AN/ALQ-165 Airborne Self Protection Jammer (ASPJ)


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Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, in behalf of Senator Roth of Delaware and myself, I send an amendment to the desk and I ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Pryor], for himself and Mr. Roth, proposes an amendment numbered 3076.

Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sanford). Without objection, it is ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

On page 22, strike out lines 16 through 25, and insert in lieu thereof the following:


None of the funds available to the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1993 or any fiscal year before fiscal year 1993 may be used for the procurement of the Airborne Self Protection Jammer system except for the payment of the costs of terminating existing contracts for the procurement of the Airborne Self Protection Jammer system.

Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, this amendment would block all fiscal year 1993 and prior year funding for any further production of the Navy's Airborne Self Protection Jammer, better known as the ASPJ.

Mr. President, few Americans have ever heard of the ASPJ. This system is supposed to protect our Navy pilots who fly the F/A-18 by cloaking the plane's position during combat. It is supposed to jam enemy radar.

After 16 years of development at a cost of some $1.5 billion, the ASPJ still has not worked. It has never worked.

Just last month Navy testers concluded the jammers failed key operational tests that show whether it will ever work in combat. It was tested and once again it failed.

When the ASPJ was first dreamed up it was intended to be a radar program for the Air Force and the Navy planned to produce a few hundred systems as well. That was in 1975. By 1989, after realizing that this particular system was more trouble, more money than it was worth, the Air Force decided to abandon this program. They dropped out leaving only the Navy behind to deal with this big turkey.

Needless to say, this was a critical moment for the ASPJ. The unit cost skyrocketed and no one knew if the ASPJ would ever work. As a result, Secretary Cheney actually killed the ASPJ program only to have his deputy, Mr. Donald Atwood, resurrect this program just weeks later. Secretary Atwood gave the ASPJ another chance. He said he would give the ASPJ one more year to prove itself reliable and effective. If not, he said, and I quote: `Then the program must be canceled.' That was 1989.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the memo from Donald J. Atwood, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

The Deputy Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC, July 31, 1989.
Memorandum for: Mike Stone
Subject: Airborne Self Potection Jammer (ASPJ).

This is in response to your memorandum of July 25, 1989, relative to the Airborne Self Protection Jammer.

Your memorandum indicates that the program has been in development since March 1976, and to date it has not satisfactorily passed the tests established relative to cost, performance and reliability. This is a clear case of not meeting the exit criteria established for transition from the Full Scale Development Phase to the Production Phase. Therefore, it appears mandatory that one of two actions be taken:

1. Cancel the program.

2. Discontinue all production efforts and relegate the program to an effective test and evaluation activity. If the system demonstrates the required performance and reliability and is cost effective, then a production program could be initiated.

There is one alternative to the above which could be considered. This is based on the fact that the services feel that the system is essential and that it will ultimately meet the performance and reliability targets. If this is the case and can be demonstrated within a reasonable period (i.e. one year), then inorder to maintain program continuity, it might be acceptable to proceed with a very limited production phase while test and evaluation is conducted.

However, it is difficult to see how this is realistic given that the system has been in development for 13 years and as yet has not proven out. If, in spite of this, you decide to go ahead with a very limited production, then it must be mandatory that full demonstration of the performance and reliability be demonstrated within one year. If it is not, then the program must be canceled.
Donald J. Atwood.

Mr. PRYOR. Today the ASPJ is still alive but it still does not work. It has never worked. Shortly after Secretary Atwood's 1-year deadline expired I began trying to find out the truth behind the ASPJ Program. I held a hearing in 1990 with Senators Roth, Grassley, Lieberman, and Kohl. At this hearing the Department of Defense Inspector General's Office informed us that after investigating a random hotline phone call they discovered that ASPJ testing reports had been blatantly manipulated to downplay the flaws and highlight the strengths of the jammers.

At this hearing, Mr. President, we were assured that future testing results would be reported in a proper, straightforward manner. However, the Government Accounting Office reported earlier this year that the Navy once again had skewed the test reports. So I called another hearing in March of this year. At this hearing the Pentagon downplayed the test failures once again, because they occurred in the laboratory they said, rather than during operational testing.

I was told that operational tests, which were designed to show if system will work in combat, would soon determine the fate of the ASPJ.

Every Pentagon official, Mr. President, who has testified before our subcommittee has promised that the ASPJ would pass strict operational testing guidelines or else the program would be terminated. Deputy Secretary Donald Atwood, Acquisitions Secretary Donald Yockey, former Navy Secretary Lawrence Garrett, and Navy Acquisition Secretary Gerald Cann, all promised on the record that if the ASPJ Program failed operational test then the program would be killed.

Mr. President, in July 1992, we saw the final failures of the ASPJ system. The ASPJ once again flunked its operational tests, which were completed just this year. Sixteen years and $1.5 billion later it still does not work.

The jammers were tested repeatedly. They were deemed unreliable now by the Navy's own operational test and evaluation force. The testers also reported that the ASPJ is not much better than the present radar jammers that our pilots currently use. After 16 years, $1.5 billion, the Navy has made no progress in upgrading their radar jammers. They wasted their time and they wasted the taxpayers' money defending this failed system called the ASPJ. Now, it is back to the drawing board.

I would like to point out, Mr. President, that during the 16 years while the jammers were failing test after test, the Pentagon still managed to produce over 136 ASPJ's; 20 percent of the whole program has been purchased and produced. Not one of these systems work.

Mr. President, I can only assume that the Pentagon will soon announce its plan to scrap this program, regroup, and work out a new plan for the future of the Navy's electronic warfare jammers. But there is a very important lesson. We must learn from this 16-year fiasco.

Mr. President, I question the commitment of Secretary Cheney's fly-before-you-buy principle. It was this concept that prompted Senator Roth and myself to help create the Pentagon Office of Testing and Evaluation in the early 1980's so we would have an independent analysis of our expensive military programs before we wasted taxpayer money further on costly lemons like the ASPJ.

Mr. President, I do not fault the operational testing process for this acquisition disaster. This program was a flop before it ever reached the operational testing phase in its 15 years.

Mr. President, I hope that we have learned a lesson. That lesson is going to be that we will certainly in the future fly before we buy, that we will not continue to fund these programs when they do not work, that we will test these programs to make certain that they work before we go into purchasing and acquiring these programs.

Mr. President, since I began tracking the ASPJ in 1989, I have never called for the termination of this program. I never challenged the Navy's right to upgrade its jammers. I simply said test it fairly and do not continue to buy more jammers until we know if they will work. My pleas were not heeded. The Navy spent $1.5 billion on 136 jammers that do not work. What happened to fly before you buy? With the ASPJ, the rule has been, `But it now, fix it later.'

Should this amendment be successful, the ASPJ will finally be laid to rest. It will be history and we will have seen that very rare event that Congress very seldom sees and that is the death of a weapons system.

Mr. PRYOR. The news of the ASPJ's failures has been public for weeks. Still at the arms bazaar held just 2 days ago, we had our own defense contractors handing out pamphlets on the ASPJ to those who were participating in the arms bazaar. We find ITT in Defense Avionics advertising just 2 days ago that the ASPJ is reliable, that it has passed all performance reliability tests.

Mr. President, the fact is this system has never worked. It is a turkey that has gobbled up $1.5 billion of taxpayer's dollars funded into it, and now needs to end. We need to kill it, and we need to move on and find a system that will best protect our Navy pilots.

Mr. President, I would like to express my appreciation to Senator William Roth of Delaware who had worked together with me in this effort. I ask unanimous consent that his statement be printed in the Record at this time.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Statement of Senator William V. Roth, Jr.

Mr. President, the airborne self protection jammer is over budget, way behind schedule, and, even after $1.5 billion has been spent, it still won't work. Moreover, the Navy's Operational Testing Command determined that the jammer should not be fielded even after the Navy eased stringent operational test criteria. It is time to stop spending the taxpayer's money to buy more jammers that may never be fielded because they cannot pass operational tests.

Mr. President, I am bothered by the General Accounting Office and Defense inspector general's reports of waste and management actions in the ASPJ Program. I am bothered that the Under Secretary of Defense approved the Navy's request last year to buy more ASPJ units when he knew they did not work, even though his boss, Mr. Atwood, promised the Congress that the Pentagon would not do so. I am bothered by the fact that the Navy wants to keep producing the jammer, even though operational tests show that it doesn't work.

Two years ago, the Congress required that the Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation certify that the jammer passed operational testing before full rate production could begin. In 1991, the Deputy Secretary of Defense promised the Governmental Affairs Committee that the jammer would have to pass operational testing and evaluation by showing that it could meet existing performance criteria. In March of this year, the Director of Operational Testing, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition testified before the Governmental Affairs Subcommittee. They reiterated that firm criteria for determining the jammer's operational effectiveness had been defined and that those criteria would not be modified.

In July, we uncovered internal Navy documents that show each of the three operational testing and evaluation criteria for the jammer's built in test were altered. One criterion, the false removal rate, was dropped and two other criteria were loosened. The built in test indicates whether the jammer is working and, therefore, is important to pilots who
depend on electronic jammers for protection. The significance of the Navy's changes is that critical failures may not be counted and the system would appear more reliable than it is. It's like having a smoke detector in your house that indicates it's working when it is not.

Mr. President, now we have received the operational test results, and they show very clearly why this system should be killed. In spite of the attempts by some in the Navy to ease the testing criteria, it appears that the Navy's operational testing and evaluation command held firm--the Commander, Operational Testing and Evaluation Force should be commended for his efforts in this regard. The Navy's operational testing report states that the jammer failed testing and is not suitable for use by Navy pilots. The report states: `The ASPJ was determined to be not operationally suitable. ASPJ failed reliability, human factors, and built in test, all due to BIT deficiencies.' Dr. Duncan, the director of operational testing and evaluation, in his August 20 letter to us wrote: `On July 17, 1992, I informed the Under Secretay of Defense for Acquisition in writing that it was highly unlikely that I could certify to the congressional defense committees that ASPJ meets or exceeds all established criteria.' We have since been informed that Dr. Duncan will not certify the ASPJ.

Mr. President, the ASPJ was officially kicked-off 16 years ago, in 1976, and, it is over budget and behind schedule. It has failed three sets of operational tests, and the 136 that have been bought cannot be fielded until the Navy figures out how to make them work. Yet, the Navy continues to ask for more money to buy ASPJ's, and taxpayers eventually will foot the bill to fix them. The General Accounting Office recently informed us that the Navy plans to spend $275 million in 1992 and 1993 to buy more of these Jammers that do not work. In addition, it now appears that the Navy has entered into foreign military sales agreements and has hidden funding for the jammer in other Navy programs.

Mr. President, the Defense Department predicted that the ASPJ would cost $1.7 million a copy to buy. However, today the Navy is spending $3.2 million per unit. And, there is every indication that the costs will continue to grow as modifications are made so that the system works well enough to pass operational testing. It is important to note that a large portion of the cost increase resulted from the Air Force's recognition of the ASPJ's problems and its subsequent decision not to buy the ASPJ and to pursue an alternative approach. It appears that the Navy and the Defense Acquisition Board have not yet seen the wisdom of the Air Force's approach. But, the American taxpayers ultimately pay the cost, since they now have to support at least two jammer systems, instead of enjoying the economies of scale from one joint program.

Two weeks ago, we received a letter from the Defense Department's inspector general. He reported on the operational test results, and strongly concluded that the ASPJ should be killed. I encourage any of my colleagues to read this report if they have any doubts on the amendment now before us.

Mr. President, the amendment that Senator Pryor and I are proposing will send a strong message to the Defense Department. It tells them that the Congress will not accept the bending of the rules in order to cover up problems in a weapons program. And, it tells them that the Congress will not continue throwing money at weapons that cannot pass operational testing.

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Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, Senator Roth and I have worked together for many years on the ASPJ Program, and hopefully, Mr. President, in a few moments we are getting ready to see the beginning of its end.

I wish to thank also several individuals who we have worked so long and hard with us to bring this amendment to the floor.

Lou Rodriques and Chuck Ward of the General Accounting Office have been absolutely superb. Russell Rau and Harry Followell of the Department of Defense Inspector General's Office have done fine work as well. Mark Forman of Senator Roth's staff, Mr. President, has been of invaluable assistance. And Kirk Robertson and Steve Ronnel on our staff have been true soldiers, if I might use that term, in bringing this amendment to the floor and hopefully bringing this matter of the ASPJ to a final end.

Mr. President, at this time I yield the floor.

Mr. NUNN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, in response to the Senator from Arkansas, both his amendment and his arguments, let me say the ASPJ Program is currently in an operational testing mode. The bill last year--and Senator Pryor has been skeptical and on top of the situation for several years and our committee has responded to both his concern and our own concern--last year in the bill we basically said that either this program passed the test or it was dead.

We repeated that provision in this year's bill, because we have not been officially notified about the test. The Senator referred to the test. So the provision of last year's bill and this year's bill basically say if this program does not pass the test, the operational testing, it is killed.

We have also put some fences around money so there is about $175 million if this program is killed that will be saved and will probably have some of it spent in determination costs that have already been appropriated but not yet expended, I am informed.

We have heard that this test did not go well and we have heard that the ASPJ failed the test. The Senator from Arkansas, I believe, alluded to that. We have not received official word on that though, and the director of operational test and evaluation has not finished his evaluation.

The committee-reported bill this year contains a provision that will basically kill this program if it does not pass the test. So for that reason I did not believe that Senator Pryor's amendment was necessary. I still do not think it is essential, but the Appropriations Committee has already taken this step in light of that. And in light of the fact that we have heard that the test has failed, I see no need in having a big battle on the floor tonight, since it looks to me as if this program has failed and the test has failed and, therefore, the provision in last year's bill will be applicable in the next few weeks, as soon as they announce this. If we find that is not accurate, then, of course, we would have to revisit this issue in the conference. But it is my recommendation that the Senator's amendment be accepted.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wish to associate myself with the remarks made by the distinguished chairman. We accept the amendment and commend our distinguished colleague from Arkansas.

Some of us last week got the watchdog of the Treasury--bulldog or something--award. I think we have to set up an award around here for Senator Pryor. He is a watchdog of the defense contracts here. And I think on this one, he deserves a watchdog award.

There is another one coming along where this dog is going to maybe bite at him a little bit, but until that time, he certainly earned his spurs on this one.

Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, let me thank the Senator from Virginia and also the Senator from Georgia, the distinguished chairman. Both Senators have been very easy to work with, I must say, during the last several days in preparing to bring this amendment to the floor. I appreciate very much the Senators accepting the amendment.

Mr. President, I have a letter here from Robert C. Duncan, the director of the operational test and evaluation Office of Secretary of Defense. I think this letter states that on July 17, the Acquisition Secretary was informed that the ASPJ did not meet operational testing, and that certification was highly unlikely. In addition, I have been informed that Dr. Duncan's office has notified the GAO that they will not certify the ASPJ.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that his letter be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC, August 20, 1992.

Hon. David Pryor,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Federal Services, Post Office, and Civil Service, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

Dear Senator Pryor: In your July 31, 1992, letter, you and Senator Roth expressed concern that I had approved test and evaluation master plan (TEMP) changes that reduced the Airborne Self-Protection Jammer (ASPJ) performance requirements. As the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, I do not establish the operational requirements or criteria for any weapons system. Those requirements and criteria are set by the Service user. For programs under the purview of the Defense Acquisition Board, the most critical requirements are listed in the acquisition program baseline (APB) and are validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the APB is approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (USD(A)). I do, however, review those operational requirements listed in the TEMP for Testability, operational utility, and consistency with the APB and other requirements documents.

In the case of the ASPJ, the most recent TEMP was submitted to me in November 1990 and contained measures of effectiveness (MOEs) that were structured differently than those in the previous TEMP. As a result, I did not approve that TEMP, and the USD(A) directed the Navy to provide an audit trail from the previously approved MOEs. This audit trail did not confirm that MOEs had not been degraded. Therefore, in May 1991, I recommended to the USD(A) that the JROC validate the new MOEs. The USD(A) requested the MOE review, and I returned the TEMP to the Navy pending the outcome. In August 1991, the JROC validated the performance requirements contained in the APB, and the USD(A) approved that APB in December 1991. A TEMP change submitted in November 1991 was consistent with the APB, and I approved the TEMP in January 1992.

The final TEMP included changes to three parameters from the 1990 submission. The built-in-test (BIT) criteria for fault detection and fault isolation rates had both been lowered from 0.95 to 0.90. The new values were consistent with the APB and the previously approved TEMP and apparently reflected an administrative error in the 1990 version. The third change was the deletion of the false removal rate requirement. This was consistent with the APB and earlier requirements documents but
was a change from the 1987-approved TEMP. Because this change originated from the Service user representative and was not inconsistent with the APB, I saw no reason not to approve the TEMP. It is this latest TEMP and the APB that will provide the criteria for my ASPJ certification.

As I indicated in my remarks to your committee in March 1992, I will count all failures in the operational test, including software failures resulting from a BIT-indicated false removal. False removals are important because if the BIT tells the pilot the ASPJ is not working, the pilot will react as if the system has failed, whether the failure is real or false. However, the problem is not the false removal rate but the total number of removals, real and false, that impact mission reliability and logistics supportability, both of which have criteria in the APB and TEMP. In our preliminary analysis of operational test data, we have classified several BIT-indicated failures as critical even though they were later determined to be false removals. These false removals degraded ASPJ mission reliability. (Therefore, on July 17, 1992, I informed the USD(A) in writing that it was highly unlikely that I could certify to the congressional defense committees that ASPJ meets or exceeds all established criteria.) I can assure you that there was no intent on my part to make it easier for ASPJ to pass its operational test.

Before the next Defense Acquisition Board meeting on ASPJ, I will provide the Board with a thorough and independent evaluation of the results of the ASPJ operational tests. Furthermore, before there is a decision to proceed beyond low-rate initial production, I will provide the appropriate committees of Congress with my report on test adequacy and my assessment of ASPJ operational effectiveness and suitability. A copy of this report will be made available to you. I also repeat my offer to brief you or your staff on the test results after our assessment is complete.

I have also provided this information to Senator Roth.


Robert C. Duncan,

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Mr. PRYOR. Finally, Mr. President, should this amendment ultimately come to fruition, not only be accepted but be implemented, which I hope it will be, it is my understanding we would save approximately $198.3 million in fiscal 1992 funds, unobligated, which were fenced, and that we would also save roughly an additional $67 million which had been requested for expenditures for production in this coming 1993 fiscal year.

So we are talking about roughly $265 million being saved this year, and millions more in the outyears if this amendment is ultimately accepted and signed off on and effectuated.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the GAO recommendation to the Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees on ASPJ fiscal year 1993 funds be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Potential Reduction to Aircraft Procurement, Navy Budget for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence Programs

We identified $67.7 million in potential reductions to the Navy's fiscal year 1993 Aircraft Procurement, Navy budget activity 01, line items 05 and 06, F-14 and F/A-18, related to command, control, communications, and intelligence programs. The following sections provide a brief description of the Aircraft Procurement, Navy line items we examined and the results of our analysis.


The Airborne Self-Protection Jammer (ASPJ) is an electronic warfare jammer intended to protect some of the Navy's F/A-18 and F-14 aircraft from threat weapons. DOD authorized initial production of 100 jammers in fiscal year 1989, despite ASPJ's marginal performance in Navy and Air Force operational testing. In response, the Congress provided no procurement funding in fiscal year 1990 for ASPJ.

For fiscal year 1991, Congress reduce funding for ASPJ and two Air Force jammer programs, requiring the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) to certify that ASPJ and the Air Force jammers meet all operational requirements before producing at above minimal essential rates of production. In August 1991, the Navy contracted for 36 additional jammers using $63.1 million in FY 1991 funds appropriated for jammers and reprogrammed an additional $27.8 million for ASPJ from the Navy's Operational Safety and Improvement Program.

For FY 1992, the Navy has designated, but not yet obligated, $172.1 million and $26.2 million for the full rate production of ASPJ from the F/A-18 and F-14 line items, respectively. As of June 1992, however, ASPJ had not not yet been certified by DOT&E as required by the Congress. The Navy's fiscal year 1993 budget request for the F/A-18 include $65.6 million for procurement of 28 additional ASPJ systems and an additional $2.1 million for ASPJ procurement is in the F-14 line item.


The Navy's request for $67.7 million for fiscal year 1993 for 28 additional ASPJ systems can be deferred. The Navy currently has 136 low rate production units on contract and the two contractors just began deliveries in January 1992. If the current congressionally-mandated minimum essential production rate is maintained, we estimate that the two contractors will not complete deliveries of the 136 units until November 1994. Furthermore, the Navy has on hand $198.3 million in fiscal year 1992 funds that have not yet been obligated. The Navy intends to use these funds to procure an additional 69 ASPJ systems. Hence, funding for procurement of additional ASPJ systems is not required in fiscal year 1993. Finally, deferral of the fiscal year 1993 funding request until 1994 will allow the Congress to consider the results of currently ongoing operational testing of ASPJ in making future budget decisions.


Table --.1: F/A-18 and F-14, shows the funds requested for fiscal year 1993, appropriated for fiscal year 1992, spent fiscal year 1991, and a $67.7 million potential reduction for ASPJ for fiscal year 1993.

Potential Reduction to Aircraft Procurement, Navy Budget For Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence.

[Dollars in millions]
Budget line                         Fiscal year               
                                           1993   1992   1991 
APN-06, F/A-18                           1807.8 2175.5 1756.7 
APN-05, F-14                              143.1  172.5 1079.1 
Potential reductions APN-06, F/A-18        65.6     --     -- 
APN-05, F-14                                2.1     --     -- 

Mr. NUNN. I think the Senator is correct. The Senator deserves a great deal of credit for his vigilance and his willingness to look into this program in great detail. It has certainly been a troubled program. The Senator is correct on that. Most of the money spent on this program was spent before it got into trouble and before the Senator looked at it as carefully as he has in the last 3 years. Since he started looking at it, it has been on a go-slow basis and the funds have not been extended, the funds for the operation testing have been.

So it is true this program, unfortunately, has had a large amount of expenditure, but it is also true the program has only been in trouble in about the last 3 years, as I understand it.

But the Senator has performed a real service here, and I hope we can save a substantial amount of money. I hope also that we do not have a repeat of this kind of incident very often. But in a high-technology age you are going to have some failures, and this is, unfortunately, one based on the information we received.

Mr. PRYOR addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All the time has expired.

Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, if I could have 60 seconds, I wish to respond to the distinguished chairman.

I think if the military establishment, the Department of Defense, and all those involved in acquisition would simply come to the Congress and level with us, if they would tell us the truth, if they would say this program is in trouble, this program is not passing the test, we think that we can fix it; if they would just level with us and tell us the truth before they encourage us to go forward and purchase these weapons systems, I think then that we would be a lot better off, not only in our procurement system, but certainly the Congress I think would have a lot more reason to find their statements credible when they came before the committees.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I agree with the Senator from Arkansas. I think this program is an example of that, because the military would raise their credibility on the programs they are championing if they kicked in the towel sooner on those that are in trouble, and we would also save an awful lot of money. The Senator is correct on that.

Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time having expired, the question is on agreeing to the amendment.

The amendment (no. 3076) was agreed to.

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