LPD-17LPD-17
LPD 17 WORKSHOP REPORT
MISSIONS AND OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES
(MONTEREY II) April 1996
Prepared by: Dahlgren, Virginia 22448-5000
This report was written by the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) and EG&G Washington Analytical Services Center (WASC). NSWCDD team members include Jon Sweigart, Ben Raterman and Dennis Warne. EG&G WASC team members include Pat McCarthy and Dick Feierabend.
RADM (ret) Len Picotte and Capt (ret) Carl Lind of the American Systems Corporation contributed to this report. Their valuable insight and encouragement is appreciated.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.0 INTRODUCTION
2.0 PURPOSE OF THE WORKSHOP
3.0 METHODOLOGY
4.0 FINDINGS
4.1 Mission Related
4.2 Operational Capabilities
4.2.1 Sea-based Logistics
4.2.2 Survivability
4.2.3 Surveillance
4.2.4 Command & Control
4.2.5 Communications
4.2.6 Impact of Evolving Concepts
4.2.7 Other
5.0 RECOMMENDATIONS
6.0 FUTURE DIRECTION
ENDNOTES
PMS 317, the LPD 17 Program Office, has embraced a "Design for Ownership" philosophy; a concurrent engineering approach that injects warrior (operator, maintainer, and trainer) input into the design development process. As a result, in addition to the Team 17 design site in Crystal City, Va., LPD 17 Warrooms have been established at the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Dahlgren, Virginia (NSWCDD) and at the Expeditionary Warfare Training Group at the Amphibious Base in Little Creek, Virginia (EWTGLANT). The addition of the systems engineering environment at Dahlgren and the warriors at Little Creek will combine to produce an effective concurrent engineering process that results in a LPD 17 design that strives to meet the needs of the operators, maintainers, and trainers.
Workshops will be routinely conducted to sustain warrior inputs to this overall process. The first dedicated LPD 17 Workshop was conducted on 23, 24, and 25 January 1996. This workshop focused on LPD 17 missions and the resulting expected capabilities and requirements. This report details the methodology, findings, and conclusions of the workshop.
The workshop validated many aspects of the LPD 17 design, identified areas for future workshops, and suggested some near term design recommendations. Future workshop topics being considered include: Integrated Blue/ Green Planning, C4I, Maintenance, Pre- commissioning, Manning, Training, Mine Warfare, Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS)/Ship-to-Objective Maneuver, Maintenance, and Logistics. The results of these workshops will identify additional near-term design recommendations and should produce proposals regarding LPD 17 capabilities, requirements, new systems, enhanced systems and system integration for PMS 317 consideration. These proposals will address implementation in future ship builds and backfits if appropriate.
Specific workshop recommendations that can be applied to the LPD 17 are:
INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS to allow combat cargo to tie into a wireless system to allow hands-off communications.
SELECTIVE VIEW of all camera’s from command and control spaces. Specifically, to be able to view the boat valley, well deck, flight deck, and vehicle decks.
50 CALIBER GUN mounted on the bow. The ship design includes two 50 cal. guns but the bow area is not defended by a mounted gun.
POWER for containerized capabilities. Containerized capability vans may be brought aboard from time to time. The capability for the ship to easily provide power to them needs to be included in the design. Standard power provided with standard commercial connectors need to be made readily available.
DUMMY LOADS for Marine Corps communications equipment. Loads should be available and readily accessible to the Marines so that their communications systems can be checked out under full EMCON.
Given the isolated way in which new systems have been introduced into the fleet in the past and the rate at which new technology is being injected into individual systems, we can no longer afford the luxury of maintaining a "stove piped" approach to fielding complex systems. As part of a new initiative embraced by key Navy acquisition executives, the design approach to new ship combatants will follow a "Design for Ownership" process involving the use of "mission teams". These teams will help define a surface combatant's operational characteristics with the ultimate purpose of transforming these characteristics into cohesive warfighting systems. Major drivers for this process "re-engineering" include (1) making sure that ship design is grounded in what the warriors must do; (2) overcoming the problem of stovepiping; and (3) fostering use of modern system engineering methods to create ships which are warfare capable, mission flexible, technically adaptable, and affordable through their lifecycle.
As a first step in this "Design for Ownership" process a workshop was held at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in September 1995. The workshop participants, organized into four mission teams (Expeditionary Warfare, Maritime Firebase, Joint Air Dominance, Integrated Survivability), examined the processes (planning through execution) by which these missions operate. The information requirements for these processes were then examined. Finally, recommendations were made as to opportunities for process improvements as well as for new or different information relevant to those processes. As would be expected many questions and issues were left unresolved.
This current workshop, held on 23-25 January 1996 at the Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, Atlantic (EWTGLANT) War Room was the second step in a continuing dialogue involving close interaction between the naval warriors and their system acquisition counterparts from Washington in bringing a new ship into the Fleet. This workshop closely paralleled an earlier conference at the Naval Postgraduate School in September 1995, which was focused towards the Expeditionary Warfare Mission in general. This current workshop built on the results of the NPS workshop focusing on the LPD 17 in particular. The emphasis was to involve the warriors as key participants in the Mission Team Concept and address LPD 17 issues that arose from the previous workshop.
The opening session was devoted to a series of briefings by Senior Acquisition Program Managers to set the stage for future ship design, development and acquisition. RADM Paul M. Robinson, the newly designated Program Executive Officer for Carriers, Littoral and Auxiliary ships (PEO CLA) provided an overview of his organization that was established to place special emphasis on critical programs associated with the Carrier Battle Group and Amphibious Ready Group operations. He remarked that the CLA program goal was to improve products while providing the same level of support now in existence for the Cruisers and Destroyers. He further stated the LPD 17 will be the first ship to implement the "Design for Ownership" philosophy and apply the system-of-systems engineering process to take advantage of the significant advances in automation technology. This approach to ship acquisition has never been tried before, and there will a learning curve for all those involved with the process. One of the major points he stressed during his presentation was the emphasis on the "naval expeditionary" aspects of the LPD 17 and for that reason the Marines Corps was brought into the initial phases of the ship design and integration in order to optimally incorporate their requirements early in the design process, thereby enhancing the Navy-Marine Corps team. TEAM 17 will increase the use of simulation based design particularly in the area of ship design and equipment layout which is expected to ultimately translate into significant cost savings by "getting it right the first time." One major operational change is that the ship will shift from a dependence on "paper" to reliance on the electronic media. RADM Robinson concluded his remarks with a review of the development waypoints which has the LPD 17 "ARG-Ready" by March 2004.
CAPT. Maurice Gauthier, the LPD 17 Program Manager (PMS-317), followed with a presentation of the LPD 17 design approach and emphasized the vital need for the naval warriors’ input and perspective which is the fundamental tenet of the Navy’s "Design for Ownership" philosophy where the "Owner" is the Operator, Maintainer, and Trainer. Warrior inputs, which are generated through the various War Rooms, will serve as the "Seawater Inlet" for the Program Manager in the design and integration of the LPD 17. Captain Gauthier stressed that rapidly advancing technology (e.g. "the capacity of computer chips doubles every 18 months...and has for the past thirty years.") must be taken advantage of in order to reduce personnel and maintenance costs while improving training. The LPD 17 program is taking advantage of the technological advancements in simulation-based design as was demonstrated with an impressive computer- generated depiction of various operational functions that are directed by the Operational Readiness Document (ORD). The expanded use of simulation-based design as an engineering tool in the early phases of design and integration are expected to pay large dividends in the future and result in significant cost savings to the program. Captain Gauthier concluded his remarks by stressing the current budgetary constraints are forcing us to change the way we do business. We can no longer afford a business-as-usual approach and must continually seek ways to acquire the LPD 17 class faster, better, and cheaper.
COL. M. Williams, Commanding Officer of EWTGLANT, provided the MEU/SOC perspective and remarked the LPD 17 program is on the right track by factoring in Marine Corps requirements early in the design phase. This step in the design process has not been done in previous ship development programs which resulted in costly design changes after the ship was built in order to accommodate Marine Corps requirements. Col. Williams believes the Marine Corps logistical requirements will have a significant impact on LPD 17 ship operations and must be given serious consideration early in the design phase. He stressed the importance of onboard training prior to an amphibious operation and believes a "virtual training" capability designed into the ship would be extremely beneficial. He also believes there will be a large cultural and philosophical change within the Marine Corps in the ensuing years. An example of such a change will be the redesignation of the Executive Officer (XO); he will be referred to as the "2IC" (i.e. 2nd-in-Command) in the future. His final remarks concerned energy resources and our dependence on fossil-based fuels to operate. He questioned "What other type of fuel is possible beside fossil-based?"
The remaining presentations of the opening session included a review of the LPD 17 Operational Requirements Document (ORD) by CDR Steve Joachim (OPNAV N85), a discussion of the Integrated Battle Organization (IBO) by CDR Carl Semmler (NAVDOCCOM), and an overview of Marine warfighting concepts by COL Florence. Radm(ret) Picotte concluded the opening sessions with the Naval Expeditionary Warfare System-of-Systems brief.
The purpose of the LPD 17 workshops, in general, is to open a dialog between the naval warriors and the acquisition teams involved in Expeditionary Warfare for the purpose of ensuring that operational realities are considered throughout the total ship design, integration, construction, test and life cycle support of new ships and their systems.
The purpose of this first LPD 17 workshop was to examine the LPD 17 mission and operational requirements and reflect them against existing and evolving doctrine, tactics, and operational thinking to ensure that engineering requirements are anticipated and met. The workshop was designed to set the mission framework for the LPD 17 class of ships. It was felt that an understanding of the operational context this ship class could find itself in would provide a sound foundation from which to postulate future requirements based on future mission excursions. This framework will then be used as the starting point for all future workshops.
Future workshops will be designed to address specific issues arising from past workshops, as well as other discussion venues, that fall within the mission framework established by this first LPD 17 workshop. It is understood that as time goes by the perimeter of this initial framework may change. Nonetheless, it will have been pegged from the start; a history of its dynamic will be preserved and carried forth.
FIGURE 1 - LPD 17 WORKSHOP PROCESS |
From this analysis will inevitably arise additional questions or issues that should be addressed to future workshops or to specialists in a particular area. The product of the warroom analysis is a report to PMS-317 outlining recommendations that come out of the workshops. These could be proposals for design changes to an existing ship or for consideration of a new system design or capability. At the same time, ideas generated from the workshops may influence a higher level. That is, recommendations specific to LPD 17 class ships may have particular application to other ships or Navy systems. These would be passed on through the NExWEP tie in.
Participants were grouped according to three ship deployment schemes. The three groups were:
Group 1, Single Ship Ops;
Group 2, ARG MEU/SOC (Recurring deployment in theater);
Group 3, MEF Forward (2 ARG/CVBG Composite).
The reasons for dividing attendees into 3 groups are based on the three different deployment possibilities for the ship and since deployment requirements overlap it was hoped that the different groups would corroborate the findings of each other.
The first half of the first day was devoted to a refinement of the LPD 17's mission requirements. Issues that might affect mission requirements were discussed. Among others these were: joint and combined operations, expeditionary warfare battle space, evolving naval doctrine, and operations other than war. The remaining day and a half was devoted to the LPD 17's operational requirements, especially as they are formed by issues such as survivability, battle space awareness, expeditionary warfare operations, planning and execution, and information requirements.
The results of the workshop confirmed the speculation that the different deployments envisioned for this ship class (split arg...) would establish requirements that to a large extent overlapped. Accordingly, this section is divided into areas that were found to be common among the groups. Several important themes surfaced within the groups that were common. Areas not common are clearly identified.
The LPD 17 is a specialized military vessel. Like all navy vessels it has two major functions: First, it is a sea-borne vessel designed for transporting men and material; second, it is a platform from which to conduct the business of naval operations in support of our national military strategy. The primary focus of the workshop was that of conducting the business of naval operations. This section is divided into sub-sections based on the business of amphibious operations that was felt to be important to this ship. Thus, those issues belonging to the first function of a ship: seaworthiness of the vessel, navigating ability, power plant, hull design, etc, was considered beyond the scope of this workshop. Further, the design of new hull forms and the philosophy of building one type of ship vice another for particular missions, though worthy of debate, were not issues with this workshop. Thus, the business of amphibious operations, spanning the spectrum from armed conflict to humanitarian assistance, was the central theme of this workshop.
There was agreement across the three groups for the general types of missions the LPD 17 would be involved in. The following five missions were felt to represent both stressing and probable scenarios for the ship, ship's crew, and the landing force. They are, in no particular order,
advance force operations;
amphibious assault;
non-combatant evacuation;
humanitarian assistance;
disaster relief.
In the split ARG deployment, where it was assumed the ship would act independently without specific support from other ships or forces in the area, it was felt that the amphibious assault would take on the character of a limited raid. Anything more stressing would be undertaken with a more sizable and more capable naval force in company. Although the single ship deployment would not be sent into environments expected to harbor significant threats-- mines, cruise missiles-- it should nonetheless be prepared to defend against some form of these threats if they arose. Thus, survivability became a major area of discussion during the operational capabilities part of the workshop. These discussions involved not only the ability of the ship to defend itself from possible threats but also the role of the ship in protecting the marines as they transited ashore and once they landed and established themselves.
The bulk of the workshop was spent discussing operational capabilities required of the ship in order to support the general missions outlined in section 4.1 above. As expected, the recurring thread throughout these discussions was the information that was needed by key decision makers, up and down the chain of command, in order for them to effectively and efficiently conduct their business.
This section is divided into seven subsections based on common (among the three groups) areas of importance. The definitions given for these sections may be different from general term usage; they are used here only to provide an understanding of the categories as they pertain to the workshop discussions.
Logistics has always been the tail that wagged the dog. It represents the movement and sustainment of men and materiel. It is at the heart of what this ship is all about. The LPD 17 will play a role in strategic movement, transporting forces (personnel, equipment) from the U.S. to a theater of operation. It will provide operational and tactical movement once in theater in the form of moving and supporting marine forces ashore. Tomorrow's battlefields will differ markedly from yesterday's. The thrust of all combat forces, driven by technology, is to mobility and speed. The logistics base required to support these concepts is not in place and, historically, always seems to lag the forces it is meant to support.
Our distribution system, which includes supply and transportation, is based on Cold War thinking and antiquated technology. In the Central Front scenario, units knew exactly where they were to locate, where they would draw there support, and over what routes and by what schedule they would move-- everything was neat and predictable. Well, things have changed. Progressing from a Cold War supply point logistical system that relies on getting goods to fixed locations, to one that is distribution based, would focus on getting the goods to customer units, wherever they are at in the theater of operations. To accomplish this, though, logisticians must know where critical supplies are and direct them where most needed. Otherwise, we will continue to do no more than react and improvise, instead of anticipate support requirements. [emphasis added]1
Lt. Col. Conrad goes on to observe: "Today, shippers around the world expect not only dock-to-dock service, but transportation tracking from producer to consumer." This ability to track cargo-- asset visibility-- which is commonplace in the civil sector, is seen to be a critical capability that must be incorporated into amphibious ships in the future.
Thus, moving and supporting marine forces in theater, is a critical capability the LPD 17 will take on. Although the Marine Corps' Sea Dragon concept is far from agreed upon doctrine it establishes a future view of warfare that is not inconsistent with the direction technology has taken over the past 20 years and continues to take today. The pace of life is accelerating, the ability to inform is becoming more precise and timely, and the systems we rely on are becoming smaller and more capable. The Marines have seized upon the inevitable and taken on the martial arts dictum: "Lead with speed, follow with power." They want to minimize the number and size of vital areas established ashore so that they can minimize the protection elements required and the combat service support and logistics needed. Since large combat service support areas and detachments ashore can be extremely vulnerable, the Sea Dragon concept calls for moving these facilities to sea-- aboard ship. This would place a decided burden on navy ships over that which has been borne up to now. In order to overcome this burden Sea Dragon calls for "reducing the quantity/frequency of support needed, being able to access needed support when required, and delivering needed support without adversely affecting operations."2 The last two capabilities directly affect the LPD 17 and were extensively discussed in this workshop. (The first capability-- reducing the quantity/frequency of support needed-- will be discussed under command and control, section 4.2.4.) These discussions centered on the ability of navy and marine personnel to understand the logistics needs of the forces ashore, quickly locate and move required equipment to the point of need and to quickly respond to system failures by repair or replacement.
The following items arose from the discussion:
1. Vehicle and cargo accessibility;
2. The ability to reconfigure equipment and personnel given a change in mission;
3. The ability to quickly reconfigure the well deck;
4. The need for a 3D cargo operations situation awareness system which would be tied into
Cargo Planning & Execution systems.
These four items are related and deal with the physical design of the ship and its cargo handling systems as well as the need for a cargo planning and execution system that can maximize the potential of these systems and features. The LPD 17 must be designed in order to facilitate the rapid and disciplined handling of cargo-- those systems and personnel essential for the conduct of amphibious operations. Without this core capability the LPD 17 is simply another ship. These areas were felt to be sufficiently important as to address them in more detail at a future workshop.
5. LPD 17 Maintenance philosophy. This must be a blue/green philosophy which will efficiently support both navy and marine systems. This philosophy could (and probably should) affect acquisition philosophy as well. When spares, modules, individual parts are common across service boundaries the maintenance facilities and sparing required to support the systems is greatly lessened and simplified. The training required for maintenance personnel can be made common. In addition, those systems that can be made common for both navy and marine users (primarily information systems but others as well) will simplify user training pipelines and allow marine forces to utilize navy systems while aboard ship without having to unpack and pack marine systems prior to going ashore.
This maintenance philosophy must address the issue of repair and replacement facilities aboard ship and the extent of self sufficiency the ship must have in order to best support the forces ashore and afloat. At one extreme is to have the ship act as a floating warehouse for all spares needed. At the other is to have the ship equipped and personnel trained to repair any possible fault.
6. Integrated TACLOG and CIC. Shipboard real estate is a premium commodity that must be given serious attention and careful planning. Whenever possible, similar functions of the Navy- Marine Corps team should be consolidated and integrated as much as practical in the same or closely adjacent spaces (e.g. TACLOG (vs LFOC) and CIC should be a blue/green space). This should also include other spaces such as the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) and the Ship's Signal Exploitation Center (SSES). In addition, each space should have sufficient utilities (e.g. electrical power, water, air conditioning) and ease of access to tactical data and navigation information in order to accommodate upgraded equipment, to incorporate and rapid technological advances in technology (e.g. automation, fiber optics, "plug-N-play" capability), and to facilitate acceptance of an embarked staff and/or to easily relocate ship's personnel or a critical function.
The automation of the combat system on the LPD 17 (Advanced Combat Direction System (ACDS) Block 1, the development of the Joint Maritime Command Information System (JMCIS), and the parallel development of Marine Air Ground Task Force Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (MAGTF C4I) systems that provides automation to the amphibious commander, renders new opportunities to integrate these developing systems. The LPD 17's Ship Wide Area Network (SWAN) could provide the conduit to connect these systems when Marines are embarked.
Survivability has two components for the LPD 17. One, it includes the ability of the ship to survive attacks on itself from all types of threat both man-induced (enemy and friendly) and natural. Two, survivability also deals with the ship's ability to support its landed (or landing) forces ashore from attacks. Survivability is always a primary issue with any navy ship. The recommendations from the Ship Operational Characteristics Study succinctly addresses the issue of survivability for a 21st century combatant:
Survivability and damage control are treated as a single issue because the 21st century combatant should integrate the two into an effective total system. Survivability and damage control involve all steps from avoiding detection, avoiding targeting, and avoiding getting hit, to minimizing damage when hit, damage control and restoration after being hit, and "fighting hurt."3
And, further:
Damage control and damage assessment must be significantly automated and a revolutionary, "anticipatory" system (one which can prepare the ship for specific damage) should be included. By integrating shipboard status information and combat system data it will be possible to minimize the effect of a weapon hit.
The workshop discussion did not deal with an "anticipatory" system but did touch on the benefits of integrating certain combat system elements with damage control in order to provide damage control personnel with a situation awareness capability which could provide them with warning of imminent danger in order to better prepare for eventual damage to the ship. What was included, which the aforementioned study did not address, was the role of the LPD 17 in providing an element of survivability to the forces ashore.
Much of the discussion dealt with what was felt to represent the premier danger to this ship- the mine threat. A low cost, easily deployed, stealthy weapon, the simple mine can deal a ship a mortal blow. Memories of the Gulf War were uppermost in many minds. The ability of the Iraqi's to effectively stymie a potential marine amphibious landing through the threat of off-shore mines demonstrated a weakness in the Navy's philosophy that probably affected planned operations. The day after both the USS Princeton and USS Tripoli were wounded by mines Vice Admiral Arthur instructed Maj.General Jenkins to scale back his plans for an amphibious raid--which were then subsequently reduced to a feint.4 The issue for the LPD 17 is more one of being able to deal with the mine threat organically. It was recognized that this ship would probably be in company with mine clearing ships if it had to deal with a significant mine threat; however, the difficulty arises when intelligence is insufficient to predict the extent of the mine threat, the timeline is short, and the ship finds itself in a situation where mines are present and it has no way of maneuvering safely to avoid encountering mines. In a recent policy paper5 Admiral Boorda wrote:
If we are serious about our enduring role in forward presence and engagement, we should not have to wait days or weeks, if not longer, to execute our plans while our dedicated mine warfare forces-- surface MCM ships, airborne MCM helicopters, and MCM diver teams (the Navy's MCM experts) make the long transit from CONUS bases to overseas operating areas in order to locate and clear mines. We must have organic sensors, systems, tactics, training, and planning integrated into the Fleet to "damn the torpedoes" and achieve mission objectives within desired timelines.
For these reasons it was felt important enough to convene a workshop to deal with the mine issue and the role of the LPD 17 in more depth.
The following survivability areas were discussed:
1. Automation. There was no disagreement that as much ship self defense capability as possible should be automated.
2. Mines. The issue of mines and the role of the LPD 17 in dealing with the mine threat is divided into three areas:
Mine Field Reconnaissance and Avoidance. The objective of mine field reconnaissance is to determine the presence of and the perimeter of a minefield so that a ship could, with confidence, maneuver around these areas. MCM ships and helicopters, if nearby, could then be called in if necessary. It was felt that the ship needed an organic capability like this at a minimum. The ROC requires a Mine Neutralization/Destruction capability (MIW 3) for the ship to be performed by embarked EOD/SEAL teams as well as other mine countermeasure capabilities to be performed by an AMCM squadron/detachment (MIW 9). The limited threat of floating mines might best be dealt with by a mast mounted sight.
Signature Reduction And Jamming. Some discussion centered on the need for the ship to have an organic countermeasure capability especially in the area of acoustic quieting and mine jamming. The ROC stipulates a requirement for maintaining magnetic signature limits (MIW 6.7) but does not go beyond degaussing or deperming the hull. The issue of the role this ship should take on relative to mine countermeasures remained open and will be addressed in an upcoming workshop.
Mine Clearance. There was general agreement that this ship would not take on the task of mine clearance other than that which could be provided by an AMCM detachment and embarked EOD/SEAL teams.
3. Low Value Targets. It was noted that the ship did not have a caliber gun which could cover the bow area.is was felt to be a major shortcoming. An EO sensor for low value targets would also be a benefit as current design calls for 25 mm guns and Stinger operation to rely solely on human visual capabilities.
4. Launch and recovery of boats and aircraft. This was felt to be the most vulnerable time for the LPD 17. The concern is with the dynamics of the situation, the load on personnel, C2 and communications systems, and navigation systems. The electromagnetic signature of the ship is very great due to the communications and radar systems activity. The potential for fratricide increases dramatically. No concrete recommendations surfaced during these discussions; however it was felt that with improved low probability of detection communications systems and improved C2 systems and procedures along with rigorous training this area of concern could be reduced to an acceptable level. Nonetheless, it should be a prominent discussion point for future workshops especially those dealing with command and control.
5. Naval Surface Fire Support. What is the role of the LPD 17 in providing fire support to the marines ashore? Currently the LPD 17's sixteen cell Vertical Launch System (VLS) will have Sea Sparrow missiles for ship self defense against air threats. Each VLS cell is anticipated to have four missiles to a cell giving the ship a total of sixty-four missiles (16X4=64). Because of the decreasing AntiAir Warfare (AAW) threat, participants at the workshop were concerned that this appeared to be a large number of missiles for ship's defense. It was believed that some of these cells could be better utilized for other purposes such as a quick-strike missile system like the Navy's Tactical Missile System (TACMS). A TACMS capability would add a Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) offensive strike capability to the ship's mission and may allow the LPD 17 to better support the embarked forces scheme of maneuver ashore.
6. Rearming Aircraft. A secondary concern is with the storage and rearming of Assault Helicopters, AV-8Bs, or another air vehicle that could land on the LPD 17 Flight Deck. Ammo handling near the Flight Deck with special requirements may cause impact to HM&E. New Joint weapons require blowout shields above the water line is a change from standard Navy Ammo stowage (deep in the ship).
7. USMC Artillery and Ammunition. Another concern between the Navy and Marine Corps is the possible change in the expanded NSFS Capability and required USMC ammo loadout. If the Navy can provide adequate Fire Support to the Troops ashore, does the Marines need to carry all of the tube artillery and associated ammo aboard ship. Should the load out in the future be changes and what impact to the LPD 17 does this create?
8. Surge Medical Capability. The issue here was the ability of the ship to handle additional flight surgeons or other medical personnel not otherwise embarked. It was felt that the ROC (FSO 9) covered this area adequately.
The topic of surveillance covers all those systems designed to provide a sense of the environment around this ship. It includes sensors optimized for air, surface, and subsurface surveillance. For this report, discussions dealing with surveillance include only organic systems. Non-organic surveillance is covered under Communications (Section 4.2.5) since the design of these remote sensors is not directly a ship issue; the issue is one of communications of the sensor's information and the ability of the ship to receive and process that information.
For the group working the single ship operation a surveillance range was specified of 200 miles for the air picture and 50 miles for the surface picture. There was debate among the group as to the operational requirement for these ranges. The surveillance systems needed to provide these ranges would probably be made up of both organic and non-organic sensors. The discussion revolved around the ability of the ship to organically gather surveillance data to provide battlefield awareness adequate to the missions being undertaken. In the two cases where the ship was deployed in company with other ships, it was felt the LPD 17 could rely on remote surveillance capabilities (on other ships primarily) that would be data-linked to the ship. (See discussion of data links under Communications, Section 4.2.5.) Also covered in the general discussion was the issue of mine surveillance (discussed under Survivability, section 4.2.2.) and the use of the exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum in providing surveillance information. The ROC stipulates a requirement for the ability to "search for and intercept threat related communications and/or non-communications signals." (C2W 1.1) and a line of bearing for threat system signal sources (C2W 1.4). Again, the issue was more relevant in the group covering single ship operations. The question was: what is adequate communications intercept and direction finding (DF) capability for the LPD 17 operating by itself? This topic will be a point to be covered in a future workshop.
Specific items were:
1. Automated position, location, and reporting system. Different systems will be installed on the LPD 17 which will both input Position Location Information (PLI) or use/display it. What should the PLI architecture be on the LPD 17? PLI is directly related to Mapping/Charting/Geodesy functions since track PLI will be displayed with a digital map. PLRS (Position Location Reporting System), KSQ-1 (Amphibious Assault Planning System), ACDS BLK 1 (Advanced Combat Direction System), JTIDS (Joint Tactical Information Distribution System - LINK 16), NTDS (Navy Tactical Data System - LINK 11), etc. are all slated to be installed aboard LPD 17 in some form. How do you coordinate, integrate or interoperate all of this aboard the ship? This also includes operating with the ARG, with the CVBG and with both Ground and Air Forces. Add on top of all of this the joint and combined operating environment, where the LPD 17 will operate with Army and Air Force units who will have additional PLI systems which will cause an interoperability challenge for the LPD 17. The Joint Services will bring systems/platforms like EPLRS (Enhanced PLRS), AFATDS (Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System), CTAPS (Contingency Tactical Air Planning System), JSTARS (Joint Surveillance and Targeting Radar System) , AWACS, ASAS (All Source Analysis System), SINCGARS/SABER (Single Channel Ground Air Radio System), etc. which will compound the PLI problem (what frame of reference used, what datum point used, what grid coordinates used, etc?)
The workshop surfaced the requirement that both developing and existing Command, Control, Communication, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) systems of the Navy and Marine Corps require a near real-time common tactical picture of the air, sea and landward battlespace for situation awareness and timely/accurate decision making. Both the Navy's Joint Maritime Command Information System (JMCIS) and the Marine Air Ground Task Force Command, Control, Communication, Computers, and Information (MAGTF C4I) are two systems that require a common tactical picture to be generated by an external system.
The Navy has, until recently, relied mainly on the ship's radar systems to feed air and sea situation awareness to the automated Combat Direction System (CDS) aboard ship. Data from multiple radar systems aboard each ship were processed and correlated to provide a common ship's picture. Each ship's situation awareness was shared and correlated with other ships in the force via LINK 11 or LINK 16, a Tactical Digital Information Link (TADIL) used to exchange processed radar data in a closed, netted environment. Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) will greatly improve the real-time air picture.
Newer communication/situation awareness systems such as the Position Location Reporting System (PLRS) or the Amphibious Assault Direction System (AN/KSQ-1), Single Channel Ground Air Radio System (SINCGARS) Improvement Program (SIP), and Situation Awareness Beacon with Reply (SABER) are being developed and fielded with embedded, near real-time, Position Location Information (PLI) of ground or seaborne friendly forces. This embedded PLI has the potential of providing the Navy Commander, for the first time, the ability to have situation awareness of the supported ground forces.
The workshop participants voiced the opinion that the LPD 17 needs the ability to fuse and correlate situation awareness data from multiple sources and/or agencies and to distribute this data in a standardized form as the ship's common tactical picture.
2. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). The concern here is that the LPD 17 has no UAV capability in its baseline design. No up-link or down-link capability. The LPD 17 Class is considered prime real estate for a deployed Detachment (VC 6 - PIONEER DET.)UAV's (look at the LPD-4 Class). With the LHA's and LHD's having a crowded Flight Deck, the LPD's become the next available platform with a large Flight Deck.
JTIDS is being considered as a possible UAV link which will have an impact on the LPD 17 since it currently will not get JTIDS on the first ship (will get NTDS LINK 11 instead). Space and weight should be included for future growth capability in the LPD 17 Class. There will be either a Joint or Navy UAV Program by FY 2002-3 that the LPD 17 Class will need to interoperate with (either organic or external to the ARG).
The current design of the LPD 17 includes neither a UAV control or UAV data/video downlink capability. Participants at the workshop voiced concern that during single ship or split ARG operations critical tactical data that could be provided by a UAV might not be available to the ground force commander without an organic system.
The recent cancellation of the Hunter UAV program further confuses the issue because aside from the currently fielded Pioneer system, no tactical Joint Service UAV program exists. Strategic UAV systems such as the Predator, Tier II+, and Tier III systems could provide an acceptable alternative but these current systems have unique control/downlink stations with equally unique communication systems. The group felt that if a common control/downlink workstation with an associated communication system could either be developed or already existed, this common control system would prove a valuable asset to the LPD 17.
3. Targeting. The concern here was the tracking and targeting of hostile forces when the Marines are ashore and very mobile. Here PLI information become critical along with fratricide. How will Naval Logistics keep up with fast/mobile units ashore and how will NSFS be able to acquire and target enemy mobile platforms. What systems will be available to survey, track, and target the hostile forces on Land? How will JSTARS, EPLRS, PLRS, SINCGARS/SABER, etc. like systems interface with systems on the LPD 17 and the rest of the ARG/CVBG? How do new concepts like SEA DRAGON handle targeting and C2?
Command and Control (C2) uses data and information gained through the surveillance and communications functions and processes, assimilates, fuses, and displays information for decision makers. It includes the planning, preparation, training, and administrative and operational coordination necessary to successfully create and execute military operations. It includes functions necessary for creating and maintaining battlespace awareness as situations change. It includes information of different forms: data, models, conjectures, theories, options, predictions, plans, procedures, directives, rules, expectations, etc. Coordination among disparate operational elements relies on the timely melding of all this information. C2 operates in a dynamic continuum; effective C2 relies on its ability to adapt. For these reasons and others C2 is not a problem with a solution waiting to be solved. It is a problem requiring continual and changing solutions.
The thrust of the discussions at this workshop dealt not with specific C2 systems but with ways that systems could be made better in order to improve overall force effectiveness through improved C2. Thus individual systems may be improved considerably but if all the systems do not play in concert the force's (as a team of distinct systems and personnel) effectiveness may not be improved; indeed, it may be hindered.
Coordination of marine forces in transit and ashore was the primary issue when discussing command and control. Just where the C2 boundaries are with respect to this ship depends on the ships role and the mission being undertaken. Acting alone, the ship will have to take on the C2 problem without support from forces in company. Acting in concert with other ARG ships or a full battle group the LPD 17 can rely heavily on capabilities these other ships may bring. In either case it was the unanimous agreement of all groups that command and control capabilities represent the greatest payoff and the greatest headaches for ship system designers and users alike.
There were three distinct areas of discussion resulting from the workshop: space, interoperability, and decision support. Space dealt with the adequacy of the ship to handle part- time personnel (suitcase operations). Interoperability will always be an issue when two or more groups field different systems that must communicate. Within the Navy itself this is a problem. Across Navy/Marine services it becomes even more so. When full joint and combined operations are undertaken, the problem of system interoperability becomes acute. Decision support dealt with the ability of command and control systems to effectively support the complex planning and execution of amphibious operations.
Although not directly discussed in the workshop, the ability of C2 to contribute to a lessening of logistics needed to support forces ashore was an underlying theme. The bulk of the C2 capability this ship will take to sea will be used to coordinate the movement and subsequent combat support of marine forces ashore. In the sea-based logistics section, above, it was noted that although the ability to move forces ashore was a primary LPD 17 task, the ability to provide sustaining support to those forces was critical. With a battlespace environment characterized by dynamics and speed the ability to sustain these forces will strain even the most advanced systems. The two greatest sustainment concerns are ammunition and fuel. C2 can contribute to reducing the logistics burden both these elements represent. For example, by optimizing the use of sensors and other intelligence assets to provide timely and accurate battle space awareness, only those threats (especially mobile) of the highest value at the time will be targeted. The logistics fallout, of course, is to reduce the number of weapons required for a particular area and to reduce the number of shots taken to destroy a threat. Improved C2 can help by optimizing the use of fuel as well. "Today, reserves sometimes move two or three times in response to an attack that never materializes. If our forces have a better idea of what's really occurring on the battlefield, unnecessary movement toward an unclear objective can be reduced-- and refueled less."6
The issue of command and control is so important that a future workshop(s) will be convened to zero in on issues which arose at this workshop and to broaden the scope to account for topics that may have been overlooked.
The following issues were discussed:
1. Architecture. Architecture is the way in which individual C4I system elements are combined in order to form a unified capability. Typically, these system elements are designed and built prior to devising an overall architecture. In other words the architect follows the builder-- essentially documenting what has been built and tied together. What is lost in the long term is flexibility, growth, maintainability, and robustness to say nothing of elegance. In the case of these system elements, which increasingly are based on commercial systems, the 'long term' may be defined in terms of a very few years. The lack of an overarching C2 architecture (which must incorporate the communications architecture) places a real restraint on the navy's ability to adapt to new situations and global challenges. Participants did not offer any solutions to this demanding and complex problem but agreed it must be addressed in some future workshop.
2. Interoperability. The issue with system interoperability is two fold when dealing with amphibious warfare and ship design. The LPD 17 is unique in that it will be a navy ship directly supporting marine forces. Both Navy and Marine systems will be present and must be compatible. That is, they must be capable of communicating data and information among one another-- be able to interoperate. They must also be user-similar because Navy and Marine users may be sharing systems. Not only will it be necessary to have these systems communicate but also they should be near identical to the users and maintainers. To the users the systems should be tailorable in order to achieve as near a look and feel as possible. For example, when Marine forces come aboard they should not have to unpack their planning and intelligence systems and use additional power and space. They should be able to use as much Navy planning and intelligence assets as possible in developing their operational plans. For the maintainers there should be an effort to use common modules and common spares across like systems.
These issues primarily deal with systems that are developed extrinsic to the ship and do not, per se, have a role in ship design. However, ship design enters when the systems are integrated and placed aboard the ship. Thus ship designers and managers have a particular interest in making these systems as compatible as possible. They should be able to influence individual system design in order to ensure the ship will support overall Navy and Marine mission requirements. Incompatible systems create faults that can ripple throughout the C2 hierarchy of systems which can ultimately cause complete breakdowns in the ability to share information.
3. Decision Support. Command and Control7 is a human activity. Although the computer has supplanted much of the tedious and repetitive operations found in C2 processes it still has a long way to go before it can replace a human altogether. The decision support element is the use of computer systems (primarily) to provide the human decision maker with support to many time consuming and often complex activities. The workshop brought up a number of decision support areas that will be followed up in more detail:
a. Ability to create and maintain tactical pictures during complex operations. Complex operations refers to the decidedly complex nature of landing force operations conducted from ships, boats, and aircraft offshore. These operations would be complex and dangerous without enemy activity. Coordination and timeline sequencing of different interdependent actions require decision makers to have a complete yet concise picture of the activities under their control along with those not under their direct control but which could influence their activities. With the injection of enemy activities as well as environmental factors these "tactical pictures" become critical to the understanding of what is going on and what may go on. The issue here is the role of the LPD 17 in contributing to the creation and maintenance of these tactical pictures. This is a problem of having the right sensors at the right place at the right time, the ability to communicate with those sensors, to integrate and fuse information received so that all pictures are derived from a common set of data consistent in form and time. And it is a problem of displaying to the user in a concise manner the essence of the volumes of data received from these sensors. In addition, if parts of this network of sensors and processors are destroyed or maimed by whatever means the ability remains to quickly reconfigure the balance into a viable system. This last is of particular importance to the LPD 17 as it is an important element in ship survivability.
b. Integrated (Navy/Marine) Planning System. Attendees were near unanimous with their support for the need for an integrated planning system. This system would integrate the different naval amphibious planning requirements and allow both navy and marine forces to share information during the planning and conduct of amphibious operations. Among other ideas discussed, this system should:
-take advantage of simulated operations (such as cargo operations, boat and helicopter operations, medical operations, etc.) in order to anticipate potential problem areas;
-have the ability to download information to individual tactical systems. For example, specific LCAC/LCU systems may be directly downloaded with planning information. This information could then be used to prepare for an operation in a simulated fashion or it could be used as initial guidance for an actual operation.
-have the ability to handle feedback from tactical operations. This would give it a dynamic planning capability with the ability to take advantage of changes in operations as they occur and plan follow-on actions.
-have the ability to recreate an operation, or part of one, from recorded digital information. As an operation comes off different data are recorded by different combat and C2 systems. These systems are currently not designed to play back this information in a way that would allow an accurate representation of the operation as it occurred.
c. Information Fusion Capability. This is a perennial favorite on the C2 list. It includes the ability to fuse all source information including the JIC/SSES interface. Along with the fusion of information emanating from disparate sources is the necessity to maintain the security of the information. A true multi-level secure C2 system does not exist. Until it does system and personnel procedures need to be streamlined in order to allow for the timely and accurate flow of information to all decision makers.
Communications are all those functions and systems associated with moving information (of differing forms) among decision makers on the battlefield. The workshop addressed communications in a very cursory fashion recognizing the general requirement to be able to communicate with forces ashore, afloat, forces in transit, and personnel aboard ship. Additional discussion concerned possibility for interference among the different communications systems, the interoperability of the different systems, the susceptibility of exploitation by enemy systems, and the need for links to national sensor systems. The ROC stipulates different communications capabilities including the use of low probability of intercept HF systems (CCC 6.13) and satellite communications (CCC 6.14).
Specific recommendations included the requirement for a wireless communications system that would allow cargo handlers and planners to communicate; the ability to selectively view different areas on the ship through the television system especially the boat valley, well deck, flight deck, and vehicle decks; and a space to set up and check communication transmitters using dummy loads.
Rapid advances in technology and automation are creating a highly dynamic operational environment in which concepts that were once thought impossible are suddenly brought into the realm of reality. As was demonstrated so clearly to the world in recent years, the capability of present day weapon systems are truly impressive and the possibilities for future concepts and systems seem to be limited only by one's imagination. Today, the Navy is proceeding at flank speed Forward...From the Sea in company with Marine strategy, Operational Maneuver From the Sea. Tomorrow, the future Naval Expeditionary Task Forces, operating as highly efficient Integrated Battle Organizations (IBOs), could conceivably find themselves conducting over-the- horizon operations from great distances off-shore and/or employing one of several advanced concepts found in the Marine Corps' Sea Dragon concept. Greater dependence on UAV's for reconnaissance and targeting is a distinct possibility as a future tactical employment option for expeditionary forces. The impact of this and other yet-to-be-defined concepts on the LPD 17 are not completely understood or defined. They must be given critical and objective consideration so that their potential contributions to the expeditionary warfare mission can be fully realized.
Joint concepts and doctrine will also play a key part in future expeditionary operations such as the Air Force's HORIZON, the Army's XXI, and DoD's C4I for the Warrior.
Messing. A serious messing deficiency was highlighted during a recent ship design review using models and simulations. It was remarked that the analysis showed that it would require approximately 6.5 sittings to serve meals to the troops and crew. This is considered unacceptable by many individuals who indicated the number of sittings should not to exceed 3.
Shore-based Electrical Power. A surprising revelation to many at the conference was the fact that the ship would require 21-power cables when along side the pier in order to supply electrical power to the ship. This greatly exceeds the current capability of many, if not all, port facilities where the LPD 17 is expected to use. A related issue concerns supplying electrical power to commercial vans that may be hosted onboard for sea trials of advanced combat system evaluation.
LCU (Landing Craft Utility). The LCU is still a valuable platform in the amphibious environment since its lift/moving capability is far superior to any other landing craft. The LCAC maybe faster but the LCU can carry much more but at a slower pace. The LCU has a long range capability due to its fuel load vice any other Landing Craft. Over time during ship-to-shore movement, the LCU will move more good ashore than any other landing craft. The LCU is also the platform of choice in moving large quantities of civilians (NEO, Disaster relief, peace keeping, etc.) along the water. The LPD 17 needs to consider LCU operations since the platform will be in the Naval inventory for many years to come. The LPD 17 seems to be only concerned about LCAC's in the Well Deck. Deployment will determine which platform to carry, either LCACs or the LCU's, but not both on the same ship.
Track Vehicles. Vehicles like the AAV and air cushion vehicles like the LCAC do not operate from the same vessel. Different operational requirements in the Navy do not allow these platforms to mix on the same ship. Further, consideration must be made to determine the impact to the LPD 17 since it is envisioned that both platforms (AAVs or AAAVs and LCACs) will be on the ship.
This workshop examined many issues related to the mission and operational capabilities of the LPD 17. The participants were successful in zeroing in on several large and complex issues that need further study. These will be addressed in future workshops. A number of specific recommendations were made.
INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS to allow combat cargo to tie into a wireless system to allow hands-off communications.
SELECTIVE VIEW of all camera’s from command and control spaces. Specifically, to be able to view the boat valley, well deck, flight deck, and vehicle decks.
50 CALIBER GUN mounted on the bow. The ship design includes two 50 cal. guns but the bow area is not defended by a mounted gun.
POWER for containerized capabilities. Containerized capability vans may be brought aboard from time to time. The capability for the ship to easily provide power to them needs to be included in the design. Standard power provided with standard commercial connectors need to be made readily available.
DUMMY LOADS for Marine Corps communications equipment. Loads should be available and readily accessible to the Marines so that their communications systems can be checked out under full EMCON.
As a result of this workshop, TEAM 17 will further explore a number of areas that fleet warriors have brought up. This will be accomplished primarily through the use of workshops. Potential future workshops that can be envisioned may involve:
1 Moving The Force, Desert Storm and Beyond, Scott W. Conrad, National Defense University, McNair Paper 32, 62
2Long Poles in the Sea Dragon Concept, http://138.156.204.100/WWW/CWL/
3 Report on the Ship Operational Characteristics Study on the Operational Characteristics of the Surface Combatant of the Year 2010, Chief of Naval Operations Staff (OP-03K) 26 April 1988
4The General's War, Michael R. Gordon & General Bernard E. Trainor, Little, Brown, and Company, 1995
5Mine Countermeasures-- An Integral part of Our Strategy and Our Forces, Admiral J.M. Boorda, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, 13 Dec 1995
6 Conrad, 72
7One may sometimes find C2 referred to when talking about combat systems; such as, "the command and control system provides precise track information to the weapon..." This is a corruption of the original meaning of the term; however,it is becoming increasingly popular. As used in this report C2 is a human endeavor augmented by hardware/software system support.