CG 47 CLASS ADVISORY NR 09-95R1 AN-SPY-1B SIGNAL PROCESSOR BEAM STEERING CONTROLLER OPERATING TEMPERATURES REF/A/RMG/AEGIS PROG MGR/011443ZJUN95// AMPN/REF A IS CG 47 CLASS ADVISORY 09-95.// RMKS/1. THE PURPOSE OF THIS CLASS ADVISORY REVISION IS TO EXPAND THE SCOPE OF REF A AND WARN THAT OVERTEMPERATURE CONDITIONS MAY NOT ONLY CAUSE CATASTROPHIC CASUALTIES TO THE AN/SPY-1B SIGNAL PROCESSOR, BUT ALSO TO THE BEAM STEERING CONTROLLER CONTAINED IN THE RADAR RECEIVER PROGRAMMER CABINET. THIS REVISION APPLIES ONLY TO CG 59 THRU CG 73 WHICH HAVE THE WATER COOLED SPY-1B SIGNAL PROCESSOR AND BEAM STEERING CONTROLLER. IT PROVIDES INTERIM GUIDANCE ON RECOMMENDED OPERATING TEMPERATURES AND PROCEDURES UNTIL A MODIFICATION TO ALLOW FOR AUTOMATIC SHUTDOWN HAS BEEN INSTALLED. THIS REVISION SUPERSEDES AND CANCELS REF A. 2. BACKGROUND. A. FLEET AND NEW CONSTRUCTION FEEDBACK AND DATA REVIEWS IDENTIFIED A SERIES OF CASUALTIES TO THE AN/SPY-1B SIGNAL PROCESSOR DUE TO LOSS OF ELECTRONIC COOLING WATER (ECW) FLOW OR HIGH ECW TEMPERATURE. MOST OF THESE CASUALTIES OCCURRED DURING INPORT PERIODS DURING INDUSTRIAL AVAILABILITIES OR IN NEW CONSTRUCTION WHEN ECW WAS SECURED AND THE RADAR EQUIPMENT WAS NOT. WHILE LOSS OF ECW OR HIGH ECW TEMPERATURE WILL TRIGGER EXISTING ALARMS, AN IMPROVED EQUIPMENT PROTECTION DESIGN IS BEING DEVELOPED WHICH CAN REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF THESE COSTLY CASUALTIES. B. THE IMPROVED DESIGN WILL MONITOR THE CABINET AIR TEMPERATURE AND SECURE THE SIGNAL PROCESSOR AND/OR BEAM STEERING CONTROLLER BEFORE EQUIPMENT IS DAMAGED UNLESS OVERRIDDEN BY THE SPY RADAR OPERATOR. 3. ACTION. UNTIL PARA 2.B. MODIFICATION IS INSTALLED, CG 59 THRU CG 73 SHOULD COMPLY WITH THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE TO PREVENT EQUIPMENT DAMAGE: A. UPON RECEIVING ANY ONE OF THE HIGH TEMPERATURE/LOW ECW FLOW ALARMS AFFECTING THE SIGNAL PROCESSOR AND THE BEAM STEERING CONTROLLER, IMMEDIATELY INVESTIGATE THE COMMAND AND DECISION (C AND D) SKID AND/OR THE CHILLED WATER SYSTEM FOR THE CAUSE OF THE ALARM. B. OBSERVE THE SIGNAL PROCESSOR ECW OUTLET TEMPERATURE GAGES IN RADAR ROOM 3 AND BEAM STEERING CONTROLLER ECW OUTLET TEMPERATURE GAGES IN RADAR ROOMS 2 AND 5, TO MONITOR THE COOLANT TEMPERATURE. C. SECURE THE SIGNAL PROCESSOR: (1) WHEN ONE OR MORE OF THE TWELVE ECW OUTLET TEMPERATURE GAGES (SIGNAL PROCESSOR OUTLET/RETURN SIDE) REACHES 90 DEG F, OR (2) WITHIN 5 MINUTES OF A LOSS OF ECW FLOW. D. SECURE THE BEAM STEERING CONTROLLER: (1) WHEN ECW OUTLET TEMPERATURE (BEAM STEERING CONTROLLERS OUTLET/RETURN SIDE) REACHES 90 DEG F, OR (2) WITHIN 15 MINUTES OF A LOSS OF ECW FLOW. E. WHEN ANY ONE OF THE CONDITIONS IN PARA 3.C. OCCURS, AND THE TACTICAL SITUATION REQUIRES CONTINUED SPY OPERATION, EXTEND THE AFFECTED SIGNAL PROCESSOR CABINET FRAMES TO THE FOURTH LOCKING POSITION TO ALLOW FOR CONVECTION COOLING WITH ROOM AIR (PER CSOSS PROCEDURES MCRP 2 AND CRP 2.1). THE BEAM STEERING CONTROLLER FRAME, CONTAINED IN EACH OF THE RADAR RECEIVER PROGRAMMER CABINETS, SHOULD BE EXTENDED IN THE SAME MANNER WHEN ONE OF THE CONDITIONS IN PARA 3.D. OCCURS AND CONTINUED OPERATION IS REQUIRED. NOTE THAT THE BEAM STEERING CONTROLLER IS LESS SENSITIVE TO ABNORMAL COOLING WATER CONDITIONS AND THEREFORE MEASURES REQUIRED FOR SIGNAL PROCESSOR PROTECTION SHOULD BE GIVEN PRIORITY. 4. FOR COMNAVSURFLANT/COMNAVSURFPAC - RECOMMEND CG 59 THRU CG 73 BE TASKED TO ADHERE TO PARA 3 GUIDANCE. 5. FOR NSWC PHD (CODE 4C22) A. ENSURE CSOSS PROCEDURES ARE UPDATED AS PART OF THE ECP MODIFICATION. B. DEVELOP A CSOSS PROCEDURE FOR BEAM STEERING CONTROLLER OVERTEMPERATURE INCORPORATING PARA 3 GUIDANCE. 6. THIS ADVISORY DOES NOT AFFECT EOSS, PMS OR CMMP. IT WILL BE CANCELLED WHEN THE MODIFICATION THAT COMMANDS AUTOMATIC EQUIPMENT SHUTDOWN DURING OVERTEMPERATURE CONDITIONS HAS BEEN APPROVED AND INSTALLED IN ALL SPY-1B AND SPY-1B(V) CG 47 CLASS SHIPS (CG 59 THRU CG 73) AND WHEN ALL APPLICABLE CSOSS PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN UPDATED AND DISTRIBUTED. 7. ORIG POC IS N. SMITHSON, PMS400F511, DSN 332-5981 (X133) OR COMM (703) 602-5981 (X133). TECHNICAL POC IS MR. W. DYKSTRA, PMS400B6AI, DSN 332-7296 OR COMM (703) 602-7296. // BT