CG 47 CLASS ADVISORY NR 09-95R1
AN-SPY-1B SIGNAL PROCESSOR BEAM STEERING CONTROLLER OPERATING TEMPERATURES
REF/A/RMG/AEGIS PROG MGR/011443ZJUN95//
AMPN/REF A IS CG 47 CLASS ADVISORY 09-95.//
RMKS/1. THE PURPOSE OF THIS CLASS ADVISORY REVISION IS TO EXPAND THE
SCOPE OF REF A AND WARN THAT OVERTEMPERATURE CONDITIONS MAY NOT ONLY
CAUSE CATASTROPHIC CASUALTIES TO THE AN/SPY-1B SIGNAL PROCESSOR, BUT
ALSO TO THE BEAM STEERING CONTROLLER CONTAINED IN THE RADAR RECEIVER
PROGRAMMER CABINET. THIS REVISION APPLIES ONLY TO CG 59 THRU CG 73
WHICH HAVE THE WATER COOLED SPY-1B SIGNAL PROCESSOR AND BEAM STEERING
CONTROLLER. IT PROVIDES INTERIM GUIDANCE ON RECOMMENDED OPERATING
TEMPERATURES AND PROCEDURES UNTIL A MODIFICATION TO ALLOW FOR
AUTOMATIC SHUTDOWN HAS BEEN INSTALLED. THIS REVISION SUPERSEDES AND
CANCELS REF A.
2. BACKGROUND.
A. FLEET AND NEW CONSTRUCTION FEEDBACK AND DATA REVIEWS
IDENTIFIED A SERIES OF CASUALTIES TO THE AN/SPY-1B SIGNAL PROCESSOR
DUE TO LOSS OF ELECTRONIC COOLING WATER (ECW) FLOW OR HIGH ECW
TEMPERATURE. MOST OF THESE CASUALTIES OCCURRED DURING INPORT PERIODS
DURING INDUSTRIAL AVAILABILITIES OR IN NEW CONSTRUCTION WHEN ECW WAS
SECURED AND THE RADAR EQUIPMENT WAS NOT. WHILE LOSS OF ECW OR HIGH
ECW TEMPERATURE WILL TRIGGER EXISTING ALARMS, AN IMPROVED EQUIPMENT
PROTECTION DESIGN IS BEING DEVELOPED WHICH CAN REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY
OF THESE COSTLY CASUALTIES.
B. THE IMPROVED DESIGN WILL MONITOR THE CABINET AIR TEMPERATURE
AND SECURE THE SIGNAL PROCESSOR AND/OR BEAM STEERING CONTROLLER
BEFORE EQUIPMENT IS DAMAGED UNLESS OVERRIDDEN BY THE SPY RADAR
OPERATOR.
3. ACTION. UNTIL PARA 2.B. MODIFICATION IS INSTALLED, CG 59 THRU
CG 73 SHOULD COMPLY WITH THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE TO PREVENT EQUIPMENT
DAMAGE:
A. UPON RECEIVING ANY ONE OF THE HIGH TEMPERATURE/LOW ECW FLOW
ALARMS AFFECTING THE SIGNAL PROCESSOR AND THE BEAM STEERING
CONTROLLER, IMMEDIATELY INVESTIGATE THE COMMAND AND DECISION
(C AND D) SKID AND/OR THE CHILLED WATER SYSTEM FOR THE CAUSE OF THE
ALARM.
B. OBSERVE THE SIGNAL PROCESSOR ECW OUTLET TEMPERATURE GAGES IN
RADAR ROOM 3 AND BEAM STEERING CONTROLLER ECW OUTLET TEMPERATURE
GAGES IN RADAR ROOMS 2 AND 5, TO MONITOR THE COOLANT TEMPERATURE.
C. SECURE THE SIGNAL PROCESSOR:
(1) WHEN ONE OR MORE OF THE TWELVE ECW OUTLET TEMPERATURE
GAGES (SIGNAL PROCESSOR OUTLET/RETURN SIDE) REACHES 90 DEG F, OR
(2) WITHIN 5 MINUTES OF A LOSS OF ECW FLOW.
D. SECURE THE BEAM STEERING CONTROLLER:
(1) WHEN ECW OUTLET TEMPERATURE (BEAM STEERING CONTROLLERS
OUTLET/RETURN SIDE) REACHES 90 DEG F, OR
(2) WITHIN 15 MINUTES OF A LOSS OF ECW FLOW.
E. WHEN ANY ONE OF THE CONDITIONS IN PARA 3.C. OCCURS, AND THE
TACTICAL SITUATION REQUIRES CONTINUED SPY OPERATION, EXTEND THE
AFFECTED SIGNAL PROCESSOR CABINET FRAMES TO THE FOURTH LOCKING
POSITION TO ALLOW FOR CONVECTION COOLING WITH ROOM AIR (PER CSOSS
PROCEDURES MCRP 2 AND CRP 2.1). THE BEAM STEERING CONTROLLER FRAME,
CONTAINED IN EACH OF THE RADAR RECEIVER PROGRAMMER CABINETS, SHOULD
BE EXTENDED IN THE SAME MANNER WHEN ONE OF THE CONDITIONS IN PARA
3.D. OCCURS AND CONTINUED OPERATION IS REQUIRED. NOTE THAT THE BEAM
STEERING CONTROLLER IS LESS SENSITIVE TO ABNORMAL COOLING WATER
CONDITIONS AND THEREFORE MEASURES REQUIRED FOR SIGNAL PROCESSOR
PROTECTION SHOULD BE GIVEN PRIORITY.
4. FOR COMNAVSURFLANT/COMNAVSURFPAC - RECOMMEND CG 59 THRU CG 73 BE
TASKED TO ADHERE TO PARA 3 GUIDANCE.
5. FOR NSWC PHD (CODE 4C22)
A. ENSURE CSOSS PROCEDURES ARE UPDATED AS PART OF THE ECP
MODIFICATION.
B. DEVELOP A CSOSS PROCEDURE FOR BEAM STEERING CONTROLLER
OVERTEMPERATURE INCORPORATING PARA 3 GUIDANCE.
6. THIS ADVISORY DOES NOT AFFECT EOSS, PMS OR CMMP. IT WILL BE
CANCELLED WHEN THE MODIFICATION THAT COMMANDS AUTOMATIC EQUIPMENT
SHUTDOWN DURING OVERTEMPERATURE CONDITIONS HAS BEEN APPROVED AND
INSTALLED IN ALL SPY-1B AND SPY-1B(V) CG 47 CLASS SHIPS (CG 59 THRU
CG 73) AND WHEN ALL APPLICABLE CSOSS PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN UPDATED AND
DISTRIBUTED.
7. ORIG POC IS N. SMITHSON, PMS400F511, DSN 332-5981 (X133) OR COMM
(703) 602-5981 (X133). TECHNICAL POC IS MR. W. DYKSTRA, PMS400B6AI,
DSN 332-7296 OR COMM (703) 602-7296. //
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