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The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author. They do not reflect the official position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or Air University.

Major Bryan J. Benson (BS, Parks College of St. Louis University; MBA, National University) is a C-141 Pilot. A Distinguished Graduate, he was commissioned through the Reserve Officer Training Corps in 1982 and spent the next year in undergraduate pilot training at Vance AFB, Oklahoma. His first operational flying tour was in the C-141 at Charleston AFB, South Carolina. In addition to upgrading to Special Operations Low Level II (SOLL II) Instructor Pilot, he served as the squadron Tactics Officer and Combat Aircrew Training manager. Major Benson was reassigned to the Military Airlift Command Combat Aircrew Training School at Nellis AFB, Nevada where he taught combat tactics courses to MAC, SAC, special operations, and sister service personnel. He later served in the Directorate of Operations and Transportation, HQ Military Airlift Command (later Air Mobility Command), Scott AFB, IL, as the Chief of Strategic Special Operations Programs, Special Operations Branch, and then Executive Officer to the Director. As a Senior Pilot with more than 2,600 hours, he is a graduate of Squadron Officers School, the US Army Command and General Staff College and completed Air Command and Staff College. In June 1996, Major Benson returned to the cockpit as a KC-135 pilot at Robins AFB, Georgia. Major Benson is happily married to the former Sherrie Crews and has two sons, Christopher and Matthew.

The US Department of Defense has identified a shortfall in bomber and transport capabilities necessary to execute the two nearly simultaneous Major Regional Contingencies called for in the President’s National Security Strategy. One option to fill the bomber and transport shortfall, though one not discussed in current studies, is to develop transport-bombers.

This study addresses three main questions to determine the transport-bomber’s usefulness. The first is whether commanders can use such an aircraft in ways that truly enhance force application and mobility operations without unduly undermining one in favor of the other? The answer, because of technology enhancements and budget constraints, is definitely yes. The second question targets technology specifically by asking whether engineers could place some elements of both missions on a single aircraft? Again the answer appears to be positive. Finally, the study analyzes budgetary and operational constraints in an attempt to answer the question of the appropriate force mix. In the end, either three squadrons of C-17s or two squadrons of B-747-400s provide the necessary capability. The C-17 is a more versatile and flexible mobility platform than the B-747 and engineers have identified all the technological challenges that will allow it to rapidly convert into a bomber. The B-747, on the other hand, can employ twice as many missiles, carry more than two and one-half times the number of cargo pallets and fly further than the C-17. However, its ability to "swing" promptly remains unproven and it requires intratheater airlift support to move its cargo to forward operating bases.

Chapter Page

DISCLAIMER ...................................................................................ii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR ...................................................................iii

ABSTRACT ......................................................................................iv

1 INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................1

2 OPERATIONAL UTILITY ................................................................7

3 TECHNOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT ...............................................29

4 BUDGETARY AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ..........48

5 CONCLUSIONS ...............................................................................64

BIBLIOGRAPHY..............................................................................68

Figure

1 Halting Risk Strategy ..........................................................................9

2 Strategic Airlift Capacity ..................................................................10

3 Notional Closure Requirement .........................................................11

4 Manual Insertion Delivery Method ...................................................39

5 The Missile Ejection and Translation System (METS)

Delivery Method ..............................................................................41

Table

1 Characteristics of Heavy Bombers FY01 ..........................................15

2 Bomber Mission Areas .....................................................................16

Illustrations Continued

Table Page

3 Heavy Bomber Conventional Carriage Capabilities FY03 ................19

4 AMC Aircraft Commitment Rates ....................................................20

5 Characteristics of Transports FY02 ...................................................22

6 Force Application System Components ............................................33

7 Transport-Bomber Delivery Capabilities ..........................................43

8 Transport-Bomber Cost Analysis .....................................................49

9 Single Squadron Transport-Bomber Excursion ................................56

10 Two Squadron Transport-Bomber Excursion ...................................56

11 Three Squadron Transport-Bomber Excursion .................................57

12 US Army Air Transportation Requirements .....................................58

13 Summary of Technical Assessment ..................................................65

14 Cruise Missile Carrier Cost Summary ..............................................65

J.F.C. Fuller, Foundations of the Science of War

The US Department of Defense (DOD) has identified a shortfall in bomber and transport capabilities. The Bottom Up Review (BUR) and the Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) outlined the bomber and airlift assets (respectively) necessary to execute the two, nearly simultaneous Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs) called for in the President’s National Security Strategy (NSS). The BUR called for a conventional bomber force structure in 1999 of 184 precision guided munition (PGM) capable bombers, 100 of which would be necessary to fight the first MRC. Today the United States Air Force has 168 bombers of which only 67 are PGM capable. Furthermore, the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) recommended a nuclear capable force structure of 86 aircraft (66 B-52s, 20 B-2s). The BUR includes these aircraft and they are available for conventional use unless the Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Command, needs to withhold them for the nuclear (deterrence) mission. Similarly, the MRS highlighted a five million-ton-mile (MTM) per day airlift shortfall by 2003. An increase of pre-positioned stocks has eliminated most of the airlift shortfall. The remainder of the shortfall will persist throughout the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP).

The National Command Authority responded to the shortfall of bombers and transports by increasing the level of risk that it would accept (from no risk to moderate) in the two MRC scenario rather than by increasing force structure. This decision reflected President William J. Clinton’s continued desire to cut federal budget deficits as well as the realization of a more-or-less natural tendency of requirements to exceed force structure in high-cost bomber and transport programs. Real DOD budget authority (after-inflation) has decreased by 30% since 1990. Likewise, military procurement decreased 59% and Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) decreased by 20%. Original acquisition plans for the B-2 and C-17 called for 132 and 210 aircraft respectively but the Clinton administration’s drawdown curtailed production at 20 B-2s and 120 C-17s.

One option to fill the bomber and transport shortfall, though one not discussed in current studies, is to develop transport-bombers. Multi-mission aircraft are operationally useful and make a lot of sense in today’s budget environment, as exemplified by the Pentagon’s decision to add a surface attack mission to the F-22 air superiority fighter. The transport-bomber, if operationally and technologically feasible, could enhance flexibility and provide a greater return on a costly investment. There are many examples of transports being used in force application roles. The German Air Force flew AR 232s and JU-52/89/188/290s as transport-bombers during WW II. The French used C-119s to drop napalm on targets around Dien Bien Phu in 1954. C-130s, in different variants, lay claim to dropping the US’s largest bomb in combat, shooting the largest aerial gun, as well as air transporting cargo continuously for nearly forty years. Today, the practicality of employing transport-type aircraft in combat roles is evident in the P-3, a converted Lockheed Electra, and the Air Force’s use of the B-747 as the platform for the new airborne laser.

It is important to understand that such multi-role aircraft are not likely to replace all specialized aircraft. Some mission requirements will always require maximized capabilities. For example, the B-2 bomber can penetrate almost any high threat environment and drop eight or more F-117-equivalent payloads (depending on the type of PGM). Likewise, it would not be financially prudent to integrate a bombing capability on every transport aircraft. The real question, therefore, is not whether the transport-bombers should comprise the entire fleet, but whether such dual-role aircraft should perform some part of the bomber and transport missions.

Even at the qualitative level of this analysis, determining the usefulness of bomber-transports is a complex challenge. There are essentially three main questions to address. The first explores the idea's operational utility. That is, can commanders use such dual capable aircraft in ways that truly enhance force application and mobility operations without unduly undermining one in favor of the other? The second question focuses on the idea's technological viability. Can the capabilities required for at least some elements of both missions be placed on a single aircraft? The third question, and the hardest to quantify, addresses the idea's practicality. Given the realities of budgetary and operational constraints, what are the appropriate force mixes? This thesis addresses these and a number of corollary questions.

This thesis first examines the operational parameters of the transport-bomber concept. This includes a review of bomber and transport requirements, suggestions on how to make each mission more efficient and methods of reducing transportation requirements while increasing available firepower. Next will be a discussion of the technological problems and possibilities of marrying desired bomber and transport capabilities into a single airframe. For this, it is important to understand the targeting and employment methodology necessary to employ ordnance. These requirements dictate the aircraft and weapons technology necessary to employ such ordnance from transport aircraft. Lastly, we address whether transport-type aircraft can accept this technology (including weapons) without degrading either the transport or bomber missions. The third main area is the operational and budgetary cost and benefit analysis of transport-bombers. This discussion also provides alternative uses for transport-bomber aircraft to satisfy other requirements. It concludes with a discussion of doctrinal and policy implications of the concept.

Several assumptions underpin this study. First, the baseline timeframe used for the operational concepts and technology outlined in this study is FY05. Second, the American aversion to friendly and even enemy casualties and collateral damage drives an increasing reliance on precision guided, all-weather munitions and delivery platforms. Third, Continental United States (CONUS) based military forces will have limited en-route facilities available to support their overseas employment. Fourth, Air Force weapons and aircraft will become more dependent on off-board, space-based sensors and systems for navigation and target guidance. Last, scenarios and hypothetical concepts of operations take into account Bottom Up Review assumptions, facts, and figures.

Any evaluation of the viability of such dual-capable aircraft, of course, rests on their merits with a mixed fleet of specialized bomber and transport aircraft doing the same job. Ultimately, the purpose of this paper is to present the warfighting CINCs with a potential solution to shortfalls of bomber and transport force structure and capabilities by exploring new alternatives, one of which could ultimately change the character of war.

Billy Mitchell, Winged Defense

Any new weapons platform, as a matter of first priority, must be operationally viable. This means it must have the capability to do the job, in its required operating environment. In the case of the transport-bomber, it must be able to operate in both the force enhancement and force application environments without degrading the capabilities of either role. This chapter seeks commonalties in the operational characteristics and operating environments of the bomber and transport missions that suggest the ability of a single aircraft type to do some part of them. This analysis begins by examining bomber and transport requirements in the context of the Bottom Up Review. Second, it examines ways to increase the efficiency of the existing fleet of US bomber aircraft and it recommends solutions to any operational deficiencies identified. Third, it analyzes whether the transport-bomber can accomplish any of the less demanding but still required bomber missions. Finally, this chapter demonstrates how the transport-bomber concept, if employed, might increase the warfighting capability of the combatant commanders. The Mobility Requirements Study (MRS), Bottom Up Review (BUR), Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), and the Mobility Requirements Study Bottom Up Review Update (MRS BURU) provide a useful point of departure for evaluating bomber and transport requirements.

Recently, four major studies have shaped strategic bomber and mobility requirements: the Mobility Requirements Study in 1992, the Bottom Up Review in 1993, the Nuclear Posture Review in 1994 and the Mobility Requirements Study Bottom Up Review Update in 1995. "The MRS provided the basis for current strategic mobility forces and a comprehensive review of US strategic mobility for the 1999 period. The Bottom Up Review resulted in changes to the defense strategy and overall force structure, modernization, and infrastructure." The Nuclear Posture Review recommended strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter political and military leaders with access to nuclear forces from acting against our vital interests. The recommended strategic force of 20

B-2s and 66 B-52Hs is significant because it allows the remaining bombers to focus strictly on conventional operations. The MRS BURU analyzed the strategic mobility mix to insure the nation could successfully execute the two Major Regional Contingency strategy. The total future force structure necessary to execute the two MRC strategy is a function of the amount of assumed risk.

The three conventional studies set out to identify force structure necessary for conducting three warfighting phases with a moderate level of risk. The Bottom Up Review defined risk as "the likelihood of an undesirable outcome." The BUR called for a three phased strategy to stop the aggressor (Phase I), buildup US and coalition counterattack forces (Phase II), and subsequently counterattack and defeat the fielded forces (Phase III). The Mobility Requirements Study Bottom Up Review Update concludes that the sooner halting forces are in theater, the lower the risk. Thus, the

present strategy attempts to rapidly deploy US land and sea-based air and heavy ground forces in time to save essential ports, infrastructure, and other critical facilities. Current scenarios rely on airpower to provide the bulk of the combat power in Phase I. Figure one is a notional depiction of the geographic lines associated with risk. Consequently, airlift, bombers, and some fighters, are the priority assets in this period. Surface-based forces (and their requisite sealift minus pre-positioned assets) do not play a large role in the halting phase because they can not arrive in time to affect its outcome. Phase I defines halting risk in terms of forces and not time.

The objective in Phase II, the build-up phase, is to provide the combat and logistic force support necessary for the counterattack phase. Phase II forces arrive by a combination of sealift, airlift, and pre-positioned assets (in priority). Planners define Phase II Build-up risk by time and not forces.

In Phase III, US and coalition forces carry out a large-scale air and surface counteroffensive to decisively defeat the enemy. Combat Air Forces (CAF) provide firepower against the entire spectrum of targets while surface forces attack tactical and operational level targets. Sealift is the primary mode of transportation for the material of heavy ground units and force sustainment during the counterattack phase while airlift

provides the movement of time critical equipment and personnel. Planners also define Phase III risk by time and not forces.

The MRS, BUR and MRS BURU all concluded that a single MRC required 100 precision guided munitions capable bombers (184 bombers total aircraft inventory-TAI). Twenty percent (37) of the bombers would be unavailable (depot, training, test, etc.) while the remainder (47) serve in attrition reserve (AR) or in a nuclear deterrent role. If fewer than 100 deployable bombers are available, theater commanders must either assume additional risk or include additional assets to make up for the bomber shortage. There is clearly a bomber deficiency in the event of a second MRC since there are only 147 bombers (after the 20% degradation but before attrition) to serve both theaters.

The Mobility Requirements Study Bottom Up Review Update, after extensive wargaming, modeling, and simulation, established a cargo airlift requirement of 49.4 to 51.8 million ton miles per day (MTM/D). Figure 2 illustrates this requirement.

Figure 2. Strategic Airlift Capacity

Another measurement of airlift capability and requirements is "closure" or cumulative, daily, "tons delivered" to a theater. Closure requirements match how much the CINC needs (expressed in short tons) and when he needs it (measured in days) against the fleet capability. The "delta" between the two is the risk. It is limited to that one scenario, fleet, and point in time, but is illustrative of a particular airlift fleet’s capability to support that warfighting commander. Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between lift requirements and total lift available.

Figure 3. Notional Closure Requirement.

The most demanding MRC centers on Southwest Asia. The low number of deployed forces coupled with the long distance to the theater present a number of challenges to planners. Phase I deployment forces include substantial air forces, light infantry and Marines, a number of heavy brigades and naval carrier battle groups. Coalition forces provide additional ground, air, and naval firepower. In phase I, the CINC does not want to mass troops -- he wants to mass fires. Long-range aircraft with precision guided munitions increases his ability to do this. After all, stopping the force early is a critical part of the strategy.

There is a potential tradeoff. It may be possible to exchange some transport capability early in the MRC scenario for use in a force application role. By stopping the invading force earlier than planned (between the border and the moderate risk line in figure 1), the CINC incurs a lower level of risk. Further, by reducing this risk, he ostensibly reduces overall counterattack force and transportation requirements. Converting some transport sorties into transport-bomber missions provides a greater opportunity to mass fires on the invading army thus increasing the likelihood of halting the enemy forces early. On the other hand, if the invading force proceeds beyond the moderate risk line, exchanging transport for bomber missions may stop the invading force from damaging/destroying ports and airfields, thus keeping them open and thereby reducing the amount of required lift.

The fundamental characteristics that distinguish heavy bombers from other weapons are their long range and their substantial payload capability. They can deliver large, diverse payloads virtually anywhere in the world in a matter of hours. That means they have inherent advantages in situations where massive and/or sustained firepower

matter, particularly if the attacks must occur at long range from relatively safe bases. The US political establishment has limited options for bringing force to bear in the early period of an emerging conflict as force structure recedes from overseas bases and shrinks in size. The bomber fleet of B-52s, B-1s, and B-2s may be the only practical option where commanders need massive or sustained firepower (more so if naval force is not available). Each bomber brings unique warfighting capabilities to the scene.

The characteristics and capabilities of USAF heavy bombers have evolved along with changes in national policy, the threat, and technology. The Cold War’s creation of the B-52, B-1, B-2, and their requisite weapons are testimony of this fact. The B-52 remains the most versatile bomber in the fleet. It can carry the full complement of conventional and nuclear weapons and can operate in low threat environments autonomously, medium threat environments with some tactical support, and alone against targets in high threat environments with its Long Range Cruise Missile (LRCM) capability. In terms of diversity of mission capabilities and weapons mixes, it is the most capable conventional bombing platform in the world today. In the Gulf War, 68 B-52s flew more than 1600 sorties and dropped 72,000 weapons representing over 27,000 tons of munitions (42% of the USAF and 30% of all US bomb tonnage). It is also the only US bomber currently capable in the anti-shipping operations. A major weakness is its large radar cross section that makes it vulnerable to radar guided surface-to-air (SAM) missiles. As a result, it will most likely operate in a standoff mode to remain survivable until the radar and enemy air threats are reduced/suppressed to the point that aircraft can safely penetrate hostile airspace.

The B-1B is ready to take over the core bomber role from the B-52. Rockwell designed the B-1 to penetrate Soviet airspace below the defensive radar detection threshold at subsonic speed and deliver strategic nuclear weapons on selected targets with a high degree of accuracy. The B-1 has less than a third the RCS of the B-52 and is therefore less detectable in the radar environment. The US Government’s recent decision under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II) to restrict the aircraft to a conventional only mission has given new direction to the employment of the B-1. The aircraft’s speed, agility, and weapons carriage capability make it nearly four times more effective per sortie than a comparably equipped F-15E (or F-111) on certain critical air-to-surface missions. START I and START II limitations, however, prohibit the B-1 from employing the current family of long range conventional cruise missiles. This limits the B-1s to freefall and short range stand-off weapons.

Engineers designed the B-2 to penetrate enemy defenses, search, acquire, and destroy fixed and mobile targets, and coordinate the actions of other, less capable aircraft. The combination of stealth, information processing, and large carriage capability make it the centerpiece of any halting force. America’s "Flagship" bomber, is also the most complicated. It is a highly integrated, software-intensive system, containing 226 computers, 69 software programs, 14 mil-standard 1553B data buses and 113 processor-to-processor interfaces. Unfortunately, despite the proven bomber shortfall, the DOD, with USAF agreement, has chosen not to purchase additional B-2s because of their high unit cost. Table 1 contains a summary of US heavy bomber characteristics.

Table 1. Characteristics of Heavy Bombers FY01.

Table 2. Bomber Mission Areas

Table 3. Heavy Bomber Conventional Carriage Capabilities FY03.

Nearly every facet of national security and national military strategy execution requires military transport. No where is this better illustrated than in the current National Military Strategy where airlift leads or assists in 19 of the 22 specific military tasks. America’s post-Cold War rebasing of forces from forward locations to the CONUS resulted in a decrease in routine sustainment airlift requirements but an increase in contingency lift requirements. The US military uses airlift continually in training, exercises and contingencies and numerous US governmental and non-governmental agencies procure military airlift when commercial airlift is either not available, not appropriate, or counter to national interests. Furthermore, because the US has the world’s only robust strategic mobility system -- and more specifically its only strategic airlift system, it provides lift for numerous countries and organizations for peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, administrative unit deployments/redeployments, etc.

The increasing demand of the US government to use US military air transport as a sign of American presence translates into an air transportation requirement that often exceeds capacity. Table 4 illustrates the actual commitment rates of the five major mobility weapon systems within the Air Mobility Command (AMC) for the last three and one-half years. Upon reviewing the commitment rates, it appears that substantial excess capacity exists. However, when compared against the mission capable (MC) rates, it is evident that little or no excess exits. The KC-135s are flying some airlift missions now, however, their primary task in an MRC will continue to be air refueling. The table also omits the substantial amount of contract airlift that AMC hires from the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) participants. In the event of an MRC, the greater part of lift (exact number classified) is dedicated to the war effort. Planners, however, reserve 50% of the fielded forces for the second MRC and most of these forces will lose some of their lift. This will have a negative impact on readiness rates. Purchasing additional transport aircraft above the programmed ceiling of 120 C-17s could alleviate some of the identified shortfalls. It would provide additional lift to the warfighting CINC as well as continued support to the other airlift customers not actively participating in the MRC.

Table 4. AMC Aircraft Commitment Rates

High crew ratios allow transport forces to conduct continuous world wide operations allowing planners to maximize aircraft utilization. As table 5 illustrates, active duty crew ratios range from 1.8 to 3.0 but when the SECDEF mobilizes the Air Reserve Component, these expand from 3.5 to 5.0. These crew ratios, coupled with high aircraft utilization rates permit sustained operations from the CONUS and/or allow multiple sorties from a forward operating base (FOB).

Given that the bomber fleet falls short of requirements, and that the transport fleet has the latent capability to augment the bomber fleet, the question remains, "in what way and to what extent?" The probable best answer to this question begins by remembering that the goal in Phase I is to halt an invading force and that nearly 75% of the targets are mobile. Thus, the best use of available assets might be to focus heavy bombers on mobile targets while attacking the fixed targets with other assets including transport-bombers. While transport aircraft will not be survivable over enemy territory, they do offer promise in the non-penetrating, standoff mission areas. The only weapons that currently fill that need are air launched cruise missiles.

The cruise missile carrier concept is not a new idea for transport aircraft use. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown seriously considered it in the late 1970’s as a replacement for the canceled B-1A. The idea of a single aircraft carrying up to 72 cruise missiles interested the Secretary but he decided to modify the B-52 instead of procuring a wide-body cruise missile carrier because the bombers were already "hardened" for the nuclear mission. That concern is not as relevant today.

Transport-bombers can substantially increase an air commander’s targeting capability. A squadron of transports carrying 20 conventionally air launched cruise missiles each (same capacity as existing B-52s) could target 240 aimpoints or six percent of the fixed targets (previously identified in table 4) on one strike. Further, because a transport aircraft on the ramp does not have the political "baggage" that a bomber does, host nations may allow discreet basing for transport-bomber operations. This would allow planners to capitalize on the robust crew ratios and high aircraft utilization rates, thus generating more sorties per aircraft per day. Aircraft such as the C-5 could deliver 60 or more weapons per aircraft, 720 per squadron on each strike. By using the transport aircraft to augment existing bomber capability, air commanders could exhaust the infrastructure and fixed air defense targets list sooner, allowing the bombers and other tactical assets to penetrate and strike at the fielded forces or other target sets.

In contrast, by using the transport aircraft to strike the fixed targets alone, bombers and other tactical assets can attack fielded forces earlier and ostensibly force them to halt sooner than they otherwise would have if allowed to go unimpeded. Bombers can attack more aimpoints against combat vehicles than fixed infrastructure by using weapons with smart submunitions. Long-range cruise missiles with high explosive warheads can only strike one aimpoint. Consequently, a B-52 with twenty CALCMs strikes at most, twenty aimpoints. In contrast, a B-52 or B-1 can carry 16 or 30 WCMD respectively. WCMD with 40 sensor fused weapons (SFW) submunitions averaged over three combat vehicle kills per weapon in RAND’s wargaming models. That equates to as many as 90 vehicles per bomber sortie. In other words, freeing up bombers to strike fielded forces produces a greater than 4-to-1 kill ratio advantage over bombers striking fixed targets with cruise missiles.

Transport-bombers can use existing airlift platforms, communications and computer processing equipment and operating concepts to reduce costs and allow the aircraft to "swing" from one role to the other. Since AMC equips transports (or will by FY05) with satellite communications, GPS and possibly Real Time Information in the Cockpit (RTIC), they can ostensibly operate and communicate with any commander, anywhere in the world, at anytime. Current technology is sufficient to employ long range cruise missiles without the aid of expensive onboard sensors. Planners can load weapons with targeting information before flight and the capability exists to retarget the weapons in flight if necessary. Engineers should design the system so that qualified crews can employ the weapons using RTIC outside the range of threats. The goal is not only to make as few modifications to the transport airframe as possible, so as not to adversely affect either mission, but to improve both missions with the improvements that are made. This translates into more -- and more responsive -- capability for the warfighting commander.

The limited number of both bombers and transports requires employment concepts that capitalize on the strengths and minimize the weaknesses of both. The bomber concept should be one that masses the most fires on the invading force so as to halt it prior to the loss of territory or critical facilities. This destruction occurs quickest when the B-52s and B-1s employ Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser weapons against armored forces. Transport-bombers can support them in this endeavor by either augmenting the B-52 in the non-penetrating standoff role against fixed infrastructure targets or by attacking these targets alone.

Clearly there is a shortage of peacetime airlift and the transport concept should provide more lift capability or reduce the lift requirement. In an MRC scenario, transport-bombers could be used against an invading force any time its value as a force application platform is higher than its value as a transport vehicle. One example where the concept may be helpful is when the invading force is threatening to overrun vital airfields and/or ports. By using the aircraft in the bomber-transport role and stopping the invading force short of the facilities, commanders effectively reduce overall airlift requirements by keeping the ports open. The corollary here is if AMC had additional airlift assets to use as bomber-transports then they would be available to augment the transports during peacetime operations or augment the bombers during Phase I and swing to the transport mission during Phases II and III. The idea appears to be operationally sound and the current transport infrastructure, crew training and manning appear capable of supporting the concept. The next issue to address is whether the idea is technologically feasible.

Excerpt from Die Truppenfuhrung

History has often overlooked theorists, inventors, and visionaries because their operational concepts were not technologically feasible. Just as chapter two evaluated the operational requirements and concepts of the transport-bomber, chapter three will evaluate the technical aspects. There are three components of the transport-bomber technical feasibility question that this study addresses to support concept viability. They are: (1) What are the aircraft targeting and weapons system requirements necessary to employ weapons? (2) What are the specific weapons types best suited for transport-bomber employment? (3) Can the necessary employment systems and weapons be adapted to transports without disproportionately degrading either the transport or bomber missions? Any serious analysis on transport-bomber requirements and feasibility must spring from an understanding of the basic system requirements of weapons employment.

To understand the transport-bomber targeting and employment requirements, it is important to understand the concept of putting "iron on target." The system requirements include: the weapons platform, sensor(s), fire control computer, weapons guidance, and munitions.

Airmen operate their weapons platforms, the vehicles that carry crews and munitions into battle, in one or more of three threat environments: low, medium, and high. The DOD has equipped its aircraft to operate in three possible settings relative to the target environment: (1) standoff beyond the threat range and employ its weapons, (2) penetrate the threat environment and employ its weapons, or (3) both.

Sensors are devices that search, acquire, and track targets. They range in technical complexity from the human eye to phased-array, synthetic aperture radars, to multi-spectral satellite imaging systems. As a result, they may be off- or on-board the aircraft. Off-board sensors feed targeting data to the weapons platforms either directly to the aircraft’s fire control computer, via Improved Data Modems (IDMs), or to crewmembers via data or voice transmission. Because this mode depends on a data link it is theoretically vulnerable to jamming. In that case crewmembers must hand enter data into their fire control computers. Likewise, on-board sensors such as the aircraft’s radar, Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR), or Electro-Optical (EO) systems send targeting data either to the crew or directly to the fire control computer.

The fire control computer receives, interprets, and processes various inputs including targeting information, aircraft performance information (present location, altitude, airspeed, winds, etc.), and weapons specific characteristics (launch parameters, ballistics information, weapons status, etc.) to generate weapons release at the correct place and time. On the B-52, it encompasses three central computers tied together by a Mil-Std-1553B data bus. They are the brains of the offensive avionics system.

Weapons guidance occurs from a variety of internal, external, or combinations of internal and external sources or does not occur at all ("dumb" munitions). Internal sources include inertial navigation systems (INS) and Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation (DSMAC) programs. These systems are autonomous after they leave the host aircraft. External systems include radio controlled, electro-optical (sometimes), and laser guided systems. These systems require an aircraft (may or may not be the host) to give either steering commands or a guidance source to the weapon until weapon impact and consequently require the aircraft remain within line-of-sight (LOS) of the weapon and target. Other guidance methods, such as Infrared (IR) and (anti-)radiation use a combination of internal and external sources for weapons guidance. These systems require the target to provide an energy source that the weapon, in turn, translates into steering commands. Like the internally guided weapons, they are launch-and-leave. Finally, some weapons use a combination of guidance methods to improve their probability of kill. For instance, a weapon may use INS until the terminal phase then use IR or radiation energy to guide to the target. This allows the host aircraft to employ the weapon further from the target. For obvious reasons, planners and crews prefer launch-and-leave weapons to those requiring LOS with the target. They tend, however, to be much more expensive and fewer in number than other weapons.

Weapons can be either direct attack (freefall, accurate, or precision) or standoff. Direct attack weapons require an aircraft to maneuver to a release point that allows the weapon(s) to travel by their own kinetic and potential energy to the target. Stand-off weapons use the kinetic and potential energy imparted by both their delivery aircraft’s speed and altitude as well as their motors to propel them to their targets or sometimes by gliding as with the cruciform airfoils on the GBU-15 or the low-level laser guided bomb. Stand-off weapons enhance an aircraft’s survivability by allowing it to deliver ordnance at increased distance from the enemy’s defenses.

Some modern, long range standoff weapons allow for simpler, less integrated avionics (offensive/defensive) systems on their delivery aircraft compared to other weapons types. This is a function of a number of characteristics. First, non-penetrating platforms require fewer and less complicated defensive system components. Electronic and IR jammers are not as necessary and better situational awareness tool such as Real Time Information to the Cockpit (RTIC) can replace Radar Warning Receivers (RWR) thus reducing defensive systems requirements, increasing situational awareness and mitigating the need for electronic warfare officers aboard transports.

A second characteristic is that preprogrammed or "flexible targeting" weapons eliminate on-board sensor requirements and reduce the complexity of the offensive avionics system. Direct attack and some stand-off weapons like Joint Stand Off Weapons (JSOW) require on-board sensors to search, acquire, and track mobile targets and to feed this information to the fire control computer. This requires an enormous computer processing capability because increased accuracy of the fire control solution is a function of the fidelity of the sensor, the amount and speed of hardware processing, and the quality and speed of its software. By using pre-programmed cruise missiles, planners can reduce some sensor requirements. They can further reduce them by storing a targeting database on-board the aircraft, or alternatively, by providing a digital data link capability to the aircraft offensive avionics system to receive weapon specific mission profiles enroute.

The third characteristic that allows standoff weapons to have simpler, less integrated avionics is that they usually have a launch-and-leave capability. Since cruise missiles are autonomous, they do not require the aircraft remain within line-of-sight of the weapon and target as EO and radio controlled weapons do.

Transport aircraft are best suited for non-penetrating, stand-off force application missions, given the lack of an integrated self-protection capability in the medium-to-high threat environment. Cruise missiles have the longest range among conventional air launched weapons thus permitting the weapon instead of the crew to bear the risk of penetration. The ALCMs assumed the penetration role for the aging B-52 in 1981 and thus kept the aircraft viable. The B-52 is testimony that not all weapons delivery platforms require state-of-the-art or redundant systems to accomplish their missions. Table 6 summarizes the components of a force application system as it compares conventional to transport-bombers.

The B-52, currently the US’s only cruise missile carrier aircraft, is useful as a point of comparison in determining host aircraft requirements for air launched cruise missiles from transport aircraft. It can carry up to 20 AGM-86B/C or AGM-129A/B missiles - eight internally on the Common Strategic Rotary Launcher (CSRL) and six on each wing pylon. In contrast, the C-5, C-17, KC-10, and B-747-400 could carry as many as 48, 30, 30, and 72 respectively. Air launched cruise missiles require four things from the host aircraft: electrical power, pneumatic cooling air, aircraft flight information (known as velocities), and mission profile data. The bomber satisfies these requirements through two "umbilical cords" to the weapons -- one electrical and one pneumatic.

The electrical umbilical is the weapons lifeline to the aircraft. Through it, ALCMs receive power, velocities, and mission profile information, both on the ground and in-flight. On the ground, crews perform a complete weapons power-up and offensive avionics system check that all weapons are mission capable. In-flight, the weapons require power to accomplish another health check and to align their inertial navigation systems. The central air data computer provides information such as present position, aircraft heading, and altitude, through the offensive avionics system to the weapons ejector racks. Mission profile and GPS information also travel through the connection. The mission information updates either a preloaded flight profile or installs a new profile, as required. The information comes from the aircraft’s mission planning computer (MPC) and enters the weapon the same way as the velocities.

The offensive avionics system and mission planning computer are the brains of the weapons system. The offensive avionics system serves as the fire control computer. The mission planning computer should be a stand alone component because of the complex algorithms needed to process the mission profiles. The computer may contain the entire theater fixed-target library and it must have a data link feed to provide in-flight flexible targeting capability. It prevents "out-of-the-envelope" weapons release through software mechanisms as well as inadvertent weapons release through mechanical or electrical connections.

In summary, to be effective, an ALCM needs a power source, cooling air, a mission planning computer, an offensive avionics system and a data bus interface. Transport aircraft have adequate power and pneumatic generation capability but lack adequate mission planning computers and offensive avionics systems to accomplish the bomber mission. However, "Strap-On" components could provide these capabilities.

Strap-on configurations offer several benefits. One is that they provide more aircraft with the desired capability for less cost. Another is that these systems are often replaced easier, faster, and cheaper than their integrated counter parts. This is especially true regarding computer processing capability, a factor critical to the concept of modifying transport aircraft to perform bombing missions. Today, computers double their operating speeds every 18 months with a nearly corresponding decrease in price. Consequently, given current DOD acquisition timelines, the systems being installed are slower and more expensive by a factor of three than those currently available. The main problem however comes when newer components (weapons, ejector racks, computers, etc.) are added to older and slower hardware/software. As a result, engineers must design expensive bridges and workarounds to allow interoperability or else replace the entire system. The B-52H offensive avionics system illustrates this point.

The B-52H has had considerable work done to its integrated offensive avionics systems and mission planning computers. In the early 1980s, the USAF upgraded the B-52G and H model offensive avionics system with three 16-bit computers that ran approximately 600 thousand operations per second (600K OPS). A mil-std 1553B data bus provided connectivity between the computers. Unfortunately, this capability did not allow the aircraft to communicate with newer and smarter weapons so in the late 1980s (using mid 1980's technology), some aircraft were upgraded with the mil-std 1760A data bus at considerable expense. It also meant the aircraft were not available for mission taskings while the upgrades took place. In the lean years ahead, the USAF can not afford large numbers of any type aircraft to be unproductive in depots. Snap-On systems, by definition, should reduce aircraft down time. That is, because they are modular or palletized vice permanently installed, the systems can be replaced and / or upgraded between flights or during scheduled maintenance activities. For example, if snap-on programs reduce depot down times by 5% and there are currently 30 aircraft in depot ( 20 x C-5, 4 x C-17, and 6 x KC-10) then that would equate to an additional 1.5 aircraft in the fleet or a capability increase of well over $100M of lift.

There are however, dangers associated with snap-on programs. One such danger is that snap-on components, more so than their integrated counterparts, can be easily added without much fore-thought on how it effects crew workload, integration with other components/systems or maintenance repair cycles. Obviously there must be a balance between human factors, mission requirements, and cost.

Snap-on systems give transport aircraft a quick fire control and mission planning capability. Adding a module or pallet to the C-5B, C-17A, KC-10, or B-747-400 that contains a mission planning computer, offensive avionics system, data link capability and operator work stations require the host aircraft have at least a central air data computer and aircraft mission computer connected via a data bus. The mission planning computer and offensive avionics system depend on accurate and integrated velocities information and the data bus assures a level of software commonality. Currently, as table 5 illustrates, only the C-5, C-17 and B-747-400 (assumed capability) have at least an integrated 1553B data bus and thus the requisite technology suitable for the transport-bomber mission. The requirements addressed thus far are mainly associated with the "front-end" of the transport-bomber. An assessment of the weapons carriage deals with the "business " end. The next section evaluates the technology required for actually ejecting the weapons from the aircraft.

The challenge in transport-bombers is to find the best way of safely placing their weapons into the airstream at the minimum absolute and relative cost, in the shortest time and requiring the least aircraft reconfiguration and / or modification. There are numerous methods of accomplishing the delivery as well as a variety of aircraft candidates. Some of the delivery methods include: (1) external carriage, (2) conventional bomb bays, (3) manual insertion, (4) conventional airdrop delivery, and (5) Missile Ejection and Translation System (METS) delivery method. The transport-bomber aircraft candidates available in FY05 (baseline for this study) include the C-17, C-5B, KC-10, and the

B-747-400. The C-130 was purposefully excluded because of its limited weapons capacity and slow operating speed in the long range intertheater airlift role.

The first method of delivery considered external weapons carriage. Unfortunately, none of the three military transports have external hard points on the wings capable of carrying more than 2,500 lbs. While carrying some weapons on the transports’ fuselage may be possible, there has been no testing of weapons release and fly-away characteristics. Engineers associated with the B-1 will attest that these are not simple problems to solve. Even if it is technologically feasible, it is cost prohibitive (in the absolute sense)to modify all of the transports and more importantly (in the relative sense), it would add weight to the aircraft. This weight increase would reduce the total payload and / or fuel weight carrying capacity of the aircraft and increase the total life cycle cost of the aircraft.

The second method of weapons delivery is one that places conventional bomb bays on transport aircraft. It is worthy of investigation and the Scientific Advisory Board recommends the concept for further study. While it too may be feasible (and even desirable), it is too costly to retrofit existing aircraft with the capability. As a result, neither of the two methods addressed, fit the desired criteria of employing weapons at the minimum cost, in the shortest amount of time, and requiring the minimum reconfiguration / modification. Consequently, they are not retained as viable options. The balance of this assessment focuses on the remaining options. In the interest of converting transport aircraft to bomber missions in the shortest period of time, the assessment only considers palletized and/or modular components using the snap-on concept.

Manually deploying the weapons requires a mechanical arm to insert the weapons into the slip stream. There are three modular and / or palletized components in this configuration. The forward section contains the offensive avionics system, mission computer, secure data link facilities and operator work stations. The mid section contains the weapons "hangar" and the aft section contains a launch mechanism. After the aircrew brings the weapons on-line, the launch mechanism picks them up one at a time, places them in the slipstream and releases them. An advantage to this method is that the cruise missiles are only released after successful deployment of elevons and engine start thus reducing non-combat weapon losses. The disadvantages include: (1) the long time period required to salvo weapons, (2) creating a mechanical link as the critical component, and (3) needing a mechanical arm long and strong enough to penetrate the boundary layer while maintaining weapons stability. McDonnell Douglas has conducted a technical assessment on this option and concluded that it is technically feasible today. Figure 4 illustrates the manual insertion delivery method deploying unmanned aerial vehicles, however, the same concept could be used for cruise missiles.

Figure 4. Manual Insertion Delivery Method.

Airdropping weapons using conventional cargo airdrop techniques is another delivery option. In this method, the weapons are preloaded into tiered modules on the ground. Again, the forward section of the fuselage contains the mission planning computer, offensive avionics system, and data links. The mid and aft modules contain weapons racks. The advantages of this method include: (1) a quicker release of weapons than possible with a mechanical arm, (2) aerial delivery of weapons similar to delivery of air cargo Container Delivery Systems (CDS), and (3) the existence of aircrew and cargo handlers already familiar with air drop missions and procedures. The disadvantages include: (1) the requirement for cargo riggers and aerial delivery assets, and (2) the slow forward airspeed of the weapon upon parachute release. The latter is especially true concerning employment from the C-5B. The resulting weapons release parameters force minimum release altitudes for these kinds of deliveries above 20,000 feet unless the weapons were equipped with rocket boosters similar to the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile. Allowing for operational requirements, Boeing Aerospace engineers (the prime contractor for the AGM-86) believe the airdrop concept is technologically viable today.

The last delivery method evaluated here is one that forcibly, yet cleanly places the missile into the airstream. The two most studied options investigating this method include one using missile tubes and differential pressure and another using mechanical or pneumatic force to place the weapon in the airstream. This first option is similar to launching a torpedo from a submarine; the second is similar to ejecting bombs from conventional weapons racks. The defense aircraft industry proposed these methods in the late 1970s. In the first method, the weapons are loaded into (and possibly stored in) modules for C-17 or C-5B employment. As with other methods, the mission planning computer, offensive avionics system, data links and operator stations are in a forward fuselage module and the weapons modules are in the mid and aft sections of the aircraft.

Figure 5. The Missile Ejection and Translation System (METS) Delivery Method.

These delivery methods require a number of aircraft structural modifications. Custom cargo doors replace the current C-17 ramps and door assemblies thus creating "bomb-bay" type openings for weapons to pass without having to open the doors entirely (figure 5). The C-5B would require new ramp, pressure, and petal door assemblies however, the modified C-17 and C-5 doors will not have an adverse effect on conventional transport operations. Nitrogen or carbon dioxide gas provides an over pressure that ejects the weapon, much like a torpedo launch from a submarine or similar to weapons ejections from conventional bomb racks. The aircraft can remain pressurized during launch (though the fuselage modules are internally depresurized) and there are no altitude or airspeed limitations, resulting in minimal potential and kinetic energy loss to the missile. On the KC-10 or B-747-400, rotary weapons launchers move in circular fashion on rail type assemblies, stopping at the aft cargo doors to eject the weapons. The storage and launch areas are depressurized during launches. The advantages of the METS delivery method include: (1) the ability to rapidly salvo weapons, (2) the ability for the crew area to remain pressurized under most conditions, (3) the minimal loss of weapons’ potential and/or kinetic energy in the employment sequence, and (4) they are the most researched delivery methods. The disadvantages include: (1) the requirement for new doors on all four aircraft, (2) the length of mission reconfiguration time for the KC-10 and B-747-400, (3) and the requirement to depressurize prior to launch for the KC-10 and B-747-400. Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, and Lockheed all believe the METS delivery method is currently feasible.

Of the three methods, the METS delivery method appears to be the most viable followed by the airdrop and manual delivery methods respectively. The METS delivery method exceeds the others in all eight measured areas. Within the METS delivery category, the C-5 and C-17 appear to be better suited to the bomber-transport role than the KC-10 or B-747-400. The C-17 has good capabilities and no obvious limitations in any of the graded areas while the C-5 is degraded in 1 category the KC-10 and B-747-400 are degraded in 4 and 3 areas respectively. The transport-bomber delivery capabilities table (table 7) provides a summary of the manual insertion, airdrop, and the METS delivery methods across the four transport types.

Table 7. Transport-Bomber Delivery Capabilities.

The transport-bomber concept is technologically feasible. The aircraft can strike fixed infrastructure targets using preprogrammed ALCMs. It also has the flexibility to operate against mobile targets using off-board sensors and data link to locate, identify, and track targets and reprogram weapons against these targets inflight. It operates best in the permissive environment using long-range, stand-off munitions though it can operate in medium threat environments with RTIC. ALCMs require power, velocities, mission profile information and cooling air from the host aircraft, and transport aircraft can service these requirements today with the addition of mil-std data buses and strap-on computer systems.

Weapons carriage and deployment pose no major problems in any of the four transport options when delivered by the METS delivery method. There are significant problems for the KC-10 and B-747-400 aircraft in employing weapons from the manual and airdrop methods. Weapons employment in these two methods from the C-5B and

C-17 is feasible but perhaps not as efficient as the METS delivery. Using pre-loaded palletized and/or modular components reduces the mission reconfiguration and mission turn times. This, in turn, translates into higher utilization rates. Considering the variables addressed in this chapter, the C-5B and C-17A, using the METS delivery method, are the best transport-bomber candidates. Since the transport-bomber will compete for funding against all other DOD modernization programs, it must be affordable in numbers that make it militarily significant. Chapter four investigates this issue in an attempt to link ways and means.

Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet

The transport-bomber concept appears operationally viable and technologically feasible, but, it comes at some cost. The first battle the transport-bomber must win is probably the battle of the budget. Policy makers and planners can minimize the budgetary cost and operational risk of the transport-bomber however through sound business practices. To this end, chapter four investigates the budgetary aspects of the Missile Extraction & Translation System (METS) delivery method including a cost comparison of host aircraft, weapons procurement costs, force mix options, and potential budget offsets. It also deals with operational implications of the transport-bomber concept such as how removing airlift capability from current Time Phased Force Deployment Data affects the warfighting commanders. A second operational issue to examine is how transport-bombers increase employment options, and a third addresses how the concept can compete against sister service alternatives. Finally, this chapter looks at ways to improve the interoperability of mobility and bomber planning and command & control activities and thereby increase the effective and efficient use of assets.

There are three components to the transport-bomber concept that affect program cost; procurement of host aircraft, the modification of the aircraft to accommodate the bomber mission, and the procurement of weapons and support equipment. The transport-bomber cost analysis at table 8 addresses the first issue.

Table 8. Transport-Bomber Cost Analysis.

The USAF can create a transport-bomber force element with a relatively small investment (excluding weapons cost) by using existing transport forces. Doing this, however, would be at the expense of lift capacity and would delay closing forces currently required in the Time Phased Force Deployment Data. As chapter two addressed, there are advantages in using the aircraft in this role, especially if their use aids in halting the invasion forces earlier than would have occurred otherwise. However, a potentially larger payoff exists by procuring additional lift assets, using them in the transport role to fulfill the peacetime shortfall and, if required, by employing them in a force application role as an integral part of the Phase I halting force. Tables 9-11 depict a series of excursions in which up to three squadrons of C-5/C-17/ KC-10/B-747-400s, operating from the CONUS, employ 4600 ALCMs against targets in MRC-E. The quantity of ALCMs is significant because it represents the number of fixed infrastructure and enemy air defense targets listed in table 2 (chapter 2) plus an additional 15% refly increment to account for ineffective missiles (P_s=.85). As table 9 shows, a squadron of C-5s will fly 4.24 sorties per day and employ the 4,600 missile in 22.58 days. In comparison, the B-747-400, carrying 72 missiles per sortie, attacks its targets in a little over 10 days! The real value of striking the fixed targets is that it frees bombers from the mission, allowing them to carry heavier weapons loads and concentrate their efforts against the mobile fielded forces.

Table 9. Single Squadron Transport-Bomber Excursion.

Table 10. Two Squadron Transport-Bomber Excursion

Table 11. Three Squadron Transport-Bomber Excursion.

Clearly there are opportunity costs associated with this concept, both in terms of cargo not delivered when operating in the bomber role and missiles not delivered while operating in the transport role. The opportunity cost for the C-5, after twenty-three days is approximately 6,230 short tons (s/t). This represents an cargo throughput reduction of 5.2% from the total organic lift capability (1.686 of 32 MTM/D military capability).

USTRANSCOM recently validated these excursions against the actual MRC-E TPFDD. In the excursion, planners decremented available airlift forces by one squadron of C-17 equivalents for 7, 15 and 30 days. This resulted in an increase in closure time by 2%, 4.3%, and 6.8% respectively. These small decrements indicate that there is sufficient lift available to transport bomber elements, fighter squadrons, and other forces capable of immediately attacking the invading forces. While the 6,230 s/t may still appear to be significant, and it is, it equates to less than an armor battalions’ worth of forces and their sustainment for 45 days. For comparative purposes, table 12 provides an illustration of the size and requirement of US Army forces. As chapter two posits, the operational benefits of striking 4,000 targets immediately, outweighs the risk of closing a battalion of equipment twenty three days late.

Table 12. US Army Air Transportation Requirements.

The transport-bomber offers the CINC and Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) an array of options that presently do not exist. Historically, aircraft have been type cast with an identifiable mission. Obviously, bombers have but one mission - force application. Treaty verification agreements, the aircraft’s size, and basing restrictions make the aircraft susceptible to constant surveillance. In fact, if the US has a nuclear bomber withhold and is trying to send an unambiguous warning to an aggressor, the bombers will often be placed in locations to make it easier for the aggressor to collect intelligence. The fact that transports are ubiquitous and capable of employing force add an element of uncertainty thus complicating their ability to track and estimate our relative firepower. The transport-bomber exploits this uncertainty through the element of surprise. Clausewitz recognized as much and stated, "whenever it is achieved on a grand scale, it confuses the enemy and lowers his morale."

Transport-bombers have the potential be the "gunship" of the future. Transport-bombers could be capable of carrying a wide variety of cruise missile rounds including high explosive, anti-armor / anti-personnel / runway cratering submunitions, anti-radiation, reconnaissance, decoys, etc. The ability to retarget weapons in-flight enhances this flexibility. Ostensibly, the aircraft could loiter in a standoff orbit awaiting orders to attack targets much the same as current fighters and gunships do today. This concept also allows for immediate restrike of targets upon receipt of negative Battle Damage Assessment reports.

The ability of transport-bombers to operate anywhere in the world and deliver a sizable payload offers numerous options for future commanders. One option would be to use them to replace current US Army Corps assets such as the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). Transforming the platform into aerial support moves forces and assets from the theater front to the rear (worst case) or out of the theater altogether (best case). The greater the distance between the forces / assets and the enemy threat, the smaller the security and logistical requirement. This also, in turn, reduces airlift and sealift deployment requirements. Obviously, the ability to coordinate and execute between services as well as mobility and bomber organizations will be increasingly tested.

The transport-bomber element within the force must be able to integrate with both the mobility organizations and force application organizations. Scheduling priorities and coordination are two areas for potential conflict. The theater air commander’s focus is on conducting an effective theater air campaign while the mobility commander’s responsibilities lean more towards the nation’s mobility requirements. This is not to say that the two could not be the same objective. It does say however that a natural friction exists between the two. The AC-130, having at times served two masters under the Theater Special Operations Commander and the Joint Forces Air Component Commander, may provide some lessons regarding operations across functional lines. Certainly, there are organizational concepts that can ease the natural tensions between the two components as well as the administrative elements.

There are a number of organizational changes the USAF can make to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of transport-bomber forces. The first includes creating new organizations, similar in concept to Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron, that are responsible for the "back end of the aircraft" during bomber operations. These units would be responsible for all operations and functions pertaining to the bomber mission except for aircraft operations. Its responsibilities would include providing the mission planners, work station operators, and weapons programmers required for inflight operations and all, loaders, maintenance personnel, and oversight of weapons and mission planning computer, offensive avionics system, and weapons modules. Programmers should collocate these weapons units with their weapons, however, they do not need to collocate the weapons on transport bases. This employment concept allows both the front-end and back-end crews to focus on their core tasks, just as flight crews and Aeromedical Evacuation crews do today..

The transport-bomber element provides the CINC with increased capability at some absolute and relative cost. Aircraft and weapons procurement are expensive programs. Programmers can mitigate costs by substituting some of the new C-130J aircraft they may acquire with C-17s and by redirecting money from duplicative programs that offer less flexibility like the USN arsenal ship. Programmers and service chiefs may elect to build a transport-bomber capability from existing force structure. It comes, however, at the expense of mobility requirements both in peacetime and in war.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

The transport-bomber concept appears to be viable and offers improved capability that goes beyond the margins of traditional force application and force enhancement roles and missions. As a result, its versatility enhances the overall capabilities of the nation by producing a multi-role aircraft that provides payback in times of crisis and in peace.

The transport-bomber is operationally viable as an air launched cruise missile carrier. Augmenting the halting force, it is capable of providing immediate offensive combat power against fixed infrastructure and surface-to-air defense targets. This, in turn, allows organic bombers to maximize weapons payloads while focusing their efforts on the invading forces.

The transport-bomber concept is technologically feasible in various delivery methods but only for particular weapon systems. The "stoplight" chart at table 13 summarizes these findings. The Missile Ejection and Translation System (METS) delivery method provides the best capability in terms of mission reconfiguration and sortie regeneration while reducing the number structural modifications necessary for multi-role employment.

Table 13. Summary of Technical Assessment

The cost of the transport-bomber concept, including weapons, is substantial. Table 14 summarizes the costs of the cruise missile carrier program. There are a number of areas that offer opportunities to trim program and operating costs within the aircraft and weapons acquisition programs. In the aggregate, the money spent on the transport-bomber element buys both long range, precision guided munitions employment capability and air transport capability.

Table 14. Cruise Missile Carrier Cost Summary.