LPD-17LPD-17
LPD-17 C4I WORKSHOP REPORT June 1996
Prepared by:
Dahlgren, Virginia 22448-5000
V. ADDITIONAL WORKSHOP COMMENTS
APPENDIX A: LPD 17 ROC/POE ISSUES
APPENDIX B: WORKSHOP "QUICK LOOK" MESSAGE
From 30 April to1 May 1996, the Commander, Amphibious Group Three (COMPHIBGRU THREE) (San Diego, CA) hosted the first LPD 17 workshop on Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Information (C4I). This workshop is one in a series that PMS 317, the LPD 17 Program Office, has instituted as part of its "Design for Ownership" philosophy: a concurrent engineering approach that injects Warrior (operator, maintainer, and trainer) input into the design development process. As a result, in addition to the TEAM 17 design site in Crystal City, VA, LPD 17 War Rooms have been established at the Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD), Dahlgren, VA and at the Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, Atlantic (EWTGLANT), Naval Amphibious Base (NAB) Little Creek, VA. The systems engineering environment at Dahlgren (the engineering inlet) and the Warrior inlet at Little Creek will combine to produce an effective concurrent engineering process that results in an LPD 17 design that strives to meet the needs of the operators, maintainers, and trainers. In addition to early operational assessments by OPTEVFOR each year, these workshops provide a vital, collaborative means of involving the Warrior in this concurrent engineering process. From earlier workshops at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA (Sept 95) and at EWTGLANT (Jan 96), C4I was identified as an important area requiring additional Warrior and engineering input.
This workshop gathered together experts in the field of Littoral Battlefield execution and C4I systems. The intent was to discuss LPD 17 C4I operational requirements, systems plans, and their relationship to both current and future Amphibious Ready Group (ARG)/Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and integrated Battle Group (BG) operations. The workshop validated many aspects of the LPD 17 design, identified areas for future workshops, and suggested some near term space/room layout recommendations. Since the field of C4I is so broad, two days were not enough time to detail every aspect of this topic; so boundaries were negotiated to focus the discussions.
Due to limitations of space not all acronyms have been defined in the mainbody of the text. However, a comprehensive list ot acronyms and abbreviations is given in Appendix C.
Specific workshop recommendations that can be applied to the LPD 17 are as follows:
LPD 17 C4I Conference/Workshop attendees received program and operational briefs from the following:
The symposium was conducted in three phases:
PHASE ONE: This consisted of an information exchange among the Pacific Fleet Amphibious Team on the specific mission and CONOPS team of the ARG/MEU for both current and future operations. The product of Phase One was a notional operational architecture consisting of a set of naval amphibious missions, respective CONOPS, and tactical information needs that reflect the warfighting requirements of the fleet commander.
PHASE TWO: This provided insight into current LPD 17 C4I-planned architecture and required operational capability. The product of Phase Two was to provide an overview of current LPD-17 C4I operational requirements and systems plans, including communications, sensors, intelligence and cryptographic, and Command and Control (C2) systems.
PHASE THREE: This provided some analysis and relative ranking of planned C4I systems based on operational assumptions from the Pacific Fleet Amphibious Team point of view. As part of Phase Three, the relevant C4I sections of the LPD 17 ROC/POE were reviewed with comments provided to the system commands and OPNAV sponsors. The product of Phase Three took the results of Phases One and Two, specifically the notional operational architectures and LPD 17 C4I baseline, and conducted a gap analysis of capabilities versus assumed CONOPS/information requirements.
The Naval Expeditionary Warfare IPT is finally becoming a reality. The IPT is bringing nine major stakeholders together to handle warfighter requirements on doctrine and engineering. The RFP for the LPD 17 is on the street and comments are coming in. The Navy hopes to award the ship by August 1996. After the next Presidential election, whoever wins, there will be another Bottom-Up Review (BUR). The two (2) Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs) maybe renegotiated down to one (1) or one and a half. This only heightens the demand for a flexible, adaptive Warrior-friendly LPD 17.
The USMC C4I Conference/Workshop was held at MCCDC, Quantico, VA in March with over 160 attending. The conference identified the top level naval C4I issues and amphibious missions. There was a reduction in duplication of many requirements by this conference. A document is in the final stages of production and will be forthcoming soon. The LPD 17 requirements were detailed in the following list:
The Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) have not come together on COPERNICUS FORWARD. The CMC does not agree with the OPNAV N6 concept. A working team has been assembled to negotiate the issues. Several Amphibious Master Plans are in the works within OPNAV, and a draft version will soon be going out to several commands for comment/review.
The challenge for C4I in the Pacific Littoral Warrior is 97% forward projection and contingency and only 2% actual warfare (1% undefined). The amphibious forces are seen as the "911" responders. With expanding threats, the Integrated Battle Organization (IBO) will require increased "morphing" into a joint working force. Force levels are extremely dynamic, where revenues are down 41% and deployments (expenses) are up 31%. Operating days at sea are coming down again (from 27 days to 25 days on average per quarter per ship - impacts readiness). Based on this financial reality, joint efforts will be needed to renegotiate the two MRC scenarios. KSQ-1 needs to be integrated within JMCIS, but there is no fleet requirement to do this. CNSP has agreed to fix this hole in the system requirements definition (error came out of last weeks JRWG). The Fleet wants to delete requirements for big ships to go through the Panama Canal. (MGEN Jones, OPNAV N85 has just signed this out.) ARG underway planning within the Fleet today requires at a minimum two helicopters per day just to move information/personnel between ships. LPD class ships are used extensively as advance force ships today (30nm off beach). The Special Boat companies are on the LPDs and move mostly at night. The USS BOXER ARG will deploy next year with a DDG (USS CHANDLER) in company. Very Shallow Water (VSW) (40 ft water mark to the beach) ) MIW stood up recently at NAB, Coronado, CA. A new unit will consist of SEALs, EDOs, and a Marine Reconnaissance Team.
The ARG assumptions are as follows:
From an MEF-level perspective, a greater effort needs to be made to keep all Marine forces involved in this design-for-ownership process. A vacuum of information tends to develop on the West Coast.
C4I Issues:
A new Amphibious Master Plan is being worked by OPNAV N6/SPAWAR/HQMC. SPAWAR is taking a turnkey approach to the C4I suite on the LPD 17, to get the latest/most modern equipment. They will start buying systems in 1998. SPAWAR has many questions and concerns and they desire Warrior input. The following issues were brought up:
JMCOMS and Single Channel Radios. They are not sure how many SINCGARS to buy/install. What are the Navy and Marine Corps communication requirements (dedicated networks vs. virtual networks)? They need to accommodate several different detachments-- Flag Staff, UAV, MIW, SPECOPS, etc.--and what are their unique communication requirements?
Will they be required to conduct training with the Marines while they are down in the Well Deck or storage areas? The Marines have mentioned the need to conduct radio checks during EMCOM which is usually enforced just prior to movement ashore (may need dummy loads for individual radios).
The Marines will need to interface with legacy systems (i.e., may not be on the SWAN). They may have to accommodate non-Navy equipment in racks within Radio Central or other C4I spaces (Allied equipment or Coalition Forces - as we are experiencing in Bosnia). Currently, NAVSEA has all of SPAWAR's equipment on non-vital power whereas the combat systems are all on vital power. Vital power connections are all based on mission critical systems. Maybe we need to go back and reexamine these designations and determine what systems are really vital? Aren't radios/circuits and intel systems considered vital? Empty equipment rack space needs to built in for future growth (Navy, Marine, other systems).
SPAWAR is having difficulty coming to closure with the Marines on required communication circuits. How many do the Marines need and how many need to be operating simultaneously? (impacts the number of antennas on the ship, LPD 17 already has 129 antennas). Right now they cannot put up all of the circuits required, so which ones need to be taken down to bring up others. What are the priorities/requirements? SPAWAR sent over to OPNAV a draft list of required radios for the LPD 17. Is this the right number; they need a Marine Corps final scrub. The Marines will start placing orders for equipment in 1998, so a correct figure is needed soon.
Which SINCGARS circuits will be frequency hoppers and which ones will be single frequency? Each SINCGARS that frequency hops requires its own antenna. (The Navy tends to link two or three SINCGARS to a common antenna to save space.) The Fleet today cannot frequency hop, so how will that impact the land battle operations?
SPAWAR has a two-part question for Marine Corps with regards to communications:
The Marine Corps uses portable SATCOM systems on the beach. These systems need to be factored into the SPAWAR communications architecture. Will the portable SATCOM systems be part of the "GATOR HUB"?
The operators need to get together and determine what information is needed and what equipment needs to go to whom? The N/G-6s will not make the determination but the N/G 2s,3s, and 4s will. Once they come to a consensus, the N/G 6s will figure out the communication paths/how data gets from one spot to another. (RADM Saffell statement)
The Fleet must determine the echelons of command and who is on what ship. (RADM Saffell statement)
The following issues were brought up and discussed during the workshop.
a. Overall comments on the ROC/POE for inclusion are from CPG
THREE and THIRD FLEET Representatives:
b. ROC/POE specific:
c. Additional Comments:
RTTUZYUW RUWDSGG5828 1231634-UUUU--RULSACW.
ZNR UUUUU
RHODAAA T USS ANCHORAGE
RHODABA T USS DENVER
RHPADXW T USS RUSHMORE
RHPALHA T COMPHIBRON THREE/USS TARAWA
RHPAVJU T USS DULUTH
RHWZMDD T USS FORT FISHER
RUHPEXU T USS CORONADO
RUHPPEL T COMPHIBRON ONE/USS PELELIU
R 021634Z MAY 96 ZYB
FM COMPHIBGRU THREE//00/N4/N44/N441//
TO RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC//N6/N61/N62/N63/N85/N86//
INFO RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC//C4I/CSBT//
RUWICBE/CG I MEF//01/G2/G3/G6/G7//
RUCKMEA/CG II MEF//01/G2/G3/G6/G7//
RUHBABA/CG III MEF//01/G2/G3/G6/G7//
RHHMHAH/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//N6//
RULSMCA/CG MCCDC QUANTICO VA//REQR/DOCT/CWL//
RUCBTFA/COMNAVSURFLANT NORFOLK VA//N2/N3/N4/N432/N6/N621//
RUWDEAA/COMNAVSURFPAC SAN DIEGO CA//N2/N3/N4/N432/N6/N621//
RUHBVMA/COMPHIBGRU ONE
RULYVKA/RULYJPX/COMPHIBGRU TWO
RULSSPA/COMSPAWARSYSCOM WASHINGTON DC//05F2/PMW176/PD70//
RUHPQUA/COMTHIRDFLT//00M/N6//
RUCBFAG/EWTGLANT NORFOLK VA//00//
RUWFAFI/EWTGPAC SAN DIEGO CA//00//
RUEACMC/MARCORSYSCOM WASHINGTON DC//C4I/C4IDPR//
RUWICCI/MCTSSA CAMP PENDLETON CA//00/FMFSD//
RULSACW/NAVSURFWARCENDIV DAHLGREN VA//F30/F31/F10//
RUWICBA/ELEVENTH MEU
RHPALHA/THIRTEENTH MEU
RUHPPEL/FIFTEENTH MEU
RULSSBI/PEO CLA WASHINGTON DC//00/PMS317/PMS400B//
PHIBGRU THREE AFLOAT
RUWFOAA/NCCOSC RDTE DIV SAN DIEGO CA//00/611/60F//
RUCBCLF/CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA//N6//
BT
UNCLAS //N03120//
MSGID/GENADMIN/CPG-3//
SUBJ/LPD-17 C4I SYMPOSIUM RESULTS//
REF/A/MSG/CPG-3/112000ZAPR96//
AMPN/MSG ANNOUNCING CPG-3 HOSTED LPD-17 C4I SYMPOSIUM//
POC/B.H. MATHERS/LCDR/CPG-3 N44/TEL: (619) 556-3585/TEL:DSN:526-3585.//
RMKS/1. THIS IS A CG I MEF/COMPHIBGRU THREE COORDINATED MESSAGE.
2. COMPHIBGRU THREE HOSTED AN LPD-17 C4I SYMPOSIUM 30 APRIL-01 MAY 1996. THE INTENT OF THE SYMPOSIUM WAS TO GATHER EXPERTS IN THE FIELDS OF LITTORAL BATTLEFIELD EXECUTION AND C4I SYSTEMS IN ORDER TO DISCUSS LPD-17 C4I OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS, SYSTEMS PLANS, AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO BOTH CURRENT AND FUTURE ARG/MEU AND INTEGRATED BG OPERATIONS. SYMPOSIUM ATTENDEES RECEIVED OPERATIONAL BRIEFS FROM CPG-3, CPR-5, CG I MEF (G3), WHICH FOCUSED ON ARG/MEU MISSIONS AND CONOPS FROM WHICH C4I REQUIREMENTS WERE DERIVED. ADDITIONAL BRIEFS WERE PROVIDED ON THE CURRENT LPD-17 ROC/POE(PMS 317) AND LPD-17 CURRENT C4I ARCHITECTURE (SPAWAR). THE SYMPOSIUM WAS CONDUCTED IN THREE PHASES: PHASE ONE CONSISTED OF THE INFORMATION EXCHANGE AMONG THE PACIFIC FLEET AMPHIBIOUS TEAM ON THE SPECIFIC MISSIONS AND CONOPS OF THE ARG/MEU FOR BOTH CURRENT AND FUTURE OPERATIONS. PHASE TWO PROVIDED INSIGHTS INTO CURRENT LPD-17 C4I PLANNED ARCHITECTURE AND REQUIRED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY. PHASE THREE THEN PROVIDED SOME ANALYSIS AND RELATIVE RANKING OF PLANNED C4I SYSTEMS BASED ON OPERATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS FROM THE PACIFIC AMPHIBIOUS FLEET POINT OF VIEW. AS PART OF PHASE III, THE RELEVANT C4I SECTIONS OF THE LPD-17 ROC/POE WERE REVIEWED WITH COMMENTS PROVIDED TO THE SYSTEMS COMMANDS AND PROGRAM SPONSORS. A DETAILED REVIEW WILL BE PROVIDED SEPCOR.
3. THE FOLLOWING ARE KEY PACIFIC AMPHIBIOUS TEAM OPERATIONAL
ASSUMPTIONS UPON WHICH A FUNCTIONAL/SYSTEMS ASSESSMENT WAS CONDUCTED.
THIS REPRESENTS A QUICK LOOK AT THE RESULTS OF PHASE ONE:
- THE PRIMARY OPERATIONS OF THE ARG/MEU(SOC) TEAM ARE FOCUSED
INTO THREE AREAS: PEACETIME FORWARD PRESENCE, CONTINGENCY RESPONSE
AND LARGER FORCE ENABLER.
- ARG/MEU(SOC) TEAM SHOULD HAVE CRUDES SUPPORT DURING CRISIS CONTINGENCY
OPERATIONS/RESPONSES.
- LHA/LHD SHOULD SERVE AS THE "GATOR" COMMUNICATION/
INFORMATION HUB. DEFINING "GATOR" HUB IS CRUCIAL. THE
LHA/LHD SHOULD BE THE CONDUIT FOR THE FLOW OF INFORMATION AND SHOULD POSSESS
THE MAJORITY OF THE ARG/MEU CONNECTIVITY/REACHBACK WITH THE OUTSIDE
WORLD. IT SHOULD TYPICALLY HANDLE THE FULL SHF AGGREGATE FOR THE
ARG AND WHEN APPLICABLE FUSE THEN DIRECT INFORMATION THROUGH THE
APPROPRIATE SYSTEMS TO ARG SUBSCRIBERS. IF NECESSARY DURING INDEPENDENT
OPERATIONS, THE SHF AGGREGATE SHOULD BE APPROPRIATELY APPORTIONED
BETWEEN THE LHA/LHD AND LPD-17 IN ORDER TO PROVIDE AN UMBILICAL
COMMUNICATION CONNECTIVITY TO THE "GATOR" HUB WITHOUT
EXCEEDING ASSIGNED BANDWIDTH FOR THE ARG.
- ARG COMPONENTS SHOULD ALWAYS REMAIN ON STATION IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF THE MEU(SOC).
- LPD-17 SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING INDEPENDENT OPERATIONS, INCLUDING SPECIAL
PURPOSE MARINE AIR GROUND TASK FORCE
(SPMAGTF) CONDUCTING UP TO TWO SIMULTANEOUS, LIMITED MISSIONS;
ADVANCE FORCE OPERATIONS; MARITIME PEACETIME OPERATIONS TO INCLUDE
OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (OOTW) AND AS ALTERNATIVE COMMAND PLATFORM
FROM WHICH THE MEU COMMANDER COULD FIGHT FOR A LIMITED TIME SHOULD
THE SITUATION REQUIRE SUCH TRANSFER OF FUNCTION.
- LPD-17 MUST SUPPORT SIMULTANEOUS FLIGHT AND WELL DECK OPERATIONS.
- LPD-17 MUST MAINTAIN A SUBSET OF LHD/LHA C4I FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITIES
FOR REDUNDANCY AND FOR LIMITED INDEPENDENT OPERATIONS.
THIS ASSUMPTION MEANS INCLUDING A SMALL "GATOR" HUB
CAPABILITY KEPT IN STAND-BY AND ACTIVATED IN THE EVENT OF INDEPENDENT
OPERATIONS OR AT THE DISCRETION OF THE CATF. MANNING SHOULD BE
PROVIDED VIA AUGMENTATION FROM THE ARG IN THE EVENT OF ACTIVATION.
- LPD-17 MISSION CAPABILITY MUST BE EQUAL TO OR GREATER THAN THAT
OF LPD 7 CLASS SHIPS.
- LPD-17 MUST POSSESS A LIMITED SCI CAPABILITY.
- LPD-17 MUST POSSESS A DEDICATED INTEL SPACE THAT IS PRIMARILY
MANNED DURING INDEPENDENT/CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS.
- LPD-17 MUST BE INDEPENDENTLY SURVIVABLE IN A LIMITED THREAT
ENVIRONMENT WITH AN AUTOMATED SHIP'S SELF DEFENSE SYSTEM.
- LPD-17 MUST POSSESS A C4I DESIGN THAT FACILITATES "PLUG
AND PLAY" FOR THE EMBARKED FORCES.
4. BASED ON THE OPERATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS PRESENTED PARA 3, THE WORKING GROUP THEN ANALYZED THE COMMUNICATIONS, C2 DECISION AIDS AND SENSORS PLANNED FOR LPD-17. A CONSENSUS PROCESS WAS DERIVED IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE NAVY/MARINE CORPS INPUTS INTO THE SYSTEMS. THE FOLLOWING REPRESENT THE WORKING GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS AS FAR AS LPD-17 C4I SYSTEMS.
4A. COMMUNICATIONS:
--HF CAPABILITY IS REQUIRED.
--VHF AND UHF LINE OF SIGHT (LOS) CAPABILITIES THAT ARE SECURE
AND FREQUENCY AGILE ARE REQUIRED.
--UHF AND SHF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES SHOULD BE
INCLUDED LARGELY IN ORDER TO SUPPORT INDEPENDENT OPERATIONS AND
REDUNDANCY FOR ARG OPERATIONS. THE SHF ARCHITECTURE SHOULD SUPPORT
THE SHIPBOARD JMCONS ARCHITECTURE. EHF WAS PRESENTED AS A REQUIREMENT
FOR THE NAVY; UNCERTAIN ABOUT FUTURE MARINE CORPS EHF REQUIREMENTS.
--COMMERCIAL SATCOM SHOULD BE INCLUDED FOR SIMPLEX (GBS)
CIRCUITS. FULL DUPLEX (COMMERCIAL WIDE BAND SATCOM) NOT REQUIRED.
--HIGH BANDWIDTH, LINE OF SIGHT DATA/VOICE/VIDEO CAPABILITIES
(DIGITAL WIDE BAND TRANSMISSION SYSTEM (DWTS)) REQUIRED FOR SHIP
TO SHIP AND SHIP TO SHORE CONNECTIVITY FOR DATA AND CIRCUIT SWITCHED
NETWORKS AND VIRTUAL COMMAND AND CONTROL. CIRCUIT SWITCHED NETWORK
SHOULD BE TRI TAC INTEROPERABLE OR MUST INTERFACE WITH A TRI TAC
SYSTEM.
--LINK 11 AND LINK 16 FUNCTIONALITY IS REQUIRED.
--SI COMMUNICATIONS (TACINTEL) FUNCTIONALITY IS REQUIRED.
--A FULLY INTEGRATED WIDE AREA NETWORK IS REQUIRED. THE SHIP
WIDE AREA NETWORK (SWAN) REQUIREMENT MUST INCLUDE A NETWORK
MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY THAT ENABLES NETWORK MANAGERS VISIBILITY
INTO THE SWAN OPERATIONS WHILE EMBARKED OR REMOTELY FROM THE "GATOR"
HUB. FURTHERMORE, A SYSTEMS CONTROL CAPABILITY ALLOWING THE MANAGEMENT
OF THE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM EMBARKED OR REMOTELY FROM THE "GATOR"
HUB IS REQUIRED.
4B. COMMAND AND CONTROL/ DECISION AIDS:
--THE PRIMARY MISSION OF LPD-17 IS LANDING MARINE FORCES AS PART
OF AN ARG/MEU(SOC) TEAM. THEREFORE, FUNCTIONALITY FOR SUPPORTING
ARMS COORDINATION CENTER (SACC), TACTICAL AIRCRAFT CONTROL CENTER
(TACC), TACTICAL LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT CENTER (TACLOG), LANDING
FORCE OPERATIONS CENTER (LFOC), HELICOPTER DIRECTION CENTER (HDC)
IS DEEMED CRITICAL AND ESSENTIAL. LEVEL OF FUNCTIONALITY REQUIRES
ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION/REVIEW.
--C2 SYSTEMS SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF FUSING THE TACTICAL,
OPERATIONAL, THEATER AND ALLIED PICTURE INTO ONE SYSTEM. JMCIS/GCCS
FUNCTIONALITY IS REQUIRED AND MUST PRESENT A COMMON TACTICAL PICTURE
TO INCLUDE AIR, SURFACE AND GROUND TRACKS FOR POSITION LOCATION
INFORMATION (PLI). THE INTEGRATION OF REALTIME AND NEAR-REALTIME
DATA SHOULD PROVIDE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS (NEAR/NON REALTIME)
--DEDICATED SSES SPACE REQUIRED WHICH IS CAPABLE PROVIDING BOTH
ARG SCI PROCESSING REDUNDANCY AND STANDALONE CAPABILITY FOR LIMITED
INDEPENDENT OPERATIONS.
--LPD-17 SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF HOSTING/INTEGRATING CARRY-ON
COMBAT DIRECTION FINDING EQUIPMENT.
--LPD-17 SHOULD POSSESS THE CAPABILITY FOR COOPERATIVE
ENGAGEMENT AND LIMITED SELF DEFENSE (CEC AND SSDS).
4C. SENSORS:
--REQUIREMENTS INCLUDE THE NEED FOR THE STANDARD SHIPBOARD
RADARS FOR NAVIGATION, COMMAND/CONTROL, AND SHIP'S SELF DEFENSE. THIS
INCLUDES AIR, SURFACE, NAVIGATION, AND FIRE CONTROL.
--THE LPD-17 SHOULD INCLUDE A UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE (UAV)
CAPABILITY TO CONTROL/TASK, RECEIVE, INTEROPERATE AND DISSEMINATE
INFORMATION WITH TRI-SERVICE UAVS.
--"PRECISION APPROACH" SYSTEM FOR AVIATION RECOVERY
ISREQUIRED AND VIEWED AS CRITICAL FOR ACFT SUCH AS V-22 AND AV-8.
--POSITION LOCATION INFORMATION (PLI) SENSORS REQUIRED. THE
ISSUE OF PLI IS PROBLEMATIC FOR AMPHIBIOUS FORCES AND REQUIRES
RESOLUTION. IT IS CRUCIAL TO RESOLVE EARLY IN LPD-17 DESIGN PROCESS.
RECOMMEND THAT A DEDICATED PLI WORKING GROUP BE CONVENED TO ADDRES
THE FULL INTEGRATION OF PLI SENSORS INTO ONE SYSTEM TO AID IN
PRODUCTION OF THE COMMON TACTICAL PICTURE. THIS NEEDS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED
IN CONJUNCTION WITH AND AS PART OF THE COMBAT SYSTEMS FUNCTIONAL
ALLOCATION BOARD (CSFAB) TASKING AS DESCRIBED IN ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND
ACQUISITION (ASN (RDA)) LETTER DATED 15 MAR 96 ON COHERENT TACTICAL
PICTURE.
--ORGANIC MINE DETECTION CAPABILITIES FOR ADVANCE FORCE
OPERATIONS AND SPMAGTF OPERATIONS ARE REQUIRED. THIS IS CRITICAL
TO THE DECISION PROCESS OF FORCE DELIVERY AND NEEDS TO BE ORGANIC
TO THE SHIP.
5. THE TWO DAY EFFORT WAS EXTREMELY SUCCESSFUL AND WILL HOPEFULLY
ENERGIZE FURTHER DIALOGUE AS LPD-17 DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS EVOLVE.
COMPREHENSIVE MINUTES WILL BE AVAILABLE WITHIN 30 DAYS. LCDR BRUCE
MATHERS, CPG3 COMBAT SYSTEMS OFFICER, HAS BEEN TASKED WITH COORDINATION
OF THE PACIFIC AMPHIBIOUS TEAM LPD-17 ISSUES FOR CONTINUITY, (619)556-3585,
E-MAIL MATHERS@NOSC.MIL.//
BT
APPENDIX C. ACRONYMS
ACDS Advanced Combat Direction System
ACOM Atlantic Command
ARG Amphibious Ready Group
ATO Air Tasking Order
BG Battle Group
BGPHES Battle Group Passive Horizon Extension System
BUR Bottom-Up Review
C2 Command and Control
C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Information
C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Information,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance
CINC Commander In Chief
CJTF Commander, Joint Task Force
CLA Carrier, Littoral, and Auxiliaries
CMC Commandant of the Marine Corps
CNN Cable News Network
CNO Chief of Naval Operations
CNSL COMNAVSURFLANT
CNSP COMNAVSURFPAC
CO Commanding Officer
COC Command (or Combat) Operations Center
COMNAVSURFLANT Commander, Naval Surface Force Atlantic
COMNAVSURFPAC Commander, Naval Surface Force Pacific
COMPHIBGRU Commander, Amphibious Group
COMPHIBRON Commander, Amphibious Squadron
CONOPS Concept of Operations
CONUS Continental United States
CTAPS Contingency TACs Automated Planning System
CVBG Carrier Battle Group
DF Direction Finding
DII Defense Information Infrastructure
DS/DS Desert Shield/Desert Storm
DWTS Digital Wideband Transmission System
EDO Engineering Duty Officer
EHF Extremely High Frequency
EWTGLANT Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, Atlantic
GBS Global Broadcast Service (or System)
GCCS Global Command and Control System
HQMC Headquarters, Marine Corps
I&W Indications and Warning
IBO Integrated Battle Organization
IFR Instrument Flight Rules
INMARSAT International Maritime Satellite
IPT Integrated Product Team
JCPMS Joint Computer Program Management System
JIC Joint Intelligence Center
JMCIS Joint Maritime Command Information System
JMCOMS Joint Maritime Communications Strategy
JTUAV Joint Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
LFOC Landing Force Operations Center
LOS Line of Sight
MARFOR Marine Force
MCCDC Marine Corps Combat Development Command
MCM Mine Countermeasure
MEDAL Mine Environment Decision Analysis Library
MEF Marine Expeditionary Force
MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit
MIW Mine Warfare
MRC Major Regional Contingency
NAB Naval Amphibious Base
NALCOMIS Naval Aviation Logistics Command Management Information
System
NIPRNET Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network
NMCC National Military Command Center
NRaD Navy Research and Development
NSWCDD Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division
OOTW Operations Other Than War
OPNAV Operational Navy (CNO staff)
OPTEVFOR Operational Test and Evaluation Force
PD Program Director
PEO Program Executive Officer
PLI Position Location Information
PLRS Position Location Reporting System
PMS Program Manager-Sea
POE Projected Operational Environment
PUK Pack Up Kits
RFP Request For Proposal
ROC Required Operational Capability
SABER Situational Awareness Beacon with Reply
SACC Supporting Arms Coordination Center
SALTS Strategic Arms Limitations Talks
SATCOM Satellite Communications
SI Special Intelligence
SINCGARS Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System
SIPRNET Secret (or Secure) Internet Protocol Router Network
SOF Safety of Flight
SPAWAR Naval Space and Warfare Systems Command
SPECOPS Special Operations
SPN Joint electronics type designation sytem (AN/xxx):
Water/Surface-craft Navigation Radar
SSES Ship's Signal Exploitation Space
SWAN Ship-Wide Area Network
SYSCOM System Command
TACC Tactical Air Control Center
TACINTEL Tactical Intelligence
TACLOG Tactical Logistics
TAO Tactical Action Officer
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UB Unified Build
VSW Very Shallow Water
VTC Video Teleconference