the MPLA in Angola in 1975-76; the 'mercenary' invasion of Benin in 1977; France's aproval if not participation in the coup against a revolutionary government in the Comores in 1978; and her covert assistance to Hissan Habre between the with drawal from Chad in 1980 and the election of the Socialist government in 1981.
2. There is room for dispute about whether it is proper to talk about a French intervention during these events. The French presence, however, was clearly a factor, as was the fact that there were French officers in command of Senegelese military and gendarmerie units who were obliged to make choices about whom among the completing local authorities they should obey, presumably in accordance with instructions from Paris.

> garrisons in 1964, and finally down to about 6,700 troops in six countries in 1981. The greater part of this withdrawal took place by the late 1960s, the only major changes in the 1970s being France's twice accomplished retreat from Chad (1975 and 1980) and her ejection from Diego Suarez by Madagascar in 1975. During the first 15 years of independence, however, France kept the three bases that were of most strategic importance, namely Dakar, Fort-Lamy and Diego-Suarez. The loss of the two latter in the mid-1970s did mean that she had to re-group her forces, to Gabon and to the Central African Republic in Central Africa, and to Djibouti and Réunion in the Indian Ocean.
>
> The withdrawal of French troops from Africa and their replacement by intervention forces stationed in the metropolis was an integral part of the reorganisation of French defence begun in 1959 under General de Gaulle and continued by the successive governments of the Fifth Republic.
>
> ... This consolidation of the intervention forces was sharply accelerated during the septennat of President Giscard d'Estaing, being part of the reorganisation and strengthening of France's ground defence forces embarked on between 1974 and 1976 (8).

All of the Francophone states in Africa except Guinea maintain Military Assistance agreements with France. In addition, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Gabon, the Central African Republic, Djibouti, Togo, and Cameroun are protected by Defense Agreements with France. The conventions signed with Senegal and Cameroun oblige France to intervene with armed forces at the request of either government. As described by Luckham, the post-colonial

> ... defence arrangements were formalised in a series of Defence and Military Assistance Agreements negotiated for the most part in 1960 and 1961, some on a bilateral basis, others in the form of collective sub-regional defence agreements like that between France and the four countries of Central Africa. Not all the ex-colonies signed Defence Agreements. Others were later to withdraw, notably the Congo in 1972 and Mauritania and Madagascar in 1973. The denunciation of the agreements by the latter exposed other African governments to criticism for adhering to texts which so nakedly exposed their neo-colonial status; and there was a series of re-negotiations in the mid-1970s. Nevertheless the changes were mainly symbolic. At the same time the network was expanded, to bring in countries outside France's traditional sphere of influence, including Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi.
>
> The texts of the agreements vary from case to case; and in any event are a poor guide to actual behaviour. In some instances (like France's Defence Agreements with Cameroun and Togo) they are shrouded in official secrecy. France has intervened in application of existing accords. It has moved its troops in without such agreements or in advance of them as in Zaire. And it has intervened in spite of them as in Central Africa. To be sure, the accords have provided a tissue of legitimacy for French policy, but one which rough use has twisted beyond recognition: as in the case of the French coup against Bokassa (Operation Barracuda) in the Central African 'Empire' in 1979 which according to at least one official document the author has seen was carried out 'à la demande du Président Dacko!' (9).

A brief summary of French policies, provided in the following description written by two French researchers, also makes clear France's rather opportunistic policy responses in deciding whether to intervene or not.

> France replaced its traditional permanent overseas force with a less costly, more flexible corps — the forces d'intervention extérieures, created in 1963-1964. This force, composed of specialized and mobile troops stationed in the metropole, would be ready to intervene for the defence of the French Departements d'Outre Mer (DOM) and Territoires d'Outre Mer (TOM), as well as to respond to requests for military interventions from African countries linked by an accord de défence. In addition, a doctrine of couverture à distance was adopted. This meant that three "layers" of force — the national African armies (trained and equipped by France), the small French contingents still deployed in Africa (6,000 in late 1964), and the new forces d'intervention extérieures — would perform the tasks traditionally entrusted to French colonial troops.
>
> The history of military interventions during the early 1960s illustrates the change in France's defence policy in Africa. The period immediately following independence (1960-1964) was one of great instability (for the new and weak regimes) in sub-Saharan Africa and France was called repeatedly to intervene to protect the new states — more often from internal threats than from external ones. The French usually responded positively, both to preserve the viability of friendly regimes and to retain rights to intervene.
>
> In explaining France's role of protecting these new regimes — rather than defending the states from external aggression — the then Information Minister, Alain Peyrefitte, stated:
>
> "It is not possible that a few gunmen be left free to capture at any time any presidential palace, and it is precisely because such a menace was foreseen that the new African states have concluded with France agreements to protect themselves against such risk."
> (Le Monde, 28 Feb. 1964).
>
> According to Mr. Peyrefitte, between 1960 and 1964, French military forces intervened as follows:
>
> - in Cameroun in 1960 and 1961 to reestablish order;
> - in Congo-Brazzaville, in 1960 to end tribal warfare;
> - in Congo-Brazzaville and Gabon 1962, to reestablish order;
> - in Chad, "several" times between 1960 and 1963;
> - in Niger in 1963, to quell a military uprising against President Hamani Diori;
> - in Mauritania in 1961, to help the government control tribal agitation;
> - in Gabon in February 1964, to restore President M'Ba to power after he had been removed by a military coup.
>
> According to Mr. Peyrefitte, France declined to intervene in Togo in 1963 (following the assasination of President Olympio) because Togo did not have a mutual defense agreement with France at the time. Mr. Peyrefitte also stated that in Congo-Brazzaville in 1963, "our troops began to intervene but President Youlou having himself signed his resignation, our troops stopped the intervention."

In October, 1963, France also did not intervene in Dahomey because President Maga voluntarily gave up the presidency.

Mr. Peyrefitte's statements and the controversial Gabonese intervention of 1964 provoked a wave of protest in Africa and the non-aligned world. France consequently reduced the visibility and increased the selectivity of such military actions. From 1964 to 1974 their number decreased dramatically: in fact, during that time France conducted only two "overt" military interventions (in the Central African Republic in 1967, and in Chad, between 1968 and 1971) and one "covert" action (the shipment of French arms to Biafra in 1968).

....

It has to be pointed out, however, that Cameroon had no defence agreement with France but this did not prevent French troops from intervening in 1960 and 1961. Similarly, France has no defence agreements with Mauritania, Zaire and Chad: but again this was no obstacle to French military actions in these countries. Conversely, it is also significant to note that France voluntarily refrained from rescuing a threatened regime in several other cases: this was the case in particular with President Jamani Diori of Niger in 1974 — who incidentally had been saved once in 1963 — President Tombalbaye of Chad in 1975 and President Ould Daddh of Mauritania in 1978. In such cases, passivity is also a form of intervention, or as Jean Paul Sartre could say: "Ne pas agir, c'est encore agir" (10).

Whether military intervention can at times be justified is a question posed very sharply by several of the French examples, as they also are by the series of British military interventions in the East African military mutinies in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda in 1964. In the French cases the argument is made that French military intervention is (primarily) dependent on agreements freely made by the other states and that the intervention, when made, is at their request (11). French President Giscard was also no stranger to euphemism and did not like the word "intervention". He claimed that it was not part of French policy, which he redefined as "non-interference and solidarity". However, it is clear that this position includes an enormous gloss over particulars. As in many other kinds of international political behavior, criteria are rarely uniformly applied. Pragmatic desirability and legality were again sharply juxtaposed in the overthrow of Jean Bedel Bokassa in the Central African Republic in September of 1979. French troops were certainly not requested: They were instrumental in assuring the success of his removal as head of state, and they landed together with his successor (12).

Walter Schutze also writes regarding several of the larger-scale French engagements that

> ... Whether limited in time as in Shaba, or taking the form of rather open-ended commitments, as in Chad and the Western Sahara,

were due to French initiatives taken after all efforts to multi-lateralize them and gain open and unequivocal support from the (NATO and EEC) allies failed (13).

In the case of the interventions in Shaba on behalf of Zaire, France was able to obtain the collaboration of Belgium (paratroops), the United States (for airlift) and Morocco (for troops to replace the French forces). There was no formal defence agreement which obliged France to come to the aid of Zaire in 1977 and 1978, and it can be considered the first intervention outside France's "traditional sphere of influence".

The main topic of the Fifth French-African summit conference of twenty African states in May 1978 was the creation of a joint intervention force of African states with unspecified French support. An immediate result was the agreement of Morocco, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Egypt, Togo, Gabon, and the Central African Empire to send contingents to replace the French and Belgian forces in Zaire. (The Moroccan troops were the only ones of significant size.) However, the general idea collapsed. It was opposed by the OAU summit in July which insisted that such a joint force could only be established within the framework of the OAU. French efforts in the latter half of 1978 after the Mauritanian military coup and the withdrawal of Mauritania from the Western Sahara war for a resolution of the conflict between Mauritania, the Polisario and Algeria failed. Mediation efforts by the OAU also failed. Morocco opposed all of the mediation attempts.

The French Engagement in Chad: A Case of French-Libyan-Chadian Interaction

France' most protracted, costly — and unsuccessful — intervention, lasting from 1968 to the present, has been in Chad. The Chadian civil war is usually dated as beginning in 1965 and has thus lasted for twenty years. French forces did not take on a combat role until 1968 when President de Gaulle responded to a request for help from Chad's President Tombalbaye (14). In the years between 1960 and 1973, Chad received the largest amount — 30 percent — of all French military assistance to sub-Saharan Africa, and in 1974 Chad received three times as much French military assistance as any other African state in that region.

The history of the conflict in Chad displays four important elements:

- unremitting conflict for personal power among the leaders of the major Chadian factions;
- extensive multinational intervention, Libya being the most active

by far of the interventionary powers, without which it is unlikely that the conflict could have continued very long. The relationship between Libya as the donor of both arms and troops and the various recipient groups among the Chadian factions switched on more than one occasion, providing one of the most crass displays conceivable of manipulative intervention on record,

- the failure of the attempts at mediation under the auspices, successively, of the various intervening states or organizations,
- the failure of an OAU peacekeeping force. (This will be discussed in a separate section below.)

In August 1979, the eleven principal factions in Chad agreed to form a Gouvernement d'Union Nationale de Transition (GUNT) with Oueddi Goukouni as President. In the previous years

> French troops had stayed neutral in some clashes, served as advisors in others, and at times backed diverse factions in active combat ... France backed whoever appeared most likely to bring about stability on terms compatible with French interests (15).

The new Chadian government asked France to withdraw its forces and, between March 1979 and May 1980, France withdrew the 3,000 French personnel (2,500 military) it had had stationed in Chad. Fighting did not stop, however. The two major opposing forces were divided essentially into pro-Libyan and anti-Libyan factions. The former (at this point in time, GUNT) was armed and supplied by Libya. The forces of former Prime Minister and Defense Minister Hissène Habré continued fighting, operating from bases in Sudan with Egyptian and Sudanese support.

In June 1980, Goukouni signed a mutual defense pact with Libya. In November, Libyan military forces, including the Libyan "Islamic Legion", armored units, and logistic support from foreign mercenaries, invaded Chad and reached the capital, N'Djamena, in December (16). On December 13 — somewhat after the fact — French President Giscard d'Estaing issued a warning against any intervention in Chad by foreign troops. Qaddafi disregarded the "warning", and the USSR in turn warned France not to intervene. Soviet and East German technicians entered Chad with Libyan forces in January 1981 to maintain major equipment, and Cuban and East German advisors apparently took part in combat with Libyan forces on the Chadian-Sudanese border.

On January 6, 1981, it was announced in the Libyan capital that Libya and Chad had decided on a merger of the two countries. The announcement came at the end of a four-day visit by Goukouni to Tripoli. Libya and Chad would work towards "complete unity between the two countries, a unity of the masses... ". French troops would never again be authorized to enter Chad and the Chadian army would be reconstructed by Libya. Libya's military presence in Chad was to counter an alleged threat of invasion from France and Sudan (17). On March 2, Qaddafi added that Chad needed protection from the Central African Republic, that is, from the French forces there, and he referred to Chad as a "vital space" and "strategic glacis" for Libya's future (18). The Qaddafi-Goukouni communiqué also demanded the withdrawal of all French forces from Africa, and Qaddafi added that Libyan forces would stay in Chad until French forces had left Central Africa (19).

In this case, there was no request for French assistance, and the nominally legitimate government of Chad had asked for Libyan assistance within the framework of a mutual defense pact. France had previously been asked to leave, and no one had invited it back. Giscard d'Estaing stated that a French intervention in these circumstances was inconceivable.

> When we have intervened in a country ... that has always been at the request of the government of the country, and in conditions such that France did not risk making herself condemned by either international or African organizations, and being put in a position of having to leave the country the following days ... Was France going to send troops in a country torn by a civil war and whose legitimate government would have opposed the entry of French forces, (and) would have contacted that very day or the next day the OAU and the Security Council? (20)

France reinforced its garrisons elsewhere in Africa in response to reports of as many as 10,000 Libyan troops in Chad, and Sudan airlifted some military forces to its borders with Libya and Chad (21). In the previous period of French-Libyan tension a year before, when Qaddafi had attempted to topple the Tunisian government, French ships had patrolled just outside Libyan territorial waters. Ironically, French arms sales to Libya continued during Libya's invasion of Chad.

Up to this point, most African governments had ignored the Libyan military presence in Chad because the Libyan forces were fighting on behalf of the coalition recognized by the OAU. Nigeria now played a major role in encouraging the OAU to prepare an OAU peacekeeping force to allow Goukouni to maintain control of Chad and simultaneously to

permit the withdrawal of Libyan forces. (This effort is discussed in further detail in another section later in this study.) France approved of these proposals and Goukouni decided to accept them as well. As a result, Goukouni rapidly lost favor in Libya, and he rejected the mergers suggested by Libya after January 1981 and again in September 1981. Goukouni proposed instead that France train and equip a new Chadian army which might ultimately replace the Libyans. The new Mitterrand government in France refused to consider such a proposal as long as Libyan forces remained in Chad. The Mitterrand government implemented the plans to increase the size of French interventionary forces, which had been planned under the previous government. Their name was, however, changed from Forces d'Intervention Extérieure to Forces d'Assistance Rapide.

In September-October 1981, Libya reportedly carried out 25 air raids against Sudanese border villages and camps of Habré's Chadian forces on the Sudanese side of the Libya-Sudan frontier (22). The Libyan Foreign Minister announced that Libya had the right to attack "any camp of terrorism that threatens our safety and security because the principle of self-defense is something important" (23). Sudanese President Nimieri announced to the OAU that Sudan would be forced to take defensive counter-measures to combat Libyan aggression against Sudan. In late October 1981, Qaddafi's chief aide traveled to the Chadian capital and accused France of "interfering in Chadian affairs" by attempting to impose a peacekeeping force on Chad. Immediately after his departure, on October 31, Goukouni as head of the GUNT requested the withdrawal of all Libyan forces from Chad by December 31. He apparently assumed that the OAU forces would perform the same function of opposing the FAN military forces, which it however would not consider doing. As it was also impossible for Qaddafi to become the next OAU chairman if he would not withdraw from Chad as the OAU force entered, Qaddafi not only complied with the request but almost all of the Libyan troops were withdrawn within two weeks, before OAU forces were even in place. The exception was those forces deployed in the northern Aouzou strip which Libya claimed and occupied. In addition, the Libyan troops left behind large caches of arms and other supplies in the areas directly opposite Habré's FAN forces while they withdraw their equipment with them from their positions in Southern and Western Chad. The purpose of these two moves by Qaddafi was clearly to permit the revival of the civil war, and in this tactic Qaddafi succeeded eminently.

The OAU peacekeeping force did not intervene in the fighting and by June 1982 Habré had occupied virtually all of Chad, including the capital city of N'Djamena. He requested that the OAU force remain in Chad although it was to be withdrawn by June 1982 according to a plan announced by the OAU in February 1982. He also requested Libya to leave the Aouzou strip and to return it to Chad. Goukouni had travelled to Tripoli at the end of May 1982 but his request for a new Libyan intervention was rejected: Libya's Foreign Minister stated that "In conformity with its policy of neutrality .. /Libya/ commits itself not to intervene in Chad's internal conflicts and therefore will not send troops there" (24).

The "commitment" did not last long. In June 1983, large Libyan Army forces again entered Chad and spearheaded the return of Chadian troops loyal to former President Goukouni. In July, the Libyan Air Force carried out heavy bombing raids in Chad to stop the counter-offensive of Habré's government forces. Only a bombing attack on airfields inside Libya could have prevented the fall of Faya-Largeau, but the French government rejected suggestions that it undertake such an action. The Libyan-Chadian forces quickly occupied the northern portion of the country. The Mitterrand government at first expressed itself doubtful of "demonstrable evidence of Libyan intervention", but was eventually forced to intervene itself. France now became the protector of the Habré government and airlifted forces which effectively blocked the Libyan advance (25). The French troops did not initiate combat with the Libyan forces; they simply took up positions along a line crossing Chad from East to West which required the Libyan forces to attack them in order to advance any further south toward N'Djamena. French Jaguar aircraft were also introduced with the French forces to deter any further Libyan bombing attacks. With the military situation frozen, after some months France and Libya signed an agreement in Tripoli for a mutual withdrawal of forces. Toward the end of 1984, the French Foreign Minister announced that "the Libyan withdrawal had been completed" (26). However, it quickly became known that this was not the case; not altogether surprisingly, Qaddafi had not withdrawn his forces when the French withdrew theirs.

GREAT BRITAIN

Early in 1971 Lord Carrington, then the British Minister of Defence, stated that there had been "... 45 engagements of British Forces between 1945 and 1959" (1). It is not clear why Lord Carrington should have stopped his estimate at 1959, some eleven years before his statement, and the list of these "engagements" remains unobtainable. The deployment of British military forces overseas was constantly reduced in the 1960s and 1970s and narrowed considerably in geographic scope. It is therefore very likely that there have been substantially fewer instances of the use of British military forces overseas since 1959 than there were before. Writing in 1980, Kelleher presented a list of 28 instances of British use of military forces between 1957 and 1979 (2). (See table 24). Only five of these took place before 1960, leaving 23 for the period 1960-1979. Two years later, Tillema and Van Wingen reported 36 British military interventions between 1946 and 1980 (3). These included events in Britain's own colonies before they achieved independence, many of which Kelleher had omitted, and the criteria for inclusion of events in the two lists is clearly different in other aspects as well. Tillema and Van Wingen listed thirteen events taking place before 1957 and eighteen events as taking place before 1960. Combining the sums given by Carrington and by Kelleher would indicate a minimum of 68 occasions in which British military forces were used between 1945 and 1979. There is no way of knowing, however, whether Carrington's and Kelleher's criteria for including events are at all equivalent.

A recently published study of British overseas military intervention in post-WWII years unfortunately does not provide an overall list of the instances of use of British military forces overseas (4). It does, however, provide a more detailed examination of seven instances in which the UK intervened with its military forces and two cases in which it decided not to do so:

Suez, 1956
Oman, July 1957
Jordan, July 1958
Kuwait, June/July 1961
Cyprus, December 1963
East Africa, January 1964
Malaysia, 1963-1966

The two examples of British non-intervention are the Rhodesian rebellion (UDI) of 1965 and the Cyprus crisis of 1974. Wylie makes a point of the

Table 24. Great Britain: Use of Military Force, 1957-1979

Year	Country	Action
1957-59	Cyprus	Control of civil crisis
1958	Libya	Stabilization of regime
1958	Jordan	Stabilization of regime
1958	Lebanon	Stabilization of regime
1958	Iceland	Conflict over fishing rights
1960	Congo	Intervention in civil crisis
1961	Kuwait	Defense against Iraq
1961-63	British Guiana	Border dispute with Surinam and Venezuela, civil unrest
1962	Brunei	Control of civil crisis, Indonesian assault
1962	Aden	Defense against Egyptian Invasion
1963-67	Malaysia	Indonesian confrontation
1963-66	Bahamas	Defense against Cuban subversion
1963	Swaziland	Civil unrest
1963-67	Cyprus	Civil crisis, U. N. Force support
1964	Kenya Uganda Tanganyka Zanzibar Zambia	Quelling of civil unrest and East African mutinies
1964-65	British Guiana	Civil insurgency
1964-67	Aden	South Yemen independence conflict with Egypt and insurgents
1966	Rhodesia	Beira channel patrol
1966	Mauritius	Civil insurgency
1969	Anguilla	Constitutional crisis
1972	Guatemale	Defense of British Honduras
1972-73	Iceland	Cod War I
1974	Cyprus	Greek-Turkish crisis
1975	Guatemale	Defense of Belize
1975-76	Iceland	Cod War II
1976	Argentina	Falkland Islands dispute
1977	Guatemale	Defense of Belize
1977	Bermuda	Response to civil unrest

N. B. Obvious colonial conflicts omitted.

Table from Catherine M. Kelleher, 1980

Table 25. Military Interventions by Great Britain, 1945-1980

Target	Date	Intervenor	Description	Independent State	Legal (UN Charter)	Military Commitments
Burma	6/07/46	Britain	Suppress guerilla insurgency	no	yes	yes
Federation of Malaya	6/16/48	Britain	Counterinsurgency measures	no	yes	yes
Eritrea	1/03/50	Britain	Antiterrorist action	no	yes	yes
South Korea	6/28/50	Britain	Korean War	yes	yes	no
North Korea	7/06/50	Britain	Korean War	yes	yes	no
Suez Canal Zone	10/18/51	Britain	Suppress riots	no	yes	yes
Kenya	10/20/52	Britain	Antiterrorist action	no	yes	yes
Suez Canal Zone	5/15/53	Britain	Suppress riots	no	yes	yes
British Guina	10/06/53	Britain	Deter alleged planned coup	no	yes	yes
Aden	6/16/55	Britain	Counterinsurgency action	no	yes	yes
Cyprus	9/10/55	Britain	Resist "Enosis" movement	no	yes	yes
Singapore	10/27/56	Britain	Suppress riots	no	yes	yes
Egypt	10/31/56	Britain	Seize Suez Canal	yes	no	no
Muscat, Oman	7/23/57	Britain	Counterinsurgency action	yes	no	yes
Bahama Islands	1/15/58	Britain	Deter alleged threat of violence	no	yes	yes
Malta	4/16/58	Britain	Following riots and government dispute	no	yes	yes
Yemen	5/07/58	Britain	Attack on Yemeni barracks	yes	no	no
Muscat,Oman	11/02/58	Britain	Counterinsurgency action	yes	no	yes
Zanzibar	6/03/61	Britain	Suppress riots during election	no	yes	yes
British Guiana	2/17/62	Britain	Suppress riots	no	yes	yes
Aden	9/25/62	Britain	Counterinsurgency action	no	yes	yes
Brunei	12/10/62	Britain	"-	no	yes	yes
Sarawak	4/19/63	Britain	"-	no	yes	yes
British Guiana	5/10/63	Britain	After riots and general strike	no	yes	yes
Swaziland	6/14/63	Britain	Suppress riots and general strike	no	yes	yes
Yemen	8/03/63	Britain	Attack after alleged actions in Aden	yes	no	no
Cyprus	12/17/63	Britain	Renewed civil war	yes	yes	yes
Kenya	1/25/64	Britain	Suppress military mutiny	yes	yes	yes
Tanganyika	1/25/64	Britain	"-	yes	yes	yes
Uganda	1/25/64	Britain	"-	yes	yes	yes
British Guiana	5/25/64	Britain	Suppress racial violence	no	yes	yes
Mauritius	5/14/65	Britain	Suppress riots	no	yes	yes
Hong Kong	6/30/67	Britain	Following riots	no	yes	yes
Mauritius	1/25/68	Britain	Suppress racial violence	no	yes	yes
Bermuda	4/29/68	Britain	Suppress riots	no	yes	yes
Leeward Islands	3/19/69	Britain	Suppress Anguillan coup	no	yes	yes

British concern after Suez to obtain formal invitations when it intervened.

- On July 17, 1958, 1,500 British troops supported by aircraft arrived in Jordan at the invitation of King Hussein to deter any anti-monarchist revolt which was feared after the coup earlier in July in Iraq by pro-Moscow officers.
- Upon the cessation of the Anglo-Kuwait Treaty in 1961, Iraq began to threaten the integrity of Kuwait and laid claim to Kuwait as a long-lost but integral part of Iraq. On 30 June, Sheikh Abdullah of Kuwait formally requested British assistance. The British feared not only invasion from Iraq but internal subversion and a coup d'état, perhaps on the Egyptian and Iraqi models. With the full support of the Cabinet, Prime Minister Macmillan decided to intervene. Within the first two weeks of July, 6,000 British troops, with stores and equipment, arrived in Kuwait, mostly by air. Two squadrons of Hunter aircraft and some Canberra bombers arrived as well.
- In January 1964, mutinies took place in the armed forces of the three newly independent former British colonies, Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. In Uganda, Prime Minister Obote called the British High Commission to make an official request "for the intervention of British troops to secure Entebbe airfield, to safeguard vital installations in Entebbe and Kampala and to assist the Ugandan Government to preserve peace." After asking for the request in writing, a British battalion arrived and disarmed the mutineers. Only a small portion of the new Kenyan Army mutineed, and Jomo Kenyatta called on British troops present in Kenya for assistance. In Tanzania, Nyerere also requested British assistance, reportedly after requesting help of Sweden, which said that it could not supply such assistance (5).

On July 15, 1974, the Greek Cypriot National Guard led by Greek officers, overthrew President Makarios in Cyprus.

> Makarios escaped the attempts to assassinate him, was rescued from the Paphos area by a British helicopter and taken to the British military base at Episkopi, and thence to London to request British intervention.
>
> However, despite a plea from a legitimate Commonwealth government which Britain continued to recognise, despite legitimisation of any British military intervention by Article IV of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee to which Britain was a co-signatory, despite the presence of British forces at the heart of the crisis, despite near certain international public approval, despite the attraction of interposing a third party between two hostile NATO allies, Britain declined to intervene ...

> Two opportunities for intervention presented themselves: the first, immediately after the Makarios government was overthrown and the second when, in the face of British inactivity and the rejection of a Turkish proposal made in London by the Turkish prime minister, Bulent Ecevit, of joint Turkish-British intervention to safeguard the sovereignty of Cyprus and keep the peace, Turkey intervened alone (6).

In 1964, last-minute pressure by US President Lyndon Johnson had warded off an earlier presumptive Turkish invasion of Cyprus. In 1974, British Foreign Secretary Callaghan strongly advised against British intervention, and Prime Minister Wilson concurred. The British government was strongly criticized by a House of Commons Select Committee Report for not intervening with military force. The convoluted arguments about legal niceties and differing British and Turkish aims which Wylie claims made a joint intervention impossible are completely unconvincing. It would appear that Whitehall was "Appalled at the prospect of needless British deaths in the face of Turkish tanks ...", yet a Turkish attack on British forces must be considered an extremely unlikely eventuality, and a joint interventionary force that might quickly have been converted to a larger United Nations force would have been the only possible route to a rapid Turkish withdrawal.

Fighting in the Dhofar province of Oman in 1973-1975, British officers and men were seconded to the government's forces and collaborated with a small Jordanian contingent and an Iranian brigade of 3,500 men. What the British government considered an unacceptable engagement in Cyprus — certainly a much more complicated political situation — it found acceptable in Oman where the political "goods" and "bads" were much simpler and further removed from Central European politics. The assignment of British military personnel to the Omani armed forces in specialist capacities has continued since then. About 1,000 British military personnel serve on contract or have been sent on special assignment to Oman in 1984-85.

In 1951, Muhammed Mossadegh became Prime Minister of Iran. He had campaigned on a single issue: the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). The general manager of the AIOC appealed to the British cabinet for British intervention. The Foreign Secretary in the Atlee Labour government, Herbert Morrison, requested the Joint Planning staff of the Ministry of Defence to prepare military options. Morrison and the Minister of Defence, Emmanuel Shinwell, strongly advocated military intervention (8). Prime Minister Atlee, however, did not, and neither did US President Truman, who sent Ambassador Averill Harriman to Iran as an

intermediary. The Churchill government which returned to office in October 1951 decided to topple Mossadegh and initiated covert operations to prepare a coup d'état. When the Iranian government broke relations with the British government in October 1952 as a result of learning of the activities, the operation and its agents were inherited from the British by US intelligence agencies, with the approval of President Eisenhower and US Secretary of State Dulles. The responsibility of British intelligence agencies (M-16) for various coups in Middle Eastern states, Iraq for example, in the early 1950s is a topic virtually untouched by researchers. Britain has also been implicated in Idi Amin's coup against the government of Milton Obote in Uganda.

In recommending military action in Iran to prevent nationalization of the AIOC, British Defence Minister Shinwell offered the supporting argument that in the absence of British action "... Egypt and other Middle East countries would be encouraged to think that they could try things on; the next thing might be an attempt to nationalize the Suez Canal" (9). In 1956, Nasser did just that, and British Prime Minister Anthony Eden took the action that Clement Atlee had rejected for Iran. Eden was determined, however, to attempt to find a way to topple Nasser even before the nationalization of the Canal. This is made clear by Eden's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Nutting, who strongly opposed the Suez invasion. Nutting subsequently wrote a book which provides a superb example of the power of a head of state — even in a Western democracy — to initiate a war in secret and against the advice of important portions of the few concerned sectors of the government whose responsibilities were affected by the decision (10).

Eden entered into the Israeli-French invasion plans enthusiastically despite Britain's signature of the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950 — of which France was also a signatory as well as the United States. The signatories of the Declaration were obligated to resist any attack across the armistice borders of Israel and the Arab world.

> The three Governments take this opportunity of declaring their deep interest in and their desire to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the area, and their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of the States in that area. The three Governments, should they find that any of these States was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violations (11).

Earlier in 1956, British troops had ejected Saudi Arabian forces from the disputed Buraimi Oasis on the border between Saudi Arabia and the British-protected Sultanate of Muscat and Oman (12). In addition, Britain convinced Iraq to send troops to Jordan in 1955-56 after Israeli attacks on Jordan to forestall Saudi-Egyptian suggestions that Jordan accept Egyptian military protection (13).

British forces that remain stationed in the third world are quite limited. By 1980, Britain maintained a presence outside the NATO area only in Brunei, a British protectorate in Borneo in the Malay Archipelago, in Hong Kong, and a small unit in Belize. (The large British base on Cyprus is considered within the NATO area.) None of these military deployments are in adequate depth or sufficiently supported to be considered available for major intervention operations without considerable reinforcement from home-based British forces or from other countries. After the Falklands War with Argentina, the British forces on the Falklands were substantially increased.

"SURROGATE WAR"

The practice in which one of the superpowers uses the ground troops of an ally in combat but supplies the weapons, logistics and often specialists and senior commanders is also often referred to as "war by proxy". In a sense, the practice was developed rather soon after World War II by the USSR, though its first examples are not as refined as those that have become widespread in the 1970s and 1980s. The Chinese described their role in Korea essentially as surrogates for the USSR: "We ourselves preferred to shoulder the heavy sacrifices necessary and stood in the first line of defense of the Socialist Camp so that the Soviet Union might stay in the second line" (1).

Even earlier, in 1948 and 1949, the USSR had begun a pattern of using Czechoslovakia as a nominal source of arms transfer agreements which were actually negotiated and agreed upon between itself and the recipient country. These were to Israel and Syria in 1948 and 1949, Guatemala in 1954, Egypt in 1955, and to Indonesia in 1956-1958 (2). It is clear that all of these agreements were arranged by the USSR. The purpose of using another nation as if it were the one responsible for a particular activity was the same here as it would be later in the combat operations of the 1970s and 1980s, to reduce the likelihood of response by Western nations, above all the United States, and later in combat to remove or reduce the possibility of direct engagements between military forces of the US and the USSR (3).

In a short historical study of surrogate war, Philip Towle includes discussion of the supply of arms during a conflict.

> ... while the provision of armaments and military advisers has made it easier for the Great Powers to distance themselves from some types of limited war, the development of permanent military alliances and of military bases in allied territories has made it much more likely that the Great Powers would be involved if their allies came under attack. We become so rapidly accustomed to contemporary norms of international behaviour that we often forget the historical incidents which gave rise to them. No one finds it very surprising that the Russians and Americans supply all kinds of armaments to the Arabs and Israelis whilst the Middle Eastern countries are actually at war, and Europeans have become so accustomed to the presence of foreign military bases on their territory that few consider asking for their removal. Yet, until the Second World War, the legality of supplying certain types of armaments to belligerents was still sometimes questioned and it was frequently argued that such sales would almost automatically involve the supplier in the conflict (4).

Though it has seemed meaningful to me to include arms transfer as a form of "military intervention" — in contrast to nearly all other authors — the fact that this practice is now so widespread would seem to make its inclusion no longer useful for consideration as part of the phenomenon of "surrogate war", even in several major cases. The United States had supplied France with a very large share of its costs and weapons during the 1948 to 1954 portion of the French war in Indochina. However, this was clearly a war initiated by France in its own interest. The USSR similarly supplied North Korea with weapons throughout the Korean war which began in 1950, though the Soviet role in the decision to initiate the war is ambiguous. The United States sought and gained the participation of some of its Pacific allies in its war in Indochina; ground forces from South Korea, Thailand, Australia, the Philippines and New Zealand all took part in the war. In this case, however, the United States was directly engaged with hundreds of thousands of its own troops in combat and sought the involvement of its allies more as a form of international justification for its military intervention than as a substitute for the use of its own forces. (Some 40,000 Chinese troops also served in North Vietnam, as did smaller numbers of Soviet specialists during the US-Vietnam war.)

In a brief but extremely informative paper, Bar-Siman-Tov also notes that "Arms supply can be a surrogate for direct superpower intervention in a local conflict", but then points out that

> According to this usage of the term, every local war without direct superpower intervention is a war by proxy if there is some relationship between the local adversaries and the superpowers. Such, for example, are the Arab-Israeli wars, or the Indo-Pakistani wars, which were defined as wars by proxy (5).

As he suggests, however, the wars mentioned have notably not been wars by proxy: They were unquestionably initiated by the local party for local reasons. Bar-Siman-Tov quotes a second definition of "proxy war" as

> ..."an international conflict between two foreign powers, fought out on the soil of a third country... using some or all [of] that country's manpower, resources, and territory as means for achieving preponderantly foreign goals and foreign strategies" (6).

He once again points out that following this usage, the Korean and Vietnam wars would be characterized as wars by proxy. Bar-Siman-Tov argues that the crucial question is "Who asks whom to act and for whom?"

Bar-Siman-Tov then discusses two cases in some detail: the Israeli-French-British invasion of Egypt in 1956 and the 1970 Syrian-Jordanian

crisis in which Israel and the United States were both directly involved. He notes that although "Israel had already decided to attack Egypt and was soon to do so in any event" and "France's supply of arms to Israel had been made with this possibility in mind", Israel's Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, accepted the role of "trigger proxy" to initiate the war

> ... only when France undertook to provide air cover for Israeli cities and the naval patrol of her coastline, and only when he was assured by a formal agreement that France and Britain would intervene with their own forces in the second stage of the war (7).
> ...
>
> In the Jordanian-Syrian crisis of September 1970, the United States preferred Israeli intervention to an intervention of its own for several reasons: (1) While the U.S. lacked the military option for such a contingency, Israel could assemble ground and air forces and move them into Jordan on short notice. (2) Whereas American intervention would escalate the conflict from the local to the global arena, thereby increasing the risk of confrontation between the superpowers, Israeli intervention, while it would also increase the chance of a major conflict, could be more easily restricted to local actors and controlled by the U.S.; therefore the U.S. had little choice if it intended to save the Jordanian regime. (3) Since Israel's agreement was almost certain in light of her own interests, the U.S. would sustain the minimal political cost....
>
> ... In the Jordanian-Syrian crisis of 1970, Israel and the U.S. tacitly agreed that Israel would act against the Syrian forces in Jordan, and the U.S. would deter any Soviet or Egyptian countermoves. Although Israel had demanded guarantees as a precondition for acting, she did not press for details on how America planned to carry out her commitments.
>
> ... The American commitment to Israel in 1970, for example, was advertised intentionally to provide an additional deterrent effect. Kissinger believed that open signs of American commitment would make the employing of Israel as a proxy more credible (8).

Bar-Siman-Tov's evidence leads directly to the question of alleged "rules of the game" regarding superpower behavior and interaction in foreign-military interventions. This topic will be discussed briefly in the section below.

One of the main purposes of this study is to emphasize the clear use of surrogate forces in more circumscribed roles and numbers. An early example involving the United States was the use of Taiwanese and Cuban exile pilots in very small numbers in various covert operations. It was a practice which spread rapidly to other nations. Egyptian and Soviet pilots flew combat missions in Yemen in the mid-1960s. In the Nigerian civil war Egyptian pilots flew missions in Egyptian aircraft on loan to Nigeria painted with Nigerian markings. They were later replaced by East

German and other East European pilots. Soviet pilots flew combat missions in the Sudan and in Iraq, and Cuban pilots in Yemen. North Korean and Soviet pilots flew over Egypt and North Vietnamese operated air-defense systems in Syria. Thus, the practice spread explosively. In October 1963, during a conflict between Algeria and Morocco, Cuba assumed the role that Czechoslovakia had played earlier — and continued to play — by delivering Soviet arms from Cuba to Algeria, at the same time as the UAR sent 1,000 combat troops to support Algeria. The first combat use of Cuban military forces took place in 1973-1974, though still in the role of specialist forces, when they served with tank units in Syria at the same time as North Vietnamese reportedly served in Syria and North Koreans in Egypt (9).

These last assignments of specialist surrogate forces were in all likelihood arranged by the USSR, and most certainly could not have taken place without the approval of the USSR. They are difficult to differentiate from "routine" military assistance, particularly because of the small number of personnel involved in each of the transactions. The most distinctive characteristic would be the actual roles carried out by the foreign military personnel, and this is uniformly kept under the greatest secrecy by both donor and recipient state. The last arrangements mentioned were made only several months after the signing of the Agreement Between the US and the USSR on the Prevention of Nuclear War, in June 1973, which stated:

> ... the Parties agree that they will act in such a manner as to prevent the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations, as to avoid military confrontations... The Parties agree to proceed from the premise that each Party will refrain from the threat or use of force against the other Party, against the allies of the other Party and against other countries in circumstances which may endanger international peace and security. The Parties agree that they will be guided by these considerations in the field of international relations (10).

It is an interesting question whether US disregard of the earlier Soviet arrangements during the Nixon-Kissinger administration contributed to the Soviet/Cuban decision to introduce large numbers of Cuban troops into Angola in the spring of 1975. Some of the first Cuban troops to arrive in Angola were flown from their previous combat service in Syria before the larger airlifts directly from Cuba began. The subsequent massive Cuban military interventions in Angola and Ethiopia and the use of Cuban forces in South Yemen and South Yemenese forces in Ethiopia have been widely described elsewhere. Here they are briefly discussed in other sections. There is

little doubt that the USSR was conscious of the issue of "surrogate war", without any prompting from the West. Early in 1975, the USSR accused the CIA of having stirred up the Kurdish revolt in Iraq in co-operation with Israel, strongly implying that the USSR was disturbed by the US attempt to undermine a Soviet client state through regional proxies (11).

The question is often raised whether the decision to introduce large-scale Cuban combat forces into the Angola, Ethiopian and other conflict situations in Africa has been a Cuban decision or a Soviet one. Cuba claims to have made the decision to intervene in Angola and Ethiopia independently of the USSR. The first relevant consideration is that it is uniformly accepted that the transfer of North Korean, North Vietnamese or East German contingents or specialists from other Warsaw Treaty Organization states has taken place as a result of Soviet government decisions, though the number of personnel involved is much smaller in these cases. Second, had the Cuban military presence also remained small and been solely composed of pilots or other specialists, it is not likely that anyone would have assumed anything other than that the decision was a Soviet one. It is precisely because large numbers of ground troops are involved that the question is raised. Finally, it seems unquestionable that even if the Cuban leadership had been so strongly interested in the use of its military forces in an expeditionary role as to be the first to raise the question with the USSR, the use of Cuban military forces would be impossible without concurrent Soviet support and approval:

- The USSR contributes the weapons and supplies used by the Cuban troops and, at least in some cases, the overall military command.
- The USSR often supplies the logistics for the movements of larger groups of Cuban troops and supplies.
- The USSR supplies Cuba with an economic subsidy enabling it to direct manpower to Africa and has even used small numbers of its own forces to take over particular operational military missions in Cuba in order to release trained Cuban military flight personnel for use in Africa.
- It is also extremely unlikely that the large-scale use of Cuban troops in Africa could have taken place without some sort of security assurance to Cuba on the part of the USSR in the event that American forces became engaged.

It would be impossible for Cuba to intervene without Soviet financing, weapons, and transport. William Hyland and Bar-Siman-Tov offer similar

assessments:

> ...(the) decision — to bring in Cuban troops... had to be a Soviet decision: such a risky undertaking, completely dependent on Soviet logistical support, could not be a Cuban initiative; nor is it likely that Havana could force Moscow's hand (12).

> ... without substantial military and economic help from the Soviet Union, Cuba could not have engendered or sustained this kind of military commitment in Angola and Ethiopia (13).

Table 26.

EXTRATERRITORIAL MILITARY FORCES IN AFRICA /by "Intervenor"/ as of 1981

Intervenor	Forces
France	Morocco (150), Mauritania (110), Senegal (650), Ivory Coast (420) Cameroon (60), Gabon (500), Algeria (80), Tunisia (85), Djibouti (3,700), C.A.R. (1,700), Niger (60), ZAIRE (100)
Soviet Union	Guinea-Bissau (600)*, Guinea (200) **, Benin (1,200)*, Equat.Guinea (100), Congo (220)**, Angola (850), Libya (3,000)* Ethiopia (2,000), Mozambique (550)* / * = includes East Europeans/ / ** = includes East Germans /
Cuba	Angola (18,000), Ethiopia (11-12,500)
Great Britain	Gambia (85), Ghana (150), Kenya (100), Zambia (60), Zimbabwe (380), Botwara (80)
U.S.A.	Liberia (200), Egypt (300), Sudan (70), Somalia (100)
East German	Guinea (see above under Soviet Union), Congo (see above also) Angola (1,000), Ethiopia (180).
Israel	South Africa (200)
Morocco	West Sahara (21,000), Equat. Guinea (120)
Egypt	Sudan (700)
Belgium	Zaire (350)
South Africa	Namibia &73.000), Malawi (100)
Senegal	Gambia (2,700)
Guinea-Bissau	Sierra Leone (2,000),
Libya	Chad (11,000)
Nigeria	Chad (900)
Tanzania	Uganda (1,000)
China	Zaire (120)
North Korea	Zimbabwe (200)

Source: The Economist, September 19, 1981, p. 58.

Table 27.

EXTRATERRITORIAL MILITARY FORCES IN AFRICA (as of 1981) By target state.

Morocco	150 French
West Sahara	21,000 Moroccans
Mauritania	110 French
Senegal	650 French
Gambia	2,700 Senegalese, 85 British
Guinea-Bissau	600 Russian and East European, 100 Moroccan
Guinea	200 Russian and E.German military adviser
Sierra Leone	2,000 Guinea-Bissau
Liberia	200 Americans
Ivory Coast	420 French
Ghana	150 British
Benin	1,200 Russians and East Europeans
Cameroon	60 French
Equat. Guinea	120 Moroccans, 100 Russians
Gabon	500 French
Congo	220 Russians and East Germans
Angola	18,000 Cubans, 850 Russian, 1,000 E.Germans
Namibia	73,000 South Africans
South Africa	200 Israeli
Algeria	80 French
Tunisia	85 French
Libya	3,000 Russians and East Europeans
Egypt	300 Americans
Sudan	700 Egyptians, 70 Americans
Ethiopia	1,000 - 12,000 Cubans, 2,000 Russian, 180 E.Germans
Djibouti	3,700 French, 2 squadrons of Mirage fighters
Somalia	100 Americans
C.A.R.	1,700 French
Niger	60 French
Chad	11,000 Libyans, 900 Nigerians
Uganda	1,000 Tanzanias.
Kenya	100 British
Zaire	120 Chinese, 100 French, 350 Belgians.
Zambia	60 British
Malawi	100 South Africans
Mozambique	550 Russians and East Europeans
Zimbabwe	200 North Korean, 380 British
Botswana	80 British
Madagascar	300 East Europeans.

Source: The Economist, September 19, 1981, p. 58.

Table 28. Foreign Military Technicians, Advisers, Troops Stationed Outside Europe, 1982 - 1983

Country	USA	FRANCE	UK	USSR	CUBA	GDR	Others
Middle East:							
Saudi Arabia	525						
Egypt	180						
Oman	some						
Iraq				450+	2,200		
Syria				7,000	210		
North Yemen				750			
South Yemen				750	800	325	
Libya				2,300	300	1,600	
Cyprus			some				
Lebanon							50,000 (Syria), 90,000 (Israel)
Iran				100-200			
Africa:							
Somalia	some						
Ethiopia				1,700	5,900		
Angola				700	25,000	450	
Algeria				8,500	170	250	
Mozambique				500	1,000	100	
Namibia							50,000 (South Africa)
Benin				1,200			
Congo-Brazzaville				850	950		
Guinea				350	280	125	
Guinea-Bissau				600			
Mali				630			
Madagascar				370			
Tanzania				300			
Ghana			150				
Zimbabwe			380				200 (North Korea), 100 (China)
Centr. African Rep.			950				
Chad		some					some (Libya)
Djibouti		3,500					
Gabun		500					
Ivory Coast		450					
Mauretania		110					
Senegal		600					
Zaire		100					100 (Belgium)
Uganda							1,000 (Tanzania)
Western Sahara							21,000 (Morocco)
Malawi							100 (South Africa)
Latin America:							
Cuba	2,250			7,400			
Puerto Rico	2,945						
Belize			some				
Panama	9,150						
Peru	175						
Falklands			5,000				
Nicaragua				100	2,000		
Antigua	125						
Asia:							
Diego Garcia	1,840						
Guam	8,680						
South Korea	37,560						
Philippines	15,050						
Japan	50,450						
Thailand	100						
Australia	750						
Afghanistan				120,000	100		
India				200			
Kambodia				300			150,000 (Vietnam)
Vietnam				2,500			
Brunei			some				
Hongkong			7,000				
Laos				500			40,000 (Vietnam)
Various Territories:							
Ascencion	2,200		some				
Mayotte		some					
Réunion		some					
Bermuda	some						

Table taken from Berends and Schmid, Soviet Military Interventions Since 1945, p. 154.

"RULES OF THE GAME"

The "rules of the game" is the phrase used by international relations analysts to denote alleged constraints on or formulations of behavior by the United States or the USSR during foreign military intervention or in overseas deployments, either in engagements in which they may be acting alone or in which their forces interact short of combat. The importance of the subject is obvious. It is these events that have led to the nuclear alerts and nuclear crises between the superpowers, and that promise to do so in the future. The "rules" are supposedly tacit understandings.

There are three explicit agreements that were signed during the SALT negotiations between the US and the USSR in 1972 and 1973 that are pertinent. The first of these was the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents at Sea signed in May 1972 (1). It marked a common US and Soviet interest to reduce the acute character of these events in the preceeding two years. They were occurring at the rate of three per week. Following the agreement, the rate was reduced to something less than one per week, but the problem has not been removed. The second was the Basic Principles of US-Soviet Relations, signed in May 1972, which was to represent "a charter for détente" (2). The third was the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, signed in June 1973 (3). These latter two were totally disregarded by both sides almost as soon as they were signed, the Arab-Israeli War in the Middle East in October 1973 being the case in point.

We will briefly review several of the major studies that have dealt with the subject of "rules of the game". By and large, the formulations that one finds appear highly abstract and unrealistic -- Procrustean beds into which events are squeezed or from which they are omitted. They rarely seem to reflect real behaviors and more rarely still -- or never -- actual policy formulations.

Raymond Cohen described "norms, or rules of the game" as "generalized formulations -- more or less explicit -- of expectations of proper action by differentiated units in relatively specific situations". He presented six categories of these in a continuum from legally binding written agreements to less explicit "purely tacit" agreements:

(1) legally binding agreements
(2) nonbinding written agreements
(3) gentlemen's agreements
(4) "the spirit of an agreement, the tacit dimension of a formal written accord"

(5) tacit understanding
(6) mutual self-limitation.

Of the last of these, Cohen wrote,

> ...we finally arrive at the other extreme: rules of the game that are articulated neither in writing nor in speech, are in no way binding on the parties, and are the product of a complete absence of communication even in the loosest sense of that concept. These are restraints, voluntarily undertaken by the parties concerned without consultation with each other, which happen to converge to create a symmetrical area of prohibited behavior. In fact, one may even question whether it is appropriate to talk of such rules as constituting an understanding at all. However, as both sides do fear that infringement of the constraint will have undesirable consequences, usually retaliation in kind, reciprocity does exist, and the constraint is explicit in the sense of being quite consciously maintained (4).

An immediate comment is that four of these refer to written agreements -- the few that there are have been disregarded or violated, that there do not appear to be any "tacit understandings" --the fifth category -- and that "mutual self-limitation", neither "tacit" nor a "rule", is just what has been absent except in detailed particulars or its grossest aspect, the use of nuclear weapons. Cohen also commented that

> It may be, therefore, that the only effective constraints on wartime action derive not from the existence of prior understanding or the effort, tacit or otherwise, to achieve agreement during the course of hostilities, but from the voluntary self-limitation of opponents deterred by the fear of net loss (5).

One cannot call this "tacit" or a "rule" of mutual interaction, and it is even difficult to credit it as a "restraint".

Cohen also quoted an earlier work by McWhinney who found "...seven tacit rules of the game as having emerged from the various confrontations of the cold war era":

(1) acceptance of the principle of bipolarity: "By this is meant the division of the world into superpower sphere of influence.... there had to be some kind of demarcation of the bounds..."
(2) mutual acceptance of bloc territorial integrity, and of non-intervention of each bloc in the affairs of the other
(3) renunciation of total (nuclear) war as an instrument of political change
(4) limitation of the membership of the nuclear "club" and restriction of the decision-making power as to use of nuclear weapons or as to recourse to nuclear war

(5) nuclear-age "due process": the duty to avoid surprise or sudden change in the interbloc balance-of-power relationships

(6) the principle of economy in the use of power

(7) the principle of mutual self restraint (6).

Here it can be said that three of these have clearly been violated (1, 6 and 7), two others at least partly so (2 and 5), and that it is impossible to consider nuclear war as having been "renounced". In addition, controls on nuclear proliferation have been far less than complete (4, and the second half of 4 repeats 3). One is left, at best, essentially with fractions of one or two of these "seven tacit rules".

In a longer study which followed the framework provided by Cohen, Matheson wrote:

> This paper asks what, if any, were the "rules of the game" of superpower military intervention in the Third World. The rules are based on explicit or tacit agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, or are inferred from patterns of mutual self-restraint. This continues the work of previous research by considering four cases: Angola (1975), Ethiopia (1977), Zaire (1977 and 1978), and Afghanistan (1979). The study covers international law, Soviet-American detente, the degree of one power's toleration of the other's interventions, spheres of influence, and the avoidance of direct superpower military confrontation. Rules did obtain in these cases, but based more on considerations of relative power than on shared conceptions of legitimacy.
>
> . . . . .
>
> The concept of "rules of the game" refers to generalized prescriptions for international actors which on the basis of mutual agreement, either explicit or tacit, or on the basis of mutual restraint without any agreement, hold between the parties concerned. The prescriptions concern expectations of proper action, involving both normative evaluation and prediction of such action. The actions may be of a broad range or of a relatively specific type as in this essay's concern with military intervention in the Third World.
>
> . . . . .
>
> These prescriptions are not said to constitute rules unless there is either agreement of some form about them by the parties involved or they all follow these rules without any such agreement on a reciprocal basis. Cohen has provided the most comprehensive analysis of the basis of the norms, and his classification will be employed.
>
> (i) International law may constitute a source of rules. Explicit rules are formulated either on the basis of custom or treaties. Customary law is binding on all states....
>
> (ii) Written accords resulting from negotiations which are not legally binding nevertheless create obligations between parties to them....

(iii) Gentlemen's agreements are simply verbal promises exchanged between the representatives of the actors concerned. Obligations to respect such promises thereby arise....

(iv) Parties to a written agreement, either legal or non-legal, may verbally or in a separate document reach a mutual understanding about it. This may involve merely a clarification of it or an extension or elaboration of the accord, so as to cover points which at its conclusion appeared to be obvious or had to be treated circumspectly.

(v) Parties may arrive at tacit understandings of the rules. These need not involve negotiation but may involve either verbal or non-verbal signalling. Tacit understandings usually involve the making of claims in such a manner and their subsequent recognition by not being challenged. There can however be problems with interpreting a relationship as marked by tacit consent: action consistent with this does not necessarily imply acceptance or knowledge of such an agreement, and similarly infringement of such a rule may reflect ignorance of it.

(vi) It may be impossible to speak of either a tacit or an explicit agreement in circumstances nevertheless marked by certain behaviour by the actors concerned. A pattern of action may arise from mutual self-restraint whereby the parties limit their actions in similar ways without even any signalling between them. Here it is also appropriate to speak of a rule, resting on reciprocity.

A rule does not obtain unless at least one of the above criteria are satisfied (7).

The first four of these describe explicit agreements. As indicated, two of the three that date from 1972-1973 can hardly be considered any longer in force and there are no other agreements between the US and the USSR that regulate behavior in this area. The fifth is tacit, but in reality more correctly approximates mutual threats and feints than "tacit understandings and agreements". The sixth is again dependent on a balance-of-threat behavior and is impossible to characterize as a "rule".

In another study published in 1972, Gowa and Wessell are much more circumspect. They note that at the signing of the 1972 Basic Principles of Relations, the USSR stated

> "The USA and the USSR attach major importance to preventing the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations. Therefore, they will do their utmost to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. They will always exercise restraint in their mutual relations, and will be

> prepared to negotiate and settle differences by peaceful means. Discussions and negotiations on outstanding issues will be conducted in a spirit of reciprocity, mutual accomodation, and mutual benefit.
> Both sides recognize that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with these objectives."

A year later in the Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War, the two parties slightly refined their commitment to mutual restraint but still left much room for interpretation:

> "the Parties agree that they will act in such a manner as to prevent the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations, as to avoid military confrontations, and as to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war between them and between either of the Parties and other countries.
> The Parties agree...to proceed from the premise that each Party will refrain from the threat or use of force against the other party, against the allies of the other Party and against other countries, in circumstances which may endanger international peace and security. The Parties agree that they will be guided by these considerations in the formulation of their foreign policies and in their actions in the field of international relations."

Such general language commits the signatories to virtually no significant substantive action. The accords, then, simultaneously failed to restrain the parties and opened the way for the allegations (which were inevitably difficult to substantiate) that their provisions had been violated.

. . . . .

To avoid the limitations and dangers inherent in highly general commitments to restraint, such as those in the 1972 Basic Principles of Relations, rather more specific measures are needed. For purposes of this study,the following broad categories of measures will be examined: (1) limits on conventional-arms transfers; (2) confidence-building measures, including limits on and advance notification of, military maneuvers and movements; (3) limits on naval deployments and facilities; and (4) mechanisms of joint political consultation(8).

Gowa and Wessell's suggestions again provide us with four categories to test against reality. There are no limits to conventional arms transfers. The only such post-WWII engagement, the Tripartite Agreement between France, the United States and Great Britain, which dealt with arms transfers to the Middle East, was broken by France by the sale of supersonic aircraft to Israel in 1955 and was never reinstated. There are no "confidence-building measures" in the area of US/USSR military interventions in the third world. There are no limits on naval deployments and facilities and no existing mechanisms for US/USSR consultation in

intervention crises. The few known instances of the use of the "hot line" -- intended for use in extreme crisis -- have to date notably been to transmit ultimata and implied threats as much as for "consultation". Gowa and Wessell also provided three case studies, one of which was Yugoslavia, and concluded that

> Yugoslavia, furthest from crisis of the areas studied, offers the most fertile ground for elaboration of restraints on external involvement....The Yugoslav case also suggests that, when a crisis is still only in the offing, the prior existence of multilateral mechanisms and established precedents makes for substantial opportunities to reach accord on ground rules (9).

If anything, this again emphasizes the absence of "mechanisms" and "ground rules" when intervention is in progress.

In a previously quoted study on alleged US "constraints" on its behavior in third-world conflicts (see page 18), Hosmer claimed that

> To limit and control the risks of direct or wider confrontations with the USSR and, in the case of the conflicts in Asia, to prevent or contain war with China, the United States has severely circumscribed its strategies to meet the major post-World War II communist challenges in Korea, Cuba, and Indochina.
> . . . . .
>
> In addition to severely constraining U.S. strategies in Third World conflicts and crises, U.S. fears about provoking a direct or wider military conflict with the USSR and/or China have produced other strikingly consistent U.S. behavior patterns. These include:
>
> - Minimizing challenges to Soviet prestige and avoiding damage to Soviet property and personnel
> - Eschewing military postures that might suggest a U.S. intention to embark on a wider war
> - Avoiding the risk of simultaneous conflicts with the USSR or its clients in different geographic areas
> - Conducting gradual and incremental military operations where Soviet interests have been involved
> - In confrontations with the USSR, adopting military options that would force the Soviets to fire first
> - Maintaining tight, central command and control over U.S. military operations to avoid unwanted escalation (10).

For the most part, these claims are fatuous and difficult to match with real events. Pffaf's remark about Vietnam, that US military forces "...had everything they asked for except unlimited mining and bombing of the North and the use of nuclear weapons", is more to the point (11).

In a study more carefully based on empirical data, James McConnell presents two frameworks for the use of force by the USSR in the third world. The first is a Classification of the Cases in the Soviet Third-

World Diplomacy of Force:

Case Divisions	Case Categories
I. Security on the High Seas	1. Demonstration of intent to protect USSR assets, or the assets of clients, at sea.
II. Third-World Domestic Security	2. Demonstration of support for the domestic authority of an established government.
	3. Demonstration against an established government in defense of Soviet citizens and property.
	4. Military support to a domestic faction during an interregnum when the U.S. is inhibited from counterinvolvement.
III. Third-World International Security	5. Demonstration of intent to protect a client in a confrontation with a state that, held in odium by the international community, does not enjoy U.S. patronage.
	6. Demonstration of support for a client threatened (or that might be threatened) by a Western great power or in actual conflict with such a power.
	7. Demonstration or actual intervention against a U.S. client that is defeating a Soviet client.

The second provides some examples of these various categories:

Protection of Assets at Sea

- Sealift of Moroccan troops to Syria (1973)
- Sealift of South Yemeni troops (1973)
- Sea- and air-lift from the USSR to Syria (1973)
- Angolan crisis deployment (1975)

Supporting the Domestic Authority of a Client

- Air support to Yemen (1967)
- Port visit to Somalia (1969)
- Extended Somali port visits (1970)
- Air support to Sudan (1970)
- Sierra Leone port visit (1971)
- West African Patrol (1971 and after)

Support of a Client Against an "Outlaw" State

- West Africa Patrol (1970-71)

Support of a Client Against Western Great Powers

- *Pueblo* incident (1968)
- EC-121 incident (1969)
- Jordanian crisis (1970)
- Indo-Pakistani crisis: two cases (1971)

- U.S. mining of Haiphong (1973)
- Bab-el-Mandeb blockade (1973)

Support of a Client Against a Western Client

- June War (1967)
- Combatants in Egyptian ports (1967-73)
- War of Attrition (1970)
- October War: three cases (1973)
- Port visit to Latakia, Syria (1974) (12).

Though both of these categorizations provide extremely useful information on the presumptive Soviet motivations for the use of its military forces, they do not help us to understand what the USSR chose to do or not to do during those events, or what the United States decided to do -- or not to do -- in response to particular of the events. McConnell makes the point that intervention and shows of force have represented a measure of national resolve for both superpowers and that each has been sensitive enought to this to avoid intervening alongside or against the other. But in fact exactly such simultaneous intervention has taken place on numerous occasions:

1957-1958, in the Turkish-Syrian crises
1960-1961, in the Berlin crisis (though this is not a "third world" example)
1962, in the Cuban missiles crisis
1970, in the Syrian-Jordanian crisis
1971, in the India-Pakistan war
1973, in the Israeli-Arab war

and in other instances. (able , page provides a list of instances in which both US and Soviet forces were involved.) In some cases, these interactions,particularly of fleets, were at extremely close quarters, involved nuclear-armed vessels and were quite intricate (13).

What decided in which instances this took place and what the limits to these interactions were? There are no answers to this question and it is impossible to assume that there are any "tacit" understandings or "rules" of behavior agreed to by the US or the USSR, concerning them (14). It also seems likely that each side's individual behavior in particular events is determined by the coincidences and circumstances of that event. On a level far removed from the specifics of the patterns of US-USSR naval interactions and the armament consigned to different ships and

their interactions, Katz noted that

> During the 1950s and the 1960s Soviet military thinkers frequently discussed American ideas about local war, but ceased doing this almost completely in the early 1970s. This can best be explained by the fact that the primary criticism Soviet military thinkers made about American limited war theory was that it assumed local conflict could be kept localised and would not escalate into world war. At that time, it was pointed out that such an assumption could well be false. However, when Soviet military thinkers themselves accepted the idea that local wars need not necessarily escalate into world war, the basis for criticising American limited war doctrine was removed (15).

An extremely rare example of a real "tacit understanding" can be provided, but it deals with Israel and Syria, not the US and the USSR.

> In April 1981 the Israelis shot down two Syrian helicopters over Mt. Lebanon after the Maronite Christian Phalangists convinced the Israeli government that a major Syrian attack under way on Mt. Sannin was jeopardizing the entire Christian minority in Lebanon. The Syrians responded by introducing ground-to-air missiles in Lebanon. They had hitherto refrained from such a move because of Israeli warnings that deployment in Lebanon would violate the tacit "red line" understanding reached between Israel and Syria through U.S. mediation in 1976. Although this understanding was never clearly defined in press reports or government statements, former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin disclosed in February 1983 that it included three elements: First, Syrian troops would not venture south of a "red line" extending from Sidon to Kfar Mishki near the Lebanese-Syrian border; second, Syria would not deploy ground-to-air missiles on Lebanese territory; and third, Syria would not conduct aerial attacks against targets in Lebanon (16).

The consequences of the introduction of the Syrian missiles into Lebanon and their interaction with US naval aircraft in 1984 -- at the same time as the Soviet Union reportedly took over command of Syria's air defense system after 1983 -- is however directly relevant to potential US-USSR interactions and is discussed in further detail in the section on arms transfer (see page).

TABLE 29

Operational Characteristics of Naval Incidents

INCIDENT	USN?	ACW?	AIRLIFT?	SEALIFT?	SNI?	PROXY?	NEW?
1967 June War	yes	no	yes	yes	no	no	yes*
	(*First rapid ship reinforcement in Med.)						
1967 Sov. ships in Egyptian ports	no	no	no	no	no	no	yes*
	(*First use of ships as escalation hostages)						
1968 Pueblo inc.	yes	AIR	no	no	no	no	yes*
	(*First air ACW exercising Badgers vs. US ships)						
1969 Ghanain inc.	no	no	no	no	no	no	yes*
	(*First Soviet deployment off West Africa)						
1969 EC-121 downed	yes	no	no	no	no	no	yes*
	(*First Bear/Badger reconnaisance in E. China Sea)						
69-70 Somali ptvsts	no	no	no	no	no	no	yes*
	(*First support for internally threatened regime)						
1970 Jordan crisis	yes	yes	no	no	no	no	yes*
	(*First formation of functional ACW groupings)						
since 1970 West Africa Patrol	no	no	no	no	yes	no	yes*
	(*First use of SNI to bolster a weak regime)						
1971 Indo-Pak war	yes	yes	no	no	no	no	yes*
	(*First attempt at preemptive Soviet deployment?)						
1972 Haiphong mining	yes	yes?	no	no	no	no	yes*
	(*SSGNs primary ACW force, but did not close)						
1973 Sealift of Moroccans	no	no	no	yes	yes	no(?)	yes*
	(*First use of Amphib ship for third country troops)						
1973 Sealift in S. Yemen	no	no	no	yes	yes	no(?)	yes*
	(*First sealift of insurgents vs. pro-West regime)						
1973 October War	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	no
1974 Latakia portvisit	no	no	no	no	no	no	no
1975-6 Angolan intervention	no	prep	yes	yes	yes	Cuban	yes*
	(*First large proxy intervention. Poss NGFS)						
1977-8 Ethiopian intervention	no	no	yes	yes	yes	Cuban	no
1979 Sino-Viet War	no	no	yes	yes	no	no	yes*
	(*First defense of ally vs. PRC)						
1979 Minsk transit	no	no	no	no	yes	no	yes*
	(*First Ivan Rogov demos. First exercises off S. Africa)						
1982-3 Seychelles portvisits	no	no	no	no	yes	no	no
1983-4 Novorossisk transit	no	no	no	no	yes	no	no

Source: Guy D. Holliday, The Limits of Intervention: Soviet Naval Power Projection Capabilities and the Decision to Intervene, Monterey, Calif.: Naval Postgraduate School, Master's Thesis, March 1984, pp. 46-47.

SECTION III

IMPORTANT MILITARY-POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES:

Threats of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, Acquisition and Use of Foreign Military Bases, Arms Transfers.

This section will deal with these three subjects in differing degrees of detail. There is a very large and excellent literature on arms transfer and so that will be discussed only briefly. Foreign military bases will also not be discussed in great detail, but for a quite different reason: There is not sufficient space to go into the degree of technical detail that a proper discussion of the subject should have. Emphasis will be given to the threats of use of nuclear weapons because it is a subject that is both important and only rarely receives attention.

Threats of the Use of Nuclear Weapons since WW II

The last twenty-five years have seen numerous studies of both strategic and conventional weapon competition between the US and the USSR. These studies and analyses for the most part deal with static measures: the strategic balance, other force balances, force levels, military expenditure. The studies which concern the uses of force have been for the most part case studies of individual instances, such as Hungary, Czechoslovakia or the Dominican Republic, the wars in the Middle-East, Vietnam or the Horn of Africa, and they have focused on the use of conventional weapons. Case studies of the Cuban missile crisis are an exception.

If our goal is to identify to what degree and in which instances the use of nuclear weapons has been involved in post-World War II military and political confrontations, the very few survey studies of the post-WW II use of military force all contain major weaknesses. The large study by George and Smoke with the explicit title Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice is very heavy on theory and extremely thin on what would matter most to its title, a thorough examination of the instances of US crisis deployments of nuclear weapons (1). Howe's volume Multicrises is excellent but only deals with two events, the Middle East war of 1967 and the Quemoy conflict

of 1958 (2). The recent disclosures by former US President Nixon that he "considered" the use of nuclear weapons on four occasions during his presidency (1968 to 1974) — and there was actually a fifth occasion which he apparently still chose not to discuss — may lead to substantially more serious consideration of this subject then it has received to date (3).

Threats to use nuclear weapons can be grouped according to four categories of what might be termed "immanence":

1. Routine Deployments, though these may be of systems on very high readiness, such as the US and USSR ICBM and SLBM systems, or in areas of direct confrontation of opposing military forces, such as the USSR deployment of theater nuclear forces along its border with China or US deployment of similar systems close to the NATO border with the Warsaw Treaty Organization nations.
2. Verbal Threats to use nuclear weapons, such as those by the USSR against France and England at the time of the 1956 Suez crisis, via diplomatic messages delivered to a head of state or in public statements.
3. Increased Alert Levels of part or all of a nation's nuclear weapon systems, either with or without public announcement.
4. Specific Deployments of nuclear weapon systems during a crisis, either aircraft, aircraft carriers or submarines.

The styles of the US and the USSR differ markedly in the manner in which they make nuclear threats. The USSR has most often made use of verbal threats while the US has made more frequent use of specific crisis deployments and of nuclear alerts, both announced and unannounced. It is the announced US nuclear alerts about which there is the most knowledge, such as those during the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 and the Middle East crisis in October 1973. However, there have been many more situations of increased alert levels than the public knows about and, as already noted in an earlier section, the United States has carried out approximately 80 specific deployments during one crisis or another since the mid-1950s when nuclear weapons began to be deployed on board US aircraft carriers.

Blechman and Kaplan present a list of nineteen incidents in which US strategic nuclear forces were involved (4). The criterion for inclusion in this list was that "forces which at the time had a designated

role in U.S. plans for strategic nuclear war took part in one of the political incidents, in such context that a nuclear signal of some type could be inferred". /See Table 30 7. A worldwide alert has reportedly been used by the United States only on two occasions since World War II. The first time was during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962; the second was in October 1973, to counter the alleged Soviet threat to send forces into the Middle East. In these instances, the alert levels of all US forces — land, sea and air, nuclear and conventional — were raised worldwide. In most cases, alerts are far more selective.

In the analogous study done on the USSR, Kaplan was only able to say that the open, public record shows next to no evidence of similar Soviet practices.

> ... in only one instance were data found confirming that the USSR had actually raised the alert status of forces presumably included in plans for nuclear attack upon the United States, Europe, or China. That incident was the Cuban missile crisis. No information was discovered that would indicate that the USSR has ever redeployed strategic bomber units during a crisis. To be sure about these matters is impossible, however.
>
> What can be said about publicly unknown demonstrative uses of Soviet strategic forces during crises, though, is that first, the Kremlin did not attempt to draw foreign attention to these actions (if they occurred), unlike U.S. leaders who on a number of occasions since the Second World War made it clear by the alert and deployment of strategic forces that the United States might resort to the use of nuclear weapons. Second, if the targets of such possible Soviet moves perceived them at all, they did not make that information public. Valuable classified files about these matters are undoubtedly available within the United States and perhaps other governments. Whether even these files are definitive is impossible to tell from the outside (5).

Kaplan implies that there is at least some likelihood that there were additional USSR strategic alerts that are not in the public record.

> No useful information was located about (1) actual crisis communications between Soviet political leaders, military commanders, and the operators of missile-laden submarines, land-based missiles, and nuclear-capable bombers; (2) activities at Soviet air or submarine bases during periods of tension that might indicate an increased or unchanged alert status; or (3) numerical counts of strategic submarines and aircraft at specific locations during crises. Considering this ignorance, it would not be shocking to learn that at least some Soviet strategic units had their alert status raised or were redeployed during the Berlin crisis or the crisis with China in 1969, or that Soviet strategic units were redeployed during the missile crisis. Other incidents in which such actions would not have been incredible are the 1973 Middle East war, the 1968 Czechoslovakia intervention, the 1958 Offshore Islands crisis, the 1956 Suez crisis, and the 1956 intervention in Hungary... /nevertheless/

Table 30. Incidents in which US Strategic Nuclear Forces were Involved

Incident	Date
US aircraft shot down by Yugoslavia	November 1946
Inauguration of President in Uruguay	February 1947
Security of Berlin	January 1948
Security of Berlin	April 1948
Security of Berlin	June 1948
Korean War: security of Europe	July 1950
Security of Japan/South Korea	August 1953
Guatemala accepts Soviet bloc support	May 1954
China-Taiwan conflict: Tachen Islands	August 1954
Suez crisis	October 1956
Political crisis in Lebanon	July 1958
Political crisis in Jordan	July 1958
China-Taiwan crisis: Quemoy and Matsu	July 1958
Security of Berlin	May 1959
Security of Berlin	June 1961
Soviet emplacement of missiles in Cuba	October 1962
Withdrawal of US missiles from Turkey	April 1963
Pueblo seized by North Korea	January 1968
Arab-Israeli War	October 1973

Source: Blechman and Kaplan, Brookings, 1978.

Table 31. *Incidents in Which U.S. and Major USSR Armed Forces Were Used*[a]

Incident	Date
Issue over political future of Czechoslovakia	January 1945
Issue over political future of Germany	January 1945
Issue over political future of Austria	March 1945
Issue over political future of China	August 1945
Issue over political future of Korea	August 1945
Attempt to gain economic influence in Manchuria	November 1945
Maintenance of security of Port Arthur and Dairen	February 1946
Dispute over Turkish provinces and Dardanelles	March 1946
Future of West Germany and Berlin	June 1948
Maintenance of security of China during Korean War	Late 1950
Maintenance of security of North Korea during Korean War	? 1951
U.S. intervention in Lebanon	July 1958
Western presence in Berlin	July 1961
Emplacement of missiles in Cuba	July 1962
Cuban missile crisis	October 1962
Egypt-Israel political crisis	May 1967
Arab-Israeli war	June 1967
Seizure of U.S.S. *Pueblo* by North Korea	January 1968
Jordan-PLO-Syria conflict	September 1970
U.S. response to North Vietnam Easter offensive	May 1972
Arab-Israeli war (1)	October 1973
Arab-Israeli war (2)	October 1973
Cyprus conflict	July 1974

a. Major USSR armed forces included ground units of more than one division, at least six major surface combatants, or more than one air regiment.

Source: Kaplan et al., Brookings, 1981.

> (it) is certainly plausible that Soviet strategic forces were used as a political instrument in only the Cuban missile crisis. Political leaders in Moscow may historically have been more concerned than U.S. policy-makers with the problem of command and control. The normal levels of alert of Soviet strategic forces are much lower than those of the U.S. strategic forces, and in crises Soviet leaders may have been very anxious to restrict the risk of accident or unauthorized action. ... Also, when the strategic position of the USSR was one of gross inferiority and mutual assured destruction was not certain, Soviet leaders may have considered the orchestration of nuclear forces during the Suez, Quemoy and Berlin crises, for example, profoundly dangerous insofar as the United States might have been provoked to carry out a preemptive first strike. In addition, if a discrete use of strategic nuclear units failed to deter or compel Western behavior in an era of Soviet nuclear inferiority, what then? Insofar as the Kremlin perceived its behavior over Berlin and the shelling of Quemoy and Matsu islands by the People's Republic of China as probes, almost certainly it anticipated the possibility of having to back off in the face of strong U.S. responses (6).

The USSR has definitely carried out selective alerts of other portions of its military forces. It did this during several border disputes with China, during the Turkish-Syrian crises in 1958-1959, during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971, at the time of the Mideast war of October 1973, during several of its threats to intervene in Middle East conflicts, in regard to Poland in November and December 1981; and during many of the crises in which US strategic nuclear forces were placed on alert. Shulsky _et al_. list twenty episodes of "Coercive Employment of the (Soviet naval) Fleet" between 1967 and 1976, and there have been several additional such applications of the Soviet fleet since 1976 (7). On at least five occasions, in the same seven years, there were major interactions between the US and USSR fleets during crises: in the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the Jordanian crisis of 1970, the December 1971 Indo-Pakistani crisis, the October Arab-Israeli war, and the 1975 Lebanese crisis. It must be assumed that on most and more probably on all of these occasions elements of the Soviet fleets were armed with nuclear weapons, as are the US fleets, albeit "tactical" rather than "strategic" ones.

In contrast to the apparently more limited Soviet recourse to strategic nuclear alerts, the USSR has employed a practice to which the US has never resorted, namely the flamboyant public display of threatening the use of nuclear weapons. On many occasions, but particularly during the Khrushchev era, Soviet leaders verbally raised the prospect of using nuclear weapons against other nations. The most famous such cases were the letters to the heads of state of France, Britain and Israel during the Suez crisis of 1956.

Soviet verbal nuclear threats are known to have been made on roughly ten or a dozen occasions. In some cases, Soviet conventional forces were simultaneously placed on alert or deployed. In other cases, there were simultaneous deployments by both the US and the USSR — and the number of events in this category is increasing as Soviet military capabilities have increased. In several other cases, the US and the USSR exchanged notes involving nuclear threats during a particular crises, for example, during the Syrian-Turkish crisis of 1958-1959 and during the Taiwan Straits crisis of roughly the same period. The cases in this last group tend to involve US deployment of nuclear weapon systems. There is also evidence that on one occasion (in 1969) the USSR canvassed its WTO allies for their opinions on whether it should carry out a preemptive strike against China's nuclear weapon installations.

The most serious events are those in which US and Soviet military forces become engaged at close quarters during a crisis (see Table 31). The five major fleet interactions between 1967 and 1976 already referred to, as well as the Berlin and Cuban missile crises, were such occasions. So far, however, actual combat has been avoided. In April 1979, for example, the US considered using an aircraft carrier task force "... to halt the flow of Soviet arms to Southern Yemeni forces if that had been necessary to contain the invasion" of North Yemen (8), and in 1982 Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former National Security Advisor to President Carter, wrote that in the preparations for the US attempted evacuation of the American hostages in Teheran, he "instructed the military to stimulate a collision or to generate a collision with a Soviet ship, if necessary, in case they were tailing the aircraft carrier (Journal Note, April 23, 1980)" (9). The seriousness of the hundreds of "naval incidents of sea", particularly in 1970-1972, that prompted the US and the USSR to sign an agreement in May 1973 attempting to reduce these interactions — the Protocol to the Agreement Between the USA and the USSR on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas — is largely unknown (10).

The information presented here supplies the reader with only a very brief introduction to one of the most crucial topics of Post-WWII military-political history — the deployment, alert, or threat of use of nuclear weapons in crises by the US and the USSR both against each other and against other nations. It may also be the least studied topic (11). The point is that in addition to the deterrence ostensibly conferred on the US and the USSR by their mutual nuclear weapons capabilities held in readiness

against the other, these weapon systems have been employed as instruments of coercion and intimidation in crises far more often than most people — including political scientists — are aware. We have been fortunate that this level of use has not yet led to actual use in wartime, but that has perhaps been due to more complex factors than the restraint with which it is generally assumed nuclear weapons are handled by political leaders.

ACQUISITION AND USE OF FOREIGN MILITARY BASES

There are three major components of the projection of military power by the major powers outside their borders. The first component is men and weapons, naval fleets, long-range airlift capability, and ground troops — one's own or those of an ally. The second is overseas military bases. The third, the interest and the decision to carry out the actual military intervention and deployments of men and weapons, is intimately connected with the availability of such facilities. Bases are in a sense the preparatory or enabling phase of military operations. They may not be absolutely necessary in all instance for such operations, but they make them very much more feasible and efficient. In very many cases, they are the sine qua non of a distant military operation, by virtue of reducing the time necessary to carry it out or by providing the ability to support operations that are superficially thought of as reducing the need for bases, such as airlift capability.

A second but equally important function of foreign bases and facilities, although far less well understood by the public, comprises a very large group of activities related to advanced military systems in the post-WWII period that are separate from the projection of conventional forces. These systems often can operate only with the aid of facilities based far from the borders of the country utilizing them, and quite often they are related in one way or another to nuclear weapon systems. The subject of foreign military bases has received extremely scant treatment in the literature and, until the volume published by Harkavy in 1982, not a single book existed which dealt with the topic (1).

Each year two nations, the United States and the United Kingdom, release lists of some of their major bases. The most detailed accounting is produced by the US Department of Defense and is made available to the public, usually in July. This lists several hundred selected overseas bases (2). It also provides:

- the estimated annual operating costs of maintaining US military forces in some 30 to 40 foreign countries and areas;
- the number of US military personnel in every nation in which more than 250 personnel are stationed;
- the major overseas installations according to military service (Army, Navy, Air Force), and the number of personnel in each service overseas (3).

The United Kingdom publishes a map each year in its Statement on the Defense Estimates, prepared by the government for submission to Parliament,

which displays some of Britain's major bases and the disposition of some of its overseas military forces (4).

In order to arrive at the total number of foreign military installations, one has to understand the distinction between "major" and "minor" bases or facilities. The total number for the United States by 1982 was about 1,500, of which only 10 percent were "major" bases. For the USSR, the total number may have reached 3,000, with the "major" bases again being approximately 10 percent of the total (5). The "major" bases are large naval or air bases and installations for headquarters and ground troops (6). They serve the traditional, well-known military functions, to serve fleets and operating aircraft in peacetime, to facilitate military force projection, and to engage in warfare. The "minor" facilities, by far the great majority of the total, are "special purpose" locations that by and large support newer technological systems developed in the post-WWII years. For example, for the US Air Force, "Minor installations include missile sites, radar sites, auxiliary airfields, antenna farms, navigational aids, storage sites and other such facilities". They may also be smaller communications facilities, early warning (OTH and other radar), electronic intercept, communications intercept, nuclear test detection and monitoring, satellite monitors or ground-based receivers, etc. These facilities very often are adjuncts to a nation's nuclear weapon delivery capability. Major bases also tend to house one or more of these kinds of functions within their boundaries as well, often quite many.

A recently published Soviet description of United States military bases is particularly interesting for several reasons.

> US military installations overseas include large-scale air and naval bases, Army and Marine garrisons, positions of tactical and surface-to-air missiles, depots of nuclear weapons, ammunition and other supplies, space control centers, shore-based sonars, radio interception posts, communications centers, and other diverse installations.
>
> At present, the United States has more than 1,500 military bases and installations in the territory of 32 countries, More than half a million US servicemen are stationed there permanently (7).

An accompanying map listed the "number of National Military Bases, Airfields and Ports Used By US Armed Forces". Several points are notable:

- The Soviet description included surface-to-air missile sites, and these make up a very large portion of its own facilities in Eastern Europe.
- The number of Soviet personnel in its own overseas facilities would very greatly exceed 500,000 men.

- In listing foreign national bases, airfields and ports "Used By" the United States, the Soviet description includes just those kinds of facilities the USSR routinely uses in third-world states at the same time as it claims that it "has" no overseas military bases.

For the first half of the post WWII period, and certainly through the mid-1960s, the United States had the larger international base structure, both in terms of absolute numbers and geographic distribution. The number of US overseas bases has been constantly decreasing, however, for both total and "major" bases. By the 1970s, the number of extraterritorial facilities available to the US and the USSR for military use were about equal, irrespective of what they were called and under whose control they nominally were. In 1969, US Secretary of Defense Laird provided the following information to Congress:

> The Soviets have approximately 354 major bases outside the USSR. These bases are located in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Mongolia. Types of bases considered are: tactical air force home bases and deployment airfields, air depots, and ground forces installations. There is no known major Soviet naval base outside the USSR.
>
> We /the US/ have 343 major bases abroad (8).

Ten years later, this statement needed correction in at least one aspect. Since 1969, the USSR has obtained several major overseas naval facilities. The remaining difference between the base patterns of the US and the USSR is in the geographic distribution of the bases. Those of the US are located in approximately 50-60 countries. The largest number of major US bases are also on the territory of its NATO allies.

The USSR strenuously avoids any formal public statement of control over the facilities it uses, precisely to escape the application of the term "base" to its own practices, since it has inveighed against American bases so loudly for so many years. In many cases, however, the USSR has full operational control and often sole and unrestricted use of the facility as well, so that to all intents and purposes, the facility is functionally equivalent to a "base". This applies not only to Soviet facilities in allied Warsaw Pact nations but to those in developing nations as well. There are reports from Vietnam and Libya, for example, that nationals of the host country are forbidden to enter Soviet facilities. There could hardly be any greater degree of functional control than that, irrespective of what the location is called, either by the USSR or by the host country.

As indicated, the number of US overseas bases and facilities has been decreasing constantly (see Tables 32 — 34) (9). At the same time as the

Table 32.



Source: US Congress, Senate, Appropriations Committee, Hearings: Fiscal Year 1975, Part III; Washington, DC: US Govt. Printing Office, 1974.

Table 33. TOTAL MAJOR MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN UNITED STATES TERRITORIES AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES 1957-1974



Source: "Changes in DOD's Base Structure From 1957 to 1978", US Government Accounting Office, LCD-80-104, September 11, 1980.

Table 34. Total US Military Installations (Major and Minor) in Foreign Countries, and in Territories and Possessions

Service	FY 1965	FY 1966	FY 1967	FY 1968	FY 1969	FY 1970	FY 1971	FY 1972
Army	1,403	1,407	1,436	1,414	1,408	1,365	1,231	1,202
Navy	136	124	120	109	107	110	103	99
Air Force	806	794	732	734	756	719	690	662
TOTAL	2,345	2,325	2,288	2,257	2,271	2,194	2,024	1,963

Source: US Department of Defense, OASD (Comptroller), Directorate for Information Operations, Table 407: Military Installations Inventory -- Summary, Washington, DC: January 10, 1973.

USSR has become more and more involved with various countries in the third world, as its naval and airlift capabilities increased, the number of facilities, or bases, that it uses worldwide has similarly increased. The advantages become rapidly apparent. The USSR can now operate antisubmarine warfare and naval reconnaissance flights out of numerous airfields far from its own borders, enormously increasing the range with which it can interact with US naval vessels. It has access to airfields en route for refueling aircraft which deliver troops, weapons and other supplies to client states in a crisis. It can have command and control, communications, electronic and communication intercept facilities in the theatre, in Africa, in Latin America, in the Indian Ocean and in Southeast Asia. It can refuel, refit and resupply submarines, all of these permit the USSR to do things it could not do before — but which the United States had been able to do. Its ability to project its own military forces and to intervene are vastly increased by these facilities. At the same time the forward positioning and dispersal of its own forces prohibits the unimpeded projection by the United States of its military forces. An additional goal in obtaining military facilities is to deny the opposing superpower access to such facilities and to limit its ability to operate freely in the general area surrounding the location. Some military capabilities are enhanced by bases. In other cases, they confer abilities that are unobtainable in any other way (10).

Foreign military bases can have both direct and indirect political consequences, in various ways. They can be direct, by producing compensatory deployments or interventions by either the US or the USSR, or in determining the outcome of a conflict in one or more of the developing nations. They can also be direct — as they have been for the entire post-WWII period — when an entire group of bordering states in Eastern Europe have been occupied for the military and political security of the USSR. Another direct effect, more or less the inverse of the above, is characterized by Towle as the role of military bases within the territory of allies as the "cement" for attaching a superpower to its smaller allies.

> It was widely recognised that the presence of allied troops on one's territory was the best guarantee that the ally would come to one's aid in a crisis, yet the post-1945 system of permanent military bases in allied territory was beyond the imagination of contemporary statesmen and periodic naval visits were not a satisfactory substitute (11).

This would appear to apply to the United States and NATO. At the end of

WWII, the United States expected that all US forces would be withdrawn from Europe within two years. As late as 1958, President Eisenhower continued to argue that no one had envisioned a continued US military presence in Europe following WWII, and that all but a single division of the US forces should be brought home. The suggestion was repeatedly opposed by the NATO allies, the SACEUR, and the US Department of State in recognition of the alliance's position. Paradoxically, the USSR and the smaller WTO allies were about equally interested in retaining a US military presence in West Germany.

A similar situation is the French military presence in Africa, which allows the smaller Francophone states to limit the size of their own security forces substantially. Should the French presence eventually be greatly reduced, one may expect these states to increase their own military programs. It would also not be surprising if they became vulnerable to the same kinds of cross-border problems that other African nations have suffered in the past years, against which the presence of French forces has very likely protected them to date.

An indirect effect, with major consequences for the future, are the military assistance payments and arms transfers by which both the US and the USSR pay for the use of the bases and facilities they obtain (12). In the case of the United States, this can be applied to the Philippines, Greece, Spain, Morocco and Somalia, and, in past years, Ethiopia. In the case of the USSR, it applies to Syria, Vietnam, Cuba, Yemen and previously Egypt and Somalia, although in several of these cases there are additional reasons for arms supply from the USSR. There also are examples of the reverse political interaction. In July 1984, the Greek government threatened to revoke US access to the four bases it uses in Greece "if the United States altered the balance of power in the Aegean Sea", that is, if the United States supplied Turkey with arms without compensating Greece with a similar consignment of weapons. There also appear to be cases in which interventions have been carried out at least in part to obtain basing facilities, and there appears to be more than one case in which _coups d'état_ were instigated by one of the superpowers in order to maintain a sympathetic national leadership and to maintain its military presence. Both of these are certainly major direct effects. Nevertheless, both the US and the USSR have had to give up major overseas facilities for political reasons: the United States in Morocco, Libya, Saudi Arabia and France, and the USSR in Egypt and Somalia. The US had to leave nearly 200 facilities in France

alone when France withdrew its national territory from use for NATO infrastructure, with profound consequences for the potential outcome of any conventional war in Europe.

It would be useful to look at the development of the base systems in somewhat more detail. When World War II approached, the US still had only the Panamanian, Cuban and Puerto Rican bases off its Atlantic coast. In 1940, Bourne Field at St.Thomas was the only Marine aviation base outside the continental United States. Then in 1940, in an agreement with Great Britain, the US acquired base rights at eight island locations in the Western Atlantic and in the Caribbean in exchange for 50 destroyers. One of these bases, Bermuda, is still used by the United States and a second, Argentia in Newfoundland, was used through 1970. Two Icelandic bases, Reykjavik and Hvalfjordur, midway across the Atlantic, which had been preemptively occupied by Britain to keep them from falling into German hands, also played an important role in aiding allied convoy escorts.

With these as a beginning, the United States built a vast array of bases throughout the world during World War II. At the end of September 1945, the US Air Force alone had 1,895 installations: 1,333 in the United States, and 562 overseas (13). Just the Eighth Air Force in Britain had operated from 122 British bases (14). However, the end of World War II brought a rapid reduction in these numbers. By the end of June 1948, when bases were already being re-established, the Air Force had only 290 "major" installations: 112 in the US — 90 of which were active — and 178 overseas — of which 133 were active. As bases began to be reestablished, they often went first to those locations that had been developed during WWII, in the Far East, Alaska, Newfoundland, Germany and Great Britain, and to Kindley AFB in Bermuda, Lagerfield in the Azores, Wheelus Field in Libya and Dhahran Airfield in Saudi Arabia.

However, in view of the subsequent enormous expansion of the US base system — and of the "cold war" in general — one of the most interesting aspects of the years 1943-1946 was the complete transition in US strategic assumptions and priorities for the post-war world concerning its perceptions of potential future enemies, requirements, and bases. As early as 1942, the US Navy began to consider the desirability of bases in the Pacific in the post-WWII period. This interest developed further in 1944 and 1945 and was reflected in some of the post-war agreements made by the WWII allies. A review of repeated US Air Force policy planning papers written in 1943 to 1945, however, failed to show any indications of either the policy presumptions or the base requirements that would appear subsequently (15). During

this period the shift to the notion of a new potential enemy did begin, but, for various technical reasons, the vision of the base structure as it would subsequently follow did not. It was the US Navy that took the lead in the post-war search for overseas bases and the focus for these was in the Pacific. The US Air Force, primarily the Strategic Air Command, did not begin to seek its own bases until several years later. The Air Force developed its interest in foreign facilities only when it became obvious that its aircraft would be the nation's primary means of delivering nuclear weapons in the coming years. In his study, Smith describes the earliest Air Force considerations as an interesting mixture of bureaucratic-budgetary and strategic concerns:

> A fundamental task facing the planners was the selection of air bases for the postwar world which would meet the operational and training needs of a large and diversified Air Force. The rationale behind their selection of numbers and locations of air bases gives some interesting insights into the motivational considerations underlying the choice of bases as well as into the strategic preconceptions of the planners.
>
> Although the identification of the short-term enemy, Japan, and the long-term enemy, Russia, had a direct effect on the planning for bases, the principal concern of the postwar planners was their need to justify a large postwar air force. The A.A.F.'s desire to obtain overseas bases had a direct relationship to its wish for a large portion of the defense budget. If a requirement for many overseas bases could be justified, then half the battle for funds would be won. Bases, to be useful offensive and defensive strongholds, required both types of aircraft; the more overseas bases that could be justified, the greater was the likelihood that approval of a large number of groups could be obtained. This, in turn, would permit an Air Force of sufficient size to require continual replacement of aircraft, the ongoing operation of the aircraft industry, and the uninterrupted development of new weapons systems. Justification for overseas bases was therefore an important step in the A.A.F. planners' attempt to justify a 105-group and later a 70-group Air Force. Each overseas base was to be manned with one bomber and one fighter group with the argument that bases must serve to defend the United States in two ways: with all possible air routes to this country protected through the overseas basing of defensive fighters and by deterrence with bases close enough to all potential enemies so that bombers could reach targets within the strategic heartland of any potential adversary (16).

These reports assumed that former Japanese mandated islands would "have been brought under United States sovereignty" and that the Philippine Islands, granted its independence, would "allow military base facilities to the United States."

Within a few short years, the wartime presumptions died, and an entirely new set arose in other sectors of the government and in other of the military services. In December 1957, a report to the President on

US Overseas Military Bases expressed the following central theme regarding the need for an overseas base system in the ensuing decade:

> We will have need for such a /base/ system, supplemented by forces and facilities maintained by our allies, in order (a) to maintain a deterrent to general war by assuring our capability to deliver a strategic counteroffensive, and by providing the dispersal necessary so that the enemy cannot calculate on erasing our retaliatory power through surprise attack by one blow; (b) to assure that we can maintain tactical forces in being at or close to potential trouble spots (supplemented by mobile forces maintained in central areas) so that a potential aggressor knows we are determined to assist indigenous forces in defending themselves and have varying military capacities for assisting them which can be used with discrimination as circumstances dictate; and (c) to promote U.S. political objectives, giving tangible evidence of political solidarity with our friends and of our intention to honor our various defense alliances, and thereby encouraging the fullest contribution to the common defense on the part of our friends and allies.
>
> Our base system is key to our survival as a nation. If this system is so organized as to demonstrate our strength and our readiness to meet all types of military action, there is solid reason to believe that our policy of containment will succeed, that total war will be avoided, and that limited aggression can be smothered. The foregoing analysis of the political and military aspects of probable U.S. requirements over the next ten years leads to the conclusion that their general scope and pattern are not likely to diminish in size and complexity during this period. It is certain, however, that adjustments and shifts in emphasis will occur as we adjust our strategic doctrine to the range of new weapons, improvements in the mobility and firepower of our tactical forces, and the political or military vulnerability of particular overseas areas (17).

Two years later, a follow-on report to the American president stated:

> From an overall view, one of the prime strategic advantages enjoyed by the United States over the USSR is the possibility of surrounding the communist bloc with combat forces — land, sea and air — or of strategically positioning or shifting these forces wherever needed. An adequate U.S. overseas base system is a primary means of exploiting this benefit of geography and of promoting the continued collective defense effort among free world nations.
>
> .....
>
> The forward positioning of these forces /in the Pacific theater/ in the cold war is a continuing part of the deterrent to possible communist aggression in this part of the world. The U.S. bases, by their proximity to likely areas of conflict, will expedite commitment of the appropriate force in time to defeat possible aggressive action and help prevent broadening of the war.
>
> .....
>
> Overseas facilities will continue to be required for support of a world-wide communications network, which is mandatory in order to insure adequate control of modern military forces with atomic weapons, to facilitate the transmission of intelligence to the United States, and to administer the deployed forces.
>
> .....

> If reductions in military forces should occur during the next decade, through arms control agreements or other political or economic considerations, the overseas base holdings supporting U.S. forces should be carefully evaluated before being relinquished. It should be recognized that these bases would represent the best possible means for reacting to emergencies in areas uncovered by a withdrawal of U.S. forces. A lack of adequate in-transit bases, staging areas, and terminal facilities for contingency operations could reduce reaction capability to such a degree that U.S. military intervention would be too late to safeguard our security interests. If actual relinquishment of an essential base becomes necessary, possible future use should be safeguarded by a right of re-entry (18).

At the conferences of Allied leaders towards the end of WWII, Stalin raised no objections to the acquisition of bases by the US. The USSR simply sought the same advantages for itself — contrary to the widely accepted impression. Immediately after the end of WWII, the USSR actively sought base rights in Finland, Norway (Spetsbergen), Turkey, Manchuria, and Libya:

- Libya: At the July 1945 Potsdam Conference, and two months later at the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in London, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov explained that the USSR desired an outlet on the Mediterranean Sea and demanded a base in Libya.
- Manchuria: The USSR obtained the use of Port Arthur, in Manchuria, from China.
- Finland: In its peace treaty with Finland, the USSR obtained the use of Porkalla-Udd, only twelve miles from Finland's capital, Helsinki (in addition to the 17,024 square miles — almost 12 percent of its territory — that Finland was forced to cede to the USSR).
- Norway: The USSR requested that the 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty be renegotiated, that a joint Soviet-Norwegian defense of the island be established, and that Norway cede Bear Island to the USSR. The demands were dropped only after some years.
- Turkey: In 1940, during the Soviet-German alliance period, the USSR had demanded that Germany sanction the establishment of Soviet land and naval bases "within range of the Bosporus and Dardanelles" (19). After WWII, the USSR continued to make the same demands. In June 1945, the Soviet government presented a note to Turkey which proposed a revision of the Montreux Convention that included Soviet occupation of bases in Turkey and possible joint control of the Straits in wartime. Sometime later, the proposal was altered to make it a bit more vague while meaning essentially the same thing: "to organize joint means of defense of the Straits" (20). The USSR did not renounce its claims against Turkey until 1953, after the death of Stalin.

The bases which the USSR did succeed in obtaining during this period — in China and in Finland — were certainly not obtained from their host countries willingly. Chinese feelings on the question were particularly strong and were a sore point in Soviet-Chinese relations for more than ten years. The bases were eventually returned to the respective countries in 1955, roughly at the time the Soviet Union agreed to a peace treaty for Austria.

The notable point then is that the USSR did not obtain several of these additional base concessions that it sought after WWII, but that certainly was not for lack of trying. It did, of course, obtain bases in all the Eastern European countries that it occupied and in Mongolia. It was also permitted to incorporate directly into its territory some 180,000 square miles of territory in Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Northern Bukovina, Bessarabia and Poland that it had occupied between September 17, 1939, and June 26, 1940: the Baltic states, half of Poland, and sizable portions of Finland and Romania.

The Soviet interest in foreign military bases is entirely traditional and in no way different from that of the United States, Britain or France. In an interesting recent historical summary the present Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, and its head for the past twenty years, Admiral Gorshkov, reiterated the disadvantages suffered by Russian naval forces due to the lack of appropriate naval bases — and the advantages accruing to their opponents by having such bases — on several occasions (21). He offered this as a contributing cause of Russian naval losses in sea combat with Japan in 1904: "The Japanese Navy, relying on a developed system of bases, was able to concentrate its operations." He describes as a general drawback of Tsarist Russian naval operations in widely separated seas, in the East and in the West:

> .... a number of difficulties (the absence of bases, fortified points, etc.) A similar situation developed in large measure as a result of the loss by Russia of a number of islands and overseas territories first discovered by Russian seafarers. (Incidentally, these losses likewise occurred because ruling circles in Russia failed to understand the importance of sea power.)

Earlier in his study Gorshkov had made the same point, in perfect imperialist tradition. He bemoaned the lack of foresight of former Russian governments in not acquiring Pacific island possessions:

> Many islands and lands discovered by Russian seafarers in the Pacific were not added to Russian possessions, although as their first discoverer she was fully entitled to this right. Today they belong to the Americans, British, French and Japanese.

He identifies the "islands and lands" by a long and detailed rendition of their individual "discoveries", Alaska, the California coast and the Pacific Northwest, New Guinea, and some of the Hawaiian Islands. (Elsewhere in the paper Gorshkov stated that "the nations which ... possessed powerful navies, succeeded in grabbing the lion's share of the colonial possessions.") He then pointed out that the absence of bases "required the construction in Russia of warships possessing great cruising range," and that "exceptional strategic foresight on the part of government officials was required in order to insure a timely concentration of forces in the required theatre."

As the cold war developed in intensity, Soviet policy on bases came to be composed of four elements:

1. Proposals for the elimination of foreign military bases.
   Despite its own facilities in the territory of its Eastern European WTO allies, the USSR consistently urged the removal of US bases, including these in NATO countries.
2. Constant criticism of the nuclear threat from US bases surrounding the USSR.
   Nevertheless, the USSR was capable of exactly the same practices: nuclear-armed aircraft were positioned at Soviet bases in Mongolia less than one-half hour's flight time from Peking, and Soviet nuclear capability was always in the immediate proximity of Japan and Norway.
3. A constant attempt to acquire bases of its own, particularly naval bases.
   Soviet base acquisition nearly always involved major arms transfer relationships, as with Somalia, Egypt, Syria and Vietnam. For example, the USSR supplied Somalia with military equipment and training in its use in exchange for permission in 1972 to develop naval-support facilities: a port, airfield, communications facilities and a missile storage and handling facility. The USSR had hoped for similar benefits from its arms supply relationships with Indonesia and India.
4. The constant requirement of dissembling Soviet base policy. This is necessitated by Soviet claims that it has no such bases and its continual proposals that all foreign military bases be eliminated.

Two striking examples of this last characteristic can be provided. In January 1971, Egyptian President Sadat publicly disclosed that Nasser had granted the USSR access to Egyptian naval facilities in 1968. He gave the impression then and at other times that this arrangement was an unwritten, mutual understanding. On April 3, 1974, however, Sadat disclosed that the

USSR and Egypt had concluded a formal, five-year agreement in March 1968 for the Soviet Navy's access to "facilities on the Mediterranean" (22). Ironically, the editor of the American newsweekly, Look, had asked Nasser in an interview in March 1968 if he would offer the USSR naval "bases" and Nasser had replied: "That question has never been brought up by their side or ours." The USSR sought additional facilities in other Mediterranean countries, both before and after this 1968 agreement, in Syria, Yugoslavia and Algeria. (23).

The USSR continues its policy of denying base acquisition to the present day. When President Carter and Secretary Brezhnev met in July 1979, Secretary Brezhnev made the following remark in an exchange with the President:

> Regarding the comments by President Carter about a Soviet presence in Vietnam, we have no bases there now, nor will we have any in the future. Soviet ships make routine business calls, and Soviet planes land in accordance with international custom. On the other hand, the United States bases are established at the doorstep of the Soviet Union in South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines (24).

In 1985, these protestations were patently ridiculous but were still continued. A Soviet military spokesman claimed that the Soviet Union uses the Cam Ranh Bay naval base only as a liberty port for its navy and denied that it serves as a base. "It is not a military base at all... Soviet ships stop at Cam Ranh Bay only on port calls to provide rest and relaxation for their crews. If you call it a military base, it means we have such bases in many countries" (25). Although not intended in that way, the last sentence was much the more truthful description. Cam Ranh Bay provides an excellent example of the capabilities that can be bestowed by access to a single major facility, in this case providing the USSR with capabilities that it could not previously exercise in the area at all.

After a gradual increase in intermittent use beginning in the late 1970s, the USSR was able to establish a permanent naval presence of approximately fifteen warships and auxiliaries in the South China Sea in 1983 using the base as its headquarters. By the end of 1984, it was estimated that some 20 to 26 Soviet ships, and by mid-1985 approximately 30, operated from Cam Rahn on any given day, making it the largest Soviet forward-deployment facility outside the Warsaw Pact and the largest concentration of Soviet naval units outside the USSR (26). Naval reconnaissance aircraft to follow US carrier task forces and ASW patrol aircraft to trace US SLBM submarines have been joined by bombers with a 3000-mile range. Cam Rahn Bay also provides the USSR with its third largest electronic surveillance and communications facilities outside Soviet borders, in particular to monitor US military communications from bases in the Philippines and in the South Pacific.

Soviet aircraft are only two hours in flying time from US bases in the Philippines, and Soviet ships based at Cam Ranh can now move to the Straits of Malacca, between Malaysia and Indonesia, in about three days. Previously, steaming time from Vladivostock had been nearly two weeks — four times longer — and the Soviet vessels were vulnerable to intercept in the Sea of Japan. The Soviets have built their own naval installations, including a floating dry dock and refuelling and repair facilities. In April 1984, Soviet naval infantry held two joint amphibious landing exercises with Vietnamese forces, one near Than Hoa and the other near Cam Ranh. It was the first Soviet amphibious landing maneuver in South East Asia. Vietnamese Foreign Minister Ha Van Lau told journalists in Japan that the maneuvers had been held at the initiative of the Soviet Union and not at Hanoi's request (27). Cam Ranh Bay is a major base, in every meaning of the world, under total Soviet control.

The use of a network of bases on the Arabian peninsula, the Mediterranean, in Africa, and in the Carribean has contributed substantially to the effectiveness and capabilities of Soviet naval as well as interventionary forces. Several examples make this abundantly clear:

- The naval base at Berbera in Somalia, which included a missile handling facility to reload naval cruise and surface-to-air missiles, was established as a result of the inability of the Soviet navy to sustain a significant underway replenishment capability for Soviet naval vessels at sea.
- With the loss of Somalia as a Soviet ally, these facilities as well as others were moved to South Yemen (the PDRY). Aden supplied naval facilities, and a second naval station and air base were established at Mukalla. The former RAF base at Khormaksar became a base for the Soviet air force as well as Soviet military and intelligence headquarters for the Red Sea region. New communications and Elint equipment was built at Socotra Island.
- The intensity and duration of Soviet naval activities in the Mediterranean increased sharply following Soviet access to facilities in Egypt.
- Soviet access to the air base at Conakry in Guinea in conjunction with a Soviet air base in Cuba permitted naval air reconnaissance of large portions of the Atlantic. When Guinea withdrew the use of Conakry, the Soviet naval reconnaissance aircraft began landing in Angola.

- The massive Soviet airlift exercise in November-December 1977 and January 1978, which involved 15 percent of the USSR's airlift capability, made use of seven different overflight routes with interim destinations in Aden (PDRY), Tripoli (Libya) and Mozambique and a final destination of Addis Ababa in Ethiopia (28). Countries that were overflown, with or without permission, included Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Iran, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, Niger, Chad, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Madagascar (29).

In 1979, US defense officials reported that the USSR had begun construction of its first full-size nuclear-powered attack aircraft carrier (30). Just as with the four smaller STOL aircraft carriers that the USSR has deployed in recent years, such vessels do not travel alone but in integrated battle groups of auxilliary support and supply vessels. The Soviet navy, which has been undergoing a period of marked expansion since the early 1960s, will probably continue to grow strikingly in the coming years. The Soviet demand to go everywhere that the United States goes and to do everything that the United States does, which has seen repeated diplomatic expression, is exemplified by these forces. They travel worldwide, and their need for bases increases correspondingly, rather than decreases. In 19   Admiral Gorshkov had included "a system of basing, command and control etc." among the requirements that had to be satisfied to meet "the necessity of establishing the conditions for gaining control of the sea while still at peace", and that is undoubtedly the case.

Note: this section is no more than a précis; it was not updated between 1982 and mid-1985 when work on the manuscript ended.

Arms Transfer

As indicated, there is a large and satisfactory literature on this subject.[59] Following SIPRI's major study, The Arms Trade with The Third World in 1971, its adjunct chapters in the annual SIPRI Yearbooks, and the SIPRI Arms Trade Registers in 1975, approximately a dozen volumes on arms transfer have appeared in the last ten years.[60] Arms sales and transfers have seen a meteoric rise in the post-WWII period. The increase in the past ten years — since the early 1970s — has been particularly strong. In the period 1979-1981, the USSR overtook the United States as the leading exporter of major weapons.[61] (See Tables below) for some data on arms transfers.)

An underlying assumption which provides the motive for much of the research and the diplomacy on behalf of arms control is the notion that arms races lead to war or the increased likelihood of war. Beliefs on the relation of arms to war can very crudely be reduced to two opposite positions. The first is often stated as: "If you want peace, prepare for war". It would appear that a sizable number of nations that have both the means and a quarrel operate on this assumption. The second position is that "If you prepare for war, you will get war" — and if you want peace, compromise the issues in contention rather than attempt to determine their outcome by force. The general question of the relation of the accumulation of arms to decisions to go to war applies particularly to arms transfers to developing nations insofar as one assumes that the effect will be an increased likelihood of war among developing nations. It is interesting that in this case one finds more general agreement and across a broader spectrum of opinion (in the industrialized nations) that arms produce undesirable effects than one does for the industrialized and arms-exporting states themselves:

"... a number of regional states are acquiring large arsenals of modern conventional weapons, raising the prospect of more frequent and more destructive conventional conflicts in the Third World."[62]

"The escalating international traffic in arms leads to an increased level of violence everywhere in the world. Both the volume and the kinds of weapons imported are responsible."[63]

"Externally (the USSR's) role as an arms supplier inevitably encourages Third World countries to settle their disputes by violent means."[64]

Table 16

Arms Exports, 1979 / Shares by Suppliers



ACDA, 1982

Table 17. Shares of world exports of major weapons, 1979–81, by country



SIPRI, 1982

Table 18 Shares of World Arms Imports, 1979



ACDA, 1982

Table 19. Shares of world imports of major weapons, 1979–81, by region



SIPRI, 1982

Table 20. Exports of major weapons to the Third World, compared with total world trade.



SIPRI, 1982

Table 21. World Arms Imports



ACDA, 1982

Table 22. Rank order of the 20 largest Third World major-weapon importing countries, 1979–81

Percentages are based on SIPRI trend indicator values, as expressed in US $ million, at constant (1975) prices.

Importing country	Percentage of total Third World imports	Importing country	Percentage of total Third World imports
1. Libya	*9.0*	11. Peru	*2.7*
2. Saudi Arabia	*8.9*	12. Algeria	*2.6*
3. Iraq	*7.7*	13. South Korea	*2.5*
4. Syria	*7.3*	14. Argentina	*2.2*
5. Israel	*6.8*	15. Indonesia	*2.0*
6. India	*5.1*	16. Cuba	*1.7*
7. South Yemen	*3.9*	17. Thailand	*1.6*
8. Egypt	*3.9*	18. Chile	*1.6*
9. Viet Nam	*3.7*	19. Kuwait	*1.6*
10. Morocco	*2.8*	20. Taiwan	*1.5*
		Others	*20.9*
		Total	*100.0*
		Total value[a]	**25 971**

[a] Values include licence production.

Source: SIPRI data base.

SIPRI, 1982

"The one solution that would be effective in controlling Third World Conflict over the next generation or two — an agreement among the supplier nations to strictly control arms transfers — is avoided ..." [65]

"Whether by agreements directly limiting the numbers, types and deployment or transfer of weapon systems or by more indirect means, arms control aims at curtailing the role that force or the threat of force plays in international relations. Its objectives should include achievement of political and strategic stability and diminution of the dangers of accidental conflicts; avoidance of local conflict and its intensification or prolongation by virtue of supplies of especially sophisticated and destructive arms from elsewhere: limitation of damage and suffering in war, particularly in the civilian population; support or furtherance of political aims; establishment of contractual relationships and understanding that diminish the dependence on arms; and saving of resources." [66]

This uniformity of opinion is very likely correct. Nevertheless, if one asks a series of questions on the relation of arms transfer to war and to the genesis of military coups and to the maintenance of military groups in political power in developing nations, it quickly becomes evident that very little is known by way of answers. For instance:

1. Do arms transfers make war in the third world more likely?
2. Do arms transfers make war more "costly"?
3. How do arms transfers affect or interact with military intervention, by great powers or by other nations?
4. What are the **effects of the transfer of sophisticated conventional weaponry on combat interactions in third-world conflicts?**
5. Do arms transfers make military coups more likely?
6. Do arms transfers increase the length of time in office of military juntas?

It is remarkable how very little research there is aimed at answering these questions. [67] The fourth question has probably received the most attention due to the repeated combat in the Middle-East, the war between Iraq and Iran and the recent Falkland Islands war.

In a statistical study of military assistance granted to fifteen Asian nations from 1946 to 1970, Donald Sylvan came to the following conclusions:

> ...(1) sharp increases in military assistance tend to change decidedly the recipient nation's international conflict and cooperative behavior; (2) in a substantial majority of cases examined, the direction of that behavior change is toward increased conflict and decreased cooperation... The findings seem to refute the argument that giving military aid to a nation not involved in a war will help strengthen that nation and thereby avoid future conflict. [68)]

Similar conclusions were reached by Kende. Porter points out, however, that neither Sylvan nor Kende consider the possibility that sharp rises in weapons exports to a developing nation come about because of increased demand due to a tense regional situation, or because a major arms supplier is attempting to exploit the possibilities for influence inherent in local rivalries. But whether arms exports are themselves the primary cause of local conflicts or only a contributing factor, it is clear that they have heavily shaped the nature and outcomes of local conflicts. It is also interesting to note that when local wars do occur, their termination often marks the beginning of a heightened regional arms race.

A NEW CATEGORY OF INTERVENTIONIST NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION

In 1972, the SIPRI Yearbook identified twenty countries having military forces deployed outside their own borders, aside from the US, the USSR, France and the UK (1). It is this part of the overall phenomenon of overseas military intervention that has seen the most remarkable growth, both in the numbers of actors and in the kinds of activities they carry out.

This growth has also led to a surprising complexity in supporting roles in particular conflicts. At one point in the conflict between Ethiopia, on the one hand, and Somalia (and Eritrea) on the other, the supporters of Ethiopia included Israel, Kenya, the Soviet Union, Libya and Cuba while Somalia's supporters included a mixture of conservative and radical Arab states as well as the US and China. (Libya and the USSR had earlier supported Somalia, but later switched sides.) In the Nigerian civil war, Portugal, China and France supported the secessionist province of Biafra, while the UK, USSR, Israel and Egypt supported the Nigerian government. There were often both Israeli and Egyptian military personnel serving simultaneously at the same air bases in Nigeria, the Egyptians as pilots flying combat missions in MIG aircraft for Nigeria and the Israelis as technical and maintenance personnel. Jordanian forces have aided Iraq while both Syria and Israel have aided Iran in the Iraq-Iran war. In 1969, however, three brigades of Iraqi troops had been stationed in Jordan and one in Syria in support of both countries against Israel. British, Iranian and Jordanian forces all served together in Oman. In the summer of 1973, Moroccan troops were transported by the USSR to serve in Syria. Four years later, in 1977, Moroccan forces served together with French forces in the Zaire-Shaba incursion against Katangese insurgents armed by the USSR and the GDR. Cuban pilots fly Soviet-built Southern Yemenese aircraft and Taiwanese pilots were hired to fly US-built aircraft for the Yemen Arab Republic (2). The use of foreign pilots is a practice common in an area where oil-rich and even less affluent nations have bought large armories of sophisticated weapons, particularly aircraft, but do not have the trained personnel required to maintain or to operate them. According to Egyptian military sources, in 1981 Libya reportedly used 60 Soviet pilots, 60 Cuban pilots, 40 Syrian pilots, 60 Palestinian pilots and 48 Pakistani pilots, or 268 of the 390 pilots available to Libya at the time (3). The mix is often necessitated by the variety of planes a particular govern-

ment has acquired.

Pakistani military missions reportedly were present in 22 different countries. Other related examples are North Korea, which had military training advisers in approximately a dozen countries in the 1970s, and Israel which had military training missions in a large number of states in the 1960s and 1970s. India had extended military assistance to 26 different countries as of 1980, and the Indian military aid mission in Bhutan, IMTRAT, numbers 5,000 men and functionally occupies the country.

These randomly selected examples have been given to provide an idea of the dispersion and complexity of these activities. It is important to emphasize once again that these are just a very few examples selected from among a very large population of actors and activities for purposes of illustration. If any sort of comprehensive catalogue were attempted, it would occupy very many pages. And many more pages would be needed if one attempted to add up the allegations of the lower level, "non-collaborative" categories of military intervention, short of major battles and open warfare, such as cross-border artillery duels, overflights and so on. These often number in the dozens in a single locale, and sometimes allegedly in the hundreds and even in the thousands before and after a single small-scale war. For example, military skirmishes along the Soviet-Chinese border had been taking place between 1959 and the sharper outbreak in March 1969, and each side had cited thousands of violations against the other. Vietnamese and Chinese accused each other of similarly large number of violations both before and after their short war in February 1979. Iraq accused Iran of 256 border violations and 266 artillery or bombing attacks against Iraqi territory between February 1979 and September 1980 (4). In scarcely any instance of these kinds of cross-border allegaltions anywhere in the world is there any independent verification of what actually took place or the ability to ascertain which side may actually have been responsible for the events.

The following sections indicate some of the activities of the more prominent of a new category of interventionist nations, for the most part themselves developing nations.

ISRAEL

Israel participated in the invasion of Egypt, along with France and Britain, in 1956. In the early 1960s, Israel had established military training missions in a wide range of developing nations. The number of these was substantially reduced following the Middle East war in 1967, but Israel has begun to reestablish such services and shows no reluctance to supply arms and advisors at the height of ongoing conflicts, for example in several Central American states, South Africa and Ceylon. Israel was apparently also involved to a degree that still has not been clarified in the military coup by Idi Amin in Uganda in 1971.

Since the war in 1967, Israel has occupied the West Bank and Gaza strip areas with no indication that it ever intends to relinquish these. It annexed East Jerusalem soon after 1967 and the Golan Heights in December 1981.

Israel has carried out two major invasions of Lebanon: in March 1978 and in June 1982. Sizable portions of Lebanon were already occupied by two foreign military forces, those of the PLO and of Syria. The latter also included other small national contingents of a joint Arab force at various times. In addition, Israel has carried out smaller incursions into Lebanon (for example, in November 1979, June 1980, etc.) and many hundreds of air, artillery and naval bombardments of Lebanese territory beginning in 1972. Israel's bombing raid against Iraq's nuclear energy installation in June 1981 was the first of its kind in post-war history and a major precedent.

Two principal objectives are reported to underlie activities by Israel outside of the Middle East: the desire of Israel to cushion its diplomatic isolation among third-world nations caused by the Middle East conflict and by Arab diplomacy, and to create markets essential to ease the burden of its large military industries. The desire to earn hard currency — in part related to the second of these objectives — is often also mentioned. An unidentified Israeli official was quoted in 1982 as follows:

> When a country friendly to Israel asks for help, we do not ask whether it is democratic or non-democratic and we don't ask about its motives. (1)

It seems a very fair description, Israel having aided at various times South Africa, Taiwan, Nigeria, Zaire, Khomeini's Iran and post-Selassie Ethiopia. It has also produced unusual partnerships in particular military

assistance relationships, with Israeli technicians servicing aircraft flown by Egyptian pilots in the Nigerian civil war, and Israeli, Libyan, (Soviet) and Cuban advisors aiding the Ethiopian government simultaneously in 1977-78.

> Israel began to move into markets vacated by the United States, mainly to countries denied American arms because of human rights violations. These included not only most of the countries of Central America — Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica — but Argentina and Chile as well.
>
> Israel entered the Central/Latin American market in the mid-1970's largely to supply small arms to the Nicaraguan regime headed by Anastasio Somoza Debayle. Israel continued supplying Somoza nearly until the final collapse of his regime (despite entreaties by the Carter Administration to stop much earlier). Since those initial sales, Israel has entrenched itself firmly in the region as a supplier of equipment as well as training troops. In addition, in Costa Rica and Guatemala, Israelis were assisting in intelligence activities. "The number of weapons and specialists provided, though not large in absolute terms, are generally viewed as substantial by standards of the small security forces in Central America " (2).

In Africa and in some Asian countries, Israel has been involved in the same kinds of activities, and in some additional ones as well. In 1969, Israel joined the United States, Belgium and Italy in providing training to the military forces of the Congo (now Zaire) (3). In January 1983, Israel signed a comprehensive, five-year agreement with Zaire to overhaul the Zairian Armed Forces. The agreement involved a broad range of arms sales and training for the Zairian air and ground forces, both in Zaire and in Israel (4). Israeli pilots reportedly operated Ethiopian F-5 aircraft in 1977 and 1978 (5). Israel reportedly also sold Soviet military equipment that had been captured in the 1973 war to Ethiopia. When the Israeli military presence in Ethiopia and its role in helping the Ethiopian government in Eritrea was divulged by Moshe Dayan in 1978, the Ethiopian military leadership requested that the Israeli personnel be withdrawn; the public disclosure was too compromising. In 1985 it was again disclosed that Israel had been supplying Soviet equipment to Ethiopia (6). In the late 1960s, Israel had trained Ugandan paratroops during the first tenure of President Obote. A force of these paratroops led by Idi Amin, and allegedly with the help of Israeli advisors stationed in Uganda, toppled Obote in a military coup (7). In 1981 it was reported that Israel had 200 troops stationed in South Africa teaching "anti-terrorist tactics" to the South African Army (8). Israel has also sold South Africa a wide variety of military equipment despite the United Nations embargo on the sale of military equipment to that country (9).

In 1984, Israel apparently accepted an agreement to train the Sri Lankan army, after the United States and Great Britain had reportedly both rejected such a role (10). Israel has been supplying the Khomeini government during the Iran-Iraq war with various military supplies obtained from the United States, in direct violation of the arms transfer agreements by which Israel obtained the supplies from the US (11).

On June 7, 1981, eight Israeli F-16 aircraft, procured from the United States, overflew Saudi Arabian and Jordanian territory and then bombed Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor that was still under construction (12). The reactor had not yet been loaded with fissionable material, though some was reportedly located at the construction site, and the reactor was included under IAEA safeguard arrangements. It was the first overt military attack in history on a nuclear facility. A smaller scale, ineffectual attack had apparently been made by Iranian aircraft in late September or October 1980 on the same reactor (13). If Iraq had planned to develop nuclear weapons with reactor-produced materials, it would probably have required a half dozen years or more to do so. However, it was safer to destroy the reactor before it had been loaded with fuel than afterwards and this fact presumably determined the time of the Israeli bombing. In defence of its action, Israeli Prime Minister Begin claimed to quote an October 4, 1980, statement by Iraq's President Suddam Hussein that the nuclear weapons Iraq would produce were intended for use against Israel. Prime Minister Begin's office subsequently admitted that the reference "did not exist" (14). It was the

> ... first time since the invention of atomic weapons that a state has insisted that it had the right to destroy in another country any atomic facility that it suspects may be developing nuclear weapons for its destruction (15).

Israel claimed the right to repeat the action, and against any other nation which it felt was developing nuclear weapons intended for use against itself. In view of Israel's far more advanced nuclear weapon development program of many years' standing, the act is even more hypocritical and cannot be seen to have any anti-proliferation significance, which might otherwise have been the case. Using the same argument by which Israel justified its bombing, any of several Arab states could bomb Israel's Dimona reactor at any time, in peacetime as well as during a period of open war, and could have done so at any time since 1970 or even earlier. By that year the Israeli nuclear weapon development program was assumed to have been well on the way to developing usable weapons. The precedent

of one nation bombing the nuclear facilities of another must be assumed to be of enormous significance, the consequences of which, however, will only be capable of assessment in twenty or thirty years time. The UN Security Council considered that the attack "constituted a serious threat to the entire IAEA safeguards regime which is the foundation of the non-proliferation treaty" (16).

The event was bound to happen sooner or later, but it presumably was desirable that it be postponed as long as possible. United States reaction was minimal: a verbal protest which spoke of the "unprecedented character" of the act, the temporary delay in the delivery of four aircraft, and a notification to Congress that an infraction in the terms of transfer of US military supplies to Israel, "a substantial violation of the 1952 agreement may have occurred". The infraction was admitted by Israel and was unquestionable, but the ambiguous notification to Congress that it "may have occurred" was all that was required by US law, which had been amended in 1976 to remove much stricter restraints (17). The United States also voted — together with Israel — against the United Nations General Assembly condemnation of Israel for the bombing attack (18). Following the attack Israel also informed Washington that overflights would continue through Saudi Arabian airspace "for intelligence-gathering purposes" (19).

In 1970, the PLO was defeated in battle by Jordanian government forces and expelled from Jordan. Major portions of the remaining PLO forces moved first into Syria and then into Lebanon where PLO camps had existed for some time. After two Palestinian attacks against Israelis in 1972 — at Tel Aviv airport on May 30, 1972, and at the Munich Olympics on September 5, 1972 — Israel began the policy of responding to such attacks by bombing or commando raids against Palestinian locations in Lebanon. The first two such reprisals followed the events mentioned on June 20, and September 8, 1972. Israel continued such attacks throughout the period from 1973 to 1978. The 1975-76 Lebanese civil war resulted in the occupation of major portions of Lebanon by Syria. The Syrian forces were reinforced by substantial military contingents from half a dozen other Arab states, and the costs of the Syrian occupation was borne by Saudi Arabia and other Arab oil states.

On March 14, 1978, Israel initiated a massive invasion of Lebanon, eventually occupying most of the area south of the Litani River with 20,000 men except for the city of Tyre. Israel was stopped at the Litani River by pressure from US President Carter. Israel was careful not to engage Syrian forces in Lebanon and came under major pressure from the

Carter administration to withdraw its forces entirely. Israel began its withdrawal as early as April 11 and completed it after 91 days of presence in Lebanon on June 13, 1978. A zone north of the Israeli/ Lebanese border was controlled by a United Nations force (UNIFIL) and a Lebanese Christian military force which was supplied and supported by Israel and had Israeli officers serving as advisors. Israel continued raids north of the UNIFIL zone, for example on June 13 and also massed troops along the Syrian and Lebanese borders, as for example on July 7, which led to a Syrian counter-alert. Syria had responded in a similar manner on previous occasions, for example on November 23, 1976. In October 1978 Israeli gunboats shelled Syrian positions in West Beirut in response to Syrian shelling of Christian portions of the Lebanese capital. Israel continued air and commando raids all through 1979, 1980, and 1981 (20). Aerial engagements between Syrian and Israeli aircraft over Lebanon took place in August and December 1980 and in February and April 1981. On the day following the last of these, Syria moved surface-to-air missiles into the Bekaa valley in Lebanon. Following US mediation, a cease-fire was approved on July 24, 1981, in which all parties agreed to cease hostilities between Lebanese territory and Israel. On December 14, 1981, Israel annexed the Syrian territory of the Golan Heights, occupied since 1967. East Jerusalem, captured from Jordan, had been annexed by Israel directly after the 1967 war.

On June 3, 1982, an assassination attempt was made on Israel's ambassador in London. Israel bombed targets in Lebanon as a reprisal. In turn the PLO shelled villages in Northern Israel on June 4-5. On June 6, Israel launched a massive invasion of Lebanon for which it had obviously been prepared long in advance. Israel stated that the objective of the invasion was to expel PLO forces from a zone 40 kilometers north of the Israeli/Lebanese border. However, the immediately preceeding events were a pretext: the invasion had been planned and prepared for months (21). There was no intention to stop at the 40-km. "line", Syrian forces were intentionally attacked in major air and tank battles and Israel occupied much of the southern half of Lebanon, including Beirut. Israel only began a withdrawal late in 1984 and by April 1985 still occupied Lebanon south of the Litani River. The withdrawal was not completed until Israel had occupied Lebanon for three full years.

The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon provides the opportunity to discuss a subject that is dealt with very little in the remainder of this

study — the decisions that are the basis for intervention and invasion in particular cases. Nevertheless, it is impossible to say to what degree these decisions might be considered typical, and the events in the Israeli government during 1982 are presumed to be atypical not only for Israel but for other governments as well (22). In addition, these events enable something to be said about the contacts between Israel and the United States prior to the 1982 invasion, which permitted the Israeli government to feel that it had US support for its actions.

Two persons were instrumental in the Israeli government decision to invade Lebanon: Prime Minister Begin and Defence Minister Sharon. Their intention was to destroy the PLO in Lebanon and thus to tighten Israel's hold on the occupied West Bank territories. A week after Prime Minister Begin had abruptly requested his cabinet to approve the annexation of the Golan Heights in December 1981, he surprised them by requesting their immediate advance approval for a war plan for the invasion of Lebanon. The cabinet refused. Large portions of the Israeli General Staff and intelligence community also opposed the plan devised by Sharon. For the most part, the cabinet was subsequently kept ignorant of the plans — and of knowledge of the General Staff's opposition. They were also not informed of the intention once the war was initiated to go beyond the 40-km. line, to engage Syrian forces, and to occupy Beirut. Sharon secretly travelled to Beirut in January 1982 to confer with Phalangist leaders, who were interested in encouraging an Israeli attack against the Palestinians and Syrians in Lebanon (23).

Most important, however, was Sharon's visit to Washington and to US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig. The United States had exercised its veto in the UN Security Council vote which condemned the Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights. Though Begin had decided in favor of war in Lebanon, he could not initiate it unless the United States acknowledged that the PLO was acting in violation of the cease-fire agreement that had been negotiated as a result of United States mediation only six months before. On December 5, even before Begin approached his own cabinet, Sharon had divulged selected portions of his invasion plan to US negotiator Philip Habib. According to US Ambassador to Israel, Samuel Lewis, Habib " ... made it extraordinarily clear to Sharon that this was an unthinkable proposition as far as the US government was concerned" (24). Habib reported the conversations to Washington. US intelligence had pieced together most of the Israeli invasion plan and these were even substantially disclosed by April 1982 in a NBC-TV news report. The United States revoked

the Memorandum of Strategic Understanding earlier signed between Sharon and US Secretary of Defence Weinberger which Begin and Sharon had sought as a quid pro quo for agreeing to the US sale of AWAC aircraft to Saudi Arabia and which they interpreted as US acquiescence to any subsequent Israeli military action. On May 28, just a week before the invasion of Lebanon, Haig had also written a cautionary letter to Begin. Nevertheless the Secretary of State's direct remarks on separate occasions to three senior Israeli government officials were taken by Israel as tacit approval of the invasion plans. If the Shiff-Ya'ari report is an accurate reflection of the substance of the conversations between US Secretary of State Haig and Sharon and other senior Israeli government officials, then the absence of specific questions put to Israeli officials seems astonishing. In addition, the occasional use of the US negotiating mission in the Middle East to act as a "hot-line" between Israel and the PLO in the period just prior to the invasion ran the risk of subsequently being suspected of strategic deception on behalf of Israel.

However, there is at least one indication that there is very much more to the story. If Sharon is to be believed, he supplied a much more crucial piece of information than all of Haig's equivocal and semi-permissive skirting of essentials reported by Shiff and Ya'ari. In an interview with Oriana Fallaci in August 1982, Sharon stated:

> Of course we evaluated the diverse possibilities of a Soviet intervention, and we talked about it with the Americans (26).

This should hardly be unexpected, particularly given Sharon's existing plans to engage the Syrian ground forces. Under such circumstances, Israel would have to know whether it would have US support and in what form and degree should the USSR intervene to support Syria. The USSR had threatened to intervene on behalf of Egypt in 1973, which resulted in a US nuclear alert, among other responses (27). Recent evidence suggests that there is every reason to assume that such considerations should have been anticipated:

> ... as early as June 1982, two tough Brezhnev communiqués to Reagan raised the prospect of Soviet intervention if Israeli "aggression" against Syria were not stopped. In a second, previously unreported incident of importance, American intelligence learned in that period of Soviet troop movements, including logistical arrangements and the establishment of secure communications. US analysts concluded that the USSR might dispatch two Soviet airborne divisions to Damascus. Reagan, then in Europe, at that point insisted that Israel immediately halt its efforts to envelop Syrian troops in the Bekaa Valley (28).

It is known that detailed Israeli-American consultations and contingency operational planning took place at the time of the Syrian-Jordanian conflict in September 1970, when Israel threatened to intervene on behalf of Jordan and the United States raised the alert levels of airborne troops located in Europe as well as placed some of its nuclear forces on alert. It is very likely that US intelligence was able to discern Israel's logistical preparations before the 1978 Israeli invasion of Lebanon just as it did in the months prior to June 1982. However, there is no public record of the nature of any US/Israeli interactions prior to the invasion in 1978, and the Carter administration unequivocally opposed that intervention. Sharon's disclosure defines the US culpability as infinitely greater than simply the partial acquiescence of Secretary Haig. The mild phrasing of Destler and Gelb, that Haig "... had been successful in winning a restrained American response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon", indicates the enormous significance of events that can be glossed over in a brief euphemistic political comment (29).

Shiff and Ya'ari's major point is that

> The war in Lebanon unfolded as it did because of a sharp departure from the conventions and norms of government in Israel, a lapse that made it possible for the country to "slip" into an offensive military operation that a decisive majority of the Cabinet had rejected from the outset. One individual — Defense Minister Ariel Sharon — arrogated the authority to conduct a major military venture as he saw fit and encountered no effective opposition from his government colleagues until the nation hovered on the brink of disaster. Promising what he never meant to deliver, Sharon transformed the war in Lebanon into a personal campaign, even though the Cabinet had disqualified his approach, the country's intelligence community cautioned against it and the senior ranks of the army — not to mention the political opposition and certain sectors of the press — forthrightly opposed it (30).

In comparing the two invasions of Lebanon by Israel, in 1978 and in 1982, one could consider the differences in magnitude between the two an indication of the amount that can be achieved by two senior government leaders bent on conquest, substantial portions of concealment and deception, and the aid of a careless and inconsequential political leadership of Israel's superpower patron, the United States.

The invasion ultimately resulted in the US intervention in Lebanon, and the subsequent defeat of Israel's goals as well as those of the Reagan administration as Israel and the United States were finally forced to withdraw. Peace negotiations between the Lebanese parties in Geneva quickly collapsed, and Syria and its Lebanese Muslim allies were able to destroy the agreement signed between Israel and the Lebanese government of Amin Gemayel, as well as the Lebanese army (31).

SOUTH AFRICA

South African military forces have carried out extensive operations in Zimbabwe (prior to majority rule when it was known as Rhodesia), Angola and Mozambique and have made intermittent and briefer attacks in Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. South Africa has also supplied arms to and provided military training for insurgent groups operating against the governments of Mozambique, Lesotho, Zambia and Angola, at times from within South African territory.

South African military intervention in the Rhodesian civil war began in September 1967 with the deployment of ground troops against ZAPU. By 1968 the number of South African troops serving in Rhodesia reached 2,700, only 1,000 less than the Rhodesian regular army (1). The South African expeditionary forces included helicopter-equipped airborne units and, on occasion, fighter bombers. In 1979, South Africa acknowledged that its military forces had been operating inside Rhodesia "for some time... to protect South African interests and transportation links" (2). South African forces operated from a command headquarters at Fort Victoria, in Southern Rhodesia. South African officers were in addition allowed to serve with the Rhodesian forces.

It might also be useful in this section to note that in the course of the Rhodesian civil war, military forces of the Ian Smith government repeatedly attacked the territory of neighboring states in their efforts to destroy the ZAPU and ZANU guerillas. For example, they operated:

- inside Zambia, in August 1977, September 1977, March 1978, August 1978, October, November and December 1978, and July and August 1979;
- inside Mozambique, in August 1976, November 1977, May/June 1977, November 1977, June 1978, July 1978, October 1978.

These were bombing raids and helicopter and ground-troop attacks. Rhodesian troops also aided Portugal in fighting in Mozambique.

South African aircraft carried out aerial herbicide spraying operations in Northern Mozambique in April 1972 in areas in which anti-Portuguese forces were active (3). Since the independence of Mozambique, South Africa has carried out intermittent raids in the country, for example in January and March 1981 and again in May and October 1983 (4). Beginning in 1981, South Africa has supplied an antigovernment organization, the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MNR), with arms and has trained its forces

in South Africa. The MNR was originally created by the former Ian Smith government in Rhodesia to harrass Mozambique for harboring Robert Mugabe's ZANU forces which were fighting the Rhodesian government. It was composed of whites and blacks who had fled from Mozambique when it obtained its independence. When the Smith government fell, the MNR was adopted by South Africa and has carried out military operations in all except the two northern-most provinces of Mozambique. By early 1983, the MNR was reported to have 5,000 to 6,000 armed men inside Mozambique and to have established a network of several hundred camps within the country (5). The movement also apparently uses bases in Malawi and possibly other African countries as well. There are isolated reports of South African troops participating in MNR attacks close to the South African border. Western governments, including the Reagan administration, opposed South Africa's clandestine support for rebel movements in its neighboring countries as they believed that this would only succeed in producing violence and instability and in increasing the requests for Cuban and Soviet-bloc aid on the part of the countries being attacked. Mozambique was reported to have 200 Tanzanian troops training its armed forces, as well as between 800 and 1,000 Soviet, GDR and Cuban military and security "advisers". About 1,500 troops from Zimbabwe reportedly guarded the 188-mile oil pipeline that is the source of Zimbabwe's external fuel supply, which runs from Mutare on the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border to the port of Beira on Mozambique's coast.

In March 1984, Mozambique and South Africa signed a "non-aggression pact" after several months of negotiation. Mozambique essentially agreed to prevent the South African National Congress from using its territory in exchange for a South African promise to withdraw its covert support for the MNR — support which South Africa has never publicly acknowledged (6). Mozambique had basically been forced to negotiate the accord due to the MNR's successful campaign of economic and infrastructure destruction. Within one month after the agreement had been signed, the Beira-Mutare oil pipeline was blown up on three occasions, though there were now reportedly 5,000 Zimbabwian troops in Mozambique to guard it (7), and early in 1985 the MNR again destroyed electricity pylons which delivered 8 - 10 percent of South Africa's electricity from the Cabora Bassa dam in Mozambique, something which it had been doing regularly since 1980 (8). The 1983 South African-Mozambican agreement contained a clause requiring both sides to protect the transmission lines, but this has not been acted upon and the

value of the entire agreement is in doubt.

In August 1978, South African forces invaded Zambia in an operation that lasted several days in an effort to destroy SWAPO bases and guerilla forces (9). In 1980 it was reported that Zambian dissidents were being trained in South Africa. South Africa has also carried out raids inside Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, for example in Botswana in 1981 and 1985, in Lesotho in December 1982 and January 1983 (10). South Africa states that it will use "... military power against any neighbor that lets its territory be used for guerilla incursions against South Africa", at the same time as it claims a policy of "non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries". In 1982, a group of mercenaries with backing from South African security services attempted a coup against the socialist government of the Seychelles, 1,000 miles off the African coast in the Indian Ocean (11). They were beaten off by Tanzanian-supported Seychellese troops. Sometime in the early 1980s, South Africa also reportedly began supplying arms to Somalia (12). The agreements included pilots and instructors for the small Somali air force and South African construction at a small airport and the port of Kisimayu, both of which would then be available for use by South Africa's navy and air force.

Most of South Africa's external military operations, however, have taken place in Angola. These began before the withdrawal of Portugal. Early in August 1975, South Africa sent military forces into Southern Angola. This was reportedly done with the prior knowledge and approval of the Portuguese government, and South Africa claimed that it was primarily interested in protecting the hydroelectric projects on the Cunene River (13). South Africa was, however, interested in the defeat of the MPLA and in August reportedly established training bases for FNLA and UNITA forces in Angola and Namibia. On October 23, 1975, between 5,000 and 10,000 well-armed South African troops invaded Angola. On November 11, the day of Portugal's withdrawal, South African forces were reported to be less than 200 miles from Luanda, some 1,000 kilometers north of the Namibian border (14). (The major 1975-1976 interventions are discussed further in the section on Cuba: the Angolan interventions.) South African forces reportedly also established a "buffer zone" inside Angola which the South African government said would remain until "a new Angolan government assures Pretoria that it will not provide bases for terrorists striking across the border into Namibia" (15). The strip of occupied territory was 50 miles deep and stretched from the Atlantic coast to the Zambia border. It was

reportedly patrolled by 4,000 to 5,000 South African troops. By the end of January 1976, after the commitment of the Cuban expeditionary force to Angola, South African forces had pulled back to these positions and in March 1976 began what it claimed was a total withdrawal from Angola (16). As will be seen below, it was not. Angola accused South Africa of aggression in the United Nations Security Council (17). The previous South African military operations in Rhodesia and Mozambique had gone unremarked, but the involvement of so large a South African invasion force so deep into Angola produced a slight domestic reaction. The operations could not be described as "hot pursuit". To remove doubts about the (domestic) legality of the South African invasion of Angola, new defense legislation was passed in 1976 that permitted South African military personnel to be sent into action outside the borders of the Union of South Africa. A retroactive clause was included which brought the act into force as of August 9, 1975.

South Africa continued intermittent operations in Angola through 1985. These were called "raids" in the earlier years, although they were carried out by armored ground units including heavy tanks, helicopter-borne troops, and fighter bomber attacks. Such actions took place in July 1977, May 1978, June 1980, March 1981. South Africa stated that it would invade Angola again if "Namibian insurgents" continued attacks from Angolan territory (19). The June 1980 invasion lasted three weeks. On August 23, 1981, South Africa launched "Operation Protea" in Angola which reportedly involved 11,000 troops (20). South Africa continued operations in 1981 and 1982, carrying out reconnaissance flights over Southern Angolan provinces, bombing raids, operations to aid UNITA forces, and longer range sabotage missions such as the attack on an oil refinery in Luanda in November 1981 (21). South African forces reportedly established two bases in Southern Angola, in Chiedo and Nautila, just north of the Namibian border (22). In December 1983 some 2,000 South African troops again invaded Angola, going 200 miles north of the Namibian border and taking part in pitched battles with Angolan and Cuban troops (23). In February 1984, South Africa and Angola reached an agreement similar to the one between South Africa and Mozambique. Under its terms, Angola would reduce its support for SWAPO, the Namibian liberation movement based in Angola, in return for a gradual South African withdrawal from Angolan territory. In March 1984, it was announced that 6,000 — 8,000 South African troops "who have been occupying nearly one-third of Angola" would begin to withdraw to South Africa (24). Angola was to ensure that

the area vacated by South Africa would remain free of both SWAPO forces and Cuban troops. In April 1985 it became apparent that South Africa still had not completed the withdrawal. Late in 1984, it had stopped 40 kilometers north of the Angola-Namibia border (25). It now announced that the remaining troops would be withdrawn in a week.

It is interesting to note that the traditional South African foreign policy establishment, the Foreign Ministry, has had very little influence on these events. It was reportedly excluded from the decision to invade Angola in 1975 (26). P.W. Botha, the former Defence Minister who strongly represents the positions of the military services, has since become Prime Minister and has brought the military into the government councils to an unprecedented degree. The policy-making body on the question of South Africa's external military operations is not the Cabinet, but the State Security Council, which has a large number of military members.

VIETNAM

Since its victory in 1975, Vietnam has maintained an army of 1.3 million men, the third largest in the world. It has subsequently occupied two neighboring countries, Laos and Cambodia.

Vietnamese troops in Laos were reportedly withdrawn after the communist Pathet Lao took control of the Coalition Government in the spring of 1975. They were apparently reintroduced some time in 1976 (1). When a Laotian Foreign Ministry official first admitted the presence of Vietnamese military forces, in March 23, 1979, it was justified on the basis of Article II of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Laos and Vietnam (2). This treaty was, however, not signed until July 18, 1977. The number of Vietnamese troops in Laos has been reported at about 30,000 in mid-1978, 40,000 in mid-1979, and 45,000 in 1985. Their first task in 1976 and 1977 was to fight the Meo and Hmong hill tribes that had attempted to keep Laotian and Vietnamese troops out of their traditional areas. In this early period, some members of these tribal groups that had previously fled to Thailand were also being reinfiltrated into Laos to resist government control of their areas. The Thai government has reported that between the summer of 1975 and November 1984 over 284,000 people had crossed into Thailand from Laos. With a UN population estimate for Laos of 3.8 million in 1981, this would account for 13.3 percent of the Laotian population (3). Almost 10 percent reportedly had left between mid-1975 and mid-1979. The Vietnamese Air Force took part in these campaigns, in order to bomb tribal villages in the highlands, and those attacks gave rise to the first allegations of Vietnamese use of chemical munitions (4).

After the end of these campaigns, the Vietnamese troops were referred to as "work brigades". During this period, the USSR apparently established electronic intelligence (Elint) facilities at the Laotian-Chinese border. Under Laotian government agreements with China dating from 1962, there had also been several thousand Chinese troops in Northwestern Laos building roads (5). They had originally been requested by Laos. During the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, part of the Vietnamese forces entered Cambodia from Laotian territory. After the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in February 1979, first the USSR and then Hanoi charged that China was committing aggression against Laos. Finally Laos accused China of border threats, revoked the 1962 agreement and asked China to withdraw

the roadbuilding crews. A Western observer remarked that "...everyone has seen the Vietnamese here. They are not here by accident. China is the enemy. Laos has to fight China. That is the bargain" (6). By mid-March 1979, Laos formally charged China with a border incursion, claiming that Chinese troops had penetrated three miles inside Laos in a six mile-wide area, and requested the UN Secretary-General to obtain a Chinese withdrawal. Laos did not ask for a UN Security Council meeting. Up to this point, it seems unlikely that China had taken any particular action but, by the end of 1980, there were reports that the Cambodian Khmer Rouge had began supplying arms to anti-government Laotian groups, with Chinese knowledge (7).

By mid-1979, it was accepted that Laotian government policies were determined by Vietnam and this situation has continued to the present time. The country is effectively under Vietnamese control. In 1985, the Thai Foreign Ministry also charged that Vietnam was encouraging settlement by Vietnamese in Laos, although the number alleged are smaller than the Vietnamese program of settlement in Eastern Cambodia.

Cambodian and Vietnamese relations have been historically difficult and have always included substantial conflict and antipathy. The Cambodian communist party was formed quite late, in the mid-1960s, and its relations with its more developed brother party in Vietnam seems to have been no exception. The Cambodian party, or factions within it, frequently resisted Vietnamese direction. At the time of the US invasion of Cambodia in April 1970, the Khmer Rouge were an insignificant political force. It grew as the armed opposition to the US supported Lon Nol's military government which had toppled Prince Sihanouk in March 1970. Although Prince Sihanouk returned as nominal head of state between September 1975 and April 1976, when he resigned — a period during which he was literally held under house arrest — the Khmer Rouge secretly controlled the government under Pol Pot, the Communist Party secretary. The existence of the communist party was officially confirmed only in the autumn of 1977. Cambodians of Vietnamese ancestry were expelled from Eastern Cambodia, or fled to Vietnam, just as had been the case during the 1970-1975 Government of Lon Nol (8).

Armed border warfare, as well as intraparty conflicts broke out literally within days of the communist victories in Cambodia and Vietnam in April-May 1975. They concerned the two islands of Koh Way and Phu Quoc in the Gulf of Thailand, both of which were claimed by Cambodia. Viewed historically, the Cambodian claims were justified. The borders had been

established by a French commission in 1879, and traditional Khmer-inhabited areas were included in what became Vietnam since it placed them under stronger French control at the time (9). Cambodian forces attacked the larger island, Phu Quoc which had been occupied by Vietnam, and Vietnam replied by attacking Koh Way, much farther to the West. Cambodian forces also attacked villages in the renowned "Parrots Beak" area which jutted into Cambodia. Vietnam easily retained control of all the areas that it already held. The border war escalated dramatically in 1977 and 1978, and a small-scale war was in progress for two years. Cambodian troops entered Vietnam in widely separated areas along their common border in January, April, July, August and September 1977. Smaller attacks were also made on villages along in the Cambodian-Thai border. During November-December, Vietnamese forces of about 50,000 men counter-attacked and penetrated for over a month as far as 40 km. into several provinces of Cambodia (10). Cambodia broke diplomatic relations with Vietnam on December 31, 1977, and in the spring and summer of 1978 Cambodian attacks into Vietnam continued. They were countered by Vietnamese attacks into Cambodia. In April 1978 the Khmer Rouge cadres that governed Eastern Cambodia, with Heng Samrin at their head, fled to Vietnam and Radio Hanoi called for an uprising against the Pol Pot government. On December 3, 1978, Hanoi announced the formation of the National Salvation Front of Kampuchea under Heng Samrin, and on December 25, a full-strength Vietnamese Invasion force of 100,000 men entered Cambodia to topple the Pol Pot government (11). Vietnam attempted to portray the invasion force as being composed of Cambodian "insurgents". Phnom Penh was captured by January 7, 1979 (12) and in a few weeks the entire country was essentially under control of Vietnam, with the new government headed by Heng Samrin. A friendship treaty was signed with Vietnam on February 16, 1979. On the following day, February 17, China launched a brief but costly invasion of Cambodia. In the year that followed, the Vietnamese occupation forces in Cambodia grew to 200,000 men.

In the three and a half years between April 1975 and December 1978, another event of importance took place in Kampuchea which will reserve a place for the Pol Pot — Khmer Rouge government of Kampuchea in the historical annals of infamy. Out of an estimated population of 7.3 million in 1975, when the government came to power, between 700,000 and one million people died in Kampuchea. It is estimated that between 70,000 and 100,000 people were actually executed while the remainder died from starvation and disease directly attributable to the regime's politically motivated programs

of urban displacement and forced communal agricultural production (13). The consequences of these murderous events, a consciously organized "experiment in genocide" quickly became known to the West, to Vietnam, and to China, which supported the Khmer Rouge and supports it to this day. They were, however, not the reason for the Vietnamese invasion, which was carried out as a result of the continuous border warfare initiated and maintained by the Khmer Rouge. The new Cambodian government established by Vietnam was composed of cadres from the previous Pol Pot government who were as fully responsible for the events in Cambodia in the areas under their control as were their communist party collegues elsewhere in Cambodia (14).

As Vietnam's relations with China deteriorated, Vietnam furthermore initiated a genocidal program of its own, albeit organized in a more sophisticated way and from a much larger population base. 961,115 Indochinese have been resettled in the West since 1975, and 260,000 Vietnamese of Chinese origin — the "Hoas" — have been resettled in China. The number resettled in the West includes the so-called Vietnamese "boat people", often also Hoa. These total 562,000 as of March 1985 (and 598,109 as of May 1985), according to the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees. Since it has been estimated that at least 50 percent of the boat people leaving Vietnam have perished at sea, and about 600,000 have arrived, this means that another 600,000 people or more may have died. Since it is clear that these "boat people" have been forcibly expelled by Vietnam (15), their resulting deaths are the responsibility of conscious Vietnamese government decisions and programs and in a class with those of the Pol Pot Kampuchean government which has been universally condemned and that Vietnam deposed.

Remnants of the Khmer Rouge military forces have remained intact along the Cambodian-Thai border for most of the period since January 1979 and the Vietnamese occupation army has remained in Cambodia at nearly full strength as well at least in part as a consequence. The US-backed relief effort along the Thai border area has helped to sustain the Khmer Rouge, China and the United States have supported their continued representation in the United Nations, and China has continued to supply them with arms. Previous announcements by Vietnam that it has withdrawn part of its forces from Cambodia (for example in July 1982 and March 1985) have been discounted as troop rotations and it is estimated that 160,000 to 180,000 Vietnamese troops remain in Cambodia. In July 1982, Vietnam had announced that it would not withdraw all of its troops from Kampuchea until "the threat from

China is neutralized by the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Vietnam and China." However, in April 1985, Vietnam announced that it would reduce its troop strength in Cambodia by half by 1987 if no negotiated settlement were reached (16). One third of the troops would be withdrawn by the end of 1985, a second third by 1990, and the last third by 1995. In exchange for the military equipment and Soviet aid estimated at $1billion per year that Vietnam has obtained from the USSR to maintain its large military forces and the combat operations in Cambodia, the USSR has obtained the former American naval base at Camh Ranh Bay and has developed it into the largest Soviet overseas military base outside of Warsaw Pact territory. It also uses Da Nang airbase and Tan Son Nhut airport. It has also developed the Cambodian port of Kompong Som for Soviet use. There have been allegations of Cuban and DDR military advisory personnel in Cambodia, but these are difficult to verify. Soviet pilots are reported to have flown the transport aircraft which ferried Vietnamese troops to Western Cambodia, and Soviet aircraft maintenance personnel have also been reported in Vietnam.

The military alignments and counteralignments in Indochina are composed of a chain of interacting antagonistic dyads: the USSR-China, Vietnam-China, Thailand-Vietnam and between 1975 and 1979, Vietnam-Cambodia. Thus, the USSR supports Vietnam against China, and China supports the Khmer Rouge and Thailand against Vietnam. Vietnam signed a mutual security treaty with the USSR in November 1978, immediately before it invaded Cambodia, as a clear defense against reprisal by China. China has felt impelled to attempt to relieve Vietnamese military pressure on Cambodia and Thailand. This has led to repeated military engagements between China and Vietnam and Vietnam and Thailand since Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia.

As indicated, China launched a sizable and costly invasion of Vietnam across several portions of their mutual frontier in February 1979 (17). Between 1980 and 1985, there were allegations of literally hundreds of artillery duels and cross-border clashes. It is sometimes difficult to know when these allegations by one or the other side are credible. After some two months of alleged escalating tensions and artillery duels, it was reported in May 1983 that the charges by both Vietnam and China were exaggerated and in some cases even fabricated for various political reasons (18). It was in fact later reported that China had withdrawn its regular army forces in 1982-1983 some 30-60 miles from the border, and Vietnam had similarly withdrawn its regular forces 30 miles in order to

dampen hostilities. However, in the spring of 1984, border crossings and artillery attacks were again reported after Vietnam had occupied territory inside Thailand (19). In February 1985, the same pattern was repeated and China threatened a second large-scale invasion as Vietnam carried out its most extensive campaign against camps of the Khmer Rouge and of other opposition groups just along the Thai border inside Cambodia. In some instances, these attacks crossed into Thailand and developed into battles with Thai forces.

In December 1979, Vietnam warned Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries to keep out of Cambodian affairs. The first major incursion of Vietnamese forces into Thailand in pursuit of Khmer Rouge troops and as pressure on Thailand to cease its support of other anti-Vietnamese Cambodian groups occurred in June 1980. The most recent battles, involving artillery and aircraft, took place early in 1985 (20).

The important question is whether Vietnam will ever remove its military occupation forces from Laos and Cambodia and permit these states even a nominal independence.

THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

East European military resources have been used to reinforce Soviet initiatives in the third world as these expanded in the 1970s. East Germany and Czechoslovakia, especially, assisted in promoting Soviet interests by providing arms, training, military technicians, and military advisers to third-world countries (1). In 1973, East Germany signed its first military assistance agreement with an African state, Congo-Brazzaville, although the actual program of military assistance seems to have begun earlier, in 1970 to 1972. The expansion of this activity was extremely rapid: By 1978 East Germany was supplying military assistance to seventeen African states: Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Tunisia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, Angola, Congo (Brazzaville), Nigeria, Mali, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea (2), a half dozen liberation movements (ZANU, ZAPU, SWAPO,PLO, Zairian FNLC), as well as to South Yemen and Vietnam. The GDR replaced Czechoslovakia as the second largest donor of military assistance to developing nations among the Warsaw Pact member-states.

The policy motivations and initiatives for these activities are essentially unknown, but it has been suggested that they were initiated at the urging of the USSR (3) and that the USSR supplied some of the funds necessary for the activities (4). In one of the few instances for which any details are available, Colin Legum has reported "that the Soviet bloc actually entrusted the training and equipment of the FNLC to the East Germans, a decision taken at the ninth congress of the East German Communist Party in May 1976" (5). These were the forces that then invaded Zaire's Shaba province in 1977 and 1978 from their bases in Angola. Herspring has suggested that

> one of the main motives for GDR willingness to support the USSR in Africa, despite the political and financial costs, by providing security, paramilitary and cadre development assistance... (is) to counter th(e) potential threat... that the Soviets might sacrifice vital East German interests in their pursuit of improved relations with Bonn (6).

There have also been suggestions that, in return for the use of East German officers to train ZAPU and ZANU forces in Zambia, Tanzania, Angola and Mozambique in 1978-79, "East Germany is believed to have received assurances that the Soviet Union will help it pay the higher prices for Soviet oil and gas imports introduced /for COMECON member-states_7 this year" (7).

TABLE
GDR Troops in the Third World

Country	Butler-Valenta	Military Balance 1982-83
Angola	350	450
Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde	100	-
Ethiopia	300	250
Mozambique	200	100
PDRY (S. Yemen)	300	325
Algeria	-	250
Guinea	-	125
Iraq	-	160
Libya	-	400
Syria	-	210
Total	1,250	2,270
USSR Total	3,020-3,120	19,650 (not counting Afghanistan)
Cuba Total	41,440-42,440	36,100 (of which 33,000 are in Ethiopia, Angola, Nicaragua)

Der Spiegel	Country
1,000	Angola
20	Congo, Rep.
300	Ethiopia
600	Mozambique
250	Algeria
150	Zambia
400	Libya
2,720	Total

Sources: Shannon R. Butler and Jiri Valenta, "East Germany in the Third World," Proceedings (September 1981), p. 61; International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1982-83 (London: IISS, 1982), pp. 17, 22, 103.

Table taken from: Daniel N. Nelson, ed., Soviet Allies: The Warsaw Pact and the Issue of Reliability, Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1984, p. 152, for Butler-Valenta and Military Balance. Additional column from Der Spiegel, 3 March 1980, p. 43

One can be somewhat sceptical of these latter suggestions. The GDR is one of the foremost industrial states in the world (ranking sixth or seventh in industrial production in 1980) and has the economic capability to sustain these programs, estimated to cost $200 million per year, without any compensation.

The most likely reason for the use of GDR military personnel is simply the overwhelming desirability for the USSR to avoid employing its own military personnel in the same roles and thus avoid a Western response. At the same time, the GDR goes to considerable lengths not to discuss its military programs in Africa and on the Arabian peninsula in public and not to supply any details about exactly what its personnel are doing in the different countries in which they operate. The visits of third-world military delegations to the GDR which come to arrange the details of military-assistance programs are referred to in broad, euphemistic terms, if they are referred to at all. A visiting military delegation from Guinea-Bissau was described as being present to "inform themselves about the efforts of the GDR's soldiers and officers for the protection of socialism and peace", and the Deputy Defense Minister of Mozambique had come to pay "tribute to the steadily growing friendship and cooperation between our peoples and their armed forces in the joint anti-imperialist struggle" (8). However, the relationships are more functional than such phraseology would indicate. In 1978, GDR Defense Minister Hoffman visited Tunisia, Algeria, Angola, Guinea and the Congo to discuss "further military cooperation". He acknowledged on his return that some of the troops that he inspected were led by East German instructors. The President of the Congo disclosed during a trip to the GDR that Congolese troops were being trained in the GDR. Kenya, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania and Upper Volta were among the ten third-world countries to share in 42 new GDR internal security and military-assistance projects begun in 1982.

The GDR's treaty with Mozambique makes the most explicit reference to military collaboration, while the treaty between the GDR and Angola contains no references to military cooperation of any kind. The only reference to military assistance in the GDR-Ethiopian treaty is an allusion to cooperation "in other areas" besides political, economic and cultural (9). GDR spokesmen have also noted that there is "... a clear distinction between interference in internal affairs and military attacks of a neocolonialist nature, on the one hand, and the sovereign right of every people to ask the socialist countries and other states for assistance, including military

assistance, on the other." At the same time, West German economic aid to developing nations was described as "an instrument of threat, blackmail and interference in the internal affairs of the recipient states" and a GDR commission in July 1978 held a special session to repudiate "the imperialist propaganda campaign of lies" about the activities of "the socialist States, particularly the USSR, Cuba, and the GDR in Africa". It warned instead that "NATO intervention presents as serious a threat to the African States and the national liberation movements as the attempts to form a so-called pan-African force for interventions."

Estimates of the number of East German military personnel posted in advisory or operational roles in developing countries vary considerably, ranging from 2,000 to over 10,000. Some of these estimates are given in Table (10). The estimate of 2,700 officers and non-commissioned officers of the GDR's National People's Army (Volksarmee, NVA) in 1980 provided by Der Spiegel seems to be the most authoritative as of that date. These were figures provided by the West German government to members of the Bundestag. The numbers may have increased somewhat since then. In addition, members of the GDR's State Security Service (Staatssicherheitsdienst, SSD) serve in several African countries and in South Yemen. They probably number less than 1,000 in all. Troops from some of the nations receiving GDR military assistance are also trained in the GDR. In numbers, the GDR military presence is much smaller than the Cuban, but the East German personnel are more specialized. Their functions can be divided into three categories:

(1) training
(2) specialists who perform operational functions
(3) training of paramilitary, state security (intelligence) and secret police forces.

The last seems to be a specialization that the GDR performs in a large number of countries in which they have military-assistance missions.

Several useful review articles make it possible to provide brief descriptions of the roles of GDR military missions in a sizable number of cases. I have listed these in roughly chronological order (11).

- Military training programs in Congo-Brazzaville included the training of MPLA and Frelimo forces at camps in the Congo.
- On the basis of agreements in 1973 and 1978, the GDR supplied the PLO with "non-civilian" equipment and financial assistance.
- It provided weapons and supplies for Frelimo, helped organize the

Mozambique security and intelligence service, and was reportedly in charge of President Machel's bodyguard.

- The GDR provided weapons and training for the MPLA in Angola.
- It also provided weapons and training for Nkomo's ZAPU as well as for ZANU and SWAPO.
- The GDR provided the logistics and military equipment and trained the Zairian FNLC forces which invaded Zaire from Angola in the two Shaba province events in 1977 and 1978. It has also been suggested that the East Germans planned the invasion. The GDR advisers, under the command of GDR Deputy Defense Minister General Poppe, were under orders not to take part in the fighting directly and to remain in Angola, though they apparently carried out some tactical support tasks for the invading force from within Angola.
- East Germans reportedly trained 100 pilots from Angola, South Yemen, the PLO and several other countries at bases in Tanzania.
- They have reportedly operated three training camps in South Yemen for "radical Palestinian commandos".
- The South Yemenese military detachments which fought in Ethiopia in the Ogaden were trained by GDR forces.
- East German specialists may also have served with Ethiopian forces against Eritrea, with Libyan forces in Chad, in Vietnam, and with Syrian forces in Lebanon. They have apparently taken part in ground-based air-defense against Israeli aircraft in combat in Lebanon. (During Haile Selaissie's rule, the USSR had supported the Eritrian liberation movements against the Ethiopian central government.)
- GDR intelligence specialists have helped establish intelligence and special police services in Angola (DISA), Mozambique (SNASP), Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Libya and, in several cases, are described as participating in the operations of these agencies.

For the most part, the GDR officers reportedly serve in training and logistical tasks, but this may have been extended in several instances into more active combat planning. They also include tank warfare instructors in Ethiopia, communications personnel in Mozambique, and the repair of aircraft for the Ethiopian and Mozambican air forces. In 1979, GDR specialists replaced Cubans in some areas. In at least one case, GDR training of domestic security and intelligence ēlites may already have contributed to the removal of the head of state. In February 1979, the President of the Congo, Joachim Opango, attempted to obtain Western finan-

cial assistance and appeared to be interested in increasing contacts with Western states. He was deposed by the GDR-trained Defense and Police Minister, Nguesso, and the Congo ended its attempts to approach Western states (12).

Brief Notes on Other States

It is extremely difficult to obtain information on the activities of the smaller contributors of military contingents, operational specialists or military instructors. It is particularly important to know the exact operational responsibilities performed by these units or specialists, and above all whether they participate in combat, which has been quite frequently the case with military "advisers" from the US, USSR, Cuba and several other countries. In most instances, both the donor and the recipient countries are interested in keeping these relationships secret, and it is difficult to assess or to verify individual scattered reports. For example, Dornier Alpha jets were sold to the Ivory Coast and Nigeria by West Germany. The arms transactions involved flight instructors. For a period, however, no native pilots were sufficiently trained and the instructors flew the aircraft for the armed forces. In another example, it was reported that a British commercial firm, Airwork Limited, was contracted to perform major portions of the functions of the former Rhodesian air force, in this instance during combat.

Two third-world nations with wide-ranging military-assistance relationships are North Korea and Pakistan. North Korea has already been mentioned in relation to Uganda and Zimbabwe. Pakistan is a major exporter of military forces, apparently largely for financial rather than political reasons. Some of its expeditionary forces were reported to have been overseas for more than ten years (1). In 1970, a Pakistani brigade under General Zia in Jordan reportedly played an important role in the battles between Jordanian and PLO forces. The largest contingents are in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Abu Dhabi and Libya, with the total number of Pakistani military serving overseas reported to be approximately 10,000 men in 1980-1981. Pakistani pilots maintain and fly Libya's Mirage aircraft and perform the same function for several of the smaller Gulf states.

THE QUESTION OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

The events that took place in Kampuchea between May 1975 and December 1978 under the communist government of Pol Pot were briefly discussed in the section on Vietnam (see page). We will therefore use the history of Uganda in the 1970s to demonstrate the point of this final section of the study. In 1971, Idi Amin came to power as Uganda's head of state through a military coup. He was in power for eight years and during that period it is estimated his army or security forces slaughtered between 300,000 and 500,000 Ugandans. How was this possible? Why was it tolerated? Should it have been tolerated? Do situations such as this, and that of Cambodia under the Pol Pot regime, justify a case for humanitarian intervention?

The Amin regime in Uganda appears as a bizarre hypertrophy of the process of foreign intervention (1). Ten or more other nations were involved at various times, many of them simultaneously, during the eight years of Amin's reign. (In this, it resembled the situations in Nigeria during the civil war and in Ethiopia and Angola.) Its army was in large part imported, its military instructors were imported, its weapons and supplies were imported, entire portions of the government infrastructure were imported. The Amin regime was an "ultra-mercenarization", a sort of international gangsterism.. A small number of essentially external actors, in collaboration with an internal tyrant, did what suited themselves with an entire nation, for either financial, ideological or geo-political gain.

- The coup itself had been carried out with aid from Israel and Great Britain.
- Amin's army rapidly developed into a mix of Southern Sudanese mercenaries, immigrants from Rwanda and the Nubian area in Sudan and his own minority Moslem tribal group.
- Amin's state security services, "The State Research Bureau", obtained its communications equipment from US, French and British firms. Some of its personnel were trained in the United States and in Britain. East Germany (which was also involved in security work in Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique) sent advisors to train telecommunications, electronics and computer specialists. Four hundred Pakistani specialists served in the same services, operating computers and other

sophisticated equipment. The Palestine Liberation Organization trained execution squads for the security services as well as trained and organized Amin's bodyguard.

- The USSR — with small contributions from other WTO nations — supplied Amin with arms "... in the interest of peace and security of all peoples", according to the Soviet Ambassador to Uganda.
- In March 1979, Libya rushed several thousand combat troops and equipment to Amin's aid following Amin's 1978 invasion of the Kagera region in Tanzania (after falsely claiming that Tanzania had invaded Uganda) and Tanzania had invaded in force in reply. Several hundred Palestinian combat troops also fought on behalf of Amin.

All of this was superimposed on a nominally sovereign nation. Throughout the eight years of Amin's rule and all these events, the United Nations did nothing. The OAU did nothing, out of respect for the same alleged "sovereignty". In fact, in July 1979, the OAU condemned Tanzania's invasion. Independent states in Africa looked on quietly all the years that Amin slaughtered his own population, and many of them hailed Amin.

Ironically, the situation apparently did not improve much when Milton Obote returned to power, from December 1980 to July 1985. Estimates of the number of people killed during this period range from 100,000 to 200,000, with hundreds of thousands forcibly removed from their home areas and kept in refugee centers under military guard, and an additional 280,000 refugees in neighboring countries (2). A substantial amount of the killing was carried out by "special forces" which had been trained by North Korean advisers since the end of 1981. Other Ugandan military forces were being trained by British officers. In Zimbabwe, at roughly the same time, North Korean military advisers were training two êlite units, the 5th Brigade and the Presidential Guard, and para-military instructors who were to organize "peoples' militia" units throughout the country (3). The 5th Brigade soon became notorious for functioning somewhat on the model of "SS" troops in Zimbabwe's Matabeleland province.

It seems altogether desirable that there should be sanctioned international mechanisms to remove regimes such as Pol Pot's in Cambodia and Amin's and Obote's in Uganda and that humanitarian intervention deserves serious consideration. In all of the incidents in the post-war period that can be described as genocidal — Indonesia (in 1965/66 when as many as 500,000 people may have been slaughtered in a period of a few

months, and perhaps again more recently in Timor), Burundi, Uganda, Kampuchea — the problem is of course that there are no such mechanisms and that governments would not dream of agreeing to their establishment. The United States Congress — with probably the least to fear — has so far even resisted ratifying the United Nations Genocide Convention, allegedly because of apprehensions that its enforcement might lead to encroachments on national sovereignty (4). On the other hand, a substantial number of other states that have signed the Convention have clearly disregarded it. Even if such a suggestion would not face the categorical political opposition of virtually every state in existence, all the most obvious responses immediately are apparent. "Who shall decide when intervention should occur, and on what criteria?" and "Who will be the one to intervene?" Nevertheless, it can hardly be claimed that there is at present no intervention. Nothing could be further from the truth. Instead, the current state of affairs is simply that the field is open to those with arms, funds and the interest to intervene, which they scarcely do for humanitarian reasons. Military power and a minimum of respect for international sovereignty are the determinants of when and where intervention occurs.

The major problem with Vietnam's military intervention in Cambodia is that it was not carried out for altruistic humanitarian reasons — which might otherwise have made it a serious contender for an important precedent in international affairs — but rather for Vietnam's own political advantage. Vietnam did not withdraw its military forces subsequent to toppling the genocidal Pol Pot regime. Nor did it call for the replacement of its own troops by a United Nations peacekeeping force, which would have compelled the end of Chinese and American support for the remnants of the Khmer Rouge forces. It is argued that Vietnam cannot withdraw its armed forces from Cambodia because the Khmer Rouge still remain by far the largest of the armed groups resisting the Vietnamese-installed government. That is unquestionably true. If, however, Vietnam had immediately called for the replacement of its forces by a United Nations Peacekeeping force, explicitly including the participation of China, it would have forced China to acknowledge publicly the nature of the Pol Pot regime and to cease supplying it with arms. The permanent removal of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge as a factor in Cambodian politics could have been almost immediate. In this case, however, the final result might not have been a Vietnamese puppet government, but a more independent

Cambodia. Vietnam's goal in the removal of Pol Pot was to obtain a puppet communist government. The US government's position on the United Nations' recognition of the present Kampuchean government is that recognition would "...legitimize a government installed by aggression and mantained by the presence of an invading army." The major problem with this formulation, which would otherwise represent an important argument deserving serious consideration — aside from the fact that it continues to confer legitimacy on the Pol Pot Government — is that it is hardly uniformly applied by the United States, as exemplified by its own previous interventions in the Dominican Republic and Vietnam. Such a formulation would also very likely have to be applied to several of the states in Eastern Europe today.

A rare instance in which a government's political policy faced with a case of genocide has been publicly examined is that of the response of the United States government to the events in Burundi in 1972. The following quotation reflects the pitiful inappropriateness of the traditional attitude of "non-interference in the internal political affairs of other countries" in the context of events of this magnitude.

> Through the spring and summer of 1972, in the obscure Central African state of Burundi, there took place the systematic killing of as many as a quarter million people. Even among the awesome calamities of the last decade, the tragedy in Burundi was extraordinary in impact and intensity. Though exact numbers can never be known, most eyewitnesses now agree that over a four-month period, men, women and children were savagely murdered at the rate of more than a thousand a day. It was, wrote United Nations observers a "staggering" disaster.
>
> Based primarily on interviews with responsible officials, this report traces the reaction of the United States Government to genocide in Burundi. It is largely a record of indifference, inertia and irresponsibility in the face of great human suffering.
>
> Though the Department of State knew the enormity of what was happening in Burundi relatively early, it relied upon a diplomacy which had little chance of relieving the tragedy — and which some in the government fully expected to fail. Though that failure soon became obvious, policy-makers then stood by for nearly four months while the killing went on. In the process, they rejected out of hand a proposal within the government to examine unusual and critical American economic support of the Burundian regime presiding over the murders. They ignored as well the findings of the Department's own Legal Advisor for African Affairs regarding the obligations of the U.S.Government under international law. They repeatedly misled the Congress, albeit the appropriate Congressional Committees obliged the deception by failing equally their own responsibilities to oversee policy.
>
> When the State Department finally decided to review policy in the fall, after the carnage in Burundi had seemingly run its course, there was even doubt that a private diplomatic expression of Washington's "displeasure" had been conveyed honestly to the Burundian authorities. Publicly, the United States Government never spoke out on the horror in Burundi.

> Afterward, among those who took part in these events, there was frustration, division, remorse — and the hope that somehow the episode would never be repeated. Yet the policy toward Burundi raises disturbing questions not only about the reaction of the United States to a single disaster, but also about the capacity of government to respond to humanitarian crises elsewhere (5).

One might point out that there is no particular evidence that other African countries showed even this degree of hand-wringing, although several of them drew attention to the economic burden imposed by caring for and feeding the thousands of refugees who fled from Burundi into the neighboring states of Zaire, Rwanda and Tanzania. They called for and received the help of United Nations and voluntary agencies. One can also point out that there is no evidence that the US government suffered any particular pangs of dismay or conscience over the events in Indonesia in 1965 or in Timor in 1975-76 which were perpetrated by a government to which it was sympathetic.

A point that is more relevant to the suggestion of humanitarian intervention is that United Nations and other international agencies such as the International Red Cross (ICRC) do become involved in many of these events when they result in large-scale starvation or emigration. These organization then either work in states neighboring on the one in which the crisis is occurring, or they enter the state itself _after_ the event as a result of a change in government or some other circumstance that permits their entry. Such actions have taken place in Bangladesh in 1971 (6), for Kampucheans who have fled into Thailand, Afghani refugees in Pakistan and in other cases. This is the closest existing international mechanism that offers a precedent, or parallel, to the suggestion being made here. It would seem more sensible if the intervention could take place _during_ the genocidal events, in order to stop them, rather than after the fact and at the periphery in order to feed and nurse the bodies that may have survived (7).

In a speech at the 12th International Council Meeting of Amnesty International in which he condemned "the present world phase of unprecedented violence and cruelty, and the near total breakdown in public and private morality", Sean MacBride cited the following recent cases of "massive massacres amounting to genocide":

Indonesia, 1965	Uganda, 1976-78
Chile, 1973	Argentina, 1978-79
Kampuchea, 1975-78	Central African Empire, 1978-79
East Timor, 1975-76	Equatorial Guinea, 1977-79.

(8)

MacBride's selection of events is somewhat peculiar, and requires comment. Oddly, he did not mention "two of the most lethal of contemporary genocides", Bangladesh in 1971 and Burundi in 1972. In addition, in 1960, the population of China declined by some 4.5 percent. Official Chinese government figures indicate that "more than 10 million people died" due to decisions made during the "Great Leap Forward" period (9), while MacFarquhar has estimated that some 16 to 29 million people may have died (10). US demographers have made estimates of 27 to 30 million deaths. The mortality in the Chinese catastrophe is matched only by the deaths of 10 million or more Soviet citizens in the USSR's Gulag prison camp system between 1937 and 1953. More recently, it should be noted that the Ethiopian military government, the Dergue — which came to power when Haile Selaissie's government was accused of mishandling the starvation caused by the Sahelian drought in 1974-75 — has been manipulating a second starvation catastrophe in Eritrea and Tigre provinces, caused in large part by the war, in order to destroy both the military resistance groups and large portions of the populations of both provinces. It is possible that explicit government decisions and programs of the present Ethiopian government will result in a million or more deaths in a period of 1-2 years. There has been no comment from the OAU or from any United Nations agency.

We might compare the statistics of some of these events to see what guidelines or criteria they might suggest for intervention.

Country/event	Population prior to events	Number killed/died	Percent of population
Indonesia, 1965	120.0 million	~400,000	0.3
Bangladesh, 1971	75.0 million	124,700	0.2
Burundi, 1972	4.2 million	~200,000	4.8
Uganda, 1971-78	11.0 million	~350,000	3.2
Cambodia, 1975-78	7.3 million	~800,000	11.0
East Timor, 1975-76	424,000	~125,000 (+)	29.5
Guatemala, 1980-85	6.5 million	~ 40,000	0.6
El Salvador, 1979-85	4.4 million	~ 50,000	1.1
Uganda, 1980-84	12.5 million	~200,000	1.6
Ethiopia, 1984-85	~40.0 million	~1 million	2.5

Argentina with around 15,000 politically-motivated government murders in 1978-79 (out of a population of 26.5 million), Chile with perhaps 10,000 in 1973-74 (out of a population of 11 million), and Guinea with several thousand killed, would probably not be considered, or defined, as "genocides".

One could suggest a violation threshold, the deaths of perhaps 10,000 people or 0.1 percent of the national population, possibly within a specific period of time, which would give a "United Nations Interventionary Force" the right to intervene. A potentially genocidal situation would be removed from geopolitical concerns and responded to solely on the basis of the state of civil rights within the country. Intervention would take place when a people's basic right to life was being denied. Even under the present circumstances, the attainment of the threshold should automatically trigger a recommendation by the UN Secretary-General to the UN Security Council for such an intervention, despite the risk of a subsequent veto under the existing UN procedures. The threshold could be compared to a "legitimacy test" of a national government. A government could be considered legitimate only if it respected the ultimate human right of its own population: life. Once that respect disappeared, the government would no longer be considered a legitimate government. Intervention in the internal affairs of such a state could no longer be considered a violation of the United Nations charter or of international law. A revision of the United Nations charter or the creation of a new charter for a "UNIF" would be binding on non-parties as well as on parties (11), and obviously no action under its terms could be subject to a veto. The implications of such a force are clearly far-reaching and its procedures for intervention as well as the reconstitution of a domestic authority in the country involved must certainly be well thought out, but its necessity seems unquestionable. It is not necessary for this study to attempt to delineate such a regime in further detail, only to establish its clear justification.

After writing the above chapter, and in lectures over the past two years having received nothing but criticism for the "threshold" suggestion, it was gratifying to discover a book entitled *Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations*, R. B. Lillich (ed.), Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1973. Many of the papers that the book contains make arguments similar to those present in these pages.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study was to provide a survey of a wide range of military activities relating to foreign military intervention in the post-WWII period. These range from war and invasion pure and simple to the use of expeditionary military forces, the threat of use of nuclear weapons, the acquisition and use of foreign military facilities, and other forms of military intervention. Some of these subjects could be dealt with only briefly. The study also argues strongly for the institutionalization of a humanitarian intervention capability under the auspices of the United Nations.

A major point of the paper is that the post-war decolonization process, the large increase in the number of independent nations and the dispersion of substantial weapon capabilities to a wider population of nations have not led to any greater degree of international peace and respect for the sovereignty of states; probably quite the opposite. In the words of Kenneth Waltz:

> Seldom if ever has force been more variously, more persistently, applied; and seldom has it been more consciously used as an instrument of national policy. Since the war we have seen, not the cancellation of force by nuclear stalemate, but instead the political organization and pervasion of power; not the end of the balance of power owing to a reduction in the number of major states, but instead the formation and perpetuation of a balance _à deux._

I have made an effort in this paper to demonstrate, however, that the recent past and the probable future development of international military intervention is something more than "... a balance _à deux_", even if either the USSR or the US stands behind at least some of the second rank of interventionary countries. This study therefore shifts the emphasis somewhat toward the judgment expressed by Richard Smoke:

> In a world of "military plenty" and a substantial number of independent or semi-independent actors, there is a considerably higher probability that a minor conflict may seem to threaten the interests of — or present opportunities to — regional powers who are prepared to intervene largely on their own and who have the capability to do so (1).

In the great majority of cases, however, it is the opportunities for intervention that weigh more heavily than any threat to the government carrying out the intervention, or on whose behalf some other state intervenes. Often the original conflict has been limited and the intervening power is far from the region. Conflicts are manipulated and even fabricated.

As is the case with arms transfers, ruling élites or contending political factions in the nation at the receiving end of the intervention have been only too willing to collaborate in the expansion of the foreign intervention which either brought them to power or maintains them there. In many cases, it is their only hope of achieving, or remaining in, political power. With the burgeoning of arms transfers in the recent past and more states showing greater interest in foreign military intervention, the prognosis for the future can only be a steady increase in this activity.

There should be no military intervention — and certainly none of the major variety — by one state in another. This is stated in every international convention: the United Nations Charter, innumerable UN General Assembly resolutions, the ESCE, and so on. One could claim, perhaps sarcastically, that this is recognized by all states, in that every military intervention — by someone else — is usually vigorously denounced — by everyone else. A recent newspaper editorial commented that "Few words in diplomacy are so imprecise and negative as 'interventionism'. No nation admits either the word or the deed. Your country may intervene, ours only protects vital interests, common values, or whatever" (2). Those who uniformly condemn intervention often make use of it themselves — when it suits their purposes. In response to appeals for help by Indian Prime Minister Nehru after the Sino-Indian border war in 1962, American and British Commonwealth air units participated in joint exercises with the Indian Air Force. Several hundred US military personnel were stationed in India, until 1965, and the United States subsequently built and designed much of India's air-defense network.

It is also clear that "non-intervention" can be a dubious facade, depending on the circumstances. The classic example of this was the "non-intervention policy" as applied to the Spanish Republican government during the 1936-1939 Spanish civil war. It deprived the legitimate government of Spain of the ability to purchase weapons at the same time as Germany and Italy supplied the insurgents. Over one hundred years ago, John Stuart Mill wrote that non-intervention had to be respected by all before it could be morally legitimate: "The despots must be bound by it as well as free states. Unless they do, the profession comes to this miserable issue — that the wrong side may help the wrong, but the right must not help the right". Non-intervention must not help interventionists.

Nevertheless, the reality is that there is extensive military intervention and that all the international conventions are violated. In addition, it is not just the great powers that are guilty of this behavior; many

other states, even nominally "developing nations", have begun to participate in extensive and wide-ranging programs of foreign military intervention. It is highly unlikely that anything as sophisticated or codified exists as is sometimes implied in discussions of the "rules of the game": tacitly accepted limitations on superpower behavior during military deployments and engagements in the third world. Constraints certainly must exist and caution may very well be exercised on certain occasions, but this seems more a matter of coincidental patterns of interaction in a dynamic process, with one side at some point stopping its responses to the other's acts, rather than any set of tacit thresholds or limits to operations.

States should, as they presently do under international law, have the right to call on foreign military assistance to repel foreign invasion and intervention. Optimally this assistance should be given by an international organization, but the present international political situation does not permit that. Nevertheless, even if circumstances permitted such assistance from international organizations, problems would arise, just as they clearly do at present in the margins between unjustified intervention and justified aid: When is the initial foreign intervention justified as a defensive measure; to what degree is the call for external aid made against domestic political opponents in a civil war?

In the case of genocide carried out by the ruling government (or, for that matter, by an intervening state), an international organization such as the United Nations should have the forces and the jurisdiction to enter the state and depose the governing political leadership. Such an act should be seen as no more than an extension of existing concepts of peacekeeping — though as noted above, international organizations are presently not even capable of resisting and expelling an invading interventionary state. The suggestions presented in this study are not a recommendation for any greater degree of international anarchy than presently exists. In fact, they are no more than a recognition of the presently existing situation, of what actually takes place. Most international discussion serves only to obscure the status quo. The suggestions also probably point to the only means capable of redressing the existing situation.

It is interesting that the volume entitled Common Security (published in 1982) — the report of the "Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues", known as the "Palme Commission" — suggested that the United Nations should automatically become involved in every third-world

conflict that threatens to erupt into war (3). (The Commission found it judicious to omit the Middle East from this recommendation.) Daniel Frei's volume, Risks of Unintentional Nuclear War, commissioned by UNIDIR and also published in 1982, suggested three ways in which the frequency of US-USSR crises might be reduced:

- Avoidance of additional, and reduction of existing, commitments by the major Powers to the third world;
- Bilateral and multilateral restraints on arms transfers to the third world which cause new commitments;
- Discussions on "crisis conventions" with a view to agreeing on minimum standards of behaviour when using force (4).

It remains clear, however, that international behavior tends in very much the opposite direction of these recommendations. The years 1980 to 1985 witnessed, among other events:

- the continuing Soviet destruction and occupation of Afghanistan;
- continuing South African military incursions in neighboring states;
- the occupations of Lebanon by Syria and Israel;
- Libyan military operations in Chad;
- Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia;
- Indonesia's continuing occupation of East Timor;
- the initiation of US intervention in several Central American states.

In an excellent recent study entitled Intervention and Regional Security, which examined the cases of Angola, Ethiopia, Chad and Afghanistan, Macfarlane noted that

> The UN is remarkable in these four cases for its lack of a significant role in regulating or responding to intervention. In the African cases, it was constrained by the desire of the African community to keep it out (though one may conjecture that since these African cases divided the USSR and the US, the UN would have been incapable of effective action to resolve the internal conflict or restrain external actors even if it had been involved). The Afghan case shows that the UN Security Council cannot act in disputes where the interests of the super-powers are opposed, though in theory it has the power to do so. The General Assembly, while capable of passing resolutions, does not have the power to implement them (5).

The incapability of the United Nations is a heritage derived from the inability of the League of Nations to deal with the invasions of Manchuria and Ethiopia. Even earlier, when shortly after WWI Italy bombarded and occupied the island of Corfu, which belonged to Greece, the League collapsed helplessly in the face of Italian threats to resign from the League if

it were to apply sanctions.

Several, if not all, of the events in recent years once again raise the question that was tentatively introduced in the last sections of this study and that is implicit in large portions of it. After WWII, both historians and political analysts universally decried the fact that there had been no organized international military opposition to Japan's pre-war invasion of China, Italy's of Ethiopia and Greece, and Germany's of Czechoslovakia and Poland. It is taken for granted that these events led to World War II. The same problem remains. Aggression, the most extreme form of military intervention, must be opposed, and it is preferable that this be done by international military forces. In the years following WWII, the United Nations was unfortunately not given such a capability. There is likely to be no end to aggression until sovereign states are willing to sanction such a role for international peacekeeping forces. Opposition to aggression must occur before or as soon as the aggression is begun, since it has very rarely been feasible after it has occurred.

INTERNATIONALLY SANCTIONED INTERVENTION

This section is not intended to provide a review of United Nations peacekeeping operations in the post-war period. The subject has been confered far more thoroughly elsewhere (1). In these operations, the military forces of various nations serve in foreign countries as part of the peacekeeping forces of the United Nations or in other multinational forces arranged by such international organizations as the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Organization of American States (OAS), the Arab League or in other *ad hoc* control and repatriation commissions and as observers of withdrawals. These serve to some degree as the precedents and the closest model for the suggestion that will be made in the following section. Several points which therefore seem particularly relevant will be discussed briefly.

According to Article 39 of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council is given the power to determine the existence of threats to peace or acts of aggression and to make recommendations or decide what measures should be taken to maintain or restore international peace. These measures range from economic sanctions (Art. 41) to direct military intervention (Arts. 42 and 43). The UN has exercised or attempted to exercise these powers in numerous circumstances with varying degrees of success. During the period 1945 - 1965, 55 disputes were referred to the UN and the UN succeeded in settling eighteen of these (2). (See Tables and .) The ways in which these 55 disputes have been settled can be classified as follows:

- Settled on the basis of a UN resolution:	7	13%
- Settled in part on the basis of the UN resolution:	11	20%
- Settled wholly outside the UN:	13	23%
- Unsettled:	24	44%

In 32 of these 55 cases, the parties involved resorted to armed conflict. Hostilities were stopped, largely as a result of UN intervention, in ten cases.

The United Nations has been most successful in halting wars or conflicts between two nonaligned countries. It has usually been ineffective in its attempts to control hostilities between small states that are members of opposing alliances; "cold war", East-West related hostilities; or "hostilities related to any of the major schisms in world politics" (3). The overall ineffectiveness of the United Nations in maintaining international peace derives from two main sources:

TABLE

Disputes Referred to UN
1945-1965

Period	Number	Disputes Referred to but Not Settled by UN	UN Settles or Helps Settle
1945-1947	11	French withdrawal from Levant Franco government in Spain Status of Trieste Kashmir Palestine South African race policies Revision of 1936 Suez Canal/ Sudan agreement	Azerbaijan Balkans Corfu Channel Indonesia
1948-1951	6	Berlin blockade Communist coup in Czechoslovakia Hyderabad Iran oil nationalization	Korea Withdrawal of Republic of China troops from Burma
1952-1955	3	North African decolonization Future status of Cyprus Guatemala	None
1956-1960	10	Hungary Syria/Turkey border Laos civil war Tibet South Tyrol U-2 flights	Suez war Lebanon/Jordan unrest Nicaragua/Honduras border Thai/Cambodia border
1961-1965	25	Civil unrest in Oman Cuba (Bay of Pigs) Cuban intervention in Dominican Republic Goa Iraq/Kuweit (U.K.) Portuguese colonies in Africa Cuban missile crisis U.K./Venezuela border Dominican intervention in Haiti Malaysia/Indonesia Senegal/Portugal border Yemen civil war Cyprus civil war Greece/Turkey hostile acts Panama Canal U.S./North Vietnam (Gulf of Tonkin) U.S. intervention in Dominican Republic	Congo West Irian Bizerta Southern Rhodesia Aden/Yemen border Cambodia/South Vietnam (U.S.) Stanleyville air rescue India-Pakistan war

Source: Ernst B. Haas, Collective Security and the Future International System, Monograph Series in World Affairs, Volume 5, Monograph no. 1 - 1967-68, Denver, Colo.: University of Denver, 1968, p. 46.

TABLE

Disputes Involving Hostilities Referred to UN
1945-1965

Period	Number	UN Fails in Maintaining Truce or Stopping Hostilities	UN Succeeds in Maintaining Truce or Stopping Hostilities
1945-1947	4	Balkans	Indonesia Kashmir Palestine
1948-1951	1	None	Korea
1952-1955	3	North African decolonization Future status of Cyprus Guatemala	None
1956-1960	5	Hungary Tibet Laos civil war	Suez war Lebanon/Jordan unrest
1961-1965	19	Bizerta Cuba (Bay of Pigs) Goa Portuguese colonies in Africa Cuban missile crisis Civil unrest in Oman Dominican intervention in Haiti Malaysia/Indonesia Senegal/Portugal border Yemen civil war Aden/Yemen border Cambodia/South Vietnam (U.S.) Stanleyville air rescue U.S./North Vietnam (Gulf of Tonkin) U.S. intervention in Dominican Republic	Congo West Irian Cyprus civil war India-Pakistan war

Source: Ernst B. Haas, Collective Security and the Future International System, Monograph Series in World Affairs, Volume 5, Monograph no. 1 - 1967-68, Denver, Colo.: University of Denver, 1968, p. 47.

- the inadequacy of means available;
- the attitudes of Member States with a national interest in the outcome of the dispute (4).

These problems obstruct efforts by international organizations to
- prevent external interventions from escalating local violence into cold war conflagrations;
- alleviate internal strife and internal disorders involving a total breakdown of law and order;
- eliminate subversion;
- mediate colonial wars (5).

In the case of an armed conflict or even the immediate antecedents to one, the most desirable outcome is a United Nations intervention force. However, due to the veto right of the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, the creation of such a force is far more often than not impossible. Under these circumstances, it is more desirable that some multilateral or international grouping should intervene than that no one should. Table presents a list of the nine United Nations peacekeeping operations and observer missions between 1949 and 1968. Two others have taken place more recently:

UNDOF — The UN Disengagement Observer Force on the Golan Heights deployed between Syria and Israel as a result of their 1974 cease-fire and disengagement agreement.

UNIFIL — The UN Interim Force in Lebanon, that went to Southern Lebanon following the Israeli invasion of March 1978.

Tables and display the national contributions of UN Member States to these various peacekeeping forces.

Table presents a list of international intervention or observer forces that have been arranged outside the framework of the United Nations. These seem to fall somewhere in between UN-sanctioned peace-keeping forces and pure military intervention, depending on the circumstances of their use. In some cases, the existence of a smaller group of nations collaborating with each other provides the appearance of legitimacy when there actually is none. For example, the expeditionary forces of Arab nations that have participated in various of the wars against Israel are certainly more in the nature of military interventions than peacekeeping efforts, and the Arab League contributions to the Syrian occupation forces in Lebanon (the Arab Deterrent Force) are of much the same character. The International Control Commissions in Indochina,

Table . United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Observer Missions, 1949-1968

	Operation/Mission	Acronym	Duration
1.	United Nations Military Observer Group India-Pakistan	UNMOGIP	1949 - to date
2.	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine	UNTSO	1954 - to date
3.	United Nations Emergency Force	UNEF	1956 - June 1968
4.	United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon	UNOGIL	1958 - 1959
5.	United Nations Operation in the Congo	ONUC	1960 - 1964
6.	United Nations Temporary Executive Authority West Irian	UNTEA	1962 - 1963
7.	United Nations Observer Mission Yemen	UNYOM	1963 - 1964
8.	United Nations Force in Cyprus	UNFICYP	1964 - to date
9.	United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission	UNIPOM	1965 - March 1966

Source: United Nations, General Assembly, Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations, "Letter Dated 18 June 1968 from the Permanent Representative of Canada Addressed to the Chairman of the Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations", A/AC.121/17, 19 June 1968, pp. 39-41.

Subsequent peacekeeping-observer forces:

	Operation/Mission	Acronym	Duration
10.	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (Golan Heights)	UNDOF	1974 - to date
11.	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (Southern Lebanon)	UNIFIL	March 1978 - to date

Table . Non-United Nations International Intervention or Observer Forces

Name of the Commission or Force	Years in Operation	Country Operated In	Nations Contributing Manpower: Major	Nations Contributing Manpower: Minor	Other Assisting Nations: Logistics, Funds, Supplies
1.–3. International Commission for Supervision and Control in Indochina (ICSC)	1954 – 1954 – 1954 –	Vietnam Cambodia Laos	Poland India Canada	— — —	— — —
4. Arab League	1961 –	Kuwait			
5. Inter-American Force	1965 –	Dominican Republic	US		—
6. International Commission (observers)	1973 –	Vietnam			—
7. Arab League : Arab Deterrent Force	1976 –	Lebanon	Syria	Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Iraq, etc.	Saudi Arabia
8. (Shaba I)	1978	Zaire			US
9. (Shaba II) Pan African Regional Military Force	1979	Zaire	France, Belgium, Morocco	Senegal, CAR, Togo, Gabon, Ivory Coast	US
10. Commonwealth Monitoring Force (elections) (observers)	Feb. 1980	Zimbabwe	UK	Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, Kenya	—
11. OAU Peacekeeping Force	12/81 – 6/82	Chad	Nigeria	Zaire, Senegal	US, France, Britain, Algeria
12. Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)	3/82 – cont.	Egypt (Sinai)	US, Colombia, Fiji	8 others	Egypt, Israel, US
13. Multinational Force I	Aug.-Sept. 1982	Lebanon	US, France, Italy	—	—
14. Multinational Force II	1982 – 1984	Lebanon	US, France, Italy	UK	—
15. Grenada Occupation Force	198	Grenada	US		

National Contributions To United Nations Peacekeeping Forces, 1977-78.

Country	UNTSO[(a)]	UNMOGIP[(a)]	UNFICYP	UNEF	UNDOF	UNIFIL
Argentina	✓	-	-	-	-	-
Australia	✓	✓	20	66	-	-
Austria	✓	-	312	-	535	-
Belgium	✓	-	-	-	-	-
Canada	✓	✓	515	840	169	117
Chile	✓	✓	-	-	-	-
Denmark	✓	✓	360	-	-	-
Fiji	-	-	-	-	-	500
Finland	✓	✓	11	637	-	-
France	✓	-	-	-	-	1181
Ghana	-	-	-	595	-	-
Indonesia	-	-	-	509	-	-
Iran	-	-	-	390	-	-
Ireland	✓	-	6	-	-	661
Italy	✓	✓	-	-	-	-
Nepal	-	-	-	-	-	642
Netherlands	✓	-	-	-	-	-
New Zealand	✓	-	-	-	-	-
Nigeria	-	-	-	-	-	673
Norway	-	✓	-	-	-	924
Poland	-	-	-	917	101	-
Senegal	-	-	-	-	-	634
Sweden	✓	✓	44	634	-	-
UK	-	-	817	-	-	-
Uruguay	-	✓	-	-	-	-
US	✓	-	-	-	-	-
USSR	✓	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL (observers from UNTSO excluded from the totals)	294 (including those assigned to other forces)	50	2482[(b)] (including 34 civilian police)	4178 (plus 120 observers	1195 (plus 88 observers)	5931 (plus 36 observers)

UNMOGIP — UN Military Observer Group in India
UNTSO — UN Truce Supervisory Organization
UNFICYP — UN Peacekeeping Force In Cyprus
UNEF — UN Emergency Force
UNDOF — UN Disengagement Observer Force
UNIFIL — UN Interim Force in Lebanon

Notes:

(a) No numbers given, just identified as a contributing nation (✓)
(b) Excludes units assigned to UNDOF

Source: Strategic Survey, 1978, International Institute For Strategic Studies (IISS)

National Contributions To United Nations Peacekeeping Forces, as of June 1979

Country	UNEF	UNDOF	UNIFIL	UNFICYP
Australia	46	-	-	-
Austria	-	523	-	330
Canada	840	171	-	515
Denmark	-	-	-	365
Fiji	-	-	656	-
Finland	637	148	-	11
France	-	-	609	-
Ghana	595	-	-	-
Ireland	-	-	754	7
Indonesia	509	-	-	-
Nepal	-	-	643	-
Netherlands	-	-	800	-
Nigeria	-	-	776	-
Norway	-	-	942	-
Poland	917	98	-	-
Senegal	-	-	592	-
Sweden	634	-	-	427
UK	-	-	-	817
Milt.Observers from UNTSO	-	88	-	-
TOTAL	4178	1028	5772	2472

Organizational acronyms, and date of authorization

UNEF — United Nations Emergency Force; 20 Oct. 1973.

UNDOF — UN Disengagement Observer Force; 31 May 1974.

UNIFIL — UN Interim Force in Lebanon; 19 Mar. 1978

UNFICYP — UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus; 4 Mar. 1964.

UNTSO — UN Truce Supervision Organization In Palestine; 29 May 1948.

(UNEF was being phased out in 1979)

Source: "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations In The 1970's", in World Armaments And Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1980, pp. 480, 485.

composed of representatives from an "Eastern" (Poland), a "Western" (Canada) and a nonaligned (India) state, which were supposed to observe that the 1954 Indochina accords were not violated by the signatories, were notoriously unable to perform their function.

In other cases, _ad hoc_ arrangements — aided by the interest of the parties concerned _not_ to infringe on the agreements in any significant fashion — have been reasonably successful. For example, the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty of March 1979 had envisaged the continued use of a UN peacekeeping force and military observers in the Eastern Sinai during the final stages of Israeli withdrawal. When it became clear that the UN mandate which would have authorized such a force would be blocked by a Soviet veto in the UN security Council, Egypt, Israel and the United States independently established the Sinai observers force (MFO) to which ten nations contribute contingents (6).

Problems can arise both in the establishment and the operation of peacekeeping forces and they are notably political rather than technical or operational in nature. Both the UNDOF on the Golan Heights and the UN force that was in the Sinai from 1973 to 1979 contained contingents from United Nations Member States with which Israel had no diplomatic relations. Israel refused to cooperate with such contingents, therefore they could only be used on the Syrian and Egyptian sides of the ceasefire lines and disengagement zones (7). There was nothing in international law which prevented the Israeli government from cooperating with such units; it simply chose not to. In the establishment of the MFO-Sinai observer force, only countries that were acceptable to both Egypt and Israel were considered for contribution of units. Egypt presented no particular problems; Israel again did. Similarly, when the second Multinational Force was prepared for Lebanon at the end of 1982, about a dozen countries were approached for troop contributions. Morocco was reported to have offered 2,000 troops, but Israel rejected the inclusion of a Moroccan contingent. Sweden and the Netherlands refused to participate, stating that they believed the intervening force should be a United Nations force. Despite the existence of UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon, the likelihood of a Soviet veto was considerable if a proposal had been made in the Security Council to compose such a force under UN auspices. The position adopted by the Swedish and Dutch governments therefore appears to be more or less a contradiction in terms.

The most well known study of the political problems surrounding a

difficult and fiercely contested United Nations intervention is Conor Cruise O'Brien's account of the operations of the United Nations Office in the Congo in 1960-1961, the Congo Force, and the attempt to prevent the secession of Katanga from the Congo (8). We will, however, take a brief look at a more recent example: the circumstances and political dissension surrounding the intervention and peacekeeping force that was sent to Chad by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) from December 1981 to June 1982 (9).

The major wars and invasions in Africa, in Zaire, Angola and Ethiopia, have drawn foreign-military support on behalf of different contending parties essentially along East-West lines. As a result, the OAU quickly found itself split. The OAU summit in January 1976, which dealt with the situation in Angola, was a prime example (10). When the OAU met again in July 1978, six wars were simultaneously in progress on the African continent and foreign-military intervention was the determining factor in nearly all of them. The main subject on the agenda of the meeting was the proposal from essentially Francophone African states sympathetic to the West for an Inter-African Security Force (11). The radical states — Algeria, Angola, Congo, Ethiopia, Libya and Mozambique — pressed for the condemnation of the West, particularly France, for intervention and called for resolutions again "imperialism" and "neocolonialism". They attacked the six African states that had sent token forces to replace the French and Belgian paratroops in Zaire. President Senghor of Senegal replied by asking why Africa should be solely concerned with 10,000 French troops when there were 50,000 Cubans present also. The governments that had invited the French were unquestioned masters in their own houses to a far greater degree than the governments that depended for support on Cuba, the USSR and the GDR. One delegate reportedly summed up the debate as follows: "Those who have Cuban troops attacked the West. Those with French troops attacked the Cubans. And those without either said all troops should get out" (12).

Tanzania's President Nyerere also opposed the proposal in very strong terms.

> "It might be a good thing if the OAU was sufficiently united to establish an African High Command and a Pan-African Security Force. If, having done so, the OAU then decided to ask for external support for this force, no one could legitimately object. But the OAU has made no such decision. It is highly unlikely that the OAU meeting at Khartoum will be able to agree unanimously on the creation of such a military force, or if it does, that

> it will be able to agree unanimously on which countries to ask for support if it is needed. Yet until Africa at the OAU has made such a decision, there can be no Pan-African Security Force which will uphold the freedom of Africa..."
>
> .....
>
> "... Tanzania resents the arrogance and the contempt of those who purport to set up a Pan-African Security Force, or an African Peace Force, on behalf of Africa. Either Africa will do that for itself, or there will be no Pan-African force defending the freedom of Africa, only something calling itself by some name which is an instrument for the renewed foreign domination of this continent" (13).

Within exactly one year, President Nyerere was in a position of at least in part seeking the replacement of his own occupation forces in Uganda by a Commonwealth peacekeeping force. After expelling Idi Amin's invasion force from Tanzania's northern provinces, Tanzanian military forces had gone on to invade Uganda and topple Idi Amin. The Kenyan government was relieved that Amin had been removed from power but nevertheless opposed Nyerere's action and called for a withdrawal of the Tanzanian forces. At a Commonwealth summit in Zambia in early August 1979, Kenya's President Moi proposed that a Commonwealth peacekeeping force replace the remaining 20,000 Tanzanian troops in Uganda (14). The proposal had Tanzania's support. In addition to keeping his forces in Uganda, Nyerere had clearly begun to intervene in Uganda's domestic political affairs, seeking to reinstate former Ugandan President Obote. This had drawn criticism from at least some African leaders, in addition to Kenya's Moi, at an OAU summit held one month before the Commonwealth summit. The Commonwealth nonetheless declined Moi's proposal. Remnants of Amin's forces were reportedly concentrated in bases in Southern Sudan and Northeastern Zaire, with the support of Libya and Sudan. (Many of Amin's troops were Sudanese Nubians.) The internecine, beggar-thy-neighbor policies of numerous African governments are quite remarkable. Libya had been responsible for a great many interventionary operations and coup attempts against the Sudanese government in the same years, yet both were now reportedly supporting the regrouping of forces loyal to the former tyrant, Amin.

When the OAU was created, its members had committed themselves to uphold seven principles:

- to respect each other's equality,
- not to interfere in the internal affairs of other African states,
- to respect the borders of each state,
- to settle disputes peacefully through negotiation or mediation,
- to condemn unreservedly all forms of political assassination, as well as subversive activities by neighboring or other states,

- to observe nonalignment, and
- to dedicate themselves to the emancipation of all African territories.

It is clear that only the last of these has been observed. During the OAU's discussions in 1978, Nigeria's President Obasanjo appealed to the African states not to invite in non-African forces. The OAU's first attempt to carry out a peacekeeping operation along these lines came in Chad at the end of 1981 (15). (See pages - in the section on France for a description of the French and Libyan intervention in Chad.) Seven African states promised to contribute to the force that would be sent to Chad: Nigeria, Bénin, Togo, Zaire, Guinea, Senegal, and Gabon. Disagreement developed even before the force was established: The seven governments could not agree on the financing of the operation though the United States, France, Britain and Algeria subsequently aided the OAU force with supplies and logistical and financial assistance by late December. Chad's President Goukouni refused to accept Togo's participation in the force because Togo's position that he should negotiate with Habré's FAN to reach a settlement was well-known. To negotiate with Habré was, however, something that Goukouni absolutely refused to contemplate. In the end, only three of the seven countries sent troops: Nigeria, Senegal and Zaire. Kenya, Zambia and Guinea-Bissau sent observers. The Nigerian contingent was the largest, 2,000, and the entire force was led by a Nigerian general. The first troops to arrive in Chad's capital on November 15, 1981, were from Zaire. Nigerian and Senegalese troops did not arrive until three weeks later. By then, Habré's FAN forces were well into their offensive. Estimates of the number of troops in the OAU force vary considerably, from 3,250 to 4,500. The lower figure is probably correct. The force had originally been planned to include 5,000 men.

The most serious, problem, however, was what Yost describes as "the OAU failure to define precisely the mission of the peacekeeping operation."

> The vague charter of the peacekeeping force did not specify whether the troops could be employed to fight factions opposed to Goukouni's GUNT (above all, Habré's FAN) or would limit themselves to self-defense and policing operations. The text of the peacekeeping force's charter described its mission as "to assure the defense and security of the country while governmental forces are integrated", but all three participating governments seemed determined to avoid combat in Chad. This refusal to fight Habré's forces had disappointed Goukouni by the end of December 1981, when he declared that "the Chadian government thinks it is vain to continue to support and keep such a force on its national territory, since it does nothing to safeguard the security and integrity of Chad... For us, the text signed between the Chadian government and the OAU on the coming into Chad of the neutral force is clear: it stipulates that this force must assure the

security and integrity of Chad. On the ground, it has been passive, and therefore useless" (16).

It is more probable, however, that it was not a matter of the mission of the force being ill-defined. None of the participating nations intended it to function as the UN force in the Congo had in 1961, that is, to take part in fighting. The OAU recognized GUNT and Goukouni as the legitimate government of Chad but would not participate in fighting to defend it. They presumably had hoped to act as some sort of deterrent and as a moral prop for Goukouni. But far more was necessary in Chad. Habré's forces continued to take over more and more of Chad's territory while carefully avoiding any combat with units of the OAU force. By early February 1982, after less than two months in Chad, the OAU was determined to take its forces out of the country.

> On February 11, 1982, an ad hoc committee of the OAU met in Nairobi to adopt a new peace plan for Chad. The presidents of six countries — Kenya, Nigeria, Guinea, Zaire, Zambia, and the Central African Republic — agreed on the following plan: cease-fire in Chad on February 28, 1982; initial negotiations between Habré's FAN and the GUNT beginning on March 15, 1982; adoption of a provisional constitution by April 30, 1982; presidential and legislative elections to be held in Chad between May 1 and June 30, 1982; withdrawal of the OAU peacekeeping force from Chad on June 30, 1982 (17).

Goukouni flatly rejected the proposal. He would not negotiate with FAN. Cervenka and Legum claim that Western nations failed to produce the aid that they had promised for the OAU force and that this contributed to the OAU's decision, but it appears that the aid was in fact supplied. Goukouni was able to persuade Egypt and Sudan to cease aiding Habré's forces, and in May 1982, at the request of the OAU, the United Nations Security Council created an assistance fund for the OAU peacekeeping force, but it was too late. The OAU kept to the schedule it had made in February and withdrew from Chad. In June, OAU Chairman Moi ended the OAU's first peacekeeping mission, the peace plan having provided the withdrawal with an appearance of respectability. President Goukouni asked for a new Libyan intervention in May, but without success for the moment. By mid-summer, Habré had occupied most of Chad. In mid-1983, Libyan forces once again invaded Chad from the north along with remnants of Goukouni's troops, and the civil war in Chad was resumed.

Conclusion

As the study was never properly completed, a concluding section was not written. In its stead, the brief summary comment that was written for the much shorter preliminary version of the study written for a UNESCO conference and published in France in 1985 is included here.

The purpose of the study was to provide what must be considered no more than a brief introduction to a wide range of military activities relating to foreign military intervention in the years since 1945. The activities ranged from war and invasion pure and simple to the use of expeditionary military forces, the threat of use of nuclear weapons, the use of foreign military facilities, the consideration of humanitarian intervention and other subjects. Some of these subjects could barely be touched upon in a manuscript of this length.

A major point of the study is that the post-war decolonization process, the rise of a much larger number of independent nations, and the dispersion of substantial weapons capabilities to a wider population of nations, has not led to any greater degree of international peace and sovereignty of states; probably quite the opposite. In the words of Kenneth Waltz:

> Seldom if ever has force been more variously, more persistently, applied; and seldom has it been more consciously used as an instrument of national policy. Since the war we have seen, not the cancellation of force by nuclear stalemate, but instead the political organization and pervasion of power; not the end of the balance of power owing to a reduction in the number of major states, but instead the formation and perpetuation of a balance à deux.[1]

It is very clear from the evidence gather in this study, however, that the recent past and the probable future pattern of international military intervention is something more than "...a balance à deux," even if either the USSR or the USA stand behind at least some, but not all, of the second rank of interventionary nations. This study therefore shifts the emphasis at least to some degree towards the judgment expressed by Richard Smoke:

> In a world of "military plenty" and a substantial number of independent or semi-independent actors, there is a considerably higher probability that a minor conflict may seem to threaten the interests of – or present opportunities to – regional powers who are prepared to intervene largely on their own and who have the capability to do so.[22]

In the great majority of cases it is a matter of the "opportunities" for the intervening power, rather than a threat to the government carrying out the intervention, or on whose behalf some other state carries out an intervention. Often the conflict has been small indeed, and the

intervening power can be far from the region. Conflicts are manipulated and even fabricated. And as is the case with arms transfers, ruling élites or contending political factions in the nation at the receiving end of the intervention have been only too willing collaborators in expanding the degree of the foreign intervention which either brought them to power or maintains them there. With the marked burgeoning of arms transfers in the recent past, and more states showing greater interest in foreign military intervention, the prognosis for the future can only be a steady increase in the activities described in the study.

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[1] Kenneth Waltz,

[2] Richard Smoke, "Analytic Dimensions of Intervention Decisions," p. 28, in *The Limits of Military Intervention*, ed Ellen P. Stern, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1977. Smoke extends the same framework to *non-military* interventions as well:

> "In addition, the number of players, and the multiple layers of diverse interests and involvements connecting players to local situations, will usually present a rich menu of possibilities for low-level, 'subthreshold' interventions of various kinds, as well as more overt military interventions. Numerous options are likely to present themselves for economic pressure tactics, for political threats and promises, and for many sorts of covert or semicovert 'political warfare' devices. In this kind of constellation, opportunities often abound for playing ends against middles, for agent-provocateur types of tactics, for 'psywar' and 'disinformation' operations, and for 'destabilizing' political processes, groupings and governments ... The likely flourishing of these and similar kinds of *relatively* non-violent interventions may give a Byzantine or medieval-Florentine flavor to many political affairs in the future."

References and Notes

the references for each section are numbered separately, as in the text

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5. Walzer's phrase is taken from the following quotation:
   "The principle that states should never intervene in the domestic affairs of other states follows readily from the legalist paradigm and, less readily and more ambiguously, from those conceptions of life and liberty that underlie the paradigm and make it plausible. But these same conceptions seem also to require that we sometimes disregard the principle: and what might be called the rules of disregard, rather than the principle itself, have been the focus of moral interest and argument. No state can admit to fighting an aggressive war and then defend its actions. But intervention is differently understood. The word is not defined as a criminal activity, and though the practice of intervening often threatens the territorial integrity and political independence of invaded states, it can sometimes be justified. It is more important to stress at the outset, however, that it always has to be justified. The burden of proof falls on any political leader who tries to shape the domestic arrangements or alter the conditions of life in a foreign country. And when the attempt is made with armed forces, the burden is especially heavy — not only because of the coercions and ravages that military intervention inevitably brings, but also because it is thought

that the citizens of a sovereign state have a right, insofar as they are to be coerced and ravaged at all, to suffer only at one another's hands."

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5. Milton Leitenberg, "Survey of Studies of Post WW II Wars, Conflicts and Military Coups", mimeographed, September 1977, 167 pages.

6. These estimates are very crude and extremely unsatisfactory. There is virtually not a single thorough study of the question. One estimate was made by Kende in 1976 and another by this author in the same year. Though the totals arrived at in the two estimates differed by only 25%, this seems to be more coincidence than anything else, since the estimates for mortality in individual conflicts and wars differed enormously and in both cases included much crude guessing. I have continued to update my own estimates since 1976.

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2. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, War Powers Legislation, 1973, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, April 1973, Washington D.C: U.S.Govt. Printing Office, pp. 126-156. This list included "only actual battles, landings, or evacuations in foreign territory or waters. Deployment to maintain an American presence, or alerts bringing on advanced state of readiness are not included except for seven or eight incidents when the risk of war was unusually grave." However, as these 7 or 8 spanned the larger time period of 1798 to 1972, it is not known how many of them were between 1945 and 1972. This source also provided a somewhat confusing group of additional lists, all for the period 1945-1970, with 18 "Major Military Actions for Broad Strategic Aims", 9 "Hostilities with Actual Combat or Ultimatums", 15 "Military Actions by the United States Outside the Western Hemisphere" and 21 "Military Operations Arguably Initiated Under Prior Legislative Authority". Most of these lists contained similar populations of events, and so these numbers cannot be added to one another.

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8. Regarding the level of force used in incidents, the authors constructed a scale ranking "military level of effort" based on the historical data. The scale ranges from 1 to 5 with "1" indicating the greatest effort and "5" the least effort. (As an example, "1" indicated the use of a strategic nuclear unit plus at least one "major" force component, where the "major" force component could have been a naval force — two or more aircraft carrier task groups, a ground force — more than one battalion, or a land-based air force — one or more combat wings.)
The distribution of incidents by level of military effort was provided, and the "most significant incidents", the 33 which scored a "1" or "2" on the level of effort scale, were listed.
The criteria for exclusion of various events seem open to debate. Even within the terms of the study, however, small changes in the restrictions on the military level of effort would produce very sizable differences in results. For example, if the deployment of one aircraft carrier had been considered the definition of a "major" force component, rather than two, the sums and distribution of incidents would have changed a good deal. Similarly if aircraft carriers had been considered a "strategic nuclear unit", as they substantially were for many years, the incidents in which strategic nuclear forces were involved would have numbered more than nineteen.

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- J.L.S.Girling, America and the Third World: Revolution and Interventions, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980.

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- US Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, Hearings: Congress, the President, and the War Powers, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., Washington, DC: Printing Office, 1970.
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Korea, 1950	Vietnam, 1961-1963
Indochina, 1954	Cuba, 1962
Taiwan Straits, 1954	Vietnam, 1964
Taiwan Straits, 1958	Dominican Republic, 1965
Lebanon, 1958	Vietnam, 1965 (bombing)
Berlin, 1958	Vietnam, 1965 (troops)
Laos, 1960	North Korean capture of the US Pueblo, 1968
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> "From the very moment inter-State relations were established, the Soviet Government began organizing espionage against the existing socialist order in Yugoslavia and against the independence of the Yugoslav peoples. The primary aim of these actions was to create a network of secret agents which would be a tool of the Soviet Government for undermining the Yugoslav Government. By a whole series of steps and acts which it undertook even before the Cominform Resolution of June, 1948, the Soviet Government attempted to impose unequal relations on Yugoslavia and to interfere in its internal affairs... The Cominform Resolution was in effect a signal for the launching of the unprecedented campaign against Yugoslavia, aimed at forcing the Yugoslav Government and peoples, by way of political, diplomatic, economic, propagandistic, military and other kinds of pressure and threats, to renounce their rights to sovereignty and independence, their right to be the master in their own home..."

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, White Book on Aggressive Activities by the Governments of the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania Towards Yugoslavia, Belgrade, 1951, 14-37, excerpts.

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20. Quoted in Curtis Keeble, "The Roots of Soviet Foreign Policy", International Affairs 60:4 (Autumn 1984): 565.

21. There is no reason to assume that the agreement signed in 1933 should have lost any of its international legal status due to intervening historical events. It has never been renounced by the USSR or by Czec.oslovakia. One might note that Soviet spokesmen frequently claim that the USSR still reserves the legal right to invade Iran if the USSR feels that its security is threatened by events in Iran and that this right is provided by the 1921 Iranian-Soviet Treaty. However, these provisions have been specifically renounced by Iranian governments for the past 30 years, both by the government of the former Shah and by the present Khomeini government.

22. See Jiri Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981, page 88, and Zdenek Mlynar, Nightfrost in Prague; The End of Humane Socialism, New York: Kurz Publishers, 1980, pg. 154.
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    The Joint Soviet-Czeckoslovak Communiqué, Pravda, October 29, 1969;
    The Soviet-Czeckoslovak Treaty of May 6, 1970, Pravda, May 7, 1970, and Boris Meissner, The Brezhnev Doctrine, East Europe Monograph 2, 1970.

23. "The Limits of Intra Bloc Pluralism", op. cit., p. 276.

24. D. Umanskiy, "Preparing For A New March", Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), October 22, 1968.

25. The best examples of this literature are the books by Gar Alperovitz, Gabriel Kolko, Daniel Yergin, Martin Sherwin and John Lewis Gaddis.

26. There are few better introductions for this than the memoir of the former Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow, Veljko Micunovic, Moscow Diary, Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1980. In his introduction to the English translation of this book, George Kennan wrote in 1979 that the volume was entirely unique among other reasons due to Micunovic's personal relationship with Khrushchev and that it is

> "...as an illustration of the nature of the regime to which he was accredited — that the Micunovic memoirs have their greatest value. Micunovic's account stands second to none as an intimate and searching illumination of Soviet diplomacy within the confines of the Communist 'camp' — a diplomacy veiled by the habits of secrecy to which the Soviet leadership was, and is, addicted. ...
> "There is in this fact a lesson which the Soviet leaders will themselves do well to ponder; for it suggests that a good portion of the frictions which seem always, sooner or later, to have attended the relations of the Soviet Union with other governments have been rooted not in the objective political or ideological differences which divide the Soviet state from other societies, but rather in certain Soviet habits and principles of action, inherited from precedents of earlier decades."

One can note in this regard Frederick Engels' observation in his "A Polish Proclamation", written in 1974, "A people which oppresses another cannot emancipate itself. The power which it uses to suppress the other finally turns against itself", in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Russian Menace to Europe, edited by Blackstock and Hoselitz, London: Allen & Unwin, 1953, p. 115.

27. Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs Of A President, London: Collins, 1982, p. 247.

28. Ibid., p. 249.

29. Whence The Threat To Peace, Second Edition, Moscow, 1982, pages 91, 95.

30. Konstantin Chernenko in World Marxist Review, Tass distribution, January 4, 1983 Chernenko denies all speculations in the West that the Soviet Union would not permit an independent path to socialism in its brother countries. "The principles of internationalism have formed the basis for the Soviets' activities on the international scene under the 60 years of the nation's existence". The irony of these statements are difficult to surpass but they are quite common. On October 2, 1984, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko proposed that the question of "the impermissible acts in a policy of state terrorism and all state actions with the purpose of undermining the political system in other sovereign states" be placed on the agenda of the 39th session of the United Nations General Assembly. ("Letter from Andrej Gromyko to Javier Perez De Cuellar", Novosti Press Agency, October 2, 1984). In February 1985, Soviet Politbureau member Michael Solomentsev claimed that the USSR has always supported "the struggle for a complete realization of the right of all peoples to independent development, to determine their own destiny. With these principles as its guide the USSR will also in the future help the victims of aggression" (Michael Solomentsev, "Peace Is A Common Concern", Novosti Press Agency, February 11, 1985).

31. "The United States Intervention Since World War II", News From The Soviet Union 44:2 (February 1984) (in Swedish), and see also "Terrorism At The Highest Level", News From The Soviet Union 44:11 (November 1984): 10-13 (in Swedish).

32. V.Zhurkin, SSKA i Mezhdunarodna-Politicheskie Krizisy, Moscow: Izdatelstvo Nauka, 1975. See also V.M.Kulish et al., Military Force and International Relations, Moscow, International Relations Publishing House, 1972. Translation in full by JPRS, Washington D.C. 1973.

33. G.Arbatov, "US Foreign Policy For The New Decade", Pravda, March 3, 1980, Novosti Press Agency translation in full.

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38. "Expansionism In Russia's Policy: Interview, Helmut Schmidt", Newsweek, December 3, 1984, p. 64.

39. Raymond L.Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations From Nixon to Reagan, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1985, pp. 667-668.

40. Ibid., p. 679.

41. Ibid., pp. 679-680.

42. Curtis Keeble, "The Roots of Soviet Foreign Policy", International Affairs 60:5 (Autumn 1984): pp. 561-578.

43. A.A.Gromyko and B.N.Ponomarev, Soviet Foreign Policy, 4th ed., Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1981, p. 22 (quoted in Keeble, op. cit.).

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51. Porter, The USSR in Third World Conflicts, op. cit., p. 229.

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52. Porter, The USSR in Third World Conflicts, op. cit., pp. 241-242.

53. Ibid., p. 242.

54. Alex P. Schmid and Ellen Berends, Soviet Military Interventions Since 1945, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1985, pp. 138-158.

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57. Gen. A.A.Epishev, quoted in H.F.Scott and W.F.Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR, Boulder, Colo.: Western Press, 1979, p. 57.

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63. One report indicated that the 103rd Airborne division was flown to advance bases in Romania. The USSR has apparently made use of deception at several levels in the invasion of Afghanistan and Czechoslovakia:

- Soviet troops were apparently informed that they were going to oppose Western forces in the case of Czechoslovakia, and Western mercenaries in Afghanistan.
- Soviet commandos, Special Operations Brigades (Raydoviki and Vysotniki), allegedly took over both airports before the arrival of the airborne troops, dressed in civilian clothes and delivered in civilian Aeroflot aircraft. (Ralph Ostrich, "Aeroflot", Armed Forces Journal International 118:9 (May 1981): 57.)
- "The most effective form of deception used during the Czechoslovak crisis was probably the continuous series of military exercises which very likely desensitized the Czechoslovak and Western leaders and analysts to the possible invasion."...

"Before the intervention in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet generals succeeded in lowering fuel and ammunition stocks of the Czechoslovak armed forces by transferring these to East Germany, supposedly for an 'exercise'. The Soviet generals also succeeded in securing the consent of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Defense for an unexpected military exercise of the Czechoslovak armed forces, with the participation of Warsaw Pact observers. The exercises were to take place on August 21, the second day of the invasion, and thus were intended to divert the attention of the Czechoslovak generals from the forthcoming invasion."

(Jiri Valenta, "Soviet Views of Deception and Strategic Surprise: The Invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan," in Strategic Military Deception, D.C.Daniel and K.L.Herbig, New York; Pergamon Press, 1981.)

Soviet officers apparently also succeeding in disarming important elements of the Afghanistani military forces on the day before the Soviet invasion by several deceptive strategems

64. Some reports apparently mistakenly give the date of the Soviet troop airlift exercise as October 1979. One report also indicated that some of the Soviet troop flights originated from bases in Bulgaria and that elements of seven Soviet combat divisions took part in the exercises. "Russia's Secret Airlift", Newsweek, 26 November 1979; "Moscow Has a Rapid Deployment Force Too", op. cit., and M.L.Urban, "The Strategic Role of Soviet Airborne Troops", Jane's Defense Weekly (July 14, 1984): 30.

65. "The Soviets Exercise Their Airlift Capability", Air Force Magazine, March 1978, p. 27; "Soviet Airlift to Ethiopia", Air Force Magazine, September 1978, p. 33; "Soviet Ethiopian Supply Routes", Aviation Week & Space Technology 108:1 (2 January 1978): 15; and "Soviet Arms Airlift to Ethiopia Violates Air Space of Pakistan", Aviation Week & Space Technology 107:25 (19 December 1977): 17.

66. Eric Rouleau, the veteran Middle East correspondent for Le Monde, claimed in a television interview on October 26, 1983, that there were as many as 8-10,000 Soviet military personnel in Syria (twice the previously published figure) and that as many as 1,000 of these were inside Lebanon, presumably with Syrian air-defense positions in the Bekaa Valley. He further claimed that these were independent Soviet units, not advisors assigned to Syrian units. He also alleged that some of these units were in Syrian uniform or in civilian clothing in positions only 20 kilometers from Beirut at the time that Walid Jumblatt's Druse forces were defeating the Lebanese government forces in the Shouf Heights surrounding Beirut. Since these positions were within range of US naval shelling from ships offshore Beirut, it is an interesting exercise to think of the interactions that could have developed if Rouleau's allegations are correct. It has been verified that Soviet air-defense personnel did participate in fighting against Israeli aircraft in Lebanon, and in one case, according to Israeli government sources, a GDR manned SAM facility inside Lebanon was responsible for destroying an Israeli aircraft.

67. - Zafir Iman, "Soviet Treaties with Third World Countries", Soviet Studies 35:1 (January 1983): 53-70.

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68. Carter, Keeping Faith, op. cit., p. 256.

69. A good brief summary of the events in 1978 and 1979 can be found in "Afghanistan: Soviet Intervention and the American Reaction, 1978-1980", Chapter 26 in Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, op. cit., pp. 887-965. In addition to other specific references to sources on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the notes that follow, some of the more important sources on Afghanistan are the following:

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70. An uprising in the Hazara region in June 1979 triggered an alert of an airborne division in the USSR, and in early July a 600- man contingent of the 105 Airborne division was stationed at Bagram Air base near Kabul. The Soviet airborne troops that already occupied the airfields at Bagram and in Kabul greatly facilitated the subsequent Soviet occupation of Kabul. The apparent assassination of Afghan President Amin on December 27, two days after the Soviet invasion, with the concomittant death of Soviet Lt. Gen. Papunin, recalled the killing of the Diems in Vietnam. See, R.D.M. Furlong and Theodore Winkler, "The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan", International Defense Review 13:2 (1980): pp. 168-170.

71. A.Maslennikov, "Behind the Scenes of Events: Vain Efforts", Pravda, 23 December 1979, complete translation, in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press 31:51 (January 1980): p. 4.

72. The Afghan government even reported the fanciful charge that 4,000 Iranian soldiers had infiltrated into Afghanistan.

73. A. Petrov, "Provocations Continue," Pravda, June 1, 1979. The United States apparently did not provide any direct assistance to Afghan resistance groups until after the Soviet invasion in December 1979. Oddly enough, by mid-1979 Libya was reportedly providing financial assistance to Afghan resistance groups, despite very strong Soviet-Libyan relationships in support of various groups involved in conflicts elsewhere in the world. In August 1979, Chernenko stated in a speech that "I cannot but mention the attempts by the forces of reaction and imperialism to interfere in the internal affairs of democratic Afghanistan, a country that is our neighbor. These forces seek at any cost to deprive the Afghan people of its revolutionary gains and restore feudal order." Quoted in Craig R.Whitney, "The Roll Call of Power: Who Made Afghanistan Decision?", International Herald Tribune, January 19-20, 1980 (from the New York Times).

74. Quoted in Robin Edmonds, Soviet Foreign Policy, (1983), pp. 189-190, from Pravda, December 29, 1979, and Istoriva Vneshnei Politiki SSSR, 1945-1980, Vol. 2, pp. 646-647.

75. Garthoff, Dētente and Confrontation, op. cit., pp. 928, 931. (The phrases "no other way" and "forced (to)" are directly reminiscent of the US argumentation regarding Vietnam.)

76. George W.Ball, "Threatened US Lifeline", International Herald Tribune, January 25, 1980 (from the Washington Post).

77. Garthoff, Dētente and Confrontation, op. cit., pp. 920, 923, 925, 927, 929, 939.

78. Ibid., p. 937.

79. Ibid., p. 924. See also p. 939.

80. "Leonid Brezhnev's Answers to Questions Put By Pravda", Pravda, January 13, 1980. New Times, No. 3 (January 1980): p. 5-7; excerpted in the New York Times, January 13, 1980. The translation quoted by Garthoff differs in one or two words. Brezhnev also added that if the USSR had not responded to Afghan requests for assistance it would have permitted "the aggressive forces" to repeat what they had succeeded in doing in Chile, "when the people's freedom was drowned in blood".

The writings of George Kennan on the subject of the Soviet invasion, in which he deplored the "disquieting lack of balance" in Western analysis, called for "mature statemanship" and "realism, prudence and restraint in American statesmanship", and briskly argued that "Mr. Brezhnev has specifically, publicly and rigourously denied" any more dangerous intentions (which refers to Brezhnev's statements that the Soviet Union had no expansionist plans in any other country, "...the policy and mentality of colonialism are alien to us") remind one of nothing so much as Neville Chamberlain at the time of Munich. The assessment is all the more remarkable in that Kennan is not only the author of the famed "long telegram" in 1946 on Soviet foreign policy goals, but is a professional historian, as well as an experienced diplomat and Soviet specialist. (George Kennan, "Was This Really Mature Statesmanship?", The New York Times, February 1, 1980.)

81 Leonid Zamyatin, quoted in Robin Edmonds, Soviet Foreign Policy, op.cit. p.194.

82. Alexander Bovin, Soviet News, 22 April 1980. Also reprinted in Survival. Compared to these descriptions, the one provided by Soviet Defence Minister Ustinov — which has been described as "essentially amounting to an extension of the Brezhnev Doctrine to Asia", which would be an extremely important assessment if the remarks truely represented such a policy determination — appears rather as inconsequential patriotic rhetoric: "Loyal to its international duty, the Soviet Union has always rendered and continues to render, fraternal aid and support to the peoples struggling for their independence and sovereignty and for their revolutionary gains ... It is precisely with this noble mission that limited contingents of our armed forces were sent to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan."

83. Quoted in The New Yorker, June 18, 1984, p. 31. With differing reports as early as 1980 of 3,000—4,000 Baluchi tribesmen being trained by Soviet officers in Afghanistan, or 8,000 being trained in the USSR, it should surprise no one if irregular conflicts in the Iran-Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas develop in the future. To date that has not happened. "Russia Said to Irain Baluchi Tribesmen", International Herald Tribune, 21 March 1980, and "Moscow's Next Target in Its March Southward", Business Week, (January 1980): p. 51.

84. Helsinki Watch, "Tears, Blood and Cries": Human Rights in Afghanistan Since the Invasion, 1979-1984, New York: Helsinki Watch Committee, December 1984. See also "Requiem for a Nation", New York Times, December 30, 1984.

85. The figure is remarkably similar to the number of internal migrants generated by US bombing policies in Indochina. Estimates made by the US Senate indicated that approximately 30 percent of the population of (each of) Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam fled their homes under bombing and artillery attack.

86. - Iain Guest, "UN Report Cites Soviet Massacres in Afghanistan As 'Deliberate'" International Herald Tribune, February 28, 1985.
- "Afghanistan's Long Fight", International Herald Tribune, March 6, 1985.
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87. Aernout van Lynden, "Afghan Rebels Getting Foreign Aid — Truckloads of Modern Arms", International Herald Tribune, December 21, 1982.

88. "Reports of Other Troops", International Herald Tribune, December 21, 1982.

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Britain	36	USA	10
France	18	USSR	7

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   "The irony here is that 'proxy war' — using the Soviet military base but surrogate forces, principally Cuban troops — was designed initially to outflank any form of confrontation with the United States and at the same time to maintain 'detente', yet ended by producing these very undesirable results, raising the tension between the Super Powers (not least over Angola) and bringing 'detente' into gross disrepute." "Red Alert: The Soviet Military and Soviet Policy", The Political Quarterly 51:3 (July-September 1980): 277.

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7. Ibid., p. 271.

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REFERENCES — ACQUISITION AND USE OF FOREIGN MILITARY BASES

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The early 1970s saw two very inadequate examinations of overseas bases. The first was published in 1972 by SIPRI ("Foreign Military Presence, 1971: Armed Forces and Major Bases", pp. 240-275, in World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook, 1972, SIPRI, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1982). The second appeared in two publications by Michael Klare ("US Bases and Forces Abroad", The US Apparatus: NACLA Handbook, NACLA, August 1972, and "The Sun Never Sets on America's Empire: US Bases in Asia", Commonweal, May 22, 1970, pp. 239-243.) Both were based entirely on the annual United States Department of Defense source listed in reference 2 below. Both suffer from one or more major deficiences, but the SIPRI chapter in particular completely misrepresented total numbers, displayed an extremely poor understanding of the uses and utilities of bases, and was especially deficient on all the newer "special", post-WWII functions of overseas bases. The SIPRI report is particularly misleading on the total number of US bases since it lists less than one-tenth the actual total, and often the number of facilities it identifies in a particular country, even when these are identified as a "total", are no more than 10 percent of the actual total. It also omitted all US bases under the NATO structure, and all Soviet bases under the Warsaw Pact. The two portions of the title of the SIPRI chapter are also not strictly equivalent, since "Foreign Military Presence" would include the direct loan of military specialists, expenditionary forces and so on, and comprises much more than bases per se. In short, added to the fact that the number of bases it imputes are incorrect, it seems to be missing everything of importance. Its only benefit was a presentation, in one source, of a list of a relatively large number of US, British, French, and Soviet bases. A detailed and competent examination of the function of all US installations in a single country, Australia, was published by Owen Wilkes in 1974 (Owen Wilkes, A Checklist of Foreign Military Activities in Australia, Brickfield Hill, NWS, Australia: The Campaign Against Foreign Military Bases in Australia, 1974).

After serial publication for ten years, and only after learning that the subject was under preparation by SIPRI for inclusion in its 1972 yearbook, the IISS published a short, four-page section on "Overseas Deployment of Forces" in The Military Balance, 1971-1972, which can only be considered a signal example of incompetence and misrepresentation, performed by the method of presenting highly selective material and the omission of particulars.

2. "Selected Military Installations or Activities Outside the United States," Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Installations and Logistics, mimeographed.

3. These additional lists can also be found in Selected Manpower Statistics, the annual publication of the US Department of Defense, OASD, Comptroller, and released in April of each year. There is also a selected annotated listing of USAF bases published each year in the Annual Air Force Almanac, the May issue each year of Air Force Magazine.

4. "Illustrative Deployment of the Armed Forces — Early 1975." pp. 94-95, in Statement on the Defense Estimates, 1975, London: HMSO, Cmnd 5976.

5. Estimates of USSR facilities or overseas bases come from the SIPRI data files. For the US, the count of "minor" overseas facilities also include military missions and military advisory groups and for the USSR they include SAM missile sites in Eastern Europe.

6. "'Major' installations are defined by the Defense Department as bases 'which are large in number of acres occupied or personnel accommodated, or which represent a high acquisition cost to the United States Government, or which are used in support of a principal U.S. military activity or mission.' Major bases include large air bases, ship yards and fleet facilities, principal headquarters and command complexes, large communications installations and troop training and housing compounds. 'Minor' installations include navigational aids, small communications facilities and small administrative buildings supporting incidental activities." Global Defense: U.S.Military Commitments Abroad, CQ Background, Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Service, September 1969, pp. 37-38.

   For the US Air Force, "a base is classified as a major installation if it has a permanently assigned full-time flying or missile squadron, or a wing, or higher headquarters on the base". At times the definitions depend on arbitrary quantitative characteristics that are ambiguous as to their significance. For example, for the US Navy, a "major" base was one with 500 or more personnel; in another government study, it was one employing "285 or more civilian personnel".

7. "Ramified Network of Military Bases", Whence the Threat to Peace?, 2nd ed., Moscow, 1982, pp. 29-33.

8. Testimony of Melvin Laird, before United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings: Foreign Assistance Act, 1969, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., Washington, DC: US Govt. Printing Office, July-August 1979, p. 109.

9. These numbers should be used as indicators of trends rather than as denoting correct absolute numbers, as different values exist in reports of different US government agencies for the same years, varying by substantial margins. This is apparent in the tables presented, which show discrepancies with one another and with the numbers presented by Secretary of Defense Laird in 1969 which are quoted in the text. The variations in the different official US figures are so large that they can only be explained by knowing the individual Department of Defense definitions and criteria that were used in each compilation. However, all the numbers show similar very sizable drops in the number of US overseas facilities. To indicate how enormous those decreases have been, the following are the number of installations that the US has maintained in Japan since the period of occupation directly after WW II:

1952	2,824
1957	458
1960	243
1965	152
1969	144
1973	88
1980	7

10. - US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations, prepared for Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Washington, DC: US Govt. Printing Office, 1979.

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11. Philip Towle, "The Strategy of War by Proxy", Journal of the Royal United United Services Institute (March 1981): 21-26.

12. Harkavy, op. cit. Also
Robert Harkavy, "The New Geopolitics: Arms Transfers and the Major Powers' Competition for Overseas Bases", pp. 131-151, in Arms Transfers in the Modern World, eds. Robert Harkavy and Stephanie Neuman, New York: Praeger, 1979, and "Strategic Access, Bases, and Arms Transfers: The Major Powers' Evolving Geopolitical Competition in the Middle East", in Great Power Intervention in the Middle East, (Ed.) Milton Leitenberg and Gabriel Sheffer, New York: Pergamon Press, 1979. pp.

13. "Bases, The Tools", Air Force Magazine 40:8 (August 1957): 331-337.

14. B.C.Wheeler, "America's English Bases, 1942-1971, An Anglo American Alliance", Flight International 100: 3262. (September 16, 1971): 338-446.

15. P.M.Smith, The Air Force Plans for Peace, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970, pp. 75-84.

16. Ibid. Smith also noted one strain which fortunately did not find its way into policy.

"There was definitely some latent imperialism in the overseas base requirements formulated by the postwar planners. This was particularly evident in their desire to secure bases in Latin America.

'The attitude of the Latin and South American countries with respect to any expansion program on the part of the United States must at all

times be favourable so as to be able to gain the points needed in the answering of a problem so gigantic as this one without being offensive, or so insure the least degree of offensivences on the part of this country. Nevertheless, this problem is a great one. Though it be distasteful to a small Latin or South American country to allow the United States to maintain and operate sufficient bases on the soils over which they have sovereignty, with reluctance, we must go ahead and plan, construct and occupy these necessary areas.'

The unknown author of this draft may not have been able to incorporate his ideas into AAF [Army Air Force] policy (there is no evidence that he did), but his justification of preclusive imperialism indicates the means which some of the AAF planners were willing to use to gain their ends.

These Latin American bases had little strategic value in the impending age of the very-long-range bomber, yet to at least one AAF planner they were valuable enough for him to recommend curtailment of Franklin Roosevelt's good-neighbor policy and to justify armed attack and colonization of parts of Latin American states."

19. George F. Kennan, Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1941, New York: Van Nostrand and Co., 1960, pp. 111, 183.

20. Raymond Cohen, "The United States and the Straits Question, 1946", Threat Perception and International Crisis, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979, pp. 154-155.

21. Admiral S.G.Gorshkov, "Navies in War and Peace", translated and reprinted in US Naval Institute Proceedings 100:3 (March 1974): 51-63. The quotations which follow are all taken from this source.

22. George S. Dragnich, The Soviet Union's Quest for Access to Naval Facilities in Egypt Prior to the June War of 1967, P.P. No. 127, Alexandria, Virginia: Center for Naval Analysis, July 1974, pp. 51-54.

23. Richard B. Remnek, "The Politics of Soviet Naval Access to Naval Support Facilities in the Mediterranean," pp. 357-43, in Soviet Naval Diplomacy, Bradford K.Dismukes and James M.McConnell (Ed.), New York: Pergamon Press, 1979.

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25. "Soviet Aide Cites Cam Ranh Bay Role", International Herald Tribune, March 13, 1985.

26. John Spragens, Jr., "Vietnam and the Soviets: A Tighter Alliance", Indochina Issues no. 51 (November 1984):6.

    See also Soviet Military Power, 1984, US Department of Defense, p. 118; David Watts, "Russia Doubles Use of Vietnam Base", The Times, February 19, 1983; and Paul Hoversten, "Vietnam Becomes Naval Springboard", US Today, April 17, 1985.

27. Spragens, op. cit., p. 6.

28. - Bonner Day, "The Soviets Exercise Their Airlift Capability", Air Force Magazine : (March 1978): 27.
    - Bonner Day, "Soviet Airlift to Ethiopia", Air Force Magazine : (September 1978): 33.
    - "Soviet Arms Airlift to Ethiopia Violates Air Space of Pakistan", Aviation Week and Space Technology 107:25 (December 19, 1977): 17.
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29. Henry Bradsher wrote that "A number of third-world countries had been awed into timid silence by unauthorized overflights of them by the Soviet military airlift to Ethiopia in December 1977 and January 1978....The Soviet leadership seemed confidence that any loss of good will among weak third-world countries would be more than offset by respect for its power and willingness to use it.... The Kremlin was accustomed to letting force speak for it in the third world."

30. Richard Halloran, "New Carrier Part of Soviet Naval Buildup", International Herald Tribune, December 18, 1979 (from the New York Times).

31. Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov (source to be inserted; quoted in Michael MccGwire, 1981).

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"	1966-1975,	"	90,	"	1976,	85 "
"	1967-1976,	"	98,	"	1978,	168 "
"	1968-1977,	"	100	"	1979,	165 "
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