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Chapter Page
Introduction 1-3
I. The Issue of NATO expansion 4-13
1. Obstacles to NATO expansion 4-8
A. Obstacles within the Central and Eastern European countries 5-6
B. Obstacles within NATO 6-8
2. Benefits of expanding NATO 9-13
A. Benefits to the Central and Eastern European countries 9-11
B. Benefits to NATO 11-13 II. Russian effect on NATO expansion 14-24
III. The mechanism for NATO expansion 25-30
1. Prospective Central and Eastern European candidate countries 26-28
2. Possible timing and sequence of admission 29-32
IV. Conclusion 33-36
Bibliography 37-39
INTRODUCTION
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a defensive alliance based on political and military cooperation among independent member countries, established in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. NATO member states are committed to the defense of one another by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
NATO expansion is a key issue both within NATO and in the context of alternative future security alignments in Europe as countries in Central and Eastern Europe seek membership in NATO. My thesis is that NATO should expand its membership in order to stabilize the Central and Eastern European region and to strengthen its own power. In fact, the main argument in favor of NATO expansion is political rather than military.
Since the revolution of 1989 and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, many public officials and private citizens in Central and Eastern Europe have expressed a desire for their countries to join NATO. The Visegrad states - Poland, Czechoslovakia (now the Czech Republic and Slovakia), and Hungary - were the first to press seriously for membership in NATO. The United States responded to this initiative in 1993, when it proposed to its NATO allies the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, which is working to expand political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles. At the January 1994 NATO Summit meeting, NATO heads of state agreed to the PfP program, which was seen as a compromise that held out the prospect for later NATO expansion.
It is well known that NATO is thinking seriously about enlargement. The meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Brussels on 1 December 1994 tasked the North Atlantic Council in permanent session to begin an examination inside the Alliance to "determine how NATO will enlarge, the principles to guide this process and the implications of membership."(1) In October 1996 President Clinton announced in Detroit that a decision would be made about the acceptance of first-tier countries at the summer 1997 NATO Conference.
NATO expansion is important not primarily to defend against a surprise attack of which there are no indications, but rather as a deterrent against potential future security threats and as an insurance policy against uncertainties. At issue is not the traditional cold war threat which the West opposed for the last four decades, but internal and regional instability that could erupt at any time. The current crises in the former Yugoslavia, Albania, and Chechnya are examples of this volatility.
The most significant benefit in NATO expansion is the maintenance of stability. Two different kinds of stability should be noted. First, there are external stability concerns, or regional stability within Europe, which has a positive effect on global stability since larger alliances are more capable and stable. Second, there is the internal stability of democracies, which relates to the generic domestic security of the new member countries. That is, NATO can reinforce the consolidation of free political and economic institutions in the emerging but fragile democracies of Eastern Europe, which can enhance security of the Western countries. The expansion of NATO would enhance both external and internal stability simultaneously. By extending its security umbrella to former communist countries, NATO is hoping to do for Eastern Europe what it did for Western Europe for four decades.
The key requirements for NATO membership are gradually achievable by the candidate countries. Timing and sequence are on the agenda these days. The three leading candidates, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, each has a realistic chance of joining NATO this century. However, both individual NATO members and Russia have expressed reservations concerning the admission of these countries too quickly.
Russia is the main opponent to this expansion, because it interprets this as an increasing military presence on its borders. There is also a concern over old territorial claims to parts of Russia's new neighbors that Moscow may try to pursue subsequently. For example, one vague scenario is of Russian intervention in the Eastern Ukraine to "protect the lives and property of Russian citizens". Despite this, there has been a detectable thaw in Moscow's opposition to NATO expansion as its leadership recognizes that the alliance no longer poses a threat to Russia, and this should be a manageable concern. For example, Russian Defense Minister Igor Rodionov recently stated the following: "I have become convinced NATO is not a threat to Russia, but I have millions to convince in Russia who are still worried that it is a threat."(2)
The following analysis of NATO expansion will briefly analyze the arguments in favor and against the enlargement, assess the Russian position and, finally, discuss the perspective of Central and Eastern European candidate countries, including the possible timing and sequence of their admission.
I. THE ISSUE OF NATO expansion
NATO enlargement is desirable because it will promote stability in Europe and in the world. There are several concerns regarding possible expansion of NATO membership, but the basic question is whether or not NATO should expand its membership. The following sections address the negative and positive sides of the argument.
1. OBSTACLES TO NATO expansion
Many believe that NATO expansion in Central and Eastern Europe is not a wise idea because it is not necessary and would be counterproductive and even dangerous. Their primary argument against expansion is that the main threat to NATO has disappeared, since today neither Russia nor other CIS countries represent a military danger to Central and Eastern Europe. NATO is more likely to expand if and when real threats to vital interests emerge, rather than now when the Russian military threat to Europe is nonexistent.(3) Russia's military is in bad shape and it needs a long time before waging an offensive military action, thus providing sufficient warning time to react. At the same time, for their part, the Central and Eastern European countries do not seem to be frightened by the new situation. "Observing that Poland and Hungary are reducing military conscription and the Czech Republic is reducing its mechanized and infantry forces...These are not the actions of states worried about military threats," according to one observer(4)
A. Obstacles within the Central and Eastern European countries
Internal political opposition in the candidate countries could affect expansion. Some political leaders are protesting against it because they think the financial burdens of membership would be too high and they are worried about the possible stationing of foreign troops on their soil. For example, the Independent Smallholder's Party in Hungary is against the NATO expansion because they think that membership would lead the country into bankruptcy.
At the same time, NATO expansion could create divisions not just between the West and East, but within Central and Eastern Europe. Although this is a secondary issue for NATO, apart from Russia, certain other countries would also be effected by that. For example, the Romanians might be concerned that Hungary might gain membership first and then block an invitation to Romania.(5) Countries not admitted will be discouraged and might feel abandoned by the West. As a result, their political reform might slow down or stop altogether. Furthermore, they might then sense that the regional environment is more threatening than before.
To be sure, most of the candidates are not yet ready economically and militarily for NATO membership. Albania has the worst economic conditions while Romania, Bulgaria, the Baltic States, Ukraine, and other former Soviet candidate states need to go through serious economic reforms to catch up to the Visegrad Four. Unfortunately, no Eastern European country is fully compatible with NATO from a military point of view, though the Visegrad Four are close to meeting NATO criteria. Even if the new members can meet the criteria, their personnel were trained with the Soviet approach, and some equipment might not be fully compatible with NATO standards. Significantly, the present senior leadership in Central and Eastern European armies was developed in the tradition of the Warsaw Pact, and was trained, almost without exception, at Soviet military academies.(6) Resistance to learning English, the official language of NATO, can cause additional problems. This concerns mainly the older officers who do not want any changes. The Polish Defense Minister, however, emphasized that there is a remedy to this: "Those who oppose this [learning English] will simply have to take early retirement."(7)
B. Obstacles within NATO
Some Western officials believe that NATO expansion is not necessary because NATO is able to help without admitting new members in case of emergency. Professor Williams points out that "Of course, there are those who argue that NATO should stop short of actually enlarging itself by retaining the potential for enlargement as both an incentive and a deterrent should a specific threat arise in the future directed against the Visegrad four."(8)
With expansion, NATO would have to extend its commitments to help to defend the territories of the admitted countries. This is almost impossible when current NATO members are reducing resources devoted to defense. In addition, political reluctance to expand NATO commitments, controversy in the governments, and extreme public opinions about the expansion can be seen. According to some in the United States, the United States can not, and must not, give Poland and the other Eastern European countries a guarantee that it would go to war because of their eastern borders, as would follow from their admission into NATO.(9)
NATO members would have to pay the cost of expansion. It would cost billions of dollars to prepare for the defense of Central Europe, and it is hard to imagine the parliaments of all sixteen NATO members approving an extension of new security guarantees to Central Europe, just from a financial point of view.(10) Public opinion in the NATO countries about this is not going to be positive and many taxpayers do not want to spend their money for uncertain political or/and military gains.
It is very difficult to reach consensus even with 16 members. It is not hard to imagine that, with new members, this would worsen and NATO would lose focus and cohesion. There is another threat that the relationship might deteriorate between those members who do not want expansion and those who are in favor of it.
From a military point of view, expansion would weaken NATO. The readiness and cohesion of the whole NATO force would be degraded, according to some who make this argument. The candidate states at present all have relatively weak military establishments which are in the middle of reorganization and downsizing. The small military forces of the current membership can barely meet the demands placed on them now. They probably do not want to increase their capabilities in order to meet the more extensive responsibilities involved in protecting new and vulnerable member states.
Summary:
The above listed problems are vital points, but the strongest anti-expansion argument is the effect on Russia of NATO expansion, which is discussed in Chapter II. Having covered the negative sides of the argument on NATO expansion, we must now turn to the most important part, the benefits of the enlargement.
2. BENEFITS of expanDinG NATO
A. Benefits to the Central and Eastern European countries
NATO expansion is a critical issue now because leaders of the Central and Eastern European countries have urged they be admitted to NATO membership. The expansion issue arose because Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, all previous victims of Soviet occupation, sought NATO membership. NATO should respond to the requests of these countries as soon as possible. No response or a negative one on such requests could slow down or stop reform in these countries. They do not want to be considered as part of the Russian sphere of influence. Neither do they want to be a so-called "no-man's" land between Western Europe and Russia. These states want to belong to Europe. A refusal of their request, therefore, could lead them to form a new alliance with the surrounding states or to rebuild the old links with Russia, with a hope of restoring the credibility of Russia's security guarantee. The reason for this is because they are not able to defend their territory themselves. For example, for Poland, one of its security options is to build a regional security system among the small- and medium-sized states surrounding Poland(11)
The Alliance would provide security for Central and Eastern Europe. New members will be covered by the alliance's all-for-one, one-for-all security guarantee and its nuclear umbrella.(12) The instability in Russia and other countries of the CIS is considered by candidate countries as the greatest threat to their national security. Russia may have lost some of its military capabilities, but it still has enough power to wield influence in the Eastern region and it still has a nuclear capability which is a concern not only to the applying countries but to the rest of the world. Chechnya is an excellent example of the potential Russian threat although Russia has been humiliated there. NATO should recognize the importance of its expansion in deterring such a threat. Czech Defense Minister Vilem Holan emphasized that "I think that throughout recent history, including this situation in Chechnya, all those who have any say about these matters have come to realize that it is necessary for the Central European countries to become a part of NATO."(13)
NATO expansion would provide assistance to the joining countries to finish domestic reform, to improve relations with their neighbors, and to integrate into Western Europe. As Senator Lugar has argued, "Membership in NATO is a way to strengthen domestic forces committed to democracy and market economies. Western policy-makers and analysts tend to overlook the link between democracy and security."(14) At the same time, the other Central and Eastern European countries temporarily left out of the expansion could have an example and a goal in front of their eyes to achieve. NATO membership could help the new democracies to establish a stable environment in which they could develop democracy internally, carry out economic reform promoting a market economy, and shape the military according to NATO requirements. Meanwhile, candidate countries would realize that their admission to NATO, the European Union (EU), and the Western European Union (WEU) also depends on their relations with their neighbors. As Slovak Foreign Minister Pavol Hamzik noted, "We know very well that the precondition for NATO membership is the settlement of disputes with neighboring countries,"(15) as his government recently signed a treaty of good neighborliness with Hungary, formally renouncing any territorial claims. Central and Eastern European countries believe that they were artificially separated from the West after World War II and that their integration with the West gives the best warranty for their political, economic, social, and security future.
The candidate countries have made significant steps in the achievement of the ideological and educational compatibility for their military establishments. For example, Hungary established a NATO Language Institute in Budapest which teaches Hungarian officers English according to NATO standards. In addition, in Hungary within the General Staff a special NATO Working group was set up which translates and integrates the STANAGs (Standardization Agreement) for adaptation into the Hungarian Doctrine. The transition of military education is happening at the same time. The adoption of the "western way of war" was started a couple years ago and as a result of this general officers trained in NATO countries have taken over the leadership positions in some of the candidate countries' military. For example, the Commander of the Hungarian Home Defense Forces graduated from the United States Army War College, while his Deputy attended the United States National Defense University.
B. Benefits to NATO
Expansion would also increase the security for the Western countries while strengthening the stability of Central and Eastern Europe. The Western countries wanted these buffer zones for decades and now they have an opportunity to extend stability while avoiding both a security vacuum and an East-West clash. Foreign policy experts, such as Senator Richard Lugar, then Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, recognized that "Projection of stability to the east is a prudent investment to secure the peace in Europe."(16) Stability would spread not just in political and economic areas, but in the military arena as well. These countries do not want just to get and not to give and could offer benefits to the West too. For example, as the Czech Minister of Defense offered, "In addition to being aware of the limitations of our own defense forces, we want to be part of Europe. This then leads to the duty to do something for Europe, to take part in protecting its values...Participation, for instance, in NATO peacekeeping forces....Air defense is nowadays an affair of larger regions. Therefore, we can very well imagine joint coverage of airspace."(17)
NATO expansion would also be a benefit both to the Central and Eastern European countries as well as to NATO from a military point of view. Before their admission, candidate countries should meet NATO military requirements. That is why the new members will contribute to NATO's overall military capabilities and will not undermine its military effectiveness. The three leading countries have already altered their forces according to the NATO criteria and established a peacekeeping unit. Another important point is that the new members could make their territory and military facilities available for NATO use. The interoperability and compatibility with the NATO structure and equipment is a crucial factor as well. Another advantage for Western countries is being able to sell excess NATO equipment to the candidate states for a profit.
NATO enlargement would revitalize the organization itself. Many believe that with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, there is no threat any more and that NATO has lost its primary task and therefore that it should retire. This is only partly true because NATO has a new and different mission, namely NATO is a political insurance policy that ensures Europe will not be dominated by a hostile power or block of hostile powers.
Summary:
As it appears, there are some obstacles to NATO expansion but, in spite of these, NATO should expand toward Central and Eastern Europe. The benefits of expansion outweigh the disadvantages. It is high time to begin the acceptance of new Eastern democracies to the Great Western Alliance. The most developed of them showed that they are eager to join and can meet the tough requirements such as financing the expansion. According to Laszlo Kovacs, the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, "If Hungary becomes a member, then our defense budget will be tailored to meet the needs of NATO."(18)
II. THE effect On RUSSIA OF NATO expansion
Having discussed the merits of NATO expansion, we must now cover the most important issue of the enlargement, the Russian factor. The collapse of the Soviet Union caused a deep crisis in Russia's national identity. In comparison with the past, Russia's role as a world power has decreased visibly. As a result, some Russians are becoming more nostalgic for the Soviet past when their country was, according to them, more powerful and wealthy.
The prospect for NATO enlargement to include Central and Eastern European countries has become the most important and potentially most explosive issue for Russia's foreign policy. It should also be considered as the ultimate test of Russia's relationship with the West. From Moscow's point of view, the outcome of NATO enlargement to the East will shape the future relationship between Russia and the West.
An opinion poll conducted by the International Center of Sociological Research in January 1996, reflected that the majority of the public in Russia has a negative attitude toward the prospect of the NATO expansion. About 61 per cent considered NATO membership for Central and Eastern European states as a threat to Russia and only 11 per cent thought otherwise. Asked separately, the issue of the Baltic States joining NATO worried slightly more Russians - 66 per cent considered NATO membership for the Baltic States as a threat, while only 3 per cent had an opposite opinion.(19) At the same time, Russian political leaders and the public have similar views against expanding NATO membership in general and argue that enlargement is not necessary but is counterproductive and even dangerous. Such developments, they argue, could create an unpredictability in the military-political situation in Europe, and the Russian President Boris Yeltsin warned that the result would be the flames of war across Europe, but he has moderated his views since then, especially, on the Helsinki Summit.(20)
Russia has been forced to face a multitude of challenges, the most notable being the political and economic changes required to adjust to the new world situation, which showed that the country is unstable and beset by a lack of consensus. This sense of drift was also clearly evident with respect to Russia's point of view about NATO expansion. Although Moscow has consistently opposed NATO enlargement in public, it has wavered between outspoken criticism and much softer opposition. Russians sometimes maintain that they will not tolerate NATO's acceptance of the former members of the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact Alliance, consisting mainly of the previously communist-ruled European countries, as full members of NATO Alliance. On 30 November 1996, Russia's President Boris Yeltsin said: "Russia's stance on NATO expansion remains unchanged, that is, negative."(21) On other occasions, however, Russians emphasize that they are prepared to accept an eastward expansion of NATO, as was reported of Russian Defense Minister Igor Rodionov, who "indicated a slight thaw in Moscow's opposition to NATO expansion yesterday by suggesting he is no longer convinced the alliance poses a threat to Russia."(22) In fact, recently, the Russians seem to have accepted as inevitable the fact that the Atlantic Alliance will grow this summer by extending membership to former Warsaw Pact members Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.(23) This green light to NATO expansion was given on the Helsinki Summit on 21 March 1997.
The Russians have focused on a shifting set of arguments in opposing NATO expansion. One argument they have used persistently and vigorously is that the proposed expansion of NATO eastward would bring nuclear weapons too close to Russia's borders. NATO's intention, however, contradicts this, as it has been reported that NATO will not station troops or nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe in peacetime and will not alter its nuclear doctrine.(24) Former Defense Minister William Perry, in this vein, emphasized that "...taking in new members from among the former Warsaw Pact countries will not mean stationing NATO nuclear weapons on those countries' soil..."(25)
Russia still has an enormous military capability - the largest in Europe - and despite her poor economic condition, she keeps her strategic nuclear forces at high readiness status. Mr. Primakov, the Russian Foreign Minister, pointed out that "Russia can not veto NATO's proposed expansion but Moscow reserved the right to respond."(26) In this situation, NATO leaders should think carefully about NATO expansion, and if Russia can not stop it, then they should consider engineering an environment which will satisfy both NATO and Russia.
Today Russia feels strongly that the world would prefer to ignore the big "bear". Moscow used to be at the center of the world's attention, but lately has not enjoyed the treatment it has been given by the West. On the NATO issue, the Russian Foreign Minister complained that "a geopolitical and a military-political model is being imposed on us, whereby NATO is expanding indefinitely while Russia is kept at bay...this does not suit us at all."(27) This suggests that Russia would still like to play a role in the international arena as a influential power and participate in a competition for spheres of influence.
The Russians want a guarantee for their own security but, by the same token, Russia can not afford to refuse to establish a new relationship with the West and NATO. According to Mr. Primakov: "Russia could recognize NATO as an element of the European security system and Moscow would establish 'special relations' with the NATO, if its military bases do not move closer to the Russian border."(28)
To be sure, NATO expansion could cause adverse effects in the domestic Russian political arena. If that happens, it might trigger internal instability in Russia which might bring to power extremist parties. NATO's main mission is to enhance stability in Europe as a whole, and hence it is widely argued that pin pricking weak and vulnerable Moscow could have disastrous consequences and easily pave the way for Russian ultra right-wing nationalists and communists, to gain more power and influence.(29) As Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin said: "Ultranationalists like Vladimir Zhirinovsky will accuse the president and the government of doing nothing to prevent the development of expansion."(30)
From a military point of view, Russia is also anxious because in its opinion the military strength of NATO would increase with the acceptance of new countries. This concern is true even with respect to the Visegrad four. For example, a Russian military writer, Lieutenant General L.G. Ivanov, emphasized this in an article on NATO expansion toward the east in the Russian military journal Voennaya Misl: The ground forces of NATO would increase by 11 divisions and 38 brigades in case of enlargement with the Visegrad four. The air force would get a number of combat aircraft equal to 14% of current NATO aircraft strength. The air defense artillery of NATO would be strengthened with 100 new stationary air defense stations.(31) Just adding the Polish Navy itself would increase the number of NATO combat ships by 18% and patrol aviation by 50%. With expansion, NATO would have 285 additional airfields, some of them very close to the Russian, Belorussian, and Ukrainian borders. These numbers and facts demonstrate the Russian worries about additional would-be NATO possessions.
At the same time, Russians warn that if NATO expands, part of their nuclear assets at the western border would be directed toward the new NATO members. Russia's former Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, for example, warned that if NATO expands toward his country, Russia's short-range nuclear weapons would be made operational again and implementation of arms control treaties would be suspended. Any chance of Russian ratification of the START II treaty would likely evaporate.(32)
Russia believes it needs a buffer zone for its security. If NATO expands further eastward they would feel threatened, while Germany, their historical rival, would enjoy the "defense cushion" to be established with the acceptance of Central and Eastern European countries. Russian Defense Minister Igor Rodionov said in this respect: "Russia has removed its troops and weapons from the east [Europe], yet NATO's only response is enlargement of its military alliance to our border. If it happens, it would remove our buffer zone and create dangerous new conditions that would demand action on our part."(33)
Russia and some of the other states of the former Soviet Union have felt insecure since the collapse of Soviet power. Many long for the familiar centralized economic system, the remains of which still exist, and there is concern that there may also be pressure for a revived military alliance. Although moves to reintegrate former Soviet republics such as Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are of an overtly economic nature, leading members of the military establishment in Russia openly express the view that a military alliance will ensue.(34) This shows that Russia remains active on its own front irrespective of NATO plans for expansion. Although Russia might thus respond to NATO's expansion by threatening to create new alliances based on the former states in order to protect its already relatively small sphere of influence, it might do so even if NATO does not expand. As Russian President Yeltsin has declared: "We will immediately establish constructive ties with all ex-Soviet republics and form a bloc. And as a result Europe will have two blocs."(35)
Russia has also expressed extreme concern with what it interprets as an open invitation to any Eastern European country to join NATO. In particular, the Ukraine and the Baltic States are of concern to Russia because they are strategically significant, due to their geographical positions. Influence over the Baltic states means access to the Baltic Sea, which is needed by Russia, especially if we assume that Poland is going to join the Alliance. As it is, Kaliningrad, the main remaining Russian naval base on the Baltic, is separated from the rest of Russia and Moscow claims that a sizable Russian population would be left without protection in case of NATO presence in the Baltic states.
Ukraine is even more important to Russia for four reasons. First, a NATO presence in Ukraine would threaten Russia's control over the Black Sea. Second, 11 million ethnic Russians live in Ukraine, which is more than 20 % of its population, which Russia claims it does not want to "abandon". Third, NATO would have a direct border with Russia. The Russian Defense Minister has said that moving NATO's border to Russia's doorstep would upset the strategic balance on the continent and restore a Cold War situation in Europe that would force Russia to take countermeasures.(36) Lastly, there is a close relationship between the two countries. Russia has powerful levers, especially its close ties between Russian and Ukrainian enterprises, and Ukrainian dependence on Russian natural resources such as oil and gas.(37) Moscow clearly does not want to lose its influence over the Ukraine, and the latter's entry in NATO might make it harder for Russia to exert its leverage over the Ukraine.
Russia also has alternative ways to respond NATO expansion, apart from the military. If NATO decides to expand, Russia, for example, could use also economic means to threaten those states that join. Most of the former Soviet states not only trade with Russia, but depend heavily on Russian natural resources such as oil and gas. It would be a very effective way to show the joining states that they can not act fully independently from Russia. While Russia would take years to mount a sustained military threat to eastern Europe, it can within weeks or months exert severe economic pressure on its immediate neighbors to the west.(38) So in case of expansion, Russia would be more likely to use its economic leverage to pressure its neighbors rather than overt military threats. Of course, Russia's leverage could be neutralized and would not prevent states from joining NATO if the West decided to subsidize the states hurt by Russia.
NATO expansion, it is argued, would also draw a new dividing line between East and West. Were this to happen, we could go back to the cold war era with different zones of confrontation. "Pushing NATO's boundaries eastward promises to resurrect Europe's dividing lines, not erase them...The chance to build a European security community that included Russia would be lost. The West might be larger and stronger, but Europe would again be divided into hostile halves."(39)
Russia's current condition suggests that NATO should take advantage and expand before it is too late. That is, NATO should take the initiative before Russia recovers economically and militarily. Today, the Russian leadership and public can be convinced about NATO expansion relatively easily while the country is preoccupied with political and economic issues at home. The time to push the protective line eastward is now, while Russia is weak and preoccupied with its own revival, and not later, when such a move would be an insufferable provocation to a superpower.(40) At present, in the short term, Russia does not have the resources to respond to NATO enlargement.
The deteriorated condition of the armed forces represents a lower Russian threat to the Central and Eastern European countries. US military planners estimate that preparation for a Russian conventional military attack, even against Eastern Europe, would take several years at a minimum - assuming the resources could be found to rebuild the undermanned, underfunded, poorly trained and poorly disciplined Russian military establishment.(41) The Russian military is experiencing manpower shortages. It still has conscript system which does not work very well. Due to draft postponements and youngsters who try to avoid the draft, the Russian military has a shortage of conscript soldiers. There are not enough resources to train or equip sufficiently the whole armed forces, either. For example, the readiness level of the air force is low because the Russian pilots have only 20-25 hours flying time a year. The army does not conduct enough training exercises because of the shortage of money. There have been no division-level exercises in three years; most are company-level and below.(42)
NATO should not let the expansion depend on a Russian veto. Russia is not in the position where it can dictate terms and, at the same time, Western countries should not allow it to "play" with the word veto any more. Neither Russia nor anyone else should be allowed to veto any of NATO's plans. If that were to happen, the alliance would lose much of credibility.(43)
NATO expansion is not going to generate an additional threat to Russia. This is because, although the Alliance provides an overarching security umbrella to new members, NATO will not station troops or nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe in peacetime and will not alter its nuclear doctrine.(44) That means it will not move nuclear arms east or reinforce its nuclear stockpile.
Limited NATO expansion, on the other hand, could be counterproductive and have negative political and military effects in countries not invited. This could encourage Russia to have stronger influence over neighboring countries at least within the CIS and maybe beyond. At the same time, limited expansion could lead to increased military efforts in Russia and the CIS. If NATO expands eastward, Russia under any government will become a revisionist power striving to undermine the already fragile European order.(45) If limited expansion occurs, Russia might withdraw from the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, which is a great danger. If NATO draws nearer to the CIS borders, the CIS countries located in Europe will probably try to revise the agreement on cuts in conventional arms in Europe and stop scrapping their tanks, planes, and the like.(46) From a political point of view, limited expansion could undercut also reformers in the countries not admitted, and could give to ultranationalist parties and leaders an opportunity to take over power.
Summary:
Despite Russia's opposition, NATO should expand, while simultaneously striving for the development of good relations with Russia. "Security in Europe cannot be established without Russia. We want the timetable for expansion and the charter with Russia to converge," declared NATO Secretary General Javier Solana.(47) The realization of the first goal is unavoidable according to US State Secretary, Madeleine Albright, "At the NATO summit this July in Madrid, allied leaders will reform NATO's internal structures and invite several nations to become members by 1999. President Clinton and I have no higher priority than to work with our allies, and with our people and Congress, to build this new NATO."(48) Progress toward the second goal has been achieved as well. Russia seems to be acquiescing in the expansion and is trying, together with the West, to find a solution to satisfy both sides. According to the former Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, "The practical way for Russia to transform NATO is to cooperate with the alliance - and vice versa."(49)
III. THE MECHANISM FOR NATO EXPANSION
Having covered the Russian factor, we must discuss the prospects of specific countries, and the possible timing and sequence of admission. Some believe that the question about NATO expansion should be left open but undecided for some years in order to allow discussions to mature. In the meantime, they argue, NATO has other more important things to solve. NATO should answer the question about its further existence or the issues of former Yugoslavia and Africa. Hasty and insensitive debates on an expansion of NATO merely cloud the Alliance's internal cohesion and decision-making capability, as well as undermining the requirement for comprehensive security cooperation in the entire zone between Vancouver and Vladivostok.(50)
There is still considerable instability and uncertainty within the Central and Eastern European countries. Politically and economically, these states are not strong enough yet. The political leadership is not determined because the reforms started just a few years ago and the politicians have not fully switched over to a new frequency, the frequency of the "Western way".
Finally, more time is needed for the examination and evaluation of the applying states. NATO does not have enough information about the candidates to complete its assessment yet. Some countries have representatives in NATO headquarters in Brussels and Mons, but in the future even more cooperative activities and exercises are needed.
1. prospective central and Eastern European candidate countries
Most of the 25 states that have joined the PfP, especially from Central and Eastern Europe, have indicated a desire to join NATO. Some countries keep pressing NATO for acceptance as members as soon as possible, while others understand that they are not realistically candidates for early, or in some cases any, membership. In fact former US Secretary of Defense William J. Perry emphasized that "many PfP participants would never qualify for NATO membership."(51) This negative outlook stems from the fact that some of the applying countries may be unable to meet certain NATO requirements and criteria in order to join the organization. However, in early February 1995, NATO Secretary General Claes clarified that "It is imaginable that someone joins who does not meet all the conditions. But the contrary is also possible: Someone might not become a member despite fulfilling all the criteria."(52)
The following Central and Eastern European states have indicated an interest in acceding to the NATO Treaty: Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.
There is little dispute in the West about the three leading candidates for NATO membership. As one American journalist summarized it according to conventional wisdom expressed in the Washington Post: "During the seven years since the collapse of communism in 1989, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary all have made rapid strides in moving from totalitarianism toward democracy and free markets"(53). The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland have much in common with Austria. Most of their territories were, until 1918, united under the Austro-Hungarian crown. Like Austria, they will be able to join the European Union (EU), which in many respects goes along with NATO membership, will afford them a deeper guarantee of their European status. Poland enjoys the greatest international support while the Czech Republic has the strongest economy and armed forces.
The real contest is likely to be among the second-tier states, such as Slovakia, Slovenia and, possibly, Romania. Their progress on reform is generally judged to be slightly behind that of the three previously mentioned countries, but ahead of most other countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Bulgaria, for its part, was slower to implement reforms than the Visegrad four and its quest for NATO membership does not enjoy much international support. The Baltic states - Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania - enjoy considerable sympathy and support in the West. However, NATO membership given to these countries at an early stage could cause adverse reactions in Russia and among the Russian minorities in the Baltic states. The Ukraine, for its part, is an especially important part of the European geopolitical environment, and Russia without the Ukraine is a one-armed giant, and the Ukraine will be careful to balance its independence and its relations with its eastern neighbor. "Although independent, Kiev still remains sensitive to Russian concerns and thus far has been ambivalent about NATO membership. A fundamental Western objective should be to assure that Ukraine is not reincorporated into a revived Russian empire,"(54) concluded a study by a conservative US think-tank.
Albania has the most difficult situation among all the countries applying for NATO membership. The West seems to deal with Albania separately because of its underdeveloped political, economic, and military systems, which are way behind those of the other Central and Eastern European countries, and the recent domestic instability is likely to only reinforce the West's doubts about Albania's prospects for reform.
Although Russia has not applied for NATO membership and may not want to join, some form of special relationship should be established between NATO and Moscow, which would likely reflect Russia's importance in terms of the size of its territory, population, resources, and defense establishment, including its strategic nuclear capability. The establishment of this special relationship is not unrealistic because the two opposing sides have already begun to build better relations. According to the former Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, "Now it is time to tell the Russian public the truth: NATO is not the enemy. We need a treaty."(55)
2. Possible timing and sequence of admission
The issue of sequencing admission of new members is an extremely sensitive one. The immense diversity among the candidate countries (e.g.: between Czech Republic and Uzbekistan) has led to demands for differentiation. "The issue, however, of "who and when" raises specific problems concerning entry en masse or individual admission to the Alliance," according to Professor Geoffrey Lee Williams, Senior Research Fellow, the Atlantic Council of the United Kingdom, and the Centre of International Studies, Cambridge University.(56) Furthermore, another distinction emerged between admission with full or partial membership. Judging each of the applying countries on its own merits might seem compelling and best calculated to meet individual needs, but the dynamics of their relations with each other, including the existence of ethnic minority populations, could work against a piecemeal approach. At the same time, there are military matters which also arise within this context. NATO should have a flexible system to judge these states according to the quality of their armies, their general and economic achievements, the extent of the democratic control of their defense forces, and their degree of conformity to NATO's criteria for membership. Nevertheless, after accepting some countries, there should also be some kind of encouragement for those not admitted. As Professor Williams asked correctly, "However, even if NATO accommodates the Visegrad Four (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia), will drawing the line at that point risk discouraging Bulgaria and Romania from a more rigorous pursuit of reform?"(57)
Opinions even among the NATO members differ about the timing of enlargement. According to former Defense Minister, Mr. Perry, "German and American policymakers tend to think that Central European countries might qualify for NATO closer to five years from now. French, Spanish, and Italian experts prefer a slower approach, and the British are somewhere in between."(58) The different views of the countries are due to the latter ones being afraid of possible friction with Russia and an increase in German influence.
Inviting countries in groups rather than individually is probably more rational and could avoid tensions caused by admitting some nations before others which also are eligible. There appears to be a powerful consensus in favor of grouping Poland and two of the other three Visegrad countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary) together as high-priority candidate countries for NATO. According to the prerequisite NATO criteria to the applicants, the Czech Republic seems to be the most favored nation for membership, since it shares a border with Germany and includes terrain that favors defensive operations. According to John E. Peters, researcher at the RAND Corporation, "Another aspect of the Czech Republic that makes it attractive as a member of NATO is that it does not share a border with CIS members, and thus Czech ascension to membership is likely to be less of an irritant to Moscow than other inductees might be."(59) Poland stands as a relatively less charming candidate of the three. Although it shares a border with Germany, its terrain is open and rolling, and difficult to defend. However, Polish territory would add tremendous strategic depth to NATO. Hungary offers an especially difficult case for assessment out of the three. Its geographic circumstances are not favorable because it sits isolated from other alliance members, basically in the Carpathian Basin, while some of its neighbors pose threats to it (e.g.: Serbia, Romania). Despite this, Hungary, along with the two above mentioned countries, successfully carried out economic and military reorganization. A realistic time frame for the admission of these countries is likely to still be this century, according to US Government officials, who "say Clinton expected to set 1999, the 50th anniversary of the founding of NATO, as the target date for expansion."(60)
The next package for admission might include another three states: Slovakia, Slovenia, and possibly Romania. Unfortunately, Slovakia and Romania have been developing very slowly both economically and militarily; consequently they are likely unable to meet NATO requirements in the near future, that is this century. In addition, both of these countries have minority problems, which can also delay their admission. Out of this package, Slovenia has the best chance for meeting NATO criteria, as it has done a good job toward creating a small, professional army and in introducing a market economy. Moreover, Slovenia's early admission to NATO might serve as an incentive to other former Yugoslav republics to turn away from the nationalist path. The counter-argument, which puts Slovenia into the second round, is that the latter is too close to the Balkans and still has a bad association with the memories of Yugoslavia's violent breakup in 1991. So, these three countries must first overcome a major political credibility hurdle with Western policymakers. Their admission might be 2-3 years after that of the first-tier states.
In the next iteration, Bulgaria can be discussed. Bulgaria needs to show better results in economic growth and at the same time in the military field in order to keep up with the Central European nations. Its admission, depending on its development, might be slightly delayed behind that of the second-tier applicants.
The Baltic states and Ukraine should be considered as a separate group. As noted, they used to be part of the former Soviet Union and that is why they must be judged apart from the others. An additional problem with the Baltic states is that the territories of these countries are militarily difficult to defend. Not surprisingly, as reported by the New York Times, "Senior diplomats and NATO officials made it very clear that extending NATO membership into the former Soviet Union, even to the Baltics and Ukraine, was almost inconceivable for the next decade or more."(61)
Finally, although Albania has applied for NATO membership, in light of its lack of development in the political, economic and military areas, and recent instability, as noted earlier, NATO allies will probably not grant it high priority or even consider it as an applicant in the foreseeable future.
IV. Conclusion
A major debate about enlargement is now well under way within NATO and will not be completed until the summer of 1997. How to deal with Russia without alarming it or provoking an extreme response has become the question of the hour in regard to this issue. In light of this, the logic behind any decision to expand NATO membership before a specific threat emerges - and one which may never emerge - needs to be made more explicit.
NATO was created, expanded and will expand again because of political, not strictly military considerations. In other words, NATO fulfills a political mission through necessary military means. Therefore, it should expand its scope to include Central and Eastern Europe which will help to stabilize Europe in the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union.
Another very important point that favors NATO expansion is the support of the world's leading superpower, the United States. President Clinton is committed to NATO enlargement as a way to promote free market democracy.(62) Beside the United States, there are more NATO members in favor of the expansion than are against it. For example, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl has assured the Central and Eastern European candidate countries of Germany's support.
A decision not to enlarge NATO will be just as much a message to the Russians as a decision to expand the Alliance. Moscow will interpret this as an invitation to the Russians to continue meddling in the region, and will seek to establish a condominium, together with the West, over the region.
The advantages of NATO's current course toward enlargement can not be ignored. If NATO expands in the near term to take in the Visegrad countries, these countries would gain in self-confidence and stability. It is also possible that border disputes and major ethnic conflicts presumably would be settled before entry - for instance, the dispute involving the Hungarian minority in Romania.(63) In September 1996, Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn significantly improved Hungary's chances by signing a treaty with Romania acknowledging the 1920 borders and dropping longstanding demands for Hungarian ethnic autonomy in exchange for Romania's pledges to protect minority rights, which had been predicted by Senator Nunn in 1995.(64)
The world should consider that the candidate Central and Eastern European countries are trying very hard to meet NATO criteria and develop real democracy, and to contribute to European security. The best proof of this is the IFOR logistics base in Hungary, but candidate states are also participating in different activities as well. As Defense Secretary William J. Perry emphasized in his special policy briefing: "Partner nations have proven themselves in Bosnia, and NATO should welcome their help in future operations such as humanitarian aid delivery, disaster relief and even peacemaking."(65) The leaders of Central and Eastern European countries take seriously the possibility of joining the West and NATO, and are doing their best to lead their states toward meeting the West's requirements. As the President of the Republic of Hungary, for example, pointed out in his speech: "After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Hungary did not delay in setting off on the road to Euro-Atlantic integration, and she is now doing her utmost, both in the area of preparing the country and in her foreign policy, to become a full-fledged member of NATO and the EU as soon as possible."(66)
Russia has been a key player in Europe's security for more than 300 years. It will remain so, for better or worse. The West's and NATO's interest and goal is to make it for the better. The world wants Russia to play a positive role in European security. To make this happen, the West and NATO need to promote a better relationship with Russia, and the building of this relationship has already begun. Two significant steps support this process. The first one is Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov's announcement that he had pledged "to discuss the NATO-Russia charter idea constructively even as NATO's expansion plans go forward."(67) The second one is that Russia's participation in IFOR has been a defining event, demonstrating Russia's commitment to be part of the security circle of Europe. In Bosnia, US and Russian forces work together very well and "when they patrol together, all three factions in Bosnia - Serb, Muslim and Croat - feel they are being treated even-handedly"(68) as former Defense Secretary Perry pointed out.
The enlargement of NATO will advance the consolidation of peace and freedom throughout Europe, and the expansion of NATO's common democratic security culture. "Now the new NATO can do for Europe's east what the old NATO did for Europe's west: vanquish old hatreds, promote integration, create a secure environment for prosperity, and deter violence in the region where two world wars and the cold war began."(69)
Many of the arguments raised against NATO expansion are specious or based on inaccurate or exaggerated concerns. At the same time, there are reasonable questions and concerns about how NATO expansion would work. These concerns must be addressed satisfactorily by NATO and by the candidates for membership. In particular, prospective members, as well as NATO member nations, will have to contribute their fair share, financially and otherwise.
NATO has brought in several new members since its original establishment. The admission of new members at this point would not be a radical change, but rather a natural progression in NATO's growth over the years. Opening the alliance to new members would ratify the expansion of freedom's borders and the reality that new entrants already are a part of the West.
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