C-130 Avionics Modernization
Program
System
Requirements
Document
DRAFT
Prepared by
Warner Robins Air Logistics Center
C-130 System Program Office
Robins AFB, GA 31098
NOTE: This draft, dated 19 29 April 1999, prepared by WR-ALC/LBRE, has not been approved and is subject to modification.
DO NOT USE FOR ACQUISITION PURPOSES.
Foreword
I have made this letter longer than usual because I lacked the time to make it short.
BLAISE PASCAL
(1623 – 1662)
This draft Systems Requirements Document (SRD) translates Warfighter needs from several Operational Requirements Documents (ORDs) into a single source of performance-based technical requirements for the C-130X Avionics Modernization Program. The requirements fall into three broad categories:
In the process of creating the draft SRD, the authors accumulated a large quantity of detailed technical information about the existing capability of the C-130. The level of detail exceeds what is reasonable for the SRD and was deleted from early drafts of the document, but is certainly valuable for understanding the baseline C-130. We have no way of knowing whether this information is available and familiar to the C-130 experts in the contractor community, so we decided to publish it in the Bidder’s Library as 101 Things Contractors Need to Know about the C-130. This document will be placed in the Bidder’s Library by mid May 99.
The draft SRD is very much a work in progress. It represents an enormous, dedicated effort by many people to assemble a large body of knowledge and distill it to essential elements. Our intent is to provide a technical performance baseline that will allow maximum flexibility for contractors to define innovative solutions to the ORD requirements. In some cases, we may have inadvertently limited that flexibility in some arbitrary way, and we solicit contractor feedback to help us understand where that may have happened. We plan to incorporate appropriate feedback from all sources and issue at least one more draft prior to final RFP release. Please send us your constructive comments and participate in the creation of a clear, fair, and effective document.
Woody Battle
Ed Kunay
Technical IPT Leads
C-130X Program
1.1 Identification
*1.1.1 Global Air Traffic Management (GATM)/ Navigation/Safety
*1.1.2 Total Cost of Ownership
*1.1.3 Cockpit Layout
*1.1.4 Reliability, Maintainability and Supportability
*1.1.5 Standardization
*1.1.6 Enhanced Situational Awareness (ESA) (SOF Aircraft)
*1.1.7 Terrain Following / Terrain Avoidance (TF/TA) (SOF Aircraft)
*1.1.8 Air Vehicle
*1.2 Equipment to be Removed
*1.3 Use of Off-The-Shelf Equipment
*2.0 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
*2.1 Specifications
*2.2 Standards
*2.3 Technical Orders
*2.4 Regulations and Instructions
*2.5 Handbooks
*2.6 Operational Requirements Documents
*2.7 Other Government Documents
*2.8 Non-Government Documents
*2.9 Commercial Standards
*3.0 PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
*3.1 System Overview
*3.1.1 General Requirements
*3.1.1.1 Total Cost of Ownership
*3.1.1.2 Standard Avionics Configurations.
*3.1.1.2.1 Special Mission Configuration
*3.1.1.3 Open Systems Architecture
*3.1.1.3.1 Level of Openness
*3.1.1.3.2 Avionics Architecture
*3.1.1.3.3 Interfaces to Retained/Existing Equipment
*3.1.1.3.4 System Growth
*3.1.1.4 Graceful Degradation
*3.2 All weather flight control system
*3.2.1 Flight Director Performance Requirements
*3.2.2 Autothrottle (Objective)
*3.2.2.1 Autothrottle Performance Requirements
*3.2.3 Go-Around Function
*3.2.3.1 Go-Around Function Without Autothrottle
*3.2.3.2 Go-Around Function With Autothrottle
*3.3 Cockpit Controls and Displays
*3.3.1 Multifunction Displays (MFD)
*3.3.2 Head-Up Displays (HUD)
*3.3.3 Flight Deck
*3.3.3.1 Baseline Cockpit Layout
*3.3.3.2 Pilot and Copilot Locations
*3.3.3.3 ACM Location
*3.3.3.3.1 Special Mission Crewmember Stations
*3.3.3.4 Removal of Flight Engineer (Objective)
*3.3.4 Information Presentation
*3.3.4.1 Primary Flight Function
*3.3.4.2 Standby Instruments
*3.3.4.3 Navigation Information Function
*3.3.4.3.1 Digital Moving Map
*3.3.4.3.2 Airborne Broadcast Intelligence
*3.3.4.3.3 TAWS Imagery
*3.3.4.3.4 Radar Imagery
*3.3.4.3.5
Flight Plan Display *3.3.4.4 Engine and Aircraft Systems Information Function
*3.3.4.5 Cautions, Warnings, and Advisory Function
*3.3.4.6 TCAS Presentations
*3.3.5 Control and Data Entry
*3.3.5.1 Brightness Control
*3.3.5.2 Data Transfer Device (DTD)
*3.3.5.2.1 DTD Mission Support
*3.3.5.2.2 DTD Maintenance Support
*3.3.6 Display Visual Performance
*3.3.6.1 Display Legibility
*3.3.6.2 Display Unit Viewing Angle
*3.3.6.3 Display Contrast
*3.3.6.4 Display Unit Luminance
*3.3.6.5 Display Unit Luminance Non-uniformity
*3.3.6.6 Stray Light
*3.4 System Lighting
*3.4.1 NVIS Compatibility
*3.4.1.1 General Requirements
*3.4.1.2 Specific Requirements
*3.4.2 Cockpit Lighting
*3.4.3 Cargo Compartment Lighting
*3.5 Communication, Navigation, and Surveillance Function
*3.5.1 Communication
*3.5.1.1 Communication System Components
*3.5.1.1.1 Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Requirement
*3.5.1.2 Communication Management Function
*3.5.1.3 UHF
*3.5.1.4 SATCOM (Military and Commercial)
*3.5.1.5 VHF
*3.5.1.5.1 8.33 kHz VHF Channel Spacing
*3.5.1.6 VHF Digital Link
*3.5.1.7 HF-Automatic Control Processor (ACP)
*3.5.1.8 Secure Communication / Anti-Jam
*3.5.1.9 Interphone Communication System (ICS)
*3.5.1.9.1 Intercommunications System (AFSOC Only)
*3.5.1.9.2 Interphone Communications System (ACC Only)
*3.5.1.10 Cockpit Printer.
*3.5.1.11 Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR)/Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR)
*3.5.1.11.1 DFDR/CVR Requirements
*3.5.1.11.2 AFSOC OPSEC Mode
*3.5.2 Navigation
*3.5.2.1 Flight Management System (FMS)
*3.5.2.1.1 FMS Functional Description
*3.5.2.1.2 Navigation Sensor Initialization
*3.5.2.1.3 Functional Description
*3.5.2.1.4 Accuracy
*3.5.2.1.5 Navigation Sensor Interfaces
*3.5.2.1.6 Reference Systems
*3.5.2.2 Air Data System
*3.5.2.2.1 Pitot-Static System
*3.5.2.2.2 Digital Air Data Computers (DADC)
*3.5.2.2.3 Altitude Reporting
*3.5.2.2.4 Altitude Alerting
*3.5.2.3 Radar
*3.5.2.3.1 Radar Controls and Annunciators.
*3.5.2.3.2 Ground Mapping
*3.5.2.3.3 Enhanced Resolution Ground Map
*3.5.2.3.4 Very High Resolution Ground Map Mode (CAAP)
*3.5.2.3.5 Precision Airdrop Capability
*3.5.2.3.6 Navigation Update
*3.5.2.3.7 Weather
*3.5.2.3.8 Beacon Operation
*3.5.2.3.9 Skin Paint
*3.5.2.3.10 Radar Detectability
*3.5.2.4 Terrain Awareness Warning System (TAWS)
*3.5.2.4.1 Radar Altimeter
*3.5.2.5 Windshear Detection
*3.5.2.5.1 Turbulence
*3.5.2.6 Terrain Following/Terrain Avoidance Navigation System
*3.5.2.6.1
TF/TA Life Cycle Cost *3.5.2.6.2 Functional Characteristics
*3.5.2.6.3 Low Probability of Detection and Low Probability of Intercept
*3.5.2.6.4
TF/TA System States *3.5.2.6.5
Modes *3.5.2.6.6
TF/TA Status *3.5.2.6.7
TF/TA Software *3.5.3 Surveillance
*3.5.3.1 Surveillance System Components
*3.5.3.2 Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)
*3.5.3.2.1 Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System Overall Capabilities
*3.5.3.3 Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B)
*3.6 Defensive Systems (DS)
*3.6.1 Combat Delivery and AC-130H/MC-130E Defensive Systems
*3.6.1.1 DS Integration
*3.6.1.2 System Performance
*3.6.1.3 Controls and Displays
*3.6.1.3.1 Controls
*3.6.1.3.2 Displays
*3.6.1.4 Growth
*3.6.2 AFSOC Defensive Systems (AC-130U and MC-130H)
*3.6.2.1
DS Integration *3.6.2.2 Defensive System Performance
*3.6.2.2.1
Threat Response *3.6.2.2.2 Data Correlation and Fusion
*3.6.2.3
Controls and Displays *3.6.2.3.1
Controls *3.6.2.3.2
Displays *3.6.2.4
Growth *3.6.2.5
Mission Playback. *3.6.2.6
EW Training and Simulation *3.7 Security
*3.8 Safety
*3.8.1 System Safety
*3.8.1.1 General Design Requirements
*3.8.1.2 Safety Design Order of Precedence
*3.8.1.3 Operational Safety
*3.8.1.4 Safety Design Criteria
*3.8.2 Personnel Hazards and Safety
*3.8.3 Air Vehicle Characteristics
*3.8.4 Crashworthiness
*3.8.5 Explosive Atmosphere
*3.8.6 Hazardous Materials/ODCs
*3.9 System Environment
*3.9.1 Environmental Conditions
*3.9.1.1 Fungus
*3.9.1.2 Temperature
*3.9.1.3 Altitude
*3.9.1.4 Temperature, Altitude, and Vibration Combination
*3.9.1.5 Vibration
*3.9.1.6 Shock
*3.9.1.7 Humidity
*3.9.1.8 Salt Atmosphere
*3.9.1.9 Sand and Dust
*3.9.1.10 Decompression
*3.9.2 Fluid Resistance
*3.9.3 Air Vehicle Electrical System
*3.9.3.1 External Power
*3.9.3.2 Aircraft Wiring
*3.9.3.3 Aircraft Circuit Breakers
*3.9.4 Environmental Control System
*3.10 Computer Resource Requirements
*3.10.1 Software Requirements
*3.10.1.1 General Software Requirements
*3.10.1.1.1 Software Engineering Process/Guidelines
*3.10.1.1.2 Software Configuration
*3.10.1.1.3 COTS/GOTS
*3.10.1.1.4 Year 2000 Guidance
*3.10.1.1.5 Higher Order Language (HOL)
*3.10.1.1.6 Software Design Requirements
*3.10.1.1.7 Software Reuse
*3.10.1.2 Mission Planning
*3.10.1.3 Operational Flight Software
*3.10.1.3.1 Real-Time Operating System
*3.10.1.3.2 Application Program
*3.10.1.3.3 Application Program Interface (API)
*3.10.1.3.4 Response Time/Data Transfer Rate
*3.10.1.3.5 Fault Tolerance
*3.10.1.3.6 Operational Flight Software/Simulator Software Interface
*3.10.1.3.7 Operational Flight Software Loading and Verification
*3.10.2 Computer Hardware Requirements
*3.10.2.1 General Computer Hardware Requirements
*3.10.2.1.1 Databus Throughput
*3.10.2.1.2 Declassification and Zeroize Capability
*3.10.2.2 Database Requirements
*3.10.2.3 Modified COTS/GOTS and Developmental Hardware
*3.10.3 Support
*3.10.3.1 Software Engineering Environment
*3.10.3.2 Support Equipment
*3.11 System Quality Factors
*3.11.1 Operation and Organizational Concept
*3.11.1.1 Operational Life
*3.11.1.2 Integrated Diagnostics
*3.11.1.2.1 Built-In Test (BIT)
*3.12 Design and Construction
*3.12.1 Physical Characteristics
*3.12.1.1 Payload
*3.12.1.2 Mass Properties
*3.12.1.2.1 Weight and Balance
*3.12.1.2.2 Ballast
*3.12.1.2.3 Center of Gravity
*3.12.1.2.4 Drag
*3.12.1.3 Access For Maintenance
*3.12.2 Materials, Parts and Process
*3.12.2.1 Finish Coatings
*3.12.2.2 Production Facilities, Capabilities and Processes
*3.12.3 Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility
*3.12.3.1 Subsystem and Equipment Compatibility
*3.12.3.2 Frequency Management
*3.12.3.3 Electronic Counter-Countermeasures (ECCM)
*3.12.3.3.1 AFSOC Only (MC-130E/H) Requirements.
*3.12.3.4 OPSEC/COMSEC
*3.12.3.5 Electrical Bonding
*3.12.4 Nameplates and Product Markings
*3.12.5 Interchangeability
*3.12.6 Survivability/Vulnerability
*3.12.7 Interoperability
*3.13 Human Factors
*3.14 Personnel And Training
*3.14.1 Personnel
*3.14.2 Training
*3.14.3 Simulators
*3.15 Logistics and Readiness.
*3.15.1 System Reliability, Maintainability and Supportability
*3.15.2 Mean Time Between Maintenance-Corrected
*3.15.3 Mean Repair Time
*3.15.4 Agile Combat Support
*3.15.5 Wartime Combat Support
*3.15.5.1 Aircraft Battle Damage Repair (ABDR) Capability
*3.15.5.2 Surge Support.
*3.15.5.3 Bare Base Operations.
*3.15.6 Maintainability.
*3.15.6.1 Maintenance Planning.
*3.15.6.2 Maintainability.
*3.15.7 Support Capability.
*3.15.8 Maintenance Environment.
*3.15.9 Other Logistics Considerations.
*3.15.9.1 Technical Manuals (TM)
*3.15.9.2 Supporting Command Requirements.
*3.15.9.2.1 Warranty
*3.15.9.2.2 Facilities and Land.
*3.15.9.3 Continuous Acquisition/Life Cycle Support (CALS).
*3.16 Packaging and transportation
*3.16.1 Transportability
*3.16.2 Items for Immediate Use
*3.16.3 Items for Shipment, Storage, and Redistribution
*3.16.4 Packaging and Packing
*3.16.5 Container Marking
*4.0 VERIFICATION
*4.1 Software Verification and Validation
*4.1.1 Software Testing/Certification
*4.2 C-130 AMP system and function verification
*4.2.1 Automatic Flight Control Function Performance Verification
*4.2.1.1 Flight Director Performance Verification
*4.2.1.2 Autothrottle Performance Verification
*4.2.2 Cockpit Controls and Displays Performance Verification
*4.2.2.1 Multifunction Displays Performance Verification
*4.2.2.2 Head-Up Displays Performance Verification
*4.2.2.3 Information Presentation Performance Verification
*4.2.2.4 Control and Data Entry Performance Verification
*4.2.2.5 Display Visual Performance Performance Verification
*4.2.3 System Lighting Performance Verification
*4.2.3.1 NVIS Compatibility Performance Verification
*4.2.3.2 Cockpit Lighting Performance Verification
*4.2.3.3 Cargo Compartment Lighting Performance Verification
*4.2.4 Communication, Navigation, and Surveillance Function Performance Verification
*4.2.4.1 Communication Performance Verification
*4.2.4.2 Navigation Performance Verification
*4.2.4.3 Surveillance Performance Verification
*4.2.5 Defensive Systems Performance Verification
*4.2.5.1 Combat Delivery Defensive Systems Performance Verification
*4.2.5.2 AFSOC Defensive Systems Performance Verification
*4.2.6 Computer Resource Requirements Performance Verification
*4.2.6.1 Flexibility and Expansion Performance Verification
*4.2.6.2 Software Requirements Performance Verification
*4.2.6.3 Computer Hardware Requirements Performance Verification
*4.2.6.4 Support Performance Verification
*4.3 Areas of Focus
*4.3.1 Use of Off-The-Shelf Equipment
*4.3.2 Modeling and Simulations
*4.3.3 Human Factors Demonstrations
*4.3.4 Systems Integration Demonstrations
*5.0 NOTES
*5.1 Definitions
*5.1.1 Term Definitions
*5.1.1.1 Vertical Height and Altitude Definitions
*5.2 Abbreviations and Acronyms
*APPENDIX 1 - Equipment Removal Listing
*SCOPEThis document provides top-level technical performance requirements for the C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP). Its intent is to provide a framework for more detailed definition of the AMP system, which will be documented by the AMP contractor in the System Specification. These modification requirements are constrained due to the operational requirement for no degradation in capability, and other constraints placed on the program due to the multiple configuration/multiple mission aspect of the C-130 weapon system. This modification program addresses five major areas: (1) Global Air Traffic Management (GATM), (2) Navigation/Safety (Nav/Safety), (3) Reduced Manpower Requirements, (4) Reliability and Maintainability, and (5) Standardization. The C-130 AMP will lower the cost of ownership and increase survivability of the C-130 aircraft, while complying with Air Force Navigation and Safety (Nav/Safety) Master Plan and Global Air Traffic Management (GATM) requirements. In addition to specifying the AMP requirements, this document also defines the performance requirements for those C-130 aircraft affected by the Common Avionics Architecture for Penetration Program (CAAP), namely the Special Operations Forces (SOF) C-130s (AC-130H, AC-130U, MC-130E, MC-130H, MC-130P, EC-130E).
Functional allocation of requirements may be determined by the contractor and not limited to the functional layout of this document.
The AMP for the C-130 modified aircraft encompasses the functions/equipment specified in Table 1.1.1.
Table 1.1.1 C-130 AMP Functions / Equipment
To ensure global airspace access, the C-130 requires extensive upgrades to existing communication, navigation, and surveillance (CNS) equipment. Cockpits must meet the requirements of the Air Force cockpit endorsement process outlined in AFI 11-202 Vol. III. GATM equipment, as a minimum, shall meet (or comply with the intent of) FAA or other appropriate civil technical standards and government licensing and certification.
Upon completion of AMP modification the aircraft shall be compliant with all GATM as addressed in the C-130 AMP ORD (operational requirements document) and Air Force Navigation Safety Master Plan requirements as they apply to worldwide C-130 operations.
The navigation function will meet the Required Navigation Performance-1 (RNP-1). Internal aircraft systems will provide automatic dependent surveillance (ADS) as well as TCAS (traffic alert and collision avoidance system). The C-130 AMP equipment will be functionally operational with all ground network and satellite aeronautical network provider communication requirements. To meet AF/XO Nav/Safety and European carriage requirements, an Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) is required. Also required is a Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS), a windshear detection capability and a Global Positioning System (GPS). In addition, Digital Flight Data Recorders (DFDR) and Cockpit Voice Recorders (CVR) will be installed into the aircraft.
The GATM architecture will comply with applicable information technology standards contained in the DoD Joint Technical Architecture (JTA) and JTA-AF architectures to the maximum extent possible without compromising GATM. Any command and control (C2) applications that operate over the GATM communication systems will be interoperable with the Defense Information Infrastructure-Common Operating Environment (DII-COE).
To allow aircraft to operate in the European Air Traffic Service (ATS) route structure, GATM navigation systems must meet requirements for basic area navigation (BRNAV) as defined in FAA Advisory Circular AC 90-96. BRNAV requires RNP-5 performance and a limited set of functional capabilities as defined in the guidance material referenced above. A capability that complies with the RNP MASPS (DO-236) is needed to meet planned requirements for precision area navigation (PRNAV) operation in European airspace.
The C-130 AMP modification will be designed to minimize the total ownership cost (TOC) of the C-130 aircraft. TOC shall be used as a fundamental constraint in all aspects of the design, development, documentation, and support of the system. The term "Life Cycle Cost (LCC)" shall be used as an alternative for TOC. When LCC is used in the C-130 AMP documentation, briefings, and discussions, LCC means TOC.
The system will be designed to allow operation of the aircraft by two pilots and a flight engineer for all combat delivery missions.
The AMP system will be designed to enhance the reliability and maintainability of the overall C-130 aircraft to perform the assigned mission. System should be maintainable with existing skill mix of personnel, utilizing existing support equipment to the greatest extent possible.
The modification will be designed to put all combat delivery aircraft (C-130E, C-130H, C-130H2, C-130H3) into a single standard avionics hardware and software configuration, regardless of the starting configuration of the aircraft.
Special mission aircraft, affected by the modification, will be baselined on the combat delivery configuration. However, special mission aircraft (ACs, ECs, HCs, LCs, and MCs) will have some configuration differences to account for special mission requirements and equipment. To the maximum extent possible, AMP equipment installed on special mission aircraft will be the same as on baseline aircraft. Additional hardware and software required for special mission aircraft will build upon the baseline aircraft configuration in an open system approach. Life cycle cost analysis (total cost of ownership) will be a primary factor in determining the commonality of avionics/subsystems selected for combat delivery and special mission aircraft.
Total Cost of OwnershipThe total cost of ownership over the life cycle of the fleet will be substantially reduced through judicious application of open system architecture principles to the integration of the overall avionics system, to the selection of OTS/NDI subsystems, and to any Developmental items.
The Enhanced Situational Awareness (ESA) system will provide near real time threat information (for emitting and non-emitting threats) to the aircrews. The ESA system will include correlation and data fusion of threats reported by off-board and on-board sensors and an integrated digital map display of aircraft situation. The system will also provide threat avoidance capability in the form of in-flight route replanning and integrated countermeasures control.
Certain versions of the C-130 will receive an improved terrain following/terrain avoidance capability. This improved capability will use onboard sensors as well as the existing terrain database with new terrain following and terrain avoidance algorithms to achieve a low probability of interception/low probability of detection (LPI/LPD) capability.
Modifications to the C-130 aircraft, for example, modifications to the environmental control system, electrical system, or aircraft structure, required to meet AMP avionics equipment requirements are part of the AMP program.
The list presented in Appendix 1 identifies the existing avionics that, as a minimum, will be removed along with associated wiring, circuit breakers, and mounting hardware. The AMP will not degrade or remove any existing system capabilities.
The following priorities will be used for the selection of equipment for the C-130 AMP system unless cost or performance requirements/analyses indicate otherwise:
This list is intended to be a reference starting point for contractors.
Specifications
MIL-B-5087 |
Bonding, Electrical, Lightning Protection, for Aerospace Systems |
MIL-E-7894 |
Aircraft Power, General Specification for |
MIL-F-9490 |
Flight Control Systems – Design, Installation, and Test of Piloted Aircraft, General Specification for |
Electromagnetic Environmental Effects Requirements for Systems |
|
MIL-STD-704E |
Aircraft Electric Power Characteristics |
MIL-STD-882C, Change 1 |
System Safety Program Requirements |
MIL-STD-1472 |
Human Engineering |
MIL-STD-1553B |
Digital Time Division Command/Response Multiplex Data Bus. |
MIL-STD-1787 |
Aircraft Display Symbology |
Flight Manual, USAF Series C-130 (ALL) |
|
1-1A-14 |
Installation Practices for Aircraft Electrical and Electronic Wiring |
TO 00-5-16 |
Automated Computer Program Identification Number System (ACPINS) |
TO 00-5-17 |
Computer Program Identification Numbering (CPIN) System |
Electronic Warfare Integrated Reprogramming Requirement |
|
AFI 11-202, Vol. 3 |
General Flight Rules |
AFI 11-231 |
Computed Air Release Point Procedures |
AFI 11-2C-130, Vol 3. |
Operations Procedures |
Standard General Requirement for Electronic Equipment |
MAF/CAF/AFSOC 002-98-I/II |
C-130X Phase I Avionics Modernization Program (AMP), 26 Mar 99 (FINAL) |
AMC ORD 315-92 |
Airborne Broadcast Intelligence (ABI), AKA, Real Time Information in the Cockpit (RTIC), (DRAFT) |
Capstone Requirements Document |
Special Operations Forces (SOF) Common Architecture Avionics for Penetration Missions (CAAP) 28 Apr 97 |
AC 20-130A |
FAA Advisory Circular 20-130A, Airworthiness Approval of Navigation or Flight Management Systems Integrating Multiple Navigation Sensors |
AC 90-96 |
FAA Advisory Circular 90-96, Approval of U.S. Operators and Aircraft to Operate Under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) in European Airspace Designated for Basic Area Navigation (BRNAV/RNP-5) |
Air Force System Security Instruction 5020 |
Remanence Security, dated 20 August 1996. |
ASC/ENFC-96-01 |
Interface Document, Lighting, Aircraft, Interior, Night Vision Imaging System (NVIS) Compatible |
Federal Aviation Regulation |
Part 121, Appendix M |
FAR Sec 25.1385 |
Position Light System Installation |
TSO-C92c |
Airborne Ground Proximity Warning Equipment |
TSO-C119a |
Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) Airborne Equipment |
TSO-C123a |
Cockpit Voice Recorder System |
TSO-C124a |
Flight Data Recorder Systems |
TSO-C129a |
Airborne Supplemental Navigation Equipment Using the Global Positioning System |
TSO C-151 |
TAWS |
FAA Notice 8110.64 |
FAA Interim Guidance, Terrain Avoidance and Warning System |
ARINC 635-1 |
HF Data Link Protocols |
ARINC 702A |
Advanced Flight Management Computer System |
ARINC 708 |
Airborne Weather Radar |
ARINC 739-1 |
Multi-Purpose Control and Display Unit |
ARINC 741 |
Aviation Satellite Communication System |
ARINC 753 |
HF Data Link System |
ARINC 758 |
Communication Management Unit Mark 2 |
ARINC 761 |
Second Generation Aviation Satellite Communication Systems |
ARINC Report 610A |
Guidance for Use of Avionics Equipment and Software in Simulators, dated 1 February 1994 |
ASTM D3951-95 |
Packaging, Handling, Storage, and Transportation (PHS&T) |
ICAO SARPs Annex 10 |
International Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs), Aeronautical Telecommunications, Annex 10 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Montreal, Canada |
Volume I Radio Navigation Aids |
|
Volume III Part 1 - Digital Data Communication Systems, Part 2 - Voice Communication Systems. |
|
Volume IV Surveillance Radar and Collision Avoidance Systems |
|
RTCA DO-160 |
Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment |
RTCA DO-229 |
Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for GPS/WAAS Airborne Equipment |
RTCA DO-236 |
Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards: Required Navigation Performance for Area Navigation |
RTCA-D0-242A |
Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards for Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) |
IEEE 12207.1 |
|
IEEE 12207.2 |
|
DO178B |
Items in this document that relate to all aircraft affected by the C-130 Avionics Modernization Program are presented in an Arial font.
Sections that contain additional requirements driven by special mission aircraft only are distinguished by a Times New Roman Bold font. Requirements derived form CAAP (Common Avionics Architecture for Penetration) ORDs are further designated (CAAP) . System OverviewThe avionics system shall provide, as a minimum, precision autonomous navigation and safety including global air traffic management, effective threat warning and self-defense, communications, reconnaissance and precision weapon delivery/fire control.
General Requirements
Installation of AMP systems shall not cause a reduction in capabilities currently existing on the C-130 aircraft.
Total Cost of OwnershipTotal ownership costs shall be a fundamental constraint on the engineering design. For commonality of equipment installed on baseline and special mission aircraft, total life cycle cost (LCC) analysis will be used to determine the logistics requirements for both baseline and special mission aircraft. Annual ownership cost of new, replacement subsystems shall be reduced by 6% in relation to systems they are replacing. An objective is to reduce these annual ownership costs by 25%.
Life cycle cost analysis (total cost of ownership) shall be a primary factor in determining the commonality of avionics/subsystems selected for combat delivery and special mission aircraft. (e.g. Special mission avionics requirements shall be integrated into the baseline avionics architecture when practical and cost effective, provided the baseline requirements are met).
Under no circumstances shall Combat Delivery aircraft be equipped with TF/TA (terrain following/terrain avoidance) navigation capability or be given the capability to turn off the DFDR (digital flight data recorder) or CVR (cockpit voice recorder).
Hardware and software components and equipment locations shall be common and interoperable between all C-130 models. Exceptions to common equipment shall be determined by life cycle cost. In addition, all components shall comply to the Joint Technical Architecture (JTA).
Each aircraft in an MDS (Mission Design Series) shall have equipment and circuit breakers in the same general location.
An objective is commonality of GATM equipment across AMC weapon systems to reduce the overall AMC support structure, particularly for en route locations and forward-deployed units.
Special Mission ConfigurationSpecial mission aircraft, affected by the modification, shall be baselined to the Combat Delivery configuration, to the maximum extent possible. Special mission aircraft (ACs, HCs, MCs, LCs and ECs) may have configuration differences to account for special mission requirements and equipment. Kits should be designed for special mission aircraft to use the same hardware and software as the Combat Delivery aircraft. Additional hardware and software required for special mission aircraft shall build upon the baseline aircraft configuration in a open systems approach.
Cockpits shall meet the requirements of the Air Force cockpit endorsement process outlined in AFI 11-202.VOL. 3. GATM equipment shall meet (or comply with the intent of) FAA or other appropriate civil technical standards.
The cockpit avionics architecture on all combat delivery aircraft shall be optimized to ensure the aircraft can effectively execute the combat delivery mission throughout the world with a basic cockpit crew of no greater than two pilots and one flight engineer from their respective crew positions. Navigators shall not be required on missions flown by combat delivery aircraft.
It is desirable to remove the flight engineer from all combat delivery C-130 aircraft. Therefore, the layout of the cockpit avionics architecture should be optimized to ensure aircrews can effectively execute all missions throughout the world from their respective crew positions, without a flight engineer. In order to maintain fleet commonality and reduce overall LCC cost, all C-130s, including Special Mission aircraft should be modified.
The navigator station on existing combat delivery aircraft will be referred to as an auxiliary crewmember (ACM) station. The ACM station shall be equipped with wiring and (group A) hardware that will permit optional installation and use of, as a minimum, a multi-function display, a control display unit, a radar/moving map cursor control, a full size keyboard, and necessary interfaces to allow an ACM to employ the ACM station if required. Standard crew station equipment/capability, such as, lighting, oxygen, heating/cooling outlets, interphone, radio, etc. shall be retained.
A fully functional dual crew position console shall be integrated on the cockpit of all AC-130H, HC-130N/P, and MC-130E/H/P aircraft. To the maximum extent possible, components of the second navigator/ACM station will be identical to the baseline ACM station.
This dual console will accommodate one navigator and one fire control officer (AC-130H), one navigator and one radio operator (HC-130N/P, MC-130P), or one navigator and one electronic warfare officer (MC-130E/H). The functionality of each current crew position shall be maintained. It is desired that the cargo compartment crew console be deleted, and the full cargo compartment capacity restored on MC-130E aircraft, while maintaining the EWO and radio operator functionality intact.
Contractor(s) shall use an open-system architecture approach as defined by the Open System Joint Task Force (OSJTF)The design of the AMP avionics suite shall use an open architecture approach, with all interfaces defined to facilitate future upgrades to the avionics suite. See Section 5.1.1. Term Definitions for a detailed definition of Open Systems.
The functional and physical interfaces between the air vehicle and avionics subsystem, as well as the internal interfaces within the avionics subsystem, shall be defined and controlled. All AMP systems components shall facilitate future upgrades by incremental technology insertion, rather than by large-scale system redesign to allow for incorporation of additional or higher performance elements with minimal impact on the existing systems.
These interfaces shall include, but not be limited to mechanical, electrical (power and signal wiring), software, cockpit controls and displays (including instrument panels and center console), aircraft sensors/avionics system, engine data signals/avionics system, environmental (including cooling, vibration, acoustic, shock, EMI/EMC (electromagnetic interference/ electromagnetic compatibility)), lighting, antenna locations, alignment/boresighting provisions, airframe structure, and critical cable lengths.
Level of OpennessFor this program, the level of openness shall be to al least the LRU (line replaceable unit)/LRM (line replaceable module) level. LCC shall justify any open interfaces defined below this level. LCC shall be the fundamental constraint in the engineering design process.
The system shall provide a single, overall avionics architecture that will support aircrews in the accomplishment of the diversity of missions across the C-130 fleet. The avionics architecture shall provide an affordable software/hardware solution that minimizes life cycle cost, provides an open systems philosophy to support replacement of short life-cycle computer hardware, maximizes commonality of components, and supports affordable integration of new/modified operational capabilities.
To ensure global airspace access, the C-130 requires extensive upgrades to existing communication, navigation, and surveillance (CNS) equipment. As a minimum, the GATM architecture shall meet the following requirements and possess growth capability to meet future requirements.
All system and subsystem avionics components used in this program shall function as part of a fully integrated core avionics suite using open systems architecture. System integration with existing equipment not planned for replacement is required.
The AMP system shall be designed and installed to allow 50% growth to technology and future operational requirements. The objective is 100% growth potential. Growth shall not be limited to processor speed and memory, but be expanded to include databus capabilities, additional processors, and expanded/additional sensors.
To ensure global airspace access, the C-130 requires extensive upgrades to existing communication, navigation, and surveillance (CNS) equipment. As a minimum, the GATM architecture shall meet the following requirements and possess growth capability to meet future requirements.
Orderly and graceful degradation of mission critical systems shall be provided by means of automatic regression and operator selection of backup modes. Mission critical systems are defined as those systems that are essential for operation to ensure mission success. Included within these systems are all safety of flight systems and subsystems. Mission critical systems shall have sufficient redundancy to prevent single point failures.
Commonality of GATM equipment across AMC weapon systems is desired to reduce the overall AMC support structure, particularly for enroute locations and forward-deployed units. GATM interface with navigation, surveillance, and communication equipment not planned for replacement is imperative.
Cockpits shall meet the requirements of the Air Force cockpit endorsement process outlined in AFI 11-202.VOL. 3. GATM equipment shall meet (or comply with the intent of) FAA or other appropriate civil technical standards.
The cockpit avionics architecture on all combat delivery aircraft shall be optimized to ensure the aircraft can effectively execute the combat delivery mission throughout the world with a basic cockpit crew of no greater than two pilots and one flight engineer from their respective crew positions. Navigators shall not be required on missions flown by combat delivery aircraft.
It is desirable to remove the flight engineer from all combat delivery C-130 aircraft. Therefore, the layout of the cockpit avionics architecture should be optimized to ensure aircrews can effectively execute all missions throughout the world from their respective crew positions, without a flight engineer. In order to maintain fleet commonality and reduce overall LCC cost, all C-130s, including Special Mission aircraft should be modified.
The navigator station on existing combat delivery aircraft will be referred to as an auxiliary crewmember (ACM) station. The ACM station shall be equipped with wiring and (group A) hardware that will permit optional installation and use of, as a minimum, a multi-function display, a control display unit, a radar/moving map cursor control, a full size keyboard, and necessary interfaces to allow an ACM to employ the ACM station if required. Standard crew station equipment/capability, such as, lighting, oxygen, heating/cooling outlets, interphone, radio, etc. shall be retained.
A fully functional dual crew position console shall be integrated on the cockpit of all AC-130H, HC-130N/P, and MC-130E/H/P aircraft. To the maximum extent possible, components of the second navigator/ACM station will be identical to the baseline ACM station.
This dual console will accommodate one navigator and one fire control officer (AC-130H), one navigator and one radio operator (HC-130N/P, MC-130P), or one navigator and one electronic warfare officer (MC-130E/H). The functionality of each current crew position shall be maintained. It is desired that the cargo compartment crew console be deleted, and the full cargo compartment capacity restored on MC-130E aircraft, while maintaining the EWO and radio operator functionality intact.
In order to provide the necessary interfaces for integration with the new integrated FMS needed to meet future RNP phases of flight performance, accuracy, and operational redundancies, a dual autopilot is required. A dual autopilot with an integrated flight director, and data bus interface capabilities is required. This autopilot shall retain maximum commonality with the AN/AYW-1 installed on the C-130 and C-141 aircraft to reduce the overall logistics supportability requirements. The dual autopilot systemAll Weather Flight Control System (AWFCS) (autopilot (AP) and flight director (FD)) shall be capable of integrating with the new FMS (flight management system) and external sensors.
The Autopilot function shall maintain stabilized automatic flight through control of the aircraft roll, pitch, and yaw axes, with flying qualities consistent with the performance of C-130 aircraft before the AMP modification. The autopilot shall be fail-operational. The dual autopilot/flight director configuration shall provides dual independent flight directors so should one FD fail, the other FD is operational.
When engaged, the AWFCSautomatic flight control function shall provide the aAutopilot functions and parameters defined in Table 3.2. The AWFCS shall be fail-operational.
The Autopilot functions shall maintain aircraft stabilized flight within the normal ranges defined by existing C-130 flight manuals. technical orders (TOs) 1C-130B-1, 1C-130H-1, 1C-130(H)H-1, 1C-130(A)U-1, 1C-130(A)H-1, 1C-130(L)H-1, 1C-130(M)H-1, 1C-130E(II)-1, 1C-130E(H)-1, and 1C-130(M)E-1. There shall be no undesirable periodic oscillations. All transient engagement oscillations shall be removed. During any of the AWFCSutopilot modes or submodes of operation, there shall be no hunting (about any axis) that is detectable by the flight crew; nor shall there be any uncommanded sideslip.
The autopilot shall meet or exceed the performance characteristics of AC 120-29 for Category I approach. CAT II, AC 120-29, capability with a growth capability to CAT III, AC 120-28C and AC 120-57A, is desired.for Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Category I approaches. The future capability of Category II approaches is desired. The autopilot shall not be engaged in bank, pitch, or roll angles greater than the limits of the command authority. The LNAV bank limit shall be ± 32° during Orbital Guidance Modes for the AC-130 aircraft.
Table 3.2. Autopilot Function (Engaged) Performance Parameters
Mode or Submode |
Control or Sensor |
Parameter |
Limits |
All Modes |
Autopilot Control |
Operating Environment Airspeed and Weight |
1.2 Vs - 0.64 M/318 KCAS Within the basic and wartime operating weight envelope.60,000 to 175,000 lbs |
Engagement |
Autopilot Control |
Control Transients |
< 0.05g along or about any aircraft axis or location. Transients that do occur shall always be in the direction that satisfies the Autopilot command. |
Disengagement |
Autopilot Control |
Control Transients |
< 0.05g in rotation or translation, about or along any axis (aircraft in steady-state conditions). |
Attitude Restoration 1 |
Autopilot Control |
Pitch Roll Yaw |
±50° ±60° ±20° |
Heading Hold (HH) |
Autopilot Control At initial engagement |
Heading Hold Range Static Accuracy Bank Angle Limit Turbulent Air (15) Default Mode |
Any Heading ±1° of engagement heading +/- 30 degrees +/- 5 degrees If < ±6°, if > ±6° the system shall enter into Roll Attitude Hold mode |
Roll Attitude Hold (RH) |
Autopilot Control AtUpon initial engagement Autopilot Control |
Bank Angle Limit Bank Angle Limit, Range Static Accuracy |
±60° +6° to +38° -6° to -38° ±0.5° |
Pitch Attitude Hold (PH) |
Autopilot Control AtUpon initial engagement |
Pitch Angle Limit Static Accuracy |
±30° ±0.5° |
Yaw Control |
Autopilot Control |
Yaw Angle Limit |
±20° |
Turn Knob (TK) |
Autopilot Control (Bank Angle Command) |
Bank Angle Limit Static Accuracy |
±38° ±0.5° |
Pitch Wheel (PW) |
Autopilot Control After pitch wheel input (Pitch Angle Command) |
Pitch Angle Limit Static Accuracy Attitude Change |
±30° ±0.5° 2 < ±0.5°/sec (smooth air) |
Heading (HDG) Select |
Autopilot Control |
Heading Select Range
Heading Error Bank Angle Limit |
Any HDG defined by Heading Set Marker (HSI marker) ±1° of engagementtarget HDG ±30° |
Lateral Navigation (LNAV-VOR/TACAN) |
Autopilot Control VOR, TACAN Note 10 and 11 |
Capture: VOR Intercept Angle TACAN Intercept Angle Bank Angle Limit Overshoots: VOR
TACAN
Track: (VOR/TACAN) Bank Angle Limit Course accuracy Cross-track accuracy Crosswind Correction
Over Station: (9) Bank Angle Limit
Heading Error |
Up to 45° Up to 30° ±30° < 2 overshoots of < 5,800' from course centerline, at distances > 40 NM from station (no wind). < 2 overshoots of < 6,300' from course centerline, at distances > 120 NM from station (no wind). ±15° ±1° of engaged course < 10% of full-scale deflection of CDI bar (steady state) Up to ±45° course error ±10° (without an overstation course change) ±30° (with an overstation course change) ±5° of heading on entry (without an overstation course change) |
Lateral Navigation (LNAV-FMS) |
Autopilot Control |
Capture: Intercept Angle Bank Angle Limit Overshoots: Track: Bank Angle Limit Course accuracy Cross track accuracy |
Up to 90 degrees ±30° +/- 2.5 degrees ±15° +/- 1 degrees Up to +/- 45 degrees of course error |
Lateral Navigation (LNAV-LOC/BCRS) |
Autopilot Control |
LOC/BCRS Capture: LOC Intercept Angle BCRS Intercept Angle Bank Angle Limit Overshoots
LOC/BCRS Track: Course Maintenance Bank Angle Limit Crosswind Correction |
Up to ±90° 3 Aircraft heading > 105° from selected front course ±30° < 2° overshoots, initial overshoot shall be < 50% of full scale deflection of CDI Limits per note 4 ±15 degrees Up to +/- 45 degrees 30° 4 |
Lateral Navigation Orbital Guidance |
Autopilot Control |
Bank Angle Limit Accuracy |
- 32 deg (Bank Left) +/- 0.5 degrees |
Approach (APPR) – ILS |
Autopilot Control |
Capture:
Track:
Wind limits Headwind Crosswind Tailwind Windshear |
< 1° oOvershoot of < 35 micro amperes or < 0.58 degrees when capturing from below glideslope in level flight at an altitude of > 800' above glideslope transmitter datum altitude (no wind)Stabilized on glideslope before an altitude of 700 feet above field level is reached. From an altitude of 700' to the 200' (CAT I) or the 100' (CAT II) decision height, the Aautopilot shall cause the longitudinal axis of the aircraft to track the center of the indicated glideslope to within ±35 microamperes or 10', whichever is greater, without sustained oscillations. There shall be no evidence of hunting, porposing, sideslipping, or other hard-to-manage maneuvers about any control axis.
25 knots 25 knots 15 knots 10 knots per 100' from 500' above touchdown to touchdown and their associated turbulence as specified in MIL-F-9490. |
Approach (APPR) – MLS |
Autopilot Control |
Capture:
Track:
Wind limits Headwind Crosswind Tailwind Windshear |
O< 1° overshoot of < 0.58 degrees when capturing from below glideslope in level flight at an altitude of > 800' above glideslope transmitter datum altitude (no wind) Stabilized on glideslope before an altitude of 700 feet above field level is reached. From an altitude of 700' to the 200' (CAT I) or the 100' (CAT II) decision height, the aAutopilot shall cause the longitudinal axis of the aircraft to track the center of the indicated glideslope to within TBD degrees+/- 35 microamperes or 10', whichever is greater, without sustained oscillations. There shall be no evidence of hunting, porposing, sideslipping, or other hard-to-manage maneuvers about any control axis.
25 knots 25 knots 15 knots 10 knots per 100' from 500' above touchdown to touchdown and their associated turbulence as specified in MIL-F-9490. |
Altitude Hold (ALTHLD) |
Autopilot Control |
ALTHLD Engage Range ALTHLD Engaged ErrorAccuracy
Pitch Engage g Limit Residual Oscillations |
0 to 50,000 ft ±30 ft from 0 to 30,000 ft ±0.1% between 30,000 and 50,000 ft 5 0.2g 3g 6 Period shall not be less than 20 seconds |
Speed on Pitch (SOP) |
Autopilot Control |
Airspeed Control |
±5 KCAS 7 |
Vertical Navigation (VNAV) |
Autopilot Control FMS/GPS |
Vertical WaypointTBD Capture Point |
Limits determined by FMS/GPS course guidance solution with on overshootTBD |
Go Around and Rotation |
Engage GA (first actuation of GA button) Disengage (second actuation of GA button) |
Pitch Up Speed Pitch Up Angle Limit Bank Angle Limit |
1.2Vstall 7 degrees Wings level |
Automatic Turn Coordination |
Autopilot Control |
Acceleration Limits |
See note 8 |
Servos Override |
Pilots Control Wheels |
Roll Force Pitch Force |
40 lbs 50 lbs |
Pitch Sync (PSYNC) (14) |
Autopilot
|
Basic lateral mode |
PSYNC active then the pitch and roll servo clutches shall disengage for the time the PSYNC button is depressed. PSYNC button released servos shall re-engage at the present attitude and heading command. |
Control Wheel Steering (CWS) Note 13 |
Autopilot Control Pilot and Copilot Control Wheel |
Bank Angle Range Pitch Angle Range |
Pitch and Roll angle determined by applied pilot or copilot control wheel force in excess of 2.5 lbs. Note 12 |
1
The Autopilot shall be capable of restoring the aircraft to a command stabilized attitude about all axes within the stated ranges.2
Following a pitch wheel commanded maneuver and once the pitch wheel is stationary, the pitch attitude represented by the new position of the pitch wheel shall be maintained to within ±0.5°, within the limit of ±30° of pitch attitude.3
At a distance no less than 15 miles from the localizer transmitter and within 4 miles of the center of beam.4
Stabilization shall occur before the outer marker, and once stabilized the performance shall be free from sustained oscillation. Once the aircraft is stabilized on beam center, from the outer marker to an altitude of 300 feet above runway elevation on the approach path, the aAutopilot shall cause the aircraft to track automatically to within ±35 microamps of the indicated localizer course on the HSI (horizontal situation indicator) or 0.58° from localizer beam center. FAA CAT I approach requirements of AC 120-29 shall be satisfied. For CAT I The autopilot shall cause the aircraft to track automatically to within ±25 microamps of the indicated localizer course or 0.41° from localizer beam center. While tracking the localizer beam, roll angles for correcting shall be limited to ±30°. The roll angle limits shall be reduced to ±7.5° within 1 minute after glideslope capture. FAA CAT II capability, AC 120-29 and growth capabilities to CAT III, AC-120-28C and AC 120-57A, is desirable. The C-130 AMP architecture shall allow the pilot to disengage the autopilot function and complete the landing manually. From an altitude 300 feet above runway elevation on the approach path to the 200-foot (CAT I) or the 100-foot (CAT II) decision height altitude, the Autopilot shall cause the aircraft to track automatically to within ±25 microamps of the indicated localizer course or 0.41° from localizer beam center. While tracking the localizer beam, roll angles for correcting shall be limited to ±30°. The roll angle limits shall be reduced to ±7.5° within 1 minute after glideslope capture.5
During Autopilot commanded turns up to an altitude of 50,000 feet, the reference altitude shall be held within ±50 ft or ±0.3%, whichever is greater, in turns involving up to 30° bank angles; and ±90 feet or ±0.4%, whichever is greater, between 30° to 45° bank angles. Loss of lift occurring in roll attitudes shall be compensated for by the AWFCS while in ALT HLD mode.6
Engagement of the altitude hold mode at rates of climb or dive of less than 2,000 feet per minute shall level and return the aircraft to the altitude existing at the time of engagement without exceeding 0.32g incremental normal acceleration.7
The transient response at engagement shall be controlled to within ±5 KCAS under steady state conditions. For non-steady state conditions, the airspeed should stabilize within one and one-half cycles when the airspeed at the time of engagement is changing less than 2 KCAS per second. For every 1 KCAS per second in excess of 2 KCAS per second, an additional 3 KCAS overshoot shall be allowed. Any periodic oscillation of velocity within these limits shall have a period of greater than or equal to 20 seconds.8
Acceleration limits: The miscoordinated sideslip angle shall be not greater that an angle corresponding to 0.05 g lateral accelerations or 2 degrees, whichever is less, while at steady-state bank angles up to 38 degrees. When the aircraft rolls from 38 degrees to one side to 38 degrees to the other at up to 25 degrees per second in essentially level flight, the lateral acceleration shall be maintained within 0.1 g. Lateral acceleration refers to body-axis acceleration at the center of gravity.9
Overstation. The VOR/TACAN mode shall include automatic means for maintaining the aircraft within ± 1 degree of aircraft heading or ground track existing at the inbound edge of the VOR ZOC. During overflight of the ZOC, adjustment of the present course heading or its equivalent shall cause the roll AFCS (automatic flight control system) to maneuver the aircraft to capture the appropriate outbound radial upon existing from the ZOC. The VOR/TACAN capture maneuvering limits may be reinstated during overstation operation in a no-wind condition.10
VOR Capture and Tracking. Overshoot shall not exceed 5,800 ft (20 microamps) beyond the desired VOR radial beam center in a no-wind condition for captures 50 nautical miles or more from the station with intercept angles up to 45 degrees. Following capture at 50 nautical miles or more, the aircraft shall remain within a root-mean-square (rms) average of 5,800 feet (20 microamps) from the VOR radial beam center. Average tracking error shall be measured over a 5-minute period between 50 and 10 nautical miles from the station or averaged over the nominal aircraft flight time between the same distance limits, whichever time is shorter.11
TACAN Capture and Tracking. Overshoot shall not exceed 6,300 ft beyond the desired ground track line in a no-wind condition for capture 120 miles or more from the station with intercept angles up to 30 degrees. The required 0.3-damping ratio shall be exhibited for continuous tracking between 120 miles and 20 miles from station.12
CWS shall be armed when CWS mode selected. CWS shall be active when CW forces exceeds 2.5 pounds. Roll axis CW force > 2.5 pounds shall develop proportional aircraft roll rates of 1 degree per second per pound of wheel force. Pitch axis CW forces > 2.5 pounds in pitch shall develop proportional pitch rates of 0.5 degrees per second.13
Altitude hold and CWS shall be compatible. Altitude hold shall have priority.14
Not compatible with ALT HLD, GA, or SOP modes. PSYNC shall revert to basic pitch hold mode if any of these modes are activated.15
The RMS attitude deviation shall not exceed the respective degrees in the respective attitude in Table 3-2 and shall provide at least Operational State 2 in turbulence at the RMS gust intensities corresponding to 10-2 probability of exceedance, per Table 3-2A.Table 3-2A. RMS Gust Intensities for Selected Cumulative Exceedance Probabilities (ft/sec TAS)
PROBABILITY OF EXCEEDANCE |
|||||||
FLIGHT ALTITUDE |
2x10-1 |
10-1 |
10-2 |
10-3 |
10-4 |
10-5 |
10-6 |
UP TO 1000 |
4.0 |
5.1 |
8.0 |
10.2 |
12.1 |
14.0 |
23.1 |
500 |
3.2 |
4.2 |
6.6 |
8.6 |
11.8 |
15.6 |
18.7 |
Flight Director Performance Requirements
The AFWCS flight director function shall be available for use when required system inputs (e.g., heading, navigation cross track error, VOR bearing) are operational and valid. A flight director function shall be available to each pilot, independent of the other pilot with and without the autopilot function operating.
The flight director function shall independently provide attitude (pitch and roll axes) command steering and deviation data to the pilot and copilot primary flight displays. The flight director function shall provide separate and independent flight direction data in all flight director modes to the pilot and copilot’s displays and with the AP engaged.
The flight director function shall be driven by navigation sources selected by the pilot and copilot’s controls. The flight director function shall be operational with and without the Autopilot function operating. The flight director function shall be fail-passive to each crewmember.
When engaged and flight director modes are selected, the AWFCS automatic flight control function shall provide the flight director functions defined in Table 3.2.1.
Table 3.2.1. Flight Director Function (Engaged) Performance Limits
Mode or Submode 1 |
Control or Sensor |
Parameter |
Limits |
Heading Hold (HH) 2 |
FMS |
Heading Hold Range Heading Hold Error Bank Angle Limit Roll Rate Limit Not to exceed Turbulent Air 46 Roll Acceleration Not to Exceed |
Any Heading ± 1° of engagement Hdg ± 30° 6° /sec ± 5° 3° /sec2 |
Heading Select (HSEL) 3 |
Heading HSEL engage |
Heading Select Range Heading Error Bank Angle Limit Roll Rate Limit Not to Exceed HSEL Overshoot -- Cruise -- Landing Config Roll Acceleration Not to Exceed |
Defined by Heading Set Control (HSI marker) ± 1° of engagement Hdg ± 30° 6° /sec 1.5° 2.5° 3° /sec2 |
Lateral Navigation (LNAV) |
VOR 68, TACAN 79 |
Capture: Beam Intercept Angle (HSEL mode) Course Cut Limit Bank Angle Limit Roll Rate Limit Not to Exceed Track: Bank Angle Limit Roll Rate Limit Not to Exceed Crosswind Correction Over Station 10: Bank Angle Limit Roll Rate Limit Not to Exceed |
Up to ± 90° Up to ± 45° ± 30° 6° /sec ± 15.0° 6 ° /sec Up to ± 45° course error ± 30° 6 ° /sec |
Lateral Navigation (LNAV) |
Localizer 57 or Back Course [LOC/BCS, not Glideslope] VOR/ILS/MLS
|
LOC Capture: Beam Intercept Angle (HSEL mode ) Course Cut Limit Capture Point Bank Angle Limit LOC Track: Bank Angle Limit Roll Rate Limit Crosswind Correction LOC Antenna Switch (tail to nose) |
Up to ± 90°
Up to ± 45° Limits per Note 57 ± 30° , above 200 ft, ± 15.0° , ±5.0° below 50 ft ± 4.0° /sec Up to ±45° course error < 40° course error |
|
Integrated Navigation (INAV) FMS/GPS
All lateral modes for: FMS [Kalman, INS, GPS], INS [Single, Mixed] |
Capture: Target Intercept Angle Capture Point
Track: Bank Angle Limit Roll Rate Limit Not to exceed Crosswind Correction Not to exceed |
Up to ± 90° Limits determined by FMS/GPS course guidance solution with no overshoot ± 27° 6 ° /sec 6 ° /sec in GPS approach Up to ± 45° |
Altitude Hold (ALTHLD) 4 |
ALTHLD Engage
Airspeed / Mach Hold |
Alt Hold Engage Range Alt Hold Engaged Error Pitch Angle Limit Pitch Rate g Limit Pitch Engage g Limit Vert Capture Speed Limit Settling Time
Residual Oscillations |
0 to 50,000 ft ± 30 ft from 0 to 30,000 ft, £ 0.1 % above 30,000 ft
± 30° 0.1TBD g 0.3TBD g ± 2,000 ft/min The mode response or maximum time to capture reference shall be 20 seconds in the most demanding mission phase. Period shall not be less than 20 seconds |
Vertical Navigation (VNAV)
Submodes: Cruise Climb Descent |
FMS/GPS, FSAS |
Vertical Waypoint Capture Point Altitude Capture Error Pitch Angle Limit Pitch Rate g Limit
Vert Capture Speed Limit |
Limits determined by FMS/GPS FSAS course guidance solution with no overshoot ± 30 ft, 0 to 30,000 ft, ± 0.1 % above 30,000 ft ± 30° 0.5TBD g for < 10,000 ft/min, 0.1TBD g for > 10,000 ft/min ± 2,000 ft/min |
Approach (APR) 45 [Vertical parameters only. For lateral parameters see LNAV (LOC/BCS) mode] |
VOR/ILS/MLS/GPS
|
Pitch Command Limit Pitch Rate g Limit Flare Pitch Limit |
+ 10° , - 3.5° 0.1TBD g + 10° , - 1° |
Pitch Sync (PSYNC) 8 |
Flight Director |
Basic lateral mode |
PSYNC active shall cause the pitch FD cue to synchronize to zero error. The roll FD bar shall continue to display lateral commands. When PSYNC button released the FD cue shall operate as detailed above. |
Take Off Go Around (TOGA) |
Engage GA (first actuation of GA button) Disengage GA (second actuation of GA button) |
Pitch Up Speed Pitch Angle Limit Bank Angle |
1.1 Vstall ± 15° 0° (wings level) or HSEL command value |
NOTES:
1
The disengaged submode shall be available for use, if it is compatible with the other engaged modes.2
No other lateral mode active.3
If approach or lateral navigation modes are selected, capture of radio beam (VOR/ILS/LOC, TACAN, MLS) will cause the flight director function to transition from the pre-capture HSEL mode to the appropriate lateral track mode.4
The RMS attitude deviation shall not exceed the respective degrees in the respective attitude in Table 3-2 and shall provide at least Operational State 2 in turbulence at the RMS gust intensities corresponding to 10-2 probability of exceedance, per Table 3-2A.5
Overshoot shall not exceed 0.5 degrees (37.5 microamps) radial error from localizer beam center for captures with initial intercept angles of 45 degrees at 8 miles from runway threshold and increasing linearly to 60 degrees at 18 miles from runway threshold in a no-wind condition. During localizer capture, the system shall exhibit a damping ratio of at least 0.1 within the noted capture ranges, including the effects of system nonlinearities. The system shall be considered to be tracking whenever the following conditions are satisfied: localizer beam error is 1 degree (75 microamps) or less, localizer beam rate is 0.025 degrees/second (2 microamps, 1 second) or less, and roll attitude is 5 degrees or less. During beam tracking, the system shall exhibit a damping ratio of 0.2 or greater at a distance of 40,000 feet from the localizer transmitter.6
The RMS attitude deviation shall not exceed the respective degrees in the respective attitude in Table 3-2 and shall provide at least Operational State 2 in turbulence at the RMS gust intensities corresponding to 10-2 probability of exceedance, per Table 3-2A.7
Overshoot shall not exceed 0.5 degrees (37.5 microamps) radial error from localizer beam center for captures with initial intercept angles of 45 degrees at 8 miles from runway threshold and increasing linearly to 60 degrees at 18 miles from runway threshold in a no-wind condition. During localizer capture, the system shall exhibit a damping ratio of at least 0.1 within the noted capture ranges, including the effects of system nonlinearities. The system shall be considered to be tracking whenever the following conditions are satisfied: localizer beam error is 1 degree (75 microamps) or less, localizer beam rate is 0.025 degrees/second (2 microamps, 1 second) or less, and roll attitude is 5 degrees or less. During beam tracking, the system shall exhibit a damping ratio of 0.2 or greater at a distance of 40,000 feet from the localizer transmitter.68
VOR Capture and Tracking. Overshoot shall not exceed 5,800 ft (20 microamps) beyond the desired VOR radial beam center in a no-wind condition for captures 50 nautical miles or more from the station with intercept angles up to 45 degrees. Following capture at 50 nautical miles or more, the aircraft shall remain within a root-mean-square (rms) average of 5,800 feet (20 microamps) from the VOR radial beam center. Average tracking error shall be measured over a 5-minute period between 50 and 10 nautical miles from the station or averaged over the nominal aircraft flight time between the same distance limits, whichever time is shorter.79
TACAN Capture and Tracking. Overshoot shall not exceed 6,300 ft beyond the desired ground track line in a no-wind condition for capture 120 miles or more from the station with intercept angles up to 30 degrees. The required 0.3-damping ratio shall be exhibited for continuous tracking between 120 miles and 20 miles from station.8
Not compatible with ALT HLD, GA, or SOP. PSYNC shall revert to basic pitch hold mode if any of these modes are activated.10
Overstation. The VOR/TACAN mode shall include automatic means for maintaining the aircraft within ± 1 degree of aircraft heading or ground track existing at the inbound edge of the VOR ZOC. During overflight of the ZOC, adjustment of the present course heading or its equivalent shall cause the roll AFCS to maneuver the aircraft to capture the appropriate outbound radial upon existing from the ZOC. The VOR/TACAN capture maneuvering limits may be reinstated during overstation operation in a no-wind condition.11
The Autopilot shall be capable of restoring the aircraft to a command stabilized attitude about all axes within the stated ranges.12
Following a pitch wheel commanded maneuver and once the pitch wheel is stationary, the pitch attitude represented by the new position of the pitch wheel shall be maintained to within ±0.5°, within the limit of ±30° of pitch attitude.13
At a distance no less than 15 miles from the localizer transmitter and within 4 miles of the center of beam.14
Stabilization shall occur before the outer marker, and once stabilized the performance shall be free from sustained oscillation. Once the aircraft is stabilized on beam center, from the outer marker to an altitude of 300 feet above runway elevation on the approach path, the Autopilot shall cause the aircraft to track automatically to within ±35 microamps of the indicated localizer course on the HSI or 0.58° from localizer beam center. From an altitude 300 feet above runway elevation on the approach path to the 200-foot (CAT I) or the 100-foot (CAT II) decision height altitude, the Autopilot shall cause the aircraft to track automatically to within ±25 microamps of the indicated localizer course or 0.41° from localizer beam center. While tracking the localizer beam, roll angles for correcting shall be limited to ±30°. The roll angle limits shall be reduced to ±7.5° within 1 minute after glideslope capture.15
During Autopilot commanded turns up to an altitude of 50,000 feet, the reference altitude shall be held within ±50 ft or ±0.3%, whichever is greater, in turns involving up to 30° bank angles; and ±90 feet or ±0.4%, whichever is greater, between 30° to 45° bank angles.The addition of an autothrottle function is desired. TheAWFCS should include an autothrottle capability that function shall performperforms the following functions: airspeed/a hold, throttle control in all phases of flight including SKE (station keeping equipment) formation , airdrop operations, approach, during autoland, and /go-around, and hold of a manually selected airspeed. coupled throttle control. All functions shall be available in the range of idle to maximum forward thrust. When the aircraft is stabilized in a climb, cruise, descent, or coordinated turn mode and the throttle is not operating at the minimum or maximum limits, the autothrottle shall maintain the aircraft speed within ± 5 knots of the engaged airspeed under the following conditions:
Airspeed: 1.21 x Vs to 0.64M/318 knots CASTDB knots CAS
Altitude: Sea level to 45,000 feet
Gross Weight: 90,000 to 175,000 pounds
The autothrottle function shall control the throttle movement in response to speed and vertical flight path commands. There shall be no undesirable periodic oscillations of the throttle commands. There shall be no transient engagement oscillations. The autothrottle function shall provide fail-passive.
When engaged, the automatic flight control function shall provide the autothrottle functions defined in Table 3.2.2.1TBD.
Autothrottle shall disconnect when any engine exceeds torque and TIT (turbine inlet temperature) limits as defined in T.O. 1C-130-1. The throttle force (with the autothrottle function not engaged) shall be 6.5 pounds nominal.
The autothrottle function shall be operational during stabilized climb, cruise, descent, and coordinated turns. All modes shall be available from idle to maximum forward thrust. The AMP architecture shall allow the pilot to physically overpower the autothrottle function with a nominal force of 16 lbs. per throttle.
Table 3.2.2.1. Autothrottle Function (Engaged) Performance Limits
Mode or Submode1 |
Control or Sensor |
Parameter |
Limits |
Airspeed/Mach Hold (AMAH) Note 2, 5, 6 |
Autothrottle Control Central Air Data Computer (CADC) |
Command Targets Tolerance TIT Control Range 5
TIT Hold Error Torque Mach Engage Range Mach Hold Error KCAS Engage Range 6 KCAS Hold Error Throttle Control Authority Throttle Rate Limit
Wind Shear/ Gust Compensation Settling Time
Residual Oscillations |
± 1 KCAS or ± 0.01 M 17 to 106 %, not to exceed 875° C TIT (T56-7) 1010° C TIT (T56-15) ± 2% 1.2 Vstall to 0.64 M ± 0.01 M 100 to 318 KCAS ± 5 KCAS 29° (idle) to 80° (max) ± 7° /sec Throttle Angular Velocity (TAV) Note 7, 8
Following engagement or perturbation of this mode at 2000 fpm or less, the specific ALH accuracy shall be achieved within 30 seconds Period shall not be less than 20 seconds |
VNAV/FMS
Submodes: Climb Cruise Descent |
Autothrottle Control FMS CADC |
TIT Control Range
TIT Hold Error Mach Engage Range Mach Hold Error IAS Engage Range IAS Hold Error Throttle Control Authority Throttle Rate Limit |
17 to 106 %, not to exceed 875° C TIT (T56-7) 1010° C TIT (T56-15) ± 2 % 1.2 Vstall to 0.64 M ± 0.01 M 100 to 318 KCAS ± 5 knots 29° (idle) to 80° (max) ± 7° /sec TAV |
Take Off /Go Around (TOGA)3 |
Autothrottle Control Go Around Button |
TOGA Command Targets TIT Control Range
TIT Hold Error Throttle Control Authority Throttle Rate Limit |
Manual Control 17 to 106 %, not to exceed 875° C TIT (T56-7) 1010° C TIT (T56-15) ± 2 % 29° (idle) to 80° (max) ± 20° /sec TAV |
Approach (Autoland)4 (APPR) |
Autothrottle Control |
TIT Control Range
TIT Hold Error Throttle Control Authority Throttle Rate Limit Flare Limits (Throttle Retard) Throttle Range Limit |
17 to 106 %, not to exceed 875° C TIT (T56-7) 1010° C TIT (T56-15) ± 2 % 29° (idle) to 80° (max) ± 7° /sec TAV Active at 50 ft AGL 10% RMS nominal throttle position |
NOTES:
1
The disengaged submode shall be available for use, if it is compatible with the other engaged modes.2
Adjustments allowed up to full authority with airspeed hold command control in increments of ± 1.0 KCAS or ± 0.005 Mach..3
During go around the autothrottle function shall drive the throttles to the takeoff position within 4 seconds.4
The autopilot function shall provide the autothrottle function with the command to retard the throttles during the flare maneuver.5 The autothrottle clutchpack shall be designed to preclude overheat.
6 Engagement of the autothrottle in steady-state conditions when the difference between aircraft speed and selected speed is within 5 knots, shall not cause more than 1.5 degrees of throttle action.
7 The airspeed error shall be held within 2% of clutched-in airspeed in a non-linear wind shear of up to 5 knots per 100 feet with aircraft sink rates up to 1,000 feet per minute.
8 In vertical or longitudinal gusts, the maximum airspeed error shall not exceed 3% of the clutched-in airspeed.
As a minimum, the go-around function shall perform all the functions in the present GAAS.
The go-around function is activated when commanded by either the pilot or copilot. The go-around function is disengaged when commanded by either the pilot or copilot. The go-around function shall be fail-passive.
Go-Around Function Without AutothrottleIf Autothrottle is not implemented, the Go-Around function shall calculate and display 1.2 Vstall values to the aircrew.
If Autothrottle is implemented, the aircrew shall have the ability to select a fully automated go-around function
This section defines the requirements for control and display functions. The intent of these requirements is to minimize the workload in critical phases of flight and to provide critical information in a timely and effective manner and to minimize the workload in critical phases of flight.
Control and presentation functions for normal operation of the communication/radio navigation equipment, except for the intercom, shall be integrated in the control/display system.
The system shall provide for display information redundancy and graceful degradation in the event of display failures. Display system information stored in database format shall be configured in a redundant architecture.
Display functions shall be selectively displayed depending on flight situation or display malfunctions. No loss of any control or display function significant to completion of the mission shall result from any single point failure.
New or modified control and display components shall not interfere with the usage of NVIS (NVIS Type I and Type II Class B). No loss of any control or display function significant to completion of the mission shall result from any single point failure.
The display processing architecture shall provide dual redundant processing capability. Display system information stored in database format shall be configured in a redundant architecture.
The display system shall have an overall availability of 106 hours between occasions where it is not available to the crew. The probability of the aggregate display system presenting erroneous or out-of-date information shall be less than 10-6 per flight hour. The probability of presenting any Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) shall be less than 10-9 per flight hour. Hazardously Misleading Information is defined as displayed misleading or false information that leads to hazardous conditions.
New or modified control and display components shall not interfere with the usage of Type I, Class B NVIS devices as defined in ASC/ENFC 96-01, Lighting, Aircraft, Interior, NVIS Compatible.
Multiple, iIntegrated, digital, color multifunction displays (MFDs) shall be installed on the main instrument panel. The pilot and copilot shall each have an identical set of displays. Any format for any display shall be selectable at any time by both the pilot and copilot. The MFDs which shall be capable of presenting primary flight information, engine and aircraft system parameters, and information from navigation systems, radar, Intraformation Positioning/Collision Avoidance System (IFPCAS), TCAS, TAWS, windshear detection, defensive systems, and status reporting systems. The system shall be able to display IFPCAS, TCAS, TAWS, radar information, and flight plan data from the navigation system FMS concurrently. All MFDs should be interchangeable for lean logistics and mission flexibility considerations.
Display formats shall be independently selectable on any display. MFDs shall provide for cross-cockpit (or cross console) viewing.
The display system shall be capable of displaying, at one time, all functional display presentations shown in Table 3.3.1.
Table 3.3.1 Functional Display Presentations
Primary Flight Display |
Secondary Display (radar, IFPCAS, etc.) |
Primary Flight Display |
Secondary Display |
Engine Instruments / CWA (Cautions, Warnings and Advisory) |
CWA and/or Secondary Display |
Each display shall be flexible enough to present data necessary to meet all specific C-130 mission requirements.
The pilots’ radar presentation shall be stabilized relative to aircraft heading unless operating in slave mode. In slave mode, the stabilization is that selected by the aircrew. The source for stabilizing and orienting the presentation shall be selectable as Heading Up, Track Up, Drop Zone/Landing Zone Up, or north up (true, grid, or magnetic according to navigation system mode). The radar presentation shall be in range and azimuth with ground range in nautical miles (NM) from the nose of the aircraft and azimuth in degrees relative to the selected stabilization source. The radar presentation shall also provide overlays of current heading, altitude, compass rose, selected range and range mark separations, mode, system health, and antenna tilt angle. The radar presentation shall have sufficient range and azimuth marks to permit estimates of target position within 10 percent of the actual radar range and 5 degrees of the actual bearing of the target. The refresh rate shall be such that the display(s) do not flicker under any operational condition.
The MFD shall support the display of full rate, real-time video from multiple sources, including radar, digital map, and FMS overlays. It is desired that this be accomplished with no loss of current resolution.
The MFDs on all AFSOC aircraft shall also support FLIR (for AFSOC and ACC), IDS (Infrared Detection System), and TV video and symbology. It is desired that this be accomplished with no loss of current resolution.
For all AFSOC aircraft, the system shall support the growth for integration and display of LPI formation rendezvous and station keeping systems such as the Intra-Formation Positioning System (IFPS). IFPS requirements are described in AFSOC ORD 046-91-IA, Intra-Formation Positioning System.
The system shall include integration of airdrop solutions for presentation as well as for radar update.
The system shall integrate the head-up display with the MFDs and the FMS. It is desired to have this capability without a separate dedicated head-up display processor
In addition, compatibility of MFDs with aircrew laser eye protection devices, as outlined in CAF (TAF 505-87)-I-A ORD for Aircrew Laser Eye Protection, should be considered in selection of MFDs.
The capability to direct mission critical information to an alternate display within the pilot’s field-of-view in case of a display failure shall always be available to the aircrew.
The MFD video system architecture shall ensure that either pilot can view all mission critical information after any single MFD failure. MFDs shall provide for cross cockpit (or cross console) viewing.
The HUD imagery shall be conformal to the external world world and provide both pilots with all primary flight information (i.e., heading, airspeed, flight path, vertical velocity, altitude, and attitude) required to control the aircraft. In order tTo prevent obstruction of data, no information shall be displayed over aircraft structures such as windshield wipers and windscreen posts.
Both pilots shall have the ability to display additional information on the HUDs, in a pilot-selectable, flight-mode-specific format, such as formation positioning, aerial delivery information, threat alerts, wind and drift, TCAS information, and master caution/warning. Final display content, hierarchy, and priorities shall be determined by a cockpit working group.
The HUDs shall be aligned with the aircraft flight path (aircraft boresight corrected for drift) to optimize the ability to execute precision landing and airdrop. All approach and navigation aids shall be selectable for display with the associated course guidance. The HUD shall display primary flight information in all modes. To reduce clutter, the system shall allow both pilots to deselect all "non-primary flight information" from the HUD, when desired.
Each HUD subsystem shall be connected to both pilot and copilot displays. Each HUD system shall have the capability to allow each pilot to view the same display data and configuration as presented to the other pilot for cross-cockpit awareness. Each HUD shall project infinity-focused images of symbols into the pilot’s/copilot’s eye box in order to provide primary flight display (PFD) data while the pilot/copilot is looking outside the aircraft. The eyebox design shall be large enough to allow the largest and smallest pilots to view all of the HUD symbology. The eyebox design shall also be large enough to allow for normal head and body movement without degradation of pilot’s ability to view all HUD data without requiring changes to existing seat and rudder configuration. The HUD shall accommodate the use of night vision goggles, and be located such that when NVGs are stowed on the helmet there is no occlusion of HUD symbology. , and shall accommodate the use of night vision goggles. HUD spectral content shall be compliant with NVIS Type I Class B Leaky Green, as defined in ASC/ENFC-96-01.
HUD symbology shall be standard Air Force symbology derived from MIL-STD-1787.
Side HUD on AC-130H/U aircraft shall be retained and integrated into the overall HUD architecture.
The following paragraphs define the requirements for locating the AMP controls and displays for pilot, copilot, Auxiliary Crew Member (ACM), Special Mission Crewmember (SMC), and flight engineer. The AMP cockpit arrangement shall be designed using JSSG-2010 as a guide.
.The installed AMP controls and displays shall be located and sized to be operable by the central 90% of the aircrew population as described below in Table 3.3.3, Multivariate Pilot Models. All other controls shall be accessible and operable by the same population with the restraint harness unlocked, but without adjusting the seat position or loosening the lap belt.
Table 3.3.3 Multivariate Pilot Models
INCHES |
Short Sitting Height |
Short Legs |
Big All |
Short Sit / Long legs |
Big Sit / Short Legs |
Sitting Height |
34.1 |
35.1 |
39.2 |
35.5 |
38 |
Eye Height Sitting |
29.6 |
30.6 |
33.9 |
30.7 |
32.9 |
Shoulder Height |
22.3 |
23.2 |
25.9 |
23 |
24.8 |
Buttock-Knee Length |
22.6 |
21.7 |
26.5 |
25.9 |
23.3 |
Knee Height |
19.9 |
19.1 |
23.8 |
22.8 |
21.1 |
Thumb-Tip Reach |
28.4 |
27.3 |
34.4 |
33.2 |
30.4 |
The cockpit avionics architecture on all combat delivery aircraft shall be optimized to ensure the aircraft can effectively execute the combat delivery mission throughout the world with a basic cockpit crew of no greater than two pilots and one flight engineer from their respective crew positions. Navigators shall not be required on missions flown by combat delivery aircraft.
The cockpit layout shall meet the requirements of the Air Force cockpit endorsement process outlined in AFI 11-202 Vol. 3.
The arrangement of all elements, including controls and displays, within the cockpit shall accommodate the pilot population described in Table 3.3.3 for reach and visual access. Primary flight, navigation, engine, and Cautions, Warnings, and Advisorys data shall be displayed in the primary field of view, visible from within the design eye box of each pilot location. Frequently used controls shall be installed on the glare shield, forward on the pedestal or on the side panel. Status or mode annunciation’s may be outside the primary field of view, but shall be as near as possible to the primary field of view.
The navigator station on existing combat delivery aircraft will be referred to as an auxiliary crewmember (ACM) station. The ACM station will be unpopulated on combat delivery aircraft. The ACM station shall be equipped with wiring and (group A) hardware that will permit optional installation and use of, as a minimum, a multi-function display, a control display unit, a radar/moving map cursor control, a full size keyboard, and necessary interfaces to allow an ACM to employ the ACM station if required. Standard crew station equipment/capability, such as, lighting, oxygen, heating/cooling outlets, interphone, radio, etc. shall be retained.
The station shall have the capability to be repopulated to full comm/nav control capability within eight hours by O-level personnel. The repopulation process shall provide for a method to incorporate the additional equipment into the display subsystem functional architecture.
When populated, the controls and displays for communications management and navigation management at the ACM station shall be in the primary field-of-view of the operator. When populated, the ACM station shall have sufficient functionality to allow the operator to complete all normal navigator duties associated with low level and airdrop operations.
Special Mission Crewmember StationsA fully functional dual crew position console shall be integrated on the cockpit of all AC-130H, HC-130N/P, and MC-130E/H/P aircraft. This position will be referred to as a special mission crewmember (SMC) station.
To the maximum extent possible, components of the SMC stations will be identical to the baseline ACM station.
This dual console will accommodate one navigator and one fire control officer (AC-130H), one navigator and one radio operator (HC-130N/P, MC-130P), or one navigator and one electronic warfare officer (MC-130E/H). The functionality of each current ACC/AFSOC crew position shall be maintained. An objective is that the cargo compartment crew console be deleted, and the full cargo compartment capacity restored on MC-130E aircraft, while maintaining the EWO (electronic warfare officer) and radio operator functionality intact.
An objective is to have the capability to perform all flight engineer functions from the pilot and co-pilot locations, without the need to occupy the flight engineer location. If the flight engineer is removed, the layout of the cockpit avionics and crew workload shall be optimized to ensure aircrews can effectively execute all missions throughout the world from their respective crew positions.
When the flight engineer location is occupied, all engine displays shall be in the primary field of view, and controls within the reach envelope, of the flight engineer.
The new lighting shall be equal to or better than the existing lighting systems for daylight and naked eye night operations. The modification shall permit normal use and readability of all aircraft controls, instruments and displays during all operating conditions with and without NVIS.
All new light producing equipment installed by this document and existing equipment which radiates light shall meet the requirements of ASFC/ENFC 96-01 Type 1 Class B With the exceptions stated below:
No additional lighting controls shall be used. Existing lighting controls shall be utilized to the maximum extent possible. The cockpit thunderstorm lights shall not be modified.
All new or existing red warning lights shall be modified to NVIS compatible red in accordance with the chromaticity and NVIS radiance requirements specified in ASC/ENFC 96-01.
The cargo compartment floodlights may be replaced with NVIS compatible green lights or an additional system may be added. Cargo compartment floor lighting shall not be modified. The Cargo compartment shall be equipped with NVIS-compatible red no drop (jump lights). The jump caution NVIS compatible red light shall have an NVIS radiance of less than 1.4x10-7 at a luminance of 15.0 foot lamberts (fl).
The modifications shall be designed such that there is minimum impact on aircrew procedures and training. New or modified lighting, control and display components required for the integrated avionics display suite shall not cause any interference with the usage of Type I Class B NVIS devices. New lighting controls required shall not induce delays in cognitive recognition of aircraft performance or flight instruments or induce crew misorientation and/or disorientation of aircraft flight attitude or parameters.
The luminance and contrast of the NVIS compatible lighting shall be sufficient to support crew operations throughout the flight environment. Existing lighting controls shall remain functional. All lighting modifications shall be permanently installed (but removable for maintenance) and not requiring modification by the flight crew to achieve NVIS compatibility. There shall be no degradation to visual acuity through the aircraft windscreen with the unaided eye or the NVIS due to reflections on the windscreen from any lighting or lighting reflections emanating from within the cockpit with the NVIS compatible lighting at normal operational luminance.
All mechanical or structural parts, assemblies, and installations shall be capable of withstanding the following loads without permanent deformation:
Flood lights and map lights at the ACM’s station shall be equipped with filters which meet the following specifications:
NVIS friendly position lights shall replace the existing position lights. The NVIS friendly position lights shall meet FAR 25.1385 through FAR 25.1397 and shall not noticeably degrade the NVIS during formation flying. Formation flying intervals is 2000 ft. minimum.
All lighting in the cockpit shall be permanently modified to NVIS Class B compatibility with the exception of ANDVT panel lights, KY-58 panel lights. Modified ANDVT and KY-58 controls will be GFE and they shall be included in the kit, drawings, and TOs.
Cross-cockpit viewing (pilot to copilot’s and copilot to pilot’s instruments) of primary flight instruments shall not be degraded. The Pilot’s and Copilot’s Instrument Panels shall be designed for a luminance uniformity not to exceed 2:1 between instruments.
All edge lit (integrally illuminated) plastic information/control panels MIL-P-7788 Type III which use the MS 25010 light assemblies shall be replaced with the MIL-P-7788 Type IV or Type V NVIS compatible panels.
All caution, warning, and advisory lights (including pod status lights) shall be readable in an ambient light level of 10,000 foot-candles incident on the display from any direction (non-specular).
All existing amber, green and white annunciation lights shall be modified to NVIS compatible Green B except as otherwise specified herein. All other lighting (flood lights, instrument lights and edge lit panel lights etc.) shall be modified to NVIS compatible Green A. All red annunciators, caution, warning, and advisory lights shall be modified to NVIS compatible red. All amber annunciators, caution, warning, and advisory lights shall be modified to NVIS compatible yellow B. All green annunciators, caution, and advisory lights shall be modified to NVIS compatible green B.
All lighting (to include caution, warning, advisory and panel lights) in the cargo compartment shall be permanently modified to NVIS compatibility with exception of the existing floor floodlights, loading floodlights and the overhead white floodlights. Cargo NVIS compatible floodlights shall be installed and they shall provide both bright and dim levels. The existing red flood lights may be modified for NVIS compatibility or a new NVIS compatible flood light system may be added. The dim level shall be low enough to provide paratrooper night vision acclimation - 0.1 fl.
The cargo jump lights shall be modified to NVIS compatible Green B. The cargo jump caution lights shall be modified to NVIS compatible Red. The jump and jump caution lights shall be readable in an ambient light level of 10,000 foot-candles (non-specular) incident on the display from all directions when viewed plus and minus forty five degrees to either side of a line normal with the surface of the display. The jump caution NVIS Red light shall have an NVIS radiance of less than 1.4x10-7 at a luminance of 15.0-foot lamberts (fl).
The Primary Flight Function (PFF), both the HUD and Head down displays shall conform to the requirements of MIL-STD-1787.
The Flight InformationPFF, one for the pilot and one for the copilot, shall be presented within a contiguous, single presentation area as the primary means of flight information display. implemented using a Primary Flight Format (PFF). The PFF shall be presented within a contiguous, single presentation area as the primary means of flight information display.
The PFF shall provide, as a minimum, a display of an Attitude Director Indicator (ADI), a Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI), an Airspeed/Mach Indicator(AMI), an Altitude Indicator(AI), a Vertical Velocity Indicator(VVI), and an Angle of Attack Indicator. The head down PFF display area shall be large enough to present simultaneous ADI (Attitude Direction Indicator) and HSI information in a full (not truncated) format sufficient to ensure ease and accuracy of readability from the normal crew positions. The capability shall be provided to present an expanded HSI display. As data is updated, displayed symbols and graphics shall move or scroll smoothly. Each indication shall display the behavior of the associated control or sensor, using the parameter as the visual presentation of information, within the stated limits. For example the
Each display page shall be consistent with each other, but the flight crew shall also be able to readily discriminate between them. The PFF shall include cautions, warnings, and other information that affects the ability to safely fly the aircraft.
A standby instrument suite (SIS) or equivalent single instrument, shall be installed on the main instrument panel in a location that can be easily viewed by either the pilot or co-pilot. The suite shall be independent of the MFD/HUD display system such that a failure of that system shall not interfere with the operation of the SIS instruments. The suite shall indicate, at a minimum, barometric altitude, airspeed, attitude, vertical velocity, and a magnetic compass heading independent of other navigation sources. All standby instruments which require electrical power shall be powered from the last fallback electrical source.
Navigation information, used as the primary means of navigation and situational awareness, shall be presented within a contiguous, single display area. Each display of the selected navigation solution in the cockpit shall unmistakably and conspicuously identify which navigation solution drives the aircraft flight controls and steers the airplane. Notification shall be provided that both the pilot and co-pilot are using the same source of information. All the displays shall be synchronized to UTC time. The navigation information function (one display for the pilot and one for the co-pilot) shall be implemented using the following formats:
Digital Moving MapA digital moving map system shall be installed to allow both pilots and the ACM, if present, or the SMC on special mission aircraft, to display digitally-stored map image data in a moving format on MFDs as selected by the individual crewmember.. The system shall provide smooth, automatic, real-time updates of map data as the aircraft moves. This map shall present the aircraft situation relative to flight plan, targets, threats, and other air traffic. Crewmember selectable overlays of navigation flight plan waypoints and other symbols, such as threat symbols, own aircraft, etc., shall be integrated with the basic map for composite display. The system shall also have the capability to display threat rings/range data blended with terrain elevation data to visually depict threat intervisibility. The system shall have a minimum of two independent, fully functional video channels to show current location, as well as have a look-ahead capability. The system shall have the capability to be easily updated with current "CHUM" data to allow its use as a primary means of navigation. The moving map system shall display, as a minimum, aeronautical charts to the level of detail found in the following scale charts: 1:12,500; 1:25,000; 1:62,500; 1:100,000; 1:125,000; 1:250,000; 1:500,000; 1:1,000,000; and 1:2,000,000.
The moving map shall be capable of changing operating modes (i.e. from one map product or scale to another) within one second of operator input 90% of the time, threshold, with an objective of 0.5 seconds. The digital map subsystem shall have memory capacity to store map data for a geographic area of 1,000,000 square miles using JOG (joint operational graph), TPC (tactical pilotage chart), ONC (operational navigation chart), and GNC (global navigation chart) scaled charts without any in-flight loading. Chart coverage of the entire world using TPC, ONC, JNC (jet navigation chart), and GNC scaled charts without in-flight loading is desired. It is desirable to have the digital map presentations be similar to the paper form of the map. It is desired that the AMP moving map system be able to overlay radar data.
All NIMA (National Imagery and Mapping Agency) data required by the system shall be utilized without prior transformation into system specific formats. As a minimum, the digital map system shall display all NIMA products, at all available scales, to include Compressed Arc Digitized Raster Graphics (CADRG), Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED), Controlled Image Base (CIB), and Vector Graphics, as well as operator-created Data Frame graphics.
The digital moving map system shall include as a baseline all Combat Delivery map capabilities. Operating modes shall include aeronautical chart, digital terrain data and data frame mode. Map orientations shall include heading up, track up and north up. The area to be displayed in nautical miles shall be equivalent to the map zoom factors. The system shall display elevation color banding that shall be dynamic based upon the active mission altitude or the altitude set by the aircrew. When selected, the system shall present elevation contour lines selectable down to 30 meters. The map presentations shall include pre-mission data loaded from existing and upgraded mission planning and intelligence systems. The system shall monitor and present the status of system caution and advisory discretes and present the status within one second, 99% of the time and within 10 seconds, 100% of the time whenever there is an out of tolerance condition. A prioritized hierarcchial system shall be utilized to ensure problems of more immediate concern shall not be hidden by lesser advisories. The time from system input data available to display of the data shall not exceed one second, 99% of the time.
The aeronautical chart mode shall provide selectable plan and perspective aeronautical chart views with selectable symbology overlays. The overlays shall include preplanned EOB (electronic order of battle), pop-up threats, translucent threat intervisibility, enemy C3 nets, hostile air tracks, elevation color banding, waypoints, threat area, no-fly zones, flight plan links, targets, landing/drop zones and aircraft present position. The Digital Terrain Data mode shall provide a plan view with symbology overlays from the Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) and Digital Feature Analysis Data (DFAD) in the database produced by DMA. The overlays shall include aircraft present position. The map presentation shall shade the digital terrain data map when selected. The sun angle shading of the terrain and cultural features shall be from a fixed sun angle, elevation and azimuth. The map presentation shall be capable of presenting the aircraft position indicator on the digital terrain data and aeronautical charts in a centered or decentered mode. The Data Frame mode shall provide a digitized data frame picture with symbology overlays. The system shall store up to 10 data frames and 100 pictures. The system shall provide operator-selectable overlays to include threat intervisibility, plots of aircraft navigation and mission data., ground/maritime threats, threat detection/engagement ranges, current ownship threat-detectable emanation radius, tracks of airborne threats, consolidated EW (electronic warfare) system status and fault warning, survivor location and targets/objectives data. Threat and mission overlay information, including aircraft route data, aircraft position, hostile threat locations and intent, friendly and hostile air tracks, targets, and friendly ground force/survivor location data shall be available as operator-selectable, geo-referenced overlays on any of the presentation backgrounds. Any movement of the aircraft symbol when changing operating modes shall be imperceptible to the operator.
The map presentation shall have a look-ahead capability on the aeronautical chart or digital terrain data map and shall return to present position when deselected. The map presentation shall have the capability, in the aeronautical chart or terrain data mode, to pan in any direction from the decentered aircraft present position while retaining the map size at the user selected range. Where applicable, the map system shall be capable of enlarging the terrain data or aeronautical chart map (zoom). Zoom factors shall be in steps, as opposed to continuous zoom, and scales shall be determined by the CSWG.
The system shall accommodate both Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) (down to the nearest 8 digits or 10 meters of detail) and latitude/longitude (down to the nearest hundredth arc-minute or 10 meters of detail) coordinates as selected by the crew. The terrain database shall be Common Mapping Standard (CMS) compatible IAW ESD-02155046A004. The system shall store 1500 threats with characteristics, 124 Navigation Reference Points (NRPs), a 100 consecutive waypoint flight plan, a 124 non-consecutive waypoint flight plan, 15 threat areas with dimensions, moving NRPs, and 10 no-fly zones with dimensions.
The system shall calculate threat intervisibility for all or selected EOB and OB updates when directed. Threat acquisition and detection zones shall be color-coded based on lethality and ECM effectiveness. Threat systems that cannot be identified by the sensor package shall be displayed with an unambiguous and contrasting vignette to the aircrew. The intervisibility calculations shall be selectable between a dynamic state for the changing altitude of the aircraft or based on set clearance planes. To avoid a constantly changing display during dynamic intervisibility calculations, a threshold delta shall be used to accommodate minor and transient altitude changes. The results of the intervisibility calculations shall be displayed allowing the crews to read through the threat plot and see the map data. Threat intervisibility calculations shall be from individual threat locations, not site-centered locations. Detection ranges and intervisibility shall be calculated from the threat acquisition/tracking device. Lethality ranges and intervisibility shall be calculated from the threat weapon location. The system shall notify the aircrew when a threat has been identified within 0.5 seconds and present the pop-up threat and intervisibility within 2 seconds, 99% of the time, with a desired goal of 1 second. The system shall be capable of resolving EOB display information to the individual radar location as display range is reduced. Individual radars and threats with intervisibility, or only edges of combined intervisibility, shall be crewmember selectable options at all ranges in addition to the requirement for display as range is reduced. When 2 or more overlays or symbols overlap, the system shall present the top priority overlays or symbol. The priority of the overlay and symbology shall be determined by the CSWG (crew station working group).
The SMM shall provide a central, non-volatile repository of data for the aircraft systems and sufficient data storage capacity and access speed (read and write) to fully support all of the functions of the TAWS, FMS, Moving Map and all other applicable components of the AMP, including the AFSOC EW Bus and ESA systems. The SMM, including data input and output paths, shall have adequate capacity to ensure overall system performance is maintained and growth provisions are provided for. The SMM shall provide sufficient redundancy and protection from single point failure to ensure reliable operation. The system shall provide an efficient, automated means for loading and updating information stored in the SMM.
The SMM shall, as a minimum, include concurrent storage provisions, without in-flight reloading, for:
The system shall have the capability to interface with the ABI system, per "Draft" AMC ORD 315-92, Airborne Broadcast Intelligence (ABI), AKA, Real Time Information In The Cockpit (RTIC).
The map system shall present the EOB data and updates as symbols. The EOB and updates shall be presented at the actual threat latitude/longitude or UTM coordinates. The EOB symbols shall be common throughout the C-130 fleet. AFSOC AC/MC-130 moving map systems shall be able to overlay radar, infrared, and TV real-time video.
The system shall provide display resolution to the individual radar location as display range is reduced. The system shall provide a crew selectable option to display individual radars and threats with intervisibility, or only edges of combined visibility. The system shall provide color coding of acquisition and threat detection zones based on lethality and ECM effectiveness, consistent with CWG guidance. The moving map system shall receive, store, and present pop-up threat data from the various onboard sensor systems as well as from off-board broadcasts.
Threats detected by the on-board EW sensors and from off-board sources shall be presented on the MFDs with threat detection and engagement intervisibility as required by crew position. Detailed threat data shall be made available in a window-type display by selecting the item or area on the MFD. The system reception time from subsystem output to display of the data shall not exceed one second 99% of the time.
The map system shall calculate threat intervisibility for all or selected EOB and OB updates when directed. These calculations shall be based on the individual threat location (not site-centered data), DTED, threat radius (maximum effective range, radar range limit, Plan Position Indicator (PPI) limit, etc), and aircraft altitude supplied by the mission computer. Threat systems which cannot be identified by the aircraft sensor package shall be displayed with an unambiguous and contrasting vignette to the aircrew. The intervisibility calculations shall be selectable between either a dynamic state for the changing altitude of the aircraft, or based on set clearance planes. To avoid a constantly changing display during dynamic intervisibility calculations, a threshold delta of 25 feet shall be used to accommodate minor and transient altitude changes. The results of the intervisibility calculations shall be displayed, allowing the crew to read through the threat plot and see the map data. Required operator-selectable overlays are threat intervisibility plots of ground threats, current on-board threat detectable emanation radius and tracks of airborne threats, and consolidated EW warning.
TAWS terrain data imagery shall be displayed per the format of ARINC 708. The terrain shall be displayed relative to the aircraft and shall provide visual indication of terrain that presents a threat distinct from terrain that is not a threat. A perspective view of the terrain information shall be provided.
The display shall also provide positive indication for geographic areas not in the terrain database (e.g., floor alert). The terrain display shall be available at all times. A means to "pop up" the terrain display during warning conditions shall be provided. The terrain display shall be selectable during warning conditions.
The capability shall be provided to display radar imagery on any MFD(s) as selected by the individual crewmember. Imagery shall be displayed in color where color significantly enhances presentation. The system shall be capable of simultaneously displaying two radar modes on different displays (e.g., ground map and beacon). Radar imagery shall be selectable as an overlay on the other imagery sources.
The pilots’ radar presentation shall be stabilized relative to aircraft heading unless operating in slave mode. In slave mode, the stabilization is that selected by the aircrew. The source for stabilizing and orienting the presentation shall be selectable as Heading Up, Track Up, Drop Zone/Landing Zone Up, or north up (true, grid, or magnetic according to navigation system mode). The radar presentation shall be in range and azimuth with ground range in nautical miles (NM) from the nose of the aircraft and azimuth in degrees relative to the selected stabilization source. The radar presentation shall also provide overlays of current heading, altitude, compass rose, selected range and range mark separations, mode, system health, and antenna tilt angle.
The Flight plan display shall be available on all MFDs and shall provide a composite of the existing SOF flight plan display capabilities for all SOF aircraft.
Engine and Aircraft Systems Information Function
The engine and aircraft systems information function (EASIF) shall be displayed to the pilot, copilot, and flight engineer using the MFDs.
The EASIF shall display contain engine performance menus that contain engine RPM, turbine inlet temperature (TIT), torque, fuel flow rate, Beta lights, oil temperature, oil pressure, oil cooler flap, and oil quantity. The caution advisory panel shall include, as a minimum, low engine oil and low propeller oil warnings. Each EASIF shall be displayed within a contiguous, single display area as the primary means of engine performance monitoring.
A digital fuel quantity indicator, that is at least as reliable as the system currently installed on FY95 and FY96 C-130H3 aircraft, is required on all C-130s.
An integrated Cautions, Warnings, and Advisory (CWA) function is required. When two or more Warning or Advisory situations occur simultaneously (TCAS, TAWS, Engine, etc.), the presentation of audio warnings and corresponding CWA information displays shall be prioritized such that higher priority is given to the situation which requires a more immediate response to ensure the safety of the aircraft. Existing CWAs may remain where they are if they are tied to the Master Caution and Warning which will call the crew's attention to them. The CWA function shall be presented within a contiguous, single presentation area, which may be shared with the navigation information function or the engine information function. Cautions and Warnings shall be annunciated by both a Master Caution and a Master Warning alert in the primary field of view, distinct aural tones, and an indication or message. The CWA function shall require redundant operational capability and be fail-operational.
CDTI (Cockpit Display of Traffic Information) shall be provided for presentation on all multi-function displays as selected by crewmembers occupying those stations. When displayed as an overlay the TCAS information shall be automatically scaled to the selected range scale.
Control and Data EntryThe flight crew shall be provided those controls necessary to perform all mission tasks. Controls shall include, but not be limited to; flight parameters, display format selection, communication, navigation, radar, and defensive systems. The control function shall provide redundant operational capability and be fail-operational.
Brightness ControlThe brightness control function shall control the edge-lighted panels, the individual display elements, and the lighting for the pilot and copilot stations, as well as SMC, ACM, and flight engineer stations, as applicable. The brightness control shall be fail-passive.
* Assumes minimum of two displays. I = Interleave O = Overlay
Table 3.3.6.7 Display Interleaving/Overlay
The DTD is an electronic vehicle for entry, storage, and download of mission and maintenance data to/from the host platform. Flight plans, mission parameters’ values, and communication plans, which are preplanned on the ground prior to a mission, are loaded into the DTD.
The DTD shall be used to transfer stored, primary mission and maintenance data to/from the platform, and to/from maintenance information systems, mission planning systems and intelligence systems. The DTD shall be compatible with aircraft A/W/E and current and planned mission and flight planning stations. The DTD shall receive Electronic Order of Battle (EOB), Communications Order of Battle (COB) and other OB data and updates. The DTD shall record the OB data and updates as well as read and upload the intelligence broadcast receiver EOB.
The DTD shall store maintenance data and retrieve and store EOB data for intelligence de-briefings. The time required to upload or download to the DTD, by MDS, shall not exceed current capability with an objective to reduce the time required by a factor of 10 (TBR).
The DTD shall be zeroized when the DTD is installed in the platform and a system zeroize action is performed. The DTD shall also be capable of being zeroized via a single aircrew action when not installed in the system.
DTD Mission SupportThe DTD shall transfer the following mission-specific data as a minimum:
Reversionary FMS database of at least 200 Navigation Waypoints
Terminal procedures
Airdrop data such as CARP (computed air release point), HARP (high altitude release point)
Custom databases consisting of pre-planned data such as the following:
communication frequencies
EOB/COB and other OB,
1500 threats with characteristics
15 threat areas with dimensions
MATT or equivalent software and filter settings (CAAP)
Digital terrain maps for mission area (multiple resolution)
moving nav reference points
custom-defined waypoints (100 for Combat Delivery/
500 for AFSOC)Adaptation data for AC-130H/U gunship
All overhead and offset markpoints created in the system shall be stored and subsequently transferred to the mission DTD for post-mission purposes.
The DTD shall be utilized to record fault history data.
Each MFD shall be identical in performance capability, and shall be able to display the functions described in paragraph 3.3.5. Each MFD shall be capable of presenting either monochromatic or 256-color imagery, at a minimum, with a goal of supporting 24-bit color. The display system shall simultaneously support monochrome and color display generation. Monochrome imagery shall be displayed as 16 shades of gray, as a minimum.
Latency of displayed data shall be minimized to the extent that the crew does not perceive a delay between control inputs and systems response.
New or modified C-130 displays shall meet the performance characteristics of Table 3.3.67.
Table 3.3.6 Display Visual Performance Requirements
Parameter |
Requirement |
Temporal Artifacts |
No significant delayed response, flicker, ratcheting, or jerking of symbology visible from design eye point, or retention of image commanded to be removed |
Spatial Artifacts |
No significant aliasing, moiré, line or pixel structure visible from design eye point |
Pixel or subpixel defects or failures |
No defects or blemishes of sufficient size, shape or luminance to cause distraction or erroneous interpretation |
Data Freeze |
Display of stale or otherwise erroneous data shall meet the requirements for prevention of HMI above. |
Cockpit displays shall be fully legible in all lighting environments from full sunshine to darkness. The follow 3 specific situations may be sued to simulate the full range ambient lighting. (1) 8,000 foot-candles (fc) of sunlight directly incident on the display with 500 fL (foot-lamberts) of luminance incident at the specular angle, (2) 2,000 fc of illumination incident on the display with 2,000 fL of luminance incident at the specular angle, (3) darkness, i.e., less than 0.1 fc. The relationship between these light sources and the display should follow the guidance in MIL-HDBK-87213.
The Display Unit shall be legible (readable) anywhere from within a solid viewing angle bounded by an ellipse having its major axis oriented horizontally and extended from 60 degrees to the left to 60 degrees to the right of the display central viewing axis and with its minor axis located in a vertical plane and extending from 20 degrees below to 20 degrees above the central viewing axis. As a design goal the Display Unit horizontal viewing angle shall be from 65 degrees to the left to 65 degrees to the right of the central view axis. The central viewing axis of the Display Unit is defined as a line from the center of the display to the design eyepoint for a display installed in the instrument panel directly in front of the pilot.
The displays shall not exhibit any apparent color shift in imagery or symbology when viewed with the display unit viewing angle described above. Compliance with this legibility requirement shall be established by demonstrating compliance with all of the Display Unit contrast, luminance, and color fidelity requirements of this specification, for both day and night ambient illuminations viewing conditions.
The Display shall produce a minimum contrast of 4.0 (i.e., a contrast ratio of 5:1) for graphics and alphanumerics imagery in the specified combined diffuse/specular display environments (see legibility requirements).)
This contrast shall be met from any angle within a symmetrically centered solid elliptical viewing angle having major and minor axis which are 75% of those of the overall solid elliptical viewing angle (i.e., major axis = ± 45 degrees, minor axis =± 15 degrees.) A minimum contrast of 3.0 shall be met or exceeded in the balance of the overall display viewing area. The Display shall be capable of producing imagery at a contrast of at least 50 in a dark ambient on the central viewing axis.
The area averaged maximum luminance of the Display Unit shall be capable of being controlled by the crew so as to produce a minimum difference luminance (see MIL-HDBK-87213) of 160 fL or greater, irrespective of the ambient illuminance level.
When the area-averaged difference luminance of the Display Unit white and maximum NVIS radiance color imagery is set to 0.5 fL, the spectral radiance emissions of the displays when measured in accordance with ASC/ENFC 96-01 shall not exceed the NVIS Radiance permitted for Type I, Class B multicolor electronic displays. The maximum difference luminance of the red and blue primary colors shall be sufficient to produce the specific display color palette "white" chromaticity, at an area-averaged minimum difference luminance of 160 fL or greater, irrespective of the ambient lighting conditions.
The luminance of any symbol, segment of a symbol, vector or area, when compared to other symbols or areas of like kind and chromaticity, shall not vary by more than ± 30% of the average across the usable area of the display. The luminance of any symbol, segment of a symbol, vector or area, when compared to other symbols or areas of like kind and chromaticity, shall not vary by more than ± 10% of the average across any 1 cm diameter area of the display. Background display areas whether "off" during positive contrast image portrayals or "on" during negative contrast image portrayals shall appear uniform with no noticeable blotches or mottling.
Luminance uniformity shall be maintained throughout the entire range of luminance control. Luminance non-uniformity shall be defined as ((maximum or minimum luminance – average luminance) divided by the average luminance) times 100 to get percent. Average luminance shall be defined as (maximum luminance +– minimum luminance) divided by 2.
Displays shall achieve a Stray Light Luminance Ratio (SLLR) of TBD for white symbols and TBD for black background areas. SLLR of white is defined as the luminance of a white area measured from the design eye to the luminance of the same area measured from anywhere outside a xx degree cone about the central viewing axis. SLLR of black is defined as the luminance of TBD.
The VDS shall route all video signals from any video source to any destination on board the aircraft. The routing shall be controlled by system software. This routing function shall be non-blocking such that the routing of a given source to a destination shall not preclude routing that same source to any or all other destinations. If any such blocking is deemed appropriate, it shall be controlled by system software. The VDS video signal format shall be in accordance with an open video standard (e.g., EIA or SMPTE). The selected signal format shall support both color and monochrome images. The VDS shall route color and monochrome video signals simultaneously.
The VDS shall accommodate legacy video sources and destinations. If required, a format conversion shall be provided. A given video signal shall be converted no more than once.
The method for routing color video shall not degrade the video image. The selections of the video signal format shall consider compatibility with commercially available video components. The VDS shall seamlessly provide monochrome versions of all color display images for use on legacy monochrome monitors.
The VDS carries critical display information. Therefore, it shall be fault-tolerant. There shall be no single point failures in the system. The VDS shall provide redundancy to allow the system to perform at full function with some failed components.
The VDS shall be designed with a growth capability. The VDS shall initially have a 50% spare capacity for inputs and outputs. Additional video components (e.g. sources, displays) shall be added without affecting existing components. The VDS shall be extendible if more channels than the 50% reserve are needed.
The VRS shall utilize unmodified readily commercially available recording media. The media shall be accessible during flight, and shall be removable by the crew. A unit of media (e.g. tape, cartridge) shall have a recording capacity of TBD hours. The VRS shall record any signal handled by the VDS. The VRS shall accept the VDS video signal format, and shall convert the VDS signal format to a form recordable on readily available, unmodified, commercially available recording media.
The VRS shall not degrade the recorded images more than I % (TBR). The VRS shall have the ability to playback recorded signals during flight. The VRS shall, as a minimum, record TBD# of video channels, simultaneously. The final number shall be MDS specific. The VRS shall be modularly extendible to provide the requisite number of channels, and to provide for future growth.
System Lighting General RequirementsLighting shall be compatible with the use of Night Vision Goggles (NVGs). All lighting on the flight deck and cargo compartment shall be NVIS compatible in accordance with the requirements specified herein including stated exceptions.
The new lighting shall be equal to or better than the existing lighting systems for daylight and naked eye night operations. The modification shall permit normal use and readability of all aircraft controls, instruments and displays during all operating conditions with and without NVIS.
All new light producing equipment installed by this document and existing equipment which radiates light shall meet the requirements of ASFC/ENFC 96-01 Type 1 Class B With the exceptions stated below:
Existing lighting controls shall be utilized to the maximum extent possible. The cockpit thunderstorm lights shall not be modified.
All new or existing red warning lights shall be modified to NVIS compatible red in accordance with the chromaticity and NVIS radiance requirements specified in ASC/ENFC 96-01.
The cargo compartment floodlights may be replaced with NVIS compatible green lights or an additional system may be added. Cargo compartment floor lighting shall not be modified. The Cargo compartment shall be equipped with NVIS-compatible red no drop (jump lights).
New or modified lighting, control and display components required for the integrated avionics display suite shall not cause any interference with the usage of Type I Class B NVIS devices. New lighting controls required shall not induce delays in cognitive recognition of aircraft performance or flight instruments or induce crew misorientation and/or disorientation of aircraft flight attitude or parameters.
The luminance and contrast of the NVIS compatible lighting shall be sufficient to support crew operations throughout the flight environment. All lighting modifications shall be permanently installed (but removable for maintenance) and not requiring modification by the flight crew to achieve NVIS compatibility. There shall be no degradation to visual acuity through the aircraft windscreen with the unaided eye or the NVIS due to reflections on the windscreen from any lighting or lighting reflections emanating from within the cockpit with the NVIS compatible lighting at normal operational luminance.
NVIS compatible flood lights and map lights shall be provided at the ACM and SMC stations.
NVIS compatible White filters may be used for instrument overlay filters
NVIS friendly position lights shall replace the existing position lights. The NVIS friendly position lights shall meet FAR 25.1385 through FAR 25.1397 and shall not noticeably degrade the NVIS during formation flying. Formation flying intervals is 2000 ft. minimum.
Cross-cockpit viewing (pilot to copilot’s and copilot to pilot’s instruments) of primary flight instruments shall not be degraded. The Pilot’s and Copilot’s Instrument Panels shall be designed for a luminance uniformity not to exceed 2:1 between instruments.
All caution, warning, and advisory lights (including pod status lights) shall be readable in an ambient light level of 10,000 foot-candles incident on the display from any direction (non-specular).
All existing amber, green and white annunciation lights shall be modified to NVIS compatible Green B except as otherwise specified herein. All other lighting (flood lights, instrument lights and edge lit panel lights etc.) shall be modified to NVIS compatible Green A. All red annunciators, caution, warning, and advisory lights shall be modified to NVIS compatible red. All amber annunciators, caution, warning, and advisory lights shall be modified to NVIS compatible yellow B. All green annunciators, caution, and advisory lights shall be modified to NVIS compatible green B.
All lighting (to include caution, warning, advisory and panel lights) in the cargo compartment shall be permanently modified to NVIS compatibility with exception of the existing floor floodlights, loading floodlights and the overhead white floodlights. Cargo NVIS compatible floodlights shall be installed and they shall provide both bright and dim levels. The existing red flood lights may be modified for NVIS compatibility or a new NVIS compatible flood light system may be added. The dim level shall be low enough to provide paratrooper night vision acclimation - 0.1 fL.
The cargo jump lights shall be modified to NVIS compatible Green B. The cargo jump caution lights shall be modified to NVIS compatible Red. The jump and jump caution lights shall be readable in an ambient light level of 10,000 foot-candles (non-specular) incident on the display from all directions when viewed plus and minus forty five degrees to either side of a line normal with the surface of the display. The jump caution NVIS Red light shall have an NVIS radiance of less than 1.4x10-7 at a luminance of 15.0-foot lamberts (fL).
The required radios and equipment shall have the capability of being operated simultaneously without causing degradation of communications, equipment performance or security.
Voice communication systems (VHF, HF, UHF, and SATCOM, if installed) shall be integrated with the aircraft ICS (Interphone Communication System), and shall interface with the FMS for mission coordination purposes to deliver a fully coordinated mission voice-data package. SATCOM, VHF, and HF communications systems shall provide a data link capability, and shall also provide/maintain VHF, HF, and SATCOM voice capability. Secure Voice/Data encryption, anti-jam/anti-spoof capabilities shall be provided for all communications systems.
Communication System ComponentsSystem components shall include, at a minimum: dual VHF, dual HF, dual UHF, SATCOM, digital ICS, and secure communication systems. The VHF, SATCOM, and HF systems shall support data link capabilities; a worldwide data link capability to support air traffic control (ATC) and command and control (C2) functions, and a communications management function (CMF).
The communication system shall meet the GATM requirements. The system should provide the cockpit crew with the capability to talk simultaneously on any combination of VHF, UHF, HF, and SATCOM radios from all cockpit crew position and the ability to transmit and receive on all radios from any crew position.
The VHF, UHF and SATCOM radios shall be capable of receiving time from the aircraft GPS to synchronize frequency hopping during anti-jam modes. The communication system control display(s) shall display the actual frequency selected in all modes.
Existing SATCOM communication capabilities shall be retained and integrated into the overall system such that aircrew and/or mission crew communications capabilities are not degraded. The communication system shall also provide for a manual control (Hard Wired) solution that provides emergency backup VHF/UHF voice capability. These radios shall receive power from the aircraft battery bus.
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) RequirementAll proposed radio systems must comply with the JTRS architecture and standards. For any radio systems other that the Airborne Integrated Terminal (AIT) or the JTRS, a waiver must be obtained from the JTRS Joint Program Office.
The Communications Management Function (CMF) shall prevent single point failures. A dual CMU (Communications Management Unit) or functional equivalent is required to act as a router for the data link applications and shall be capable of hosting data link applications. The communications management function shall comply with the functional and interface requirements of ARINC Characteristic 758. The CMF shall support operation over the existing ATC/airline operational control (AOC) data link ground infrastructure and provide a clear growth path to support operation over the planned aeronautical telecommunications network (ATN).
The UHF system shall be capable of worldwide air-to-air and air-to-ground traffic control in the 225 - 400 MHz frequency bands. Existing UHF capability shall be integrated into the CMF function including control for power up, frequency selection, mode control, volume/squelch control, antenna selection, and secure/plain selection. The system shall be compatible with, and capable of operating in UHF voice, DF (direction finder), and anti-jam modes including Have Quick I and II.
Existing Military SATCOM capability shall be retained and integrated with the CMF. The military SATCOM system utilized on these aircraft must maintain the current capabilities including voice capability. The military SATCOM system shall be compliant with the CJCS DAMA/DASA SATCOM requirements.
The SATCOM system shall provide both line-of-sight and satellite data communications in the 225 - 400 MHz frequency bands. The system shall be capable of operation in both the 25 kHz and 5 kHz bandwidths. A SATCOM data link system that is compliant with ICAO SARPs is required to provide a second, independent, worldwide data link capability to support ATC and C2 functions. The SATCOM system shall provide priority-preemption schemes to allow it to be shared between ATC and C2 functions.
The SATCOM system shall be compliant with the functional and interface requirements of ARINC 741 (Aviation Satellite Communication System) or ARINC 761 (Second-Generation Aviation Satellite Communication System.)
It is desired that the SATCOM system provide an ICAO SARPs-compliant voice capability that can be used for direct pilot-to-controller communication.
The VHF system shall provide dual VHF AM/FM/SINCGARS capable radios with VHF-AM operation at 25 kHz and 8.33 kHz channel spacing. Dual VHF radios need to be integrated into the CMF function including control for power up, frequency selection, mode control, volume/squelch control, antenna selection, and secure/plain selection.
Radios utilized on AFSOC/ACC aircraft must maintain the capability of operating in the FM high band, Maritime band. (AFSOC, ACC only).
To allow aircraft to operate as general air traffic in European upper airspace, dual radios capable of VHF-AM analog voice operation at reduced (8.33 kHz) channel spacing in accordance with ICAO SARPs (Annex 10, Volume III) are required. Existing 25-kHz channel spacing capability shall be retained (e.g., 125.025 MHz, 125.050 MHz, 125.075 MHz, etc.).
VHF aircraft communications addressing and reporting system (ACARS) and VHF digital link (VDL) Mode 2 (aviation VHF packet communication, AVPAC) capabilities are required. It is desired that the GATM radios have a well-defined upgrade path to meet future requirements for line-of-sight data link communications: VDL Mode 3, time-division multiple-access (TDMA) digitized voice and data; and VDL Mode 4, self-organizing TDMA.
The HF system shall provide worldwide HF single side band (SSB) and amplitude modulated (AM) voice and data communication in the 2 - 29.9999 MHz frequency range. The ACP and control is required for HF frequency hopping. Time of day shall be provided from the GPS system.
Dual HF radios shall be integrated into the CMF function including control for power up, frequency selection, mode control, volume/squelch control, antenna selection, and secure/plain selection. A high frequency data link (HFDL) system that is compliant with ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) is required to provide a worldwide data link capability to support ATC and C2 functions. The HFDL system shall provide priority-preemption schemes to allow the system to be shared between ATC and C2 functions. The HFDL system shall be compliant with ARINC 635 (HF Data Link Protocols) and with the functional and interface requirements of ARINC 753 (HF Data Link System).
Communication encryption (voice and data) shall be provided for all UHF, VHF, HF, and military SATCOM radios. The use of secure equipment shall be operator selectable. Secure devices should have a centralized load panel that will enable all cryptographic processors to be loaded from one central point. The secure devices shall be accessible so that a crewmember can load each unit individually in the event of centralized loading failure. The secure equipment shall include plain, cipher, and cipher text only modes of operation. The HF secure equipment shall include Plain and Cipher Text Only modes of operation.
All communications radios shall be compatible with, and include, a suitable anti-jam mode. All systems shall be certified to be supportable in the electromagnetic spectrum.
A highly reliable, digitally controlled central intercommunications system that is compatible with active noise reduction (ANR) headsets is required. The ICS shall allow monitoring of and transmission on all radios from all ICS locations as selected by individual crewmembers. The ICS shall support the capability to talk simultaneously on any combination of VHF, UHF, HF, & SATCOM radios from all cockpit crew positions. The ICS shall be capable of supporting, as a minimum, the same number of ICS units as existing combat delivery aircraft with no degradation as more crewmembers utilize the system. The ICS shall provide audio warnings, EMI shielding, high quality sound, and EW threat audio. System shall include the ability to address passengers and crew through a speaker system in the cockpit and cargo compartment. Audio transmissions shall be intelligible at all operational ambient noise levels. In the event of a main aircraft power failure, the ICS shall remain operable. The ICS system should have 50 percent reserve capability for audio inputs (e.g., an additional radio, an additional defensive system tone, etc.). As a minimum, all aircrew members shall be able to talk with each other and the aircrew shall have an emergency radio useable at all times.
Intercommunications System (AFSOC Only)For all AFSOC aircraft, compatibility with a wireless intercom system is required (AC/MC-130). For AFSOC aircraft, the ICS shall be capable of supporting up to 23 units (AC-130U/H) with no degradation as more crewmembers utilize the system. For all AFSOC aircraft, the ICS shall have, as a minimum, three private nets with imbedded isolation nets. The ICS shall provide the capability to talk simultaneously on any combination of VHF, UHF, HF, & SATCOM radios from all crew positions.
For EC-130 aircraft, the ICS shall be capable of supporting up to 24 units with no degradation as more crewmembers utilize the system. For HC-130 aircraft the ICS shall be compatible with a wireless intercom system, must be able to support one additional cockpit unit above the standard combat delivery requirement, and will not decrease the existing number of ICS units in the aircraft cargo compartment.
A cockpit printer shall be installed as part of the avionics suite. The printer shall be able to print, as a minimum, all Air Traffic Control information including flight plans received from off board sources through the avionics suite. The printer should also be able to print information from the avionics computers, terminal area products, and have the fidelity to print charts and photos (not photo quality) for use by the crew.
A FAA TSO-C-124a compliant solid state digital flight data recorder with at least 25 hours of solid state memory to record data is required. Data bus monitoring is required to ensure that necessary parameters are recorded, including those from display and HUD systems that have no analyzable hardware for accident investigation.
The system shall have the capability to record, as a minimum, all of the 88 parameters identified in Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 121, Appendix M, that are applicable to C-130 aircraft, plus engine fuel flow, TIT, and all engine/propeller synchrophaser control parameters for each engine. The system shall also be capable of recording engine parameters a minimum of once per second. Additionally, the capability for the recorder to record, for aircraft so equipped, the structural life history data is desired.
A solid state CVR with at least two hours of solid state memory and a minimum of four-channel capability is required. The CVR shall comply with FAA TSO-C123a.
Dual redundant DFDR and CVR capabilities are an objective. DFDR/CVR annunciation, displays, and controls shall be readable during the day, or at night, and shall be accessible by at least one crewmember. Actual annunciator placement shall be determined in the Cockpit Working Group.
DFDR/CVR Requirements DFDR/CVR General RequirementsInstallation of the DFDR and CVR unit(s) shall be in accordance with Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR), Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Part 25, to the maximum extent practical. The contractor shall recommend placement locations for the DFDR and CVR unit(s), so that the first unit(s) is in compliance with FAR Part 25, and the second unit(s) is as far from the first unit(s) as practical while still maximizing survivability and maintenance access.
The DFDR shall comply with FAA TSO-C124a. The CVR shall comply with FAA TSO-C123a. The DFDR and CVR shall be equipped with a self-powered, underwater acoustic beacon to assist with location in the event of loss during an overwater flight.
The DFDR/CVR system shall be self monitoring, and shall alert the operator in the event of failure of critical system components. The DFDR/CVR system shall have provisions for a back-up power source in the event of loss of all aircraft-generated power. The back-up power source shall be capable of providing operating power to the DFDR/CVR system for a minimum of 20 minutes. The DFDR/CVR system shall be capable of recording data bus information from various aircraft data bus standards as required.
The system shall provide the capability to verify system functionality and performance at the local unit (O-level maintenance). The ability to verify system functionality shall include down load and analysis of data as necessary to check the system. The operating unit should be able to use existing resources for this verification.
Up to two months worth of DFDR data as well as all data currently collected manually on AFTO form 151A shall be stored on aircraft. The entry of AFTO form 151A shall be automated. This data does not have to be stored in a crashworthy medium. The system shall be designed to allow periodic downloading of structural life history data by O-level maintenance personnel.
The CVR shall be capable of recording a minimum of four channels of voice data. However, six channels are desired. The CVR shall be integrated with the Interphone Communications System (ICS) and radio circuits, and shall monitor the pilot, the copilot, the flight engineer, and a wide-area microphone (channels one through four). The remaining two channels, if available, are undefined, and are to be reserved for future use.
The CVR shall have a minimum capacity to store two hours of recorded voice data on solid-state media prior to overwriting. The CVR shall record all audio annunciations provided to the aircrew through the ICS.
The CVR and DFDR must have the capability to be declassified, turned off, or operated in an OPSEC mode to preclude recording sensitive mission data in non-volatile memory.
The Flight Management System (FMS) for the C-130 aircraft shall provide automatic performance optimized, guidance along two-, three-, and four-dimensional paths. Parameters that shall be used for control are the energy-state of the aircraft, computation of speed, altitude, vertical and lateral track error, flight path angle, and vertical and lateral track angle. The control commands and indications, and path guidance/deviation data shall be displayed to the flight crew on the flight instruments such that a seamless horizontal and vertical path between the start and end of the planned flight can be achieved. The system shall include numerous functional improvements and additional functions required, satisfying the future operational mission of the C-130 aircraft fleet. The following functions shall be included in the FMS:
The C-130 AMP system shall include a dual integrated FMS, dual integrated GPS and dual integrated INS (inertial navigation system). The C-130 AMP system shall meet all technical and system performance requirements in RTCA/DO-236 for RNP-1, RTCA DO-229A (Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Global Positioning System/Wide Area Augmentation System Airborne Equipment), and requirements set forth in ARINC Characteristic 702A (Advanced Flight Management Computer System).
The FMS/GPS shall have a clearly defined upgrade path to Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS) being currently defined by RTCA.
The FMS shall be four-dimensional. The AMP FMS shall provide the C-130 aircraft with a self-contained navigation capability. The AMP FMS as well as the AMP system shall be able to perform all missions at all Lat/Lon points around the globe including the North and South Poles.
The navigation sensors shall be integrated so that the failure of a primary sensor shall cause the system to automatically revert to alternate navigation sensors and/or subsystems, and notify the aircrew that a failure has occurred and indicate the new mode of operation. The current radio navigation aid capabilities shall be retained and integrated into the overall AMP/FMS system or radio management unit and CMU:
VHF Omni-directional range (VOR)
Distance measuring equipment (DME)
Tactical air navigation (TACAN)
Microwave landing system (MLS)
Instrument landing system (ILS)
Automatic direction finder (ADF).
Personnel Locating System (PLS)
The FMS shall meet or exceed the functional requirements of FAA AC 20-130A for multi-sensor systems integrating TSO C-129a class A1, B1, or C1 sensors. The current Doppler Velocity Sensor (DVS) capabilities shall be retained and integrated into the overall AMP/FMS system. INS capability shall be retained as part of the multi-sensor navigation system. The INS-only capability shall be retained as a back-up navigation capability in the event of loss or failure of the GPS signal or receiver, and the GPS-only capability shall be retained as a back-up navigation capability in the event of loss or failure of the INS.
A capability shall be provided that shall allow the aircrew to select any navigation mode. Means to check and align the bore-sight of navigation sensor equipment during maintenance actions shall be provided.
New geospatial information shall be converted to and stored in the World Geodetic System-84 (WGS-84) coordinate system to support navigation and approach operations.
The dual FMS shall provide fully automatic and coupled solution for precision airdrop for both high and low altitudes and airborne radar approach functions that are included in existing aircraft. The dual FMS shall provide, at a minimum, the same functionality for munitions delivery as currently employed on the AC-130H and AC-130U.
The FMS shall comply with TSO-C129, Section (3)(ix)(2) for Waypoint Entry; Section (3)(x)(1) for Waypoint Storage; and Section (3)(xi)(1) and (2) for Waypoint or Leg Sequencing. The database shall conform to ARINC Specification 424, Navigation System Database.
FMS Functional DescriptionThe FMS shall provide the following functions: navigation, fight planning, lateral and vertical guidance, performance optimization and prediction, air-ground data link, and pilot interfaces via the MFD and MCDU displays. The following paragraphs provide a summary description of these characteristics, with references to their functional descriptions as described in ARINC Characteristic 702A.
Functional Initialization and Activation (paragraph 4.2)
Navigation (paragraph 4.3.1) - The navigation function determines the position and velocity of the aircraft, using input data from all appropriate sources. The outputs include position in terms of altitude, latitude and longitude, and velocity in terms of ground speed and track angle, wind, true and magnetic headings, drift angle, magnetic variation, and inertial flight path angle.
Flight Planning (paragraph 4.3.2) - This function provides the sequence of waypoints, airways, flight levels, departure procedures, and arrival procedures to fly from the origin to the destination, and/or alternates. The flight plan may be entered manually on the MCDU, or automatically by uplink via the air-ground data link. A navigation database in the FMS contains the necessary data associated with every flight plan element identifier for the entire aircraft flight domain.
Lateral and Vertical Navigation (paragraph 4.3.3) -Lateral guidance is computed with respect to great circle paths defined by the flight plan, and to transitional paths between the great circle paths, or to preset headings or courses. Vertical guidance is computed with respect to altitudes assigned to waypoints, or to paths defined by stored or computed profiles. Speed control along the desired path is provided during all phases of flight.
Trajectory Predictions (paragraph 4.3.3.1) - This function predicts distance, time, speed, altitude, and gross weight at each future waypoint in the flight plan, including computed waypoints such as top-of-climb and top-of-descent.
Performance Calculations Function (paragraph 4.3.4) - The objective of this function is to optimize the vertical and speed profiles to minimize the cost of the flight and to provide Take Off and Landing Data (TOLD).
Air-Ground Data Link - Two-way data communication can be provided to the airline operations facility and to ATS (Air Traffic Service). Tactical Airlift Control Center (TACC) Functions (4.3.6) permits uplinking of data, such as flight plans, weather data, takeoff speeds, preflight initializations, etc., from the airline operations facility directly into the FMS, via the ACARS or ATN network.
CNS/ATM (air traffic management) Functions (paragraph 4.3.7) is used to communicate predefined ATS controller-to-pilot uplink and pilot-to-controller downlink messages via the MCDU.
Pilot Interface via the MCDU (6.0) - The MCDU is the pilot interface to the FMS. It transmits button pushes to the FMS, and displays data on the MCDU screen in response to transmissions from the FMS. The MCDU may also provide backup functions should both FMSs fail.
Navigation Display Interface (paragraph 4.3.10 and section 7) - The FMS generates a variety of data for display on the MFD for display of command and reference data on the Primary Flight Display (PFD), and for graphic map display of the flight plan on the Navigational Display (ND) as well as display of dynamic data such as ground speed, wind, etc.
CMU Interface (paragraph 4.3.11 and section 8)
Predictive Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) (paragraph 4.3.12)
Integrity Monitoring and Alerting (paragraph 4.3.14)
Database/Database Loading (Section 9)
The system should provide for the initialization of various navigation sensors.
Same as ARINC Characteristic 702A paragraph 4.3.1.
Same as ARINC Characteristic 702A paragraph 4.3.1.1 with the addition of integrating the existing Doppler Velocity Sensor (DVS).
Same as ARINC Characteristic 702A paragraph 4.3.1.2 with the addition of the following:
Navigation Modes - The FMS shall provide the following independent navigation modes:
Pilot |
Copilot |
Integrated KFNS |
Integrated KFNS |
Independent GPS-1 |
Independent GPS-2 |
Independent INS-1 |
Independent INS-2 |
The FMS shall provide the following methods of position update according to the sensor used to establish the position fix: TACAN position update, Distance Measuring Equipment (DME)/DME position update, VOR/DME position update, VOR/VOR position, Visual position update, Radar position update, GPS position update, Infrared position update, Shutdown update, and Altitude updates.
The source of SYSTEM ALTITUDE may be barometric orthometric altitude, baro-inertial orthometric altitude, or GPS orthometric altitude. If the user-selected sensor for SYSTEM ALTITUDE becomes invalid, the alternate sensor shall be selected automatically, and the user shall be advised of the failure and the corresponding change in the source of SYSTEM ALTITUDE. If the user attempts to select a sensor that is invalid, the user shall be advised that the selection is prohibited.
Dual Radar Altimeters shall be integrated into the AMP system and provide ground clearance information from 0 to 50,000 ft. Dual Radar Altimeters shall provide a visual and aural low altitude warning indication if the measured altitude drops below a manually set limit. Their accuracy shall be ( 2% from 0 – 5,000 ft. and ( 1% above 5,000 ft.
Same as ARINC Characteristic 702A paragraph 4.3.1.6.1 with the addition that all User-defined NAVAIDs shall be included in the search for the closest NAVAIDS to be displayed. Thus, the closest NAVAIDS displayed by the FMS shall be a combination of the closest NAVAIDS and User-defined NAVAIDS.
Same as ARINC Characteristic 702A paragraph 4.3.2 with the addition that data can also be extracted from the navigation database that contains parachute ballistics. Also, the data shall be transferable via AFMSS (Air Force Mission Support System), if available, or by other means.
Same as ARINC Characteristic 702A paragraph 4.3.2.1 except that the MFDs shall show the modified flight plan together with the unmodified active flight plan, with unique symbology to differentiate between them. The FMS shall routinely compare the planned route of flight with TAWS and the digital terrain database to determine if the planned three-dimensional route of flight conflicts with the terrain database. This conflict shall be annunciated to the crew. This function shall check all route changes and proposed route changes made in flight. A conflict will be annunciated to the crew and the route change shall not be accepted without change made to resolve the conflict.
The FMS shall also provide near real-time threat avoidance resolution to support automatic and semi-automatic route replanning to increase probability of mission success. Threat data shall include pre-mission threat/tactical information, updates to the pre-mission threat data received in-flight and new information received from onboard defensive systems and, when installed, the Airborne Broadcast Intelligence (ABI), AKA, Real Time Information In The Cockpit (RTIC) as discussed in paragraph 3.3.5.4.1 and the AFSOC Defensive System as discussed in paragraph 3.6.2.
Same as ARINC Characteristic 702A paragraph 4.3.2.2 and section 9, with the addition that the system shall be capable of defining a flight path based on Drop Zone (DZ) data that will calculate and provide guidance to the Computed Air Release Point (CARP) and High Altitude Release Point (HARP). The system shall be also capable of defining a flight path for Rendezvous’ (including aerial refueling rendezvous), Search and Rescue Patterns, and AC-130 Orbits.
In addition to the flight path terminators defined in ARINC 424 and RTCA/DO-236, the FMS shall provide for Radius-of-turn (ROT) and Curved-path (CP) flyover and nonflyover transitions.
The FMS shall have the memory capacity of holding portions of the NIMA DAFIF (Digital Aeronautical Flight Information File) worldwide database, plus additional civilian GPS approach information or have ready access to this information via a mass memory storage. As a minimum the database shall contain the worldwide ICAO waypoint and NAVAID data. This data shall not be lost due to any single point failure. All non-user-defined information contained in the database shall be protected from inadvertent corruption by the user. Flight plans, the DAFIF database, and mission data shall be loaded from the AFMSS portable computer by utilizing the Air Force developed A/W/E. An objective is for the loaded FMS navigation database should be adequate for world-wide operations in all phases of flight without having to load additional data.
Same as ARINC Characteristic 702A paragraph 4.3.2.3 with the addition that the supplemental and temporary NDB shall have a minimum of 200/500 points.
The FMS shall provide the capability to load almanac data into the GPS sensor. Almanac data may be derived from the GPS sensor when the database is not valid.
Same as ARINC Characteristic 702A paragraph 4.3.2.4.1 with the addition of the following:
The FMS shall permit the operator to manually load waypoints by entering either the ICAO identifier or a latitude/longitude coordinate. The FMS shall permit the user to recall waypoints by ICAO identifier or by user defined identifier.
The C-130 AMP system shall be Adverse Weather Aerial Delivery System (AWADS) certified as defined in AFI 55-130.
The FMS shall be able to perform airdrop functions at any point on the globe to include the North and South Poles.
The FMS shall automate the airdrop procedures outlined in AFI 11-2C-130 Volume 3, Operations, to the maximum extent possible. The operator shall have the ability to define a minimum of eight (8) Drop Zones in a flight plan. Each of the eight airdrops shall have an independent set of ballistic parameters for the equipment or personnel to be dropped.
The flight crew may specify the ballistics for either a low altitude release or a high altitude release, and the auto-release method of extraction shall be assumed for the airdrop procedure.
The FMS shall have access to all AFMSS parachute parameters (as defined in AFI 11-231) loaded. Parachute parameters in the database shall be protected from editing/corruption by the operator. This data shall be updateable without an OFP (operational flight plan) change.
The operator shall have the ability to manually validate and update the ballistic values during waypoint definition.
The FMS shall have the capability of performing a rendezvous function. The rendezvous function shall predict the intercept point with a moving target and provide guidance to the rendezvous. The time-tagged position and velocity of the target shall be enterable. The position, velocity, and information provided by TCAS shall be used to determine the intercept point and course. Guidance and steering shall be provided to the intercept point.
The user shall be able to construct four different types of Search and Rescue (SAR) patterns: moving line (creeping line), expanding square, parallel, and sector search.
An automatic infrared sensor scan capability shall be integrated with the SAR guidance function in order to improve the search efficiency when installed.
The orbit guidance function shall provide guidance to fly the aircraft in a specified orbit about a specified point. This mode shall provide position (CDI and glideslope), nominal airspeed, and flight director (pitch and bank) cues to the pilot and co-pilot. These cues shall be available to both pilots’ MFD displays, as well as to both pilots’ HUDS. On the AC-130H/U the cues shall also be available on the side looking HUD. The system shall have the capability to couple to the autopilot providing automatic orbit capability.
Same as ARINC Characteristic 702A, paragraph 4.3.3.3 with the following additions:
There shall be provision for up to eight (8) approaches in the flight plan. Each of the approaches shall have an independent set of parameters that define a three-dimensional descent path; the format of the source data shall be as specified in ARINC 424. Provisions shall be made for allowing temporary and permanent position updates using ownship sensors (e.g. radar, infra-red systems) when defining the three dimensional approach path.
The FMS shall provide lateral and vertical guidance for the airdrop function described in section 3.5.2.1.3.2.5 and in the following sections.
Temporary position fixing shall be activated during an airdrop procedure in order to steer the airplane relative to a sensor aiming point. During an airdrop, Hot Cursor steering shall be provided according to a user-defined offset aiming point, a user-selected vertical sensor, a user-selected aiming sensor (for example, slant range or bearing), and the manual trimming commands for the aiming sensor.
Lateral guidance shall be provided to the release point in accordance with the flight plan.
The FMS shall provide lateral and vertical guidance for the Three-Dimensional RNAV Approach described in section 3.5.2.1.3.2.9 and in the following sections.
Temporary position fixing shall be activated during the approach procedure in order to steer the airplane relative to a sensor aiming point. During ASA, Hot Cursor steering shall be provided according to a user-defined offset aiming point, a user-selected vertical sensor, a user-selected aiming sensor (for example, slant range or bearing), and manual trimming commands for the aiming sensor.
Lateral guidance shall be provided to the touchdown point in accordance with the flight plan, and vertical guidance shall be provided to either the touchdown point or the Missed Approach Point (MAP).
The FMS shall provide lateral and vertical guidance for the rendezvous function.
The FMS shall provide lateral and vertical guidance for the search and rescue function.
The FMS shall provide lateral and vertical guidance for the orbital guidance function.
The system shall provide:
Four-dimensional guidance from the IP through Escape maneuvers.
CARP and HARP calculations IAW AFI 11-231
Flap and deck angle calculations for Container Delivery Systems (CDS) airdrops as described in AFI 11-2C-130 Vol. 3.
Airdrop speed calculations and annunciation.
Calculation of optimum slowdown distance to the drop zone (DZ) as described in AFI 11-2C-130 Vol. 3.
Calculation for the IMC (Instrument Meteorological Conditions) descent point as described in AFI 11-2C-130 Vol. 3.
Calculation of the DZ exit point as described in AFI 11-2C-130 Vol. 3.
The C-130 AMP shall meet the Required Navigation Performance-1 (RNP-1). Accuracy requirements for the lateral navigation function defined in RTCA/DO-236, Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards (MASPS) for Area Navigation. The system shall meet the vertical accuracy requirements as defined in RTCA/DO-236. (These requirements are still in the draft phase and should be approved by the time of the C-130 AMP. If they have not been approved by contract award, the contractor shall make provisions for upgrading the system to the vertical requirements.)
During degraded modes of operation (i.e. loss of GPS), the C-130 AMP shall have a maximum INS/DVS solution CEP
(Circular Error Probability) of 0.25NM.Each of the following sensor systems and principal system components shall comply with the applicable characteristics stated in ARINC 702A Section 5. In general, when a dual capability exists or is specified, the interfaces between each of the dual FMS components and other FMS components shall allow an automatic or manual selection of which unit of a dual system component is functional with each FMS. This is required to support redundant and single-point failure prevention operation of the FMS.
Inertial Navigation System (INS)
Tactical Air Navigation System (TACAN)
VHF Omni Range System (VOR) and Protected-Instrument Landing System (P-ILS)
Automatic Direction Finder (ADF)
Doppler Velocity Sensor (DVS)
Microwave Landing System (MLS)
Station Keeping Equipment (SKE)
Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS)
Global Positioning System (GPS) and Differential Global Positioning System (DGPS)
Multi-purpose Control and Display Unit (MCDU)
The dual Inertial Navigation System (INS) capability shall meet or exceed the performance requirements in SNU 84-1 and 84-MMSRE-011-INS. Replacement or modification/upgrade of the existing INS will be considered as a part of an overall AMP proposed implementation.
The C-130 Tactical Air Navigation System (TACAN), AN/ARN-118 and AN/ARN-139, capability shall be fully integrated with the AMP.
The existing dual VHF Omni Range System (VOR) & Instrument Landing System (ILS) shall be modified or replaced to provide a Protected Instrument Landing System (P-ILS). To prevent operational restrictions, ILS receivers shall meet the immunity to FM broadcast emission requirements as outlined in ICAO Annex 10.
The required approach capability is CAT I minimums; CAT II capability with a growth capability to CAT III is desired. A multi-mode receiver that integrates P-ILS, MLS, and DGPS is desired. The precision approach and landing system solution should be compatible with the Joint Precision Approach and Landing System (JPALS) solution, including local area differential GPS (LADGPS), as it applies to C-130 missions.
The Automatic Direction Finder (ADF) system shall meet or exceed the capabilities of the AN/ARN-149 and be fully integrated into the AMP system.
The existing Doppler Velocity Sensor (DVS) capability shall be retained in the FMS. The DVS shall interface with the appropriate components of the FMS and the DVS functions shall be fully integrated the FMS.
The existing Microwave Landing System (MLS) capability shall be retained in the FMS. The MLS shall interface with the appropriate components of the FMS and the MLS functions shall be fully integrated the FMS. A multi-mode receiver that integrates P-ILS, MLS, and DGPS is desired.
As a minimum, the current AN/APN-169C SKE capability shall be retained and integrated.
Replacement of the existing AN/APN-169C SKE system is desired. If replaced, the replacement system shall, as a minimum provide the following capabilities: Allow aircraft to perform precision airdrops, rendezvous, air refueling, and airland missions at night and in all weather conditions to include instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). The system shall allow as few as 2 aircraft and as many as 100 (250 desired) aircraft to maintain formation position/separation at selectable ranges from 500 feet to 100 NMs at all IFR altitudes. The system shall allow multiple formations to interfly and maintain formation position/ separation at selectable distances from 500 feet to 100 NMs at all IFR altitudes. The system shall have all weather intraformation positioning/collision avoidance capability with all similarly equipped aircraft and with all aircraft currently IMC formation equipped. The system shall be compatible with current and future ground based zone marker (ZM) or compatible systems and shall interrogate system within 40 NMs (100 NMs desired). The system shall provide relative position information on all aircraft in the formation, or a subset of selected aircraft (i.e., element or serial) to include distance, bearing, heading, airspeed, and relative altitude. The system shall provide steering commands to correct and maintain formation position settings. The system shall provide visual and aural proximity and collision warnings of similarly equipped aircraft and other aircraft currently IMC formation equipped that infringe on selected range and provide warnings for loss of signal or system degradation. The system shall be capable of being coupled to and interfacing with the autopilot during all phases of SKE operation including airdrop.
The integrated GPS system, provided by the GPS Joint Program Office, shall be precise positioning service (PPS) equipment which complies, as a minimum with Air Force policy (26 Mar 97 AF/XO message "Implementation of AF Navigation and Safety Master Plan and Policy Clarification for GPWS, ADF, and GPS Navigational Systems"). The integrated GPS shall provide en route, terminal, and non-precision approach operations in accordance with TSO-C129a, class A1, B1, or C1.
The GPS function shall also comply with or meet the intent of RTCA DO-229A for interoperability with the wide-area augmentation system (WAAS), to allow GPS-based navigation through non-precision approach. A CAT II capability using the local-area augmentation system (LAAS) is desired.
The GPS should also be readily upgradable to incorporate the NAVWAR (navigation warfare) solution required by FY06, as specified in Draft ORD AFSPC/ACC 003-92-III for GPS, and should have a growth path for easy upgradability to meet future requirements. GPS receivers should have maximum capability against jamming.
A growth path for differential GPS (DGPS) precision approach and landing capability is required: the required approach capability is CAT I minimums; CAT II capability with a growth capability to CAT III is desired.
The Aerial Delivery System provides for cargo airdrops. Once armed, the flight crew can initiate the release of the pallet shackles (and chute release) via a switch on the center pedestal.
The C-130 FMS shall implement an automatic release control. The copilot shall have a switch that selects the C-130 FMS or manual control of the aerial delivery system.
The Troop Jump System consists of red caution lights and green jump lights that can be activated by a switch on the copilot's side panel.
The C-130 FMS shall implement automatic jump light control. The copilot shall have a switch which selects either the C-130 FMS or manual control of the troop jump system lights. The C-130 FMS shall determine when the lights need to be illuminated and activate the appropriate output discrete.
The SMMU shall be the repository for several types of information. This information shall include but shall not be limited to: 1) National Imaging and Mapping Agency (NIMA) land mass data (for example, Digital Terrain Elevation Data [DTED]), 2) Aircraft performance data (for example vertical "g" capability, gross weight, etc), and 3) Imagery. For purposes of sizing the SMMU, it shall have adequate capacity to store, as a minimum, all of the following:
NIMA electronic terrain data for the entire departure and the entire destination continent at a resolution of 1:250,000 (TBR) or better, plus a two hundred square mile area at 1:25,000 with an objective to store all electronic terrain data in all resolutions available from NIMA at the time of fielding the system
All A/W/E data used by the Special Operations Forces Planning And Rehearsal System (SOFPARS) plus a minimum of 100 more TBD aircraft parameters
A minimum of one hundred (TBR) 24-bit depth color pictures, 1024 by 1024 (TBR) pixels in size with an objective to store one thousand (TBR) pictures of the same size
Navigation Pilotage Charts (NPC)
Global Navigation Chart (GNC) – Worldwide
Jet Navigation Chart (JNC) – Worldwide
Operational Navigation Chart (ONC), 150 nautical mile (NM) wide by 3000 NM long corridor, 25 NM radius in flat or rolling terrain and 50 NM radius in mountainous terrain around C-130 capable airfields world wide
Tactical Pilotage Chart (TPC) for 50 NM cross track and 3000 NM long track and 25 NM radius around all C-130 capable airports worldwide
Joint Operational Graph (JOG) for 50 NM cross track and 3000 NM long track
Common Imagery Base (CIB) at as resolution of 10 meters for 5 NM centered around a military objective area and 5 meter resolution data centered 2.5 NM around a military objective area.
The Multi-purpose Control and Display Unit (MCDU) shall meet or exceed the intent of ARINC characteristic 739-1, Multi-purpose Control and Display Unit.
The guidelines set forth in the following subparagraphs shall be used to develop the characteristics of the man/machine interface of the FMS for operations.
All user-specified data for navigation, flight planning, radio control, aircraft parameters, 3-D RNAV Approach, and airdrop shall be enterable. The user shall be able to select the Flight Director mode. Situation and command indicators for navigation, flight planning, radio control, and 3-D RNAV Approach and airdrop procedures shall be displayed on the MCDUs and MFDs. The user shall have the means to load mission data manually and automatically. The location of the data transfer system shall be on the flight deck.
When the pilot or copilot has selected a C-130 FMS steering mode, the lateral deviation bar sensitivity shall be as shown in Table 3.4.1.1.5.1.2.2
Table 3.4.1.1.5.12.2. Display/Course Indicator Sensitivity
ONE DOT |
TWO DOTS |
|
Normal |
1.5 NM |
3.0 NM |
Sensitive |
500 yards |
1000 yards |
The user entry of position shall be either, latitude and longitude, or UTM coordinates. In response to user UTM inputs, the UTM coordinates shall be converted to the WGS-84 coordinates. The FMS shall also support display and computation of navigation data using the Military Grid Reference System and Latitude/Longitude coordinate system. The FMS shall select/display and allow inputs in coordinate systems other than WGS-84, and convert it to WGS-84 in the background to work with the GPS and other navigation systems. The ability to upload a minimum of 5 newly defined geodetic datums using mission planning software and mission data transfer systems is an objective for the Combat Delivery fleet.
The ability to upload a minimum of 5 newly defined geodetic datums using mission planning software and mission data transfer systems is required for AFSOC aircraft.The direction reference in all flight director modes shall be independently user-selectable for each INU (inertial navigation unit) as true, magnetic, or grid north. This shall also define the direction reference for the heading indicator on the HSI display.
In all flight director modes, the grid north output of the INU shall be determined within said INU using inertial-sensed true heading (and position) and a convergence factor supplied by FMS.
The FMS shall be capable of calculating Magnetic Variation (MV) in all regions of the earth.
In all of the Flight Director modes, magnetic heading shall be determined by the INU using inertial-sensed true heading and FMS determined magnetic variation using the magnetic variation database specified in ARINC Characteristic 702A, paragraph 9.5.
The Air Data System shall provide correction for pitot and static pressure errors as necessary to support and meet the C-130 AMP system flight performance, including the 1000 foot vertical separation requirement of GATM. The Air Data System shall include failure monitoring and an output to alert the crew of system failure by visual and/or audio means.
Means shall be provided to allow the pilot and co-pilot to select the system for providing inputs for their display. Means shall also be provided, in the event of failure of a system, to switch critical inputs for subsystems to the operating system. Automatic switching shall be accomplished as appropriate.
The Air Data System shall support fire control functions for the AC-130U and AC-130H aircraft.
Pitot-Static SystemThe system shall be designed and installed to be repeatable across all aircraft modified with the new system installed. The repeatability error shall be considered in the system performance requirements, including the 1000-foot vertical separation.
The system shall be capable of continuous unaffected operation in an icing atmosphere. If the sensors are location specific (right, left, upper, or lower) then means shall be provided to prevent installing them in the wrong position.
AC-130H nose and wingtip mounted pitot-static probes shall be removed, unless fuselage mounted sensors would not meet the AMP performance requirements specified herein.Dual Digital Air Data Computers shall be installed, and the design and installation shall provide the outputs to meet the system and subsystem performance requirements as specified herein. The DADC 1 and DADC 2 shall operate from static system 1 and 2 respectively and shall replace those individual air data sensors on existing C-130 aircraft. If multiple static source error corrections are included in the DADC, a positive means shall be provided to prevent the wrong correction being applied to aircraft system on which installed.
The system shall provide for Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) and growth provisions for Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS) requirements as both are defined in RTCA DO-229A shall be provided. The outputs shall also be compatible with the displays and the flight instrument accuracy requirements.
A means shall be provided to insert and monitor an assigned altitude with and without the autopilot. The inserted altitude shall also be provided as an output to the TCAS function. A warning signal shall be provided when the aircraft deviates from the assigned altitude to the extent that vertical separation becomes at risk or if the air traffic control system would be alerted. The warnings shall be integrated with the TAWS or TCAS warnings and any flight director command functions generated. The alerting warnings shall nominally be activated at 100 feet deviations.
The C-130 aircraft requires a radar system to replace the APN-59, APN-122, APQ-170 and APQ-175 radar systems. The radar system shall be used as a primary navigation aid, providing position updates, ground mapping, and data for overlay with flight plan displays. The system shall also provide weather avoidance, beacon communication, skin paint, as well as guidance for aerial rendezvous and supplemental formation station-keeping. The radar system shall meet or exceed the capabilities and performance of radar systems installed on C-130H3. The C-130 radar shall be operationally compatible with installed Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) systems and feature Low Probability of Detection/Interception, defined as follows: A passive detection threat has less than 5% probability of detecting the aircraft, and less than 5% probability of locating and identifying the aircraft, if detected, at the longest distance that the aircraft would otherwise be detected. As an objective, the radar integration and design should consider constraints associated with the CV-22 aircraft. Failures or degradation of radar capability shall cause an indication to be issued.
The radar shall be certified for Adverse Weather Aerial Delivery System (AWADS) capability to provide accurate radar positioning (position update) and guidance to drop zones (hot cursor), landing zones, and airfields.
The radar shall be integrated to all variants of the C-130 aircraft including Special Mission aircraft, except AC-130U.The radar shall provide a blanking pulse that is time coincident with the radar pulse. The radar shall be able to blank, and to be blanked by, host MDS avionics. The blanking signal shall be compatible with existing blanking signals in the host MDS. Power requirements shall not exceed 2000VA @ 115VAC/3f /400Hz and 200W @ 28VDC.
The controls shall provide for total operation of the radar from any populated crew station. When a station is in the navigation update mode, any cursor controls located at other stations shall be operative for non-radar functions only.
Both pilots and the navigator (both navigators for AFSOC) shall be provided the means to adjust the cursor position on the radar presentation to match the true position of the target. The IDS cursor control functions shall be operative during radar updating.
The Pilot’s control(s) shall include a slave mode option that shall cause the Pilots’ displays to show what the ACM is displaying. The controls shall provide for the display of Flight Plan, SKE, and TCAS during Standby, as stand alone displays during Operate, or as overlays with other displays and/or radar modes.
The radar shall be capable of interleaving, from one scan to the next, two separate radar modes. The ACM’s control shall be capable of selecting two radar modes (interleaving) and overlaying display options to produce multiple integrated displays in accordance with Table 3.4.1.3.2. If the ACM selects two radar modes, the pilots’ displays shall be placed in standby unless either or both of the ACM selected modes are the same as those selected by the Pilot.
The controls shall be capable of manipulating the radar’s cursor to any point. The radar’s cursor shall be used for navigation position update, offset or expanded PPI, and range and bearing measurement.
* Assumes minimum of two displays. I = Interleave O = Overlay
Table 3.4.1.3.2 Display Interleaving/Overlay
The radar shall generate and display an orthorectified map of terrain features as depicted by radar returns. The radar shall display the selected terrain in either a centered, expanded, or offset Plan Position Indicator (PPI) format. The radar system shall have ground mapping capabilities that meet or exceed current capabilities and performance of radar systems installed on C-130H3 models after 1995.
In addition to the modes required for the capabilities stated herein, the radar shall provide a Freeze Mode.
Freeze Display Mode. |
The radar shall be able to store a complete radar map and use the information for subsequent navigation and situation awareness. When commanded from any station, the radar shall freeze the current map display and indicate via the display at all stations that the radar is in freeze mode. A symbol shall be generated, using information from the navigation system, to indicate the aircraft’s own position on the frozen display. The symbol’s position shall be continuously updated using information from the navigation system. Cursor functions (range and bearing, latitude and longitude readouts) shall remain operational while in the freeze mode. Any interleaved mode and all RF transmission shall cease when this mode is commanded. The freeze mode will continue until the operator commands a return to normal operation. |
The radar shall provide data to the display system for an accurate representation of the geographic relationship of terrain features such as mountains, shore lines, islands, rivers, cities, bridges, and dams at long range, 30-240 nautical miles (NM), and short range, £ 30 NM, targets such as road intersections, bridges, dams, towers, trucks, hangars, and peculiar shoreline contours of lakes. In addition, the radar shall detect runways, small buildings, bridges, and patrol and larger boats at 30NM. At short range, the radar shall provide data to the display system in such detail that the operator can successfully perform radar-assisted landings, low altitude navigation, and precision cargo airdrops. Long range and short range requirements may be accomplished using separate modes.
Except for the spatial volume within 1000 feet of the antenna, the radar shall provide uninterrupted coverage from the radar antenna to a range of at least 240 NM when line of sight permits and ± 135 degrees in azimuth. The radar shall be capable of collecting a map from a single scan and freezing the image on the display. The intensity of the display shall be inversely proportional to the logarithm of range for radar returns so as to normalize the intensity of returns with respect to range. The radar shall be unambiguous in range while operating in this mode, and selectable range scales shall be such that no blind spots or lapses in coverage exist within the limits specified herein.
Radar accuracy is defined in terms of a circular error probability (CEP) and a bias. CEP is defined as the radius of a circle that contains 50 percent of the detections from a valid target. The radar shall provide the range accuracy consisting of a CEP, defined as the radius of a circle that contains 50 percent of the detections from a valid target, no greater than shown in Table 3.5.2.3.2.22 with a bias no greater than 10% of the CEP.
Table 3.5.2.3.2.2 Radar Accuracy Requirements
Slant Range from Radar (NM) |
Aircraft Altitude (feet) |
Maximum Allowable CEP of Displayed Target (m) |
175 |
30,000 |
1,350 |
50 |
5,000 |
390 |
5-20 |
1,500 |
35 |
Table 3.4.1.3.3.3 Radar Range Resolution Requirements
At long range, 30-240 nautical miles (NM), the radar shall provide data to the display system for an accurate representation of the geographic relationship of terrain features such as mountains, shore lines, islands, rivers, cities, bridges and dams. Detection is defined in terms of single scan probability of detection (Pd) with a corresponding probability of false alarm (Pfa). For all detection requirements herein, Pd shall be equal to or greater than 90 percent with a Pfa of no greater than 1x10-6.
The radar shall detect targets, in terms of radar cross section (RCS), as shown in table 3.5.2.3.2.34, provided the RCS of a given target exceeds the surrounding terrain by at least 6 dB.Table 3.5.2.3.2.3 Long Range Detection Requirements.
Slant Range from |
Aircraft |
Target Radar Cross Sectional Area (m2) |
|
Radar (NM) |
Altitude (feet) |
Clear Weather |
10 NM Band of 10 mm/hr Rainfall |
175 |
30,000 |
600,000 |
3,000,000 |
75 |
10,000 |
40,000 |
200,000 |
50 |
5,000 |
7,000 |
35,000 |
At short range, £ 30 NM, the radar shall provide data to the display system for an accurate representation of targets such as road intersections, bridges, towers, trucks, hangars, and peculiar shoreline contours of lakes. When operating at short ranges (550 ft - 30 NM), the radar shall detect targets, in terms of RCS, as shown in table 3.5.2.3.2.54, provided the RCS of a given target exceeds the surrounding terrain by at least 6 dB.
Table 3.5.2.3.2.4 Short Range Detection Requirements
Slant Range from |
Aircraft |
Target Radar Cross Sectional Area (m2) |
|
Radar (NM) |
Altitude (feet) |
Clear Weather |
1.7 NM Band of 10 mm/hr Rainfall |
25 |
3,000 |
1,000 |
1,200 |
5 |
1,500 |
50 |
60 |
The terrain sensing shall provide a resolution sufficient to detect runways, landing zones, small buildings and bridges at 30NM, with a desired range of 40NM. The system shall also provide sufficient resolution to detect barrier cables supports and small obstacles (less than 1 m3)) on unimproved or paved landing zones at a range of 5NM and a desired range of 8NM. The radar shall provide signals to display the selected terrain in a centered, offset, or expanded plan position indicator (PPI) format.
The system shall provide sufficient resolution at to detect barrier cables and small obstacles (less than 1 cubic meter) on unimproved or paved landing zones at a threshold range of 5NM. The system shall detect small boats and vehicles at a distance of at least 5NM.
The radar shall support precision airdrop operations by providing precise position updates to the navigation system using a cursor with ground mapping. The radar will normally be operated in a hot cursor mode during precision airdrops.
The radar shall be capable of providing precision updates to the aircraft’s navigation system. The radar shall accept navigation system commands and position a visible symbol (cursor) over a radar target based on navigation system present position, altitude above the target, heading, and the designated target position. The operator shall be provided the means to adjust the cursor position on the radar presentation to match the true position of the target. When the cursor is precisely positioned over the target, the operator shall be able to signal the radar to compute and send the necessary data over the aircraft databus to the navigation system to update the accuracy of its position. . The radar shall be capable of positioning the cursor over a target at a designated set of coordinates provided by the FMS. The radar shall provide data indicating the ground range, as opposed to slant range of a designated target. The radar shall also provide data indicating the ground range and bearing of a designated target, as well as conversions from and in addition convert its azimuth, and range, and elevation to latitude and longitude.
The radar shall be capable of supporting ARAs by providing precise position updates to the navigation system using a cursor with high-resolution ground mapping. The radar will normally be operated in hot cursor mode during ARAs. During hot cursor operation, radar target position information is used by the navigation system to temporarily update the navigation solution and drive the Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI) accordingly.
The radar system shall have weather detection capabilities that meet or exceed the capabilities and performance of radar systems installed on C-130H3 aircraft after 1995. The radar shall locate and display weather to a range of 240NM with a desired range of 320NM notwithstanding radar horizon due to altitude, and facilitate the operator in determining rainfall intensity. The radar shall be capable of detecting, characterizing, and presenting data to the display system for displaying weather returns as a function of rainfall intensity and range. The radar shall provide data to the display system for weather returns in either a centered PPI or offset PPI format.
The radar shall be capable of detecting a weather cell of up to a minimum of 45,000 feet in height and 3 NM in diameter having a rainfall rate of 25 mm/hr at a range of 150 NM with a 10 NM, 4 mm/hr intervening band of weather between the aircraft and the weather cell.
The radar shall provide data to the display system for weather returns in both color coded and monochrome formats. The color-coded format shall conform to ARINC 708 type format as specified in AC-25-11, Transport Category Airplane Electronic Display Systems, 16 Jul 87, page 11. The color-coding shall be as follows:
Table 3.4.1.3.9.3 Rain Rates and Associated Colors
The radar shall transpond, as a minimum, SST-181X-E and PPN-19 beacons and present beacon data for overlay with other terrain sensor modes such as ground map. The radar shall transpond ground and air beacons up to 20NM with an objective of 40NM.
Additional AFSOC Only (AC/MC-130) Beacon Requirements.In addition to SST-181X-E and PPN-19 beacons, the radar on all AFSOC aircraft shall transpond SMP-1000 beacons.
In addition to the requirements for AMP, the TF/TA system shall provide for LPI/LPD beacon operation as shown below.
Output to Radar (Beacon RF)
Response Frequency: 9310 ± 2 MHz programmable
Pulse Width: 0.30 ± 0.05 m sec
Pulse Coding: 1 or 2 pulses programmable
Input from Radar (Radar RF)
Interrogation Frequency: 9375 ± 10 MHz programmable
Pulse Width: 0.25 – 5.0 m sec
Polarization: Left Hand Circular
The radar shall be capable of transponding the SST-181, PPN-19, and SMP-1000 beacons. Specific beacon characteristics are given in Table 3.4.1.3.10. The radar shall also be capable of blocking beacon returns from interrogations by other radars (defruiting). The data provided by the radar to the display system shall be compatible for overlay with non-radar display presentations (Flight Plan, SKE, TCAS, etc.).
Table 3.4.1.3.10 Beacon Characteristics
The radar shall provide data to the display system for returns from ground beacons in a centered, offset, or expanded ground-stabilized PPI format with or without ground mapping or weather overlaid. When ground beacon operation is commanded the radar shall automatically tilt the antenna down to point at the center of the range scale selected and select a spread beam for better ground coverage. When beacon returns are overlaid, they shall be displayed in such a way as to ensure they are discernible from other returns. The radar shall present location and beacon data from ground and air beacons and overlay beacon returns on other terrain sensor modes (such as ground map). The radar shall have the capability of successfully transponding ground beacons at a range of 20 NM at an altitude of 1000 feet or less with a Pd of 90 percent and a Pfa of 1x10-5. Resolution and accuracy requirements in this mode are the same as those for ground mapping.
The radar shall provide data to the display system for returns from airborne beacons in a body-stabilized PPI format with or without ground mapping, skin paint, or weather overlaid. When air beacon is commanded the radar shall automatically adjust the antenna tilt to zero degrees of tilt and select a pencil beam. When beacon returns are overlaid, they shall be displayed in such a way as to ensure they are discernible from other returns. The radar shall have the capability of successfully transponding airborne beacons from 30 NM at an altitude of 1000 feet or more with a Pd of 90 percent and a Pfa of 1x10-5.
The radar shall detect and present for display returns from C-130 size aircraft within ± 60 degrees of the aircraft heading when the target is above 1000 feet AGL (above ground level) and in a lookdown scenario without significant degradation by intervening moderate precipitation. The radar shall be capable of operating in this mode to at least 20 NM, with a desired range of up to 40NM. The radar shall implement a selectable clutter notch filter to reject main beam clutter and ground moving targets that it may detect in a lookdown scenario. Minimum detection probability in this mode shall be 50% with a false alarm probability no greater than 1 per minute. Targets shall be presented for display in a PPI format with target size proportional to the target’s radar cross section. For each target , the radar shall cause the display to present a vector arrow on the target to indicates the target’s relative direction and motion.
When not in a transmitting mode, or while transitioning between modes, emissions shall be reduced to a level that is not detectable by an adversary’s current passive detection system.
A TAWS, formerly called Ground Collision Avoidance System (GCAS), which utilizes a worldwide digital terrain database and a terrain display to provide a "look ahead" capability, is required. A system that complies with, or meets the intent of, FAA Technical Standards Order TSO-C92c and the FAA interim guidance (FAA Notice 8110.64) is required. Compliance with FAA TSO C-151 and pending advisory circular (AC) for TAWS is required.
In addition to Nav/Safety requirements, the TAWS system shall utilize digital terrain elevation data (DTED) level 1 in all flight regimes to include low level operations. An objective is DTED level 2. TAWS shall have a crew selectable tactical mode with tailored warning parameters to allow the aircraft to perform low-level missions and assault landings without false TAWS warning indications.
Visual and audible warning annunciations shall be individually inhibitable (AFSOC aircraft only.)The radar altimeter capability shall be retained and integrated into the AMP system. The presentation of radar altitudes shall be incorporated on the new electronic displays.
A predictive windshear detection capability shall be provided. The windshear detection capability shall detect, and present on the multi-function displays, areas of low-level windshear in sufficient time for corrective action.
The windshear detection capability shall present on the multi-function displays low altitude horizontal windshear warnings when a potential hazard (microburst) is present. The required coverage for this mode is ± 30 degrees in azimuth and 5 NMs in range. The objective detection range is 10 NMs.
In this mode weather reflectivity shall be presented over the required spatial domain using the same ARINC 708 standard described above. Windshear is defined in terms of an F factor over a distance where F is defined as:
F = Wx/g – Wh/v
where:
Wx = the horizontal component of the wind acceleration
Wh = the vertical component of the wind velocity
g = gravity
v = airspeed
Advanced warnings shall be presented for F factors greater than or equal to 0.105 averaged over one kilometer, for the approved weight, altitude, and temperature envelope of the aircraft. The windshear detection capability shall detect and present advanced windshear warning while the aircraft is at least 3 NMs from a hazard while operating in dry air with a reflectivity of 5 dBz and intervening rain up to the reflectivity of 40 dBz.
The WDS shall provide aural warnings to all cockpit crew stations. An objective is windshear detection capability that also provides various levels of windshear alerts, awareness, possible corrective action, and immediate corrective action.
TurbulenceA further objective is detection of turbulence. The system should measure the spectral width of each weather return and declare turbulence present whenever the one-sigma value (standard deviation) of the spectral width is equal to or greater than 5 m/s. The system should provide data to the display system such that areas of turbulence can be identified using unique colors or techniques to readily alert the operator. The system should be capable of detecting turbulence to a range of 50 NM.
The Terrain Following/Terrain Avoidance (TF/TA) navigation system defined in this document shall be Low Probability of Intercept/Low Probability of Detection. The TF/TA shall provide the modes and capabilities defined in paragraphs below.
TF/TA Life Cycle CostTF/TA navigation shall employ systems that minimize Operations and Support (O&S) costs. For systems that will replace existing systems, there shall be a 50% reduction in the existing O&S costs, with a desired 75% cost reduction for these systems. In order to reduce O&S costs, the TF/TA radar shall utilize an existing SOF C-130 radome. The MC-130H IDS may be relocated to facilitate the use of an existing radome.
NOTE: This paragraph is being revised to make these requirements easier to test. |
LPI/LPD requirements apply only to blended and passive modes of the system.
For SOF, an LPD-emitting (communications and non-communications) device, independent of carrier frequency, means that a passive detection threat, as described in the SOFTED, shall have a less than 5% probability of detection at the longest distance when the aircraft would otherwise be capable of being detected with the equivalent probability by RF, acoustic, visual, and infrared detectors, i.e., LOS or slightly BLOS (beyond line of sight), depending on environmental conditions.
For SOF, an LPI-emitting non-communications device, independent of carrier frequency, means that a passive detection threat, as described in the SOFTED, having detected the aircraft, shall have a less than 5% probability of identifying and locating the emissions and aircraft type (because identifying information can be extracted from the intercept) at the longest distance when the aircraft would otherwise be capable of being detected with the equivalent probability by RF, acoustic, visual, and infrared detectors, i.e.., LOS or slightly BLOS, depending on environmental conditions. For a communications system, LPI is a 5% probability of identifying and locating the emission as a communication or communication link.
The system shall provide the following system states: 1) Active, 2) Passive, and 3) Blended. The TF/TA System State shall be selectable by the operator(s) with the default being blended. TF/TA shall provide 20NM of terrain to the aircrew in any TF/TA state. The TF/TA shall provide a clear and distinct visual identification of present TF/TA System State. The TF/TA state definitions are below. Three engine TF shall be supported in all states.
During operation in either passive or blended state, the system shall alert the crew if the aircraft leaves the area covered by the electronic terrain database, or if the current aircraft ground track and speed will cause the aircraft to leave the area covered by the database within 30 seconds All system modes shall be available in all states.
The system shall have a Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) of 600 hours with a desired MTBF of 1000 hours in the blended or active states, and a 2000 hour MTBF with a desired 3500 hour MTBF in the passive state.
An onboard active terrain sensor is required. The active sensor shall control emissions. The C-130 AMP radar shall be considered for use as the active terrain sensor. TF/TA data and presentations shall be based only the terrain data received from the terrain sensor. The TF/TA system shall generate a terrain profile.
TF/TA data and presentations shall be provided based only on stored electronic DTED and the radar altimeter and a proven Terrain Reference Navigation (TRN) algorithm. This state is intended for visual meteorological conditions (VMC) flight. The appropriate display presentation(s) shall be generated strictly from these sources of terrain data. While in this state, the terrain sensor system shall automatically command the terrain sensor into a Standby condition. Emissions from the terrain sensor shall be –130dBm or less. The terrain sensor system shall provide TF and/or TA commands and display presentation(s) inputs in this mode. It is desired that DTED data be used to determine navigation position.
This state is a combination of active and passive states. TF/TA data and presentations shall be based on a combination of short-range terrain sensor data and long-range electronic DTED. The TF/TA shall provide a minimum of 4.0ş LIT (Look Into Turn), with a desired 6.0ş LIT. The TF/TA shall blend the short- and long-range data into a continuous terrain profile with no operator-perceptible anomalies in the Energy/Elevation (E2) or equivalent TF/TA presentation.
The system shall have TF and TA navigation modes that shall be power managed and use pulse compression and/or other techniques to minimize the probability of intercept while providing safe TF/TA navigation steering in stand-alone or blended mode. TF and TA navigation shall operate either separately or together. The system shall have concurrent TF/TA navigation and other modes. All functions and modes of the system shall be available for flight in VMC and IMC conditions. The system shall be optimized to provide safe flight while at minimum operating altitudes down to 250 feet AGL, and to minimize the probability of detection and interception by enemy active and passive threats while in either meteorological condition. Active and blended modes of the system must allow for weather identification and avoidance plus TF/TA navigation in visible moisture up to 10-mm /hour. Additionally, the system shall operate in the presence of man-made obscurants including smoke and bacteriological and chemical agents.
The TF/TA system shall ensure safe operation over mountainous, rolling, or smooth terrain, reflective or non-reflective, including water, sand dunes and heavy snow. The TF corridor shall be pre-planned using the mission or flight planning system associated with the host MDS. The corridor width shall be based on the combination of cross-track deviation error, navigation system Circular Error Probability (CEP), and wingspan. The TF/TA system shall utilize real-time data or estimates of MDS weight and balance, thrust, lift, drag, available pitch rate and other current capabilities to calculate vertical commands to the crew.
The TF/TA shall provide the necessary information to accomplish TF over all types of terrain, including sand, ice and snow covered terrain, and man-made obstacles. Man-made obstacles shall be detected at a distance to allow clearance. The false alarm rate shall be less than 1/hour. Single scan probability of detection shall be 90% or greater. The TF mode shall detect terrain as specified below from a minimum range of 550 ft to 20 NM.
s 0 |
Range |
-40 dBm |
Up to 1 NM |
-30 dBm |
1-4 NM |
-20 dBm |
Beyond 4 NM |
In all modes, the TF/TA shall provide Line of Sight (LOS) stabilization within the host MDS altitude limits.
The TF/TA shall maintain safe and effective manual TF flight guidance at selectable Set Clearances Planes (SCP) of 100’ to 1000’ AGL.
Off-route shall be defined as the aircraft has left or will leave the preplanned route or corridor. Off-database shall be defined as the aircraft has left or will leave the area covered by the stored electronic terrain database. The TF/TA shall alert the crew within one second of determination of either or both of these conditions. When the aircraft is off-route, the TF/TA shall provide safe guidance to return to the pre-planned route. If the aircraft is about to leave the database, the TF/TA shall provide safe guidance to return to the pre-planned route.
The TF/TA shall provide an indication(s) to the crew when the aircraft state is beyond the ability of TF/TA to maintain safe flight or recovery. This indication shall be clear, distinct and unambiguous. The indication(s) shall be provided within one second with 0.5 secondsdesired. The system shall TF/TA through steady rain of up to 10-mm/hour, with a desired capability of 15-mm/hour, and permit safe TF/TA navigation in areas of moderate rain cells without commanding fly-ups due to weather.
TF/TA shall provide a terrain avoidance (TA) mode which shall detect at or greater than current aircraft altitude over the ranges and azimuth specified herein (TBD). The TA mode shall function in straight and level flight as well as climbing, descending, and turning flight. The TF/TA shall provide terrain data for terrain avoidance for all specified aircraft for all mission regimes. The TF/TA shall perform this mode while in Active, Passive, or Blended State.
In addition to the requirements for AMP software in Section 3.10, all TF/TA software shall be the same across all SOF MDSs. Upon application of power, the TF/TA shall automatically, without aircrew or ground crew intervention, determine the MDS in which it is installed.
CommunicationThe AMP radio communication system shall perform the required communication functions and be compatible with other avionics equipment necessary to the mission, and with the overall aircraft requirements. Control and presentation functions for normal operation of the communication/radio navigation equipment, except for the intercom, shall be integrated in the control/display system. The required radios and equipment shall have the capability of being operated simultaneously without causing degradation of communications, equipment performance or security. New or modified VHF radios are required to alleviate frequency congestion in the VHF band.
Voice communication systems (VHF, HF, UHF, and SATCOM) shall be integrated with the aircraft ICS, and shall interface with the FMS for mission coordination purposes to deliver a fully coordinated mission voice-data package. SATCOM, VHF, and HF communications systems shall provide a data link capability, and shall also provide/maintain VHF, HF, and SATCOM voice capability. All installed systems that emit RF signals outside the aircraft shall be cockpit selectable including the ability to turn it on and off from a primary crew member position. Secure Voice/Data encryption, anti-jam/anti-spoof capabilities shall be provided for all communications systems.
Communication Management FunctionThe Communications Management Function (CMF) shall be designed to prevent single point failures. A dual CMU or functional equivalent is required to act as a router for the data link applications and shall be capable of hosting data link applications. The communications management function shall comply with the functional and interface requirements of ARINC Characteristic 758. The CMF shall support operation over the existing ATC/airline operational control (AOC) data link ground infrastructure and provide a clear growth path to support operation over the planned aeronautical telecommunications network (ATN).
System components shall include, at a minimum: dual VHF, dual HF, dual UHF, SATCOM, digital ICS, and secure communication systems. The VHF, SATCOM, and HF systems shall also be upgradeable to support data link capabilities; a worldwide data link capability to support air traffic control (ATC) and command and control (C2) functions, and a communications management function (CMF).
The communication system shall meet the GATM requirements. The system should provide the cockpit crew with the capability to talk simultaneously on any combination of VHF, UHF, HF, and SATCOM radios from all cockpit crew position and the ability to monitor all radios from any crew position.
The VHF, UHF and SATCOM radios shall be capable of receiving time from the aircraft GPS to synchronize frequency hopping during anti-jam modes. The communication system control display(s) shall display the actual frequency selected in all modes.
Existing, SATCOM communication capabilities shall be retained and integrated into the overall system such that aircrew and/or mission crew communications capabilities are not degraded. The communication system shall also provide for a manual control (Hard Wired) solution that provides emergency Backup VHF/UHF voice capability. These radios shall receive power from the aircraft battery bus. The communication system shall use multifunction wide band antennas and the associated diplexers/filters required for simultaneous operation of navigation and communication systems.
The UHF system shall be capable of worldwide air-to-air and air-to-ground traffic control in the 225 to 400 MHz frequency bands. Dual UHF systems shall be integrated with the FMS and controlled through software from the MCDUs to include power up, frequency selection, mode control, volume/squelch control, antenna selection, and secure/plain selection. There shall be a hard-wired control panel for emergency control of one UHF system located on the pilots control panel and powered by the aircraft battery bus. The system shall be compatible with, and capable of operating in UHF voice, data, DF, encryption, and anti-jam modes including Have Quick I and II. Multi-band antennae such as UHF/L-band or VHF/UHF antenna shall be used.
The SATCOM system shall provide both line-of-sight and satellite voice/data communications in the 225-400 MHz frequency bands. The system shall be capable of operation in both the 25 kHz and 5 kHz bandwidths. A SATCOM data link system that is compliant with ICAO SARPs is required to provide a second, independent, worldwide data link capability to support ATC and C2 functions. The SATCOM system shall provide priority-preemption schemes to allow it to be shared between ATC and C2 functions.
The SATCOM system shall be compliant with the functional and interface requirements of ARINC 741 (Aviation Satellite Communication System) or ARINC 761 (Second-Generation Aviation Satellite Communication System.) The SATCOM system shall be compliant with CJCS DAMA/DASA SATCOM requirements. (See ORD para 3.1.2.3).
The SATCOM system shall also provide an ICAO SARPs-compliant voice capability that can be used for direct pilot-to-controller communication. The SATCOM system shall have a Multi band antenna capability like a SATCOM/GPS antenna.
The VHF system shall provide dual VHF AM/FM/SINCGARS capable radios with VHF-AM operation at 25 kHz and 8.33 kHz channel spacing. Dual VHF systems shall be integrated with the FMS and controlled through software from the MCDUs to include power up, frequency selection, mode control, volume/squelch control, antenna selection, and secure/plain selection. There shall be a hard-wired control panel for emergency control of one VHF system located in the Co-pilots control panel and powered by the aircraft battery bus.
Radios utilized on these aircraft must also be capable of operating in the FM high band, Maritime band. (AFSOC, ACC only).
Encryption capability shall be provided to meet all operating bands of these radios. The system shall be upgradeable to support data link capability including worldwide support of Air Traffic Control and C2 functions and a communications management function. 8.33 kHz VHF Channel SpacingTo allow aircraft to operate as general air traffic in European upper airspace, dual radios capable of VHF-AM analog voice operation at reduced (8.33 kHz) channel spacing in accordance with ICAO SARPs (Annex 10, Volume III) are required. Existing 25-kHz channel spacing capability shall be retained (e.g., 125.025 MHz, 125.050 MHz, 125.075 MHz, etc.).
VHF aircraft communications addressing and reporting system (ACARS) and VHF digital link (VDL) Mode 2 (aviation VHF packet communication, AVPAC) capabilities are desired. It is desired that the GATM radios have a well-defined upgrade path to meet future requirements for line-of-sight data link communications: VDL Mode 3, time-division multiple-access (TDMA) digitized voice and data; and VDL Mode 4, self-organizing TDMA. Encryption capabilities are required for all VDL modes of operation.
The HF system shall provide worldwide HF single side band (SSB) and amplitude modulated (AM) voice and data communication in the 2 - 29.9999 MHz frequency range. The ACP and control is required to for the HF frequency hopping. Time of day shall be provided from the GPS system.
The HF system shall be integrated with the FMS and controlled through software from the MCDUs to include power up, frequency selection, mode control, volume/squelch control, and secure/plain selection. A high frequency data link (HFDL) system that is compliant with ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) is required to provide a worldwide data link capability to support ATC and C2 functions. The HFDL system shall provide priority-preemption schemes to allow the system to be shared between ATC and C2 functions. The HFDL system shall be compliant with ARINC 635 (HF Data Link Protocols) and with the functional and interface requirements of ARINC 753 (HF Data Link System).
Communication encryption (voice and data) shall be provided for all UHF, VHF, HF, and SATCOM radios. The use of secure equipment shall be operator selectable through either the applicable MCDU or remote secure system terminal. Secure devices should have a centralized load panel that will enable all cryptographic processors to be loaded from one central point. The secure devices shall be accessible so that a crewmember can load each unit individually in the event of centralized loading failure. The secure equipment shall include plain, cipher, and cipher text only modes of operation. The HF secure equipment shall include Plain and Cipher Text Only modes of operation.
All communications radios shall be compatible with, and include, a suitable anti-jam mode. All systems shall be certified to be supportable in the electromagnetic spectrum, and host nation frequency assignment, when required, must be obtained prior to fielding the first aircraft.
A highly reliable, digitally controlled central intercommunications system that will maintain the current number and general location of ICS stations and be compatible with active noise reduction (ANR) headsets is required. General requirements shall be as follows:
The new ICS shall have growth capability to meet future radio requirements. An ICS shall be provided to control the selected use of the radio receivers and transmitters, navigation aids, IFF, and person-to-person communication by crewmembers within the air vehicle, as well as with ground maintenance personnel. The ICS shall provide for this control and these communications links at all crew stations.
The ICS stations shall have the necessary controls for selecting equipment for monitoring, adjusting volume level for the various equipment, hot mike control, selection of interphone channel, and adjustment of the signal level to the headset or loudspeaker. All interior intercom positions shall have an emergency override capability.
ICS Capabilities
The ICS system should provide the cockpit crew with the capability to talk simultaneously on any combination of VHF, UHF, HF, and SATCOM radios from all cockpit crew positions and the ability to monitor all radios from any crew position. All positions shall have a hot mike capability independent of the normal interphone channels. As a minimum, all crewmembers shall be able to communicate with each other and the aircrew shall have an emergency radio useable at all times. The ICS shall provide an emergency override interphone call function.
The intercommunication system shall operate on internal battery, engine generator(s), external power, or in combinations thereof. In the event of main aircraft power failure, the ICS shall remain operable.
All flight deck ICS positions shall interface with navigation aids, IFF, the main interphone and all private interphone channels. ICS operation shall not be degraded no matter how many stations are in use at any one time. A non-delayed sidetone shall be provided for all stations. A failed ICS station shall not degrade the performance of the remaining ICS components and system.
The ICS shall accommodate both secure and clear data and voice. The ICS shall provide intelligible audio signals, high quality sound, during all phases of the operational mission. The ICS shall provide private conferencing between two or more stations. The exact number shall be determined based on mission needs. Total delay due to processing of any type of the audio signal by the ICS shall not exceed 100 milliseconds.
All ICS controls will include audio on/off switches as well as volume control. The ICS system shall provide plain/cipher indicators for each crew position that has a transmit capability for a selected radio subsystem.
When enabled, from any station, this call function shall be applied to all ICS stations in a way that the call audio is 6 dB above all other audio signals. The ICS shall provide path redundancy to reduce chances of catastrophic failure, and be EMI shielded.
At least three channels shall be provided (one primary and two private) for two-way crew communications. Study and analysis of mission requirements shall determine the actual number of channels. ICS shall provide ability for appropriate personnel to monitor equipment-warning tones, i.e. EW threat audio. Study and analysis of mission requirements shall determine identification of appropriate personnel.
The ICS shall have a HOT MIC capability, which allows the operator to transmit over the interphone without pressing the PTT switch. The ICS automatic gain control (AGC) response time shall not be noticeable or mission impairing.
The system shall have 50 percent reserve capability for audio inputs (e.g., an additional radio, an additional defensive tone, etc.). The system must include the ability to address passengers and crew through a speaker system in the cockpit and cargo compartment.
A highly reliable, digitally controlled central intercommunications system compatible with active noise reduction headsets and wireless intercom systems is required. Wireless capability is required (ORD 4.1.3.7.1) for the loadmaster positions (inside and outside the aircraft) and for the gunners on AC-130H/U aircraft.
The ICS should allow for enabling/disabling the transmission function at any ICS station. The ICS, as a minimum, shall have a Crew Station Control Unit available for each crew member position, and shall be capable of supporting up to 27 ICS units for ACC and AFSOC with no degradation as more crewmembers utilize the system. The ICS shall have, as a minimum, three private nets accessible by all crew positions with imbedded isolation nets. The ICS shall provide audio warnings, EMI shielding, high quality sound, and EW threat audio. Audio transmissions must be intelligible at all operational ambient noise levels.
A cockpit printer shall be installed as part of the avionics suite. The printer shall be able to print, as a minimum, all Air Traffic Control information including flight plans received from off board sources through the avionics suite. The printer should also be able to print information from the avionics computers, terminal area products, and have the fidelity to print charts and photos (not photo quality) for use by the crew.
An Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) that is interoperable with civil systems and an Automatic Dependent Surveillance system for automatic position reporting is required to meet surveillance requirements. The main components shall include, but are not limited to a TCAS system, Mode S transponder, and displays.
The downlink aircraft parameters (DAP) capability, which allows Mode S transmissions from the aircraft to carry aircraft state information to the ground Mode S sensor, is desired to meet future European carriage requirements planned for 2003. The TCAS II system and Mode S transponder shall provide a growth path to support ADS-B in accordance with RTCA DO-185A and RTCA DO-181A, respectively, and RTCA DO-242, Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards (MASPS) for ADS-B. Conflict resolutions are coordinated between aircraft via a Mode S transponder.
To meet AF/XO Nav/Safety and European carriage requirements, an airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS) system that is compliant with the ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) (Annex 10, Volume IV) is required. This requires TCAS II, Version 7 or later. To achieve the objective of fleet commonality, the Enhanced TCAS (ETCAS) is desired. The Enhanced TCAS operations shall conform to the requirements defined in the Enhanced TCAS Operation Requirements Specification, D697899.
Fault detection and display, communication protocols, interaction with other transponder-equipped aircraft and ground agencies shall also meet the requirements of TSO-C119a and applicable FARs, except as directed by this document.
TCAS II operation requires a Mode S transponder, with level 2 (or higher) functionality. After modification, the aircraft shall maintain its IFF Mode 4 capability and the capability for simultaneous operation of IFF and TCAS systems. The TCAS system shall be designed and installed to allow the aircrew to turn-off the system.
When using Enhanced TCAS, the radar and display systems shall be capable of communicating, via the aircraft databus, with the Enhanced TCAS processor to effect an air-to-air rendezvous (ACC and AFSOC Tanker aircraft only).
Situation awareness information shall be provided for presentation on the multi-function display(s) as selected by each pilot, and on multi-function display(s) located at the ACM station and SMC station as selected by crewmembers occupying those stations. When displayed as an overlay the TCAS information shall be automatically scaled to the selected range scale.
A growth path to ADS-B shall be designed into the system.
Nav/Safety Functions Terrain Awareness Warning System (TAWS)A TAWS, formerly called Ground Collision Avoidance System (GCAS), which utilizes a worldwide digital terrain database and a terrain display to provide a "look ahead" capability, is required. A system that complies with, or meets the intent of, FAA Technical Standards Order (TSO) TSO-C151 and the FAA interim guidance (FAA Notice 8110.64) is required. Compliance with FAA pending advisory circular (AC) for TAWS is required if the AC is available at contract award.
In addition to Nav/Safety requirements, the TAWS system shall utilize digital terrain elevation data (DTED) level 1 in all flight regimes to include low level operations (300 feet AGL), with a desired capability of DTED level 2 in all flight regimes to include low level operations.
Visual and audible warning annunciations shall be individually inhibitable (AFSOC aircraft only.) TAWS shall have a tactical mode with tailored warning parameters to allow the aircraft to perform low-level missions and assault landings without false TAWS warning indications.The radar altimeter functions shall be retained and integrated into the AMP system. The presentation of radar altitudes shall be incorporated on the new electronic displays. There shall be manual and automatic selection of either Combined Altitude Radar Altimeter (CARA).
A FAA TSO-C-124a compliant solid state digital flight data recorder with at least 25 hours of solid state memory to record data is required. Data bus monitoring is required to ensure that parameters are recorded, including those from display and HUD systems that have no analyzable hardware for accident investigation.
The system shall have the capability to record, as a minimum, all of the 88 parameters identified in Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 121, Appendix M, that are applicable to C-130 aircraft, plus engine fuel flow, TIT, and all engine/propeller synchrophaser control parameters for each engine. The 88 FAA parameters are included in Appendix 1. The system shall also be capable of recording engine parameters a minimum of once per second. Additionally, the capability for the recorder to record, for aircraft so equipped, the structural life history data is desired.
A solid state CVR with at least two hours of solid state memory and a minimum of four-channel capability is required. The CVR shall comply with FAA TSO-C123a.
Dual redundant DFDR and CVR capabilities are desired.
DFDR/CVR annunciation, displays, and controls shall be readable during the day, or at night, and shall be accessible by at least one crewmember. Actual annunciator placement shall be determined in the Cockpit Working Group. DFDR/CVR Requirements DFDR/CVR General RequirementsThe contractor should integrate the redundant DFDR and CVR in a dual redundant manner, so that one DFDR or CVR can accomplish all stated functions in the event of loss of the other DFDR or CVR. Redundant DFDR/CVR capability is desired. In the interest of reducing the impact to logistics and maintenance, the use of a Combined Voice and Flight Data Recorder (CVFDR) unit is preferred.
Installation of the DFDR and CVR unit(s) shall be in accordance with Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR), Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Part 25, to the maximum extent practical. The contractor shall recommend placement locations for the DFDR and CVR unit(s), so that the first unit(s) is in compliance with FAR Part 25, and the second unit(s) is as far from the first unit(s) as practical while still maximizing survivability and maintenance access.
The DFDR shall comply with FAA TSO-C124a. The CVR shall comply with FAA TSO-C123a. The DFDR and CVR shall be equipped with a self-powered, underwater acoustic beacon to assist with location in the event of loss during an overwater flight.
The DFDR/CVR system shall be self monitoring, and shall alert the operator in the event of failure of critical system components. The DFDR/CVR system shall have provisions for a back-up power source in the event of loss of all aircraft-generated power. The back-up power source shall be capable of providing operating power to the DFDR/CVR system for a minimum of 20 minutes. The DFDR/CVR system shall be capable of recording data bus information from various aircraft data bus standards as required.
The DFDR/CVR system shall be integrated so that it is capable of acquiring the flight data parameters (derived in part from FAR Part 121, Appendix M) listed in Attachment 2 to this specification. Signal acquisition through the use of a separate LRU, such as a Flight Data Acquisition Unit (FDAU), is acceptable, but, in the interest of reducing impact to logistics and maintenance, is not desired.
The contractor shall examine and define the availability of data sources for various loss of power scenarios. This definition shall include the data sources that will be lost or degraded for each power loss condition, and shall track the loss or degradation to a specific loss of power condition.
The contractor shall recommend the parameters that will comprise this minimum parameter set. The objective is to maximize the acquisition of flight data relevant to accident investigation. The DFDR/CVR system shall be integrated so that signal acquisition during degraded modes of operation is automatic, and that the minimum set of data parameters always shall be acquired for recording under every power loss scenario without any additional actions taken by crewmembers.
The DFDR/CVR system shall be capable of monitoring all aircraft data buses. The contractor shall maximize the use of data buses for signal acquisition, and shall keep the use of DFDR system-unique transducers or similar devices to a minimum. An objective for the integration is to utilize data bus inputs for at least 90 percent of signal acquisition. The DFDR shall monitor and record data bus streams from equipment, such as aircraft displays and other similar equipment for which no post-crash analyzable hardware exists. It is the intent of this requirement to enable the investigator to review aircraft data bus traffic as a part of the overall accident investigation effort.
The DFDR shall have a minimum capacity to store 25 hours of recorded data on solid-state media. The contractor shall select a DFDR analysis software package that is capable of being run in a personal computer network environment utilizing a Windows NT or Windows 95 or later version, operating system.
The contractor shall integrate the DFDR to acquire and record structural life history data. The data collected shall be stored on digital media. The life history data memory shall be capable of recording and storing up to a minimum of 12 hours of information.
The contractor shall recommend the data to record, but, as a minimum, the data specified in Technical Order (T.O.) 1C-130-101 and collected manually on Air Force Technical Order (AFTO) Form 151A shall be acquired, recorded, and stored as structural life history data.
The system shall be capable of transmitting the life history data via an RF data link. The data format and transmission frequency shall be compatible with GANS/GATM equipment and requirements. The data burst transmission feature shall have two modes of operation, manual and automatic. Operation in the manual mode shall be initiated by the operator. In the automatic mode, the system shall transmit the required data after having been interrogated by a suitably equipped ground station. The crew shall have the option of attempting to transmit the data in the manual mode, or to select a feature that prohibits overwriting the data until the next scheduled transmission attempt. At the next scheduled attempt (a one-hour interval from the last scheduled failed attempt), the system shall attempt to establish contact and transmit all stored data not previously verified as successfully transmitted.
The contractor shall recommend the equipment required for both the aircraft and ground station to ensure compatibility of the systems. The contractor shall ensure that the downloaded data is compatible with ground station analysis software." The contractor shall select a software package that provides a structural life history analysis module integrated with the DFDR analysis software. The software shall be capable of being run in a personal computer network environment utilizing a Windows NT or Windows 95 or later version, operating system.
The CVR shall be capable of recording a minimum of four channels of voice data. However, six channels are preferred. The CVR shall be integrated with the Intercommunications System (ICS) and radio circuits, and shall monitor the pilot, the copilot, the flight engineer, and a wide-area microphone (channels one through four). The remaining two channels, if available, are undefined, and are to be reserved for future use.
The CVR shall have a minimum capacity to store one hour of recorded voice data on solid-state media prior to overwriting. The CVR shall record all audio annunciations provided to the aircrew through the ICS. The contractor shall integrate with the ICS and radio circuits to ensure that classified transmissions are not recorded.
The CVR and DFDR must have the capability to be zeroized, turned off, or operated in an OPSEC mode to preclude recording sensitive mission data in non-volatile memory, or to prevent inadvertent transmission of life history data.
Windshear DetectionA predictive windshear detection capability shall be provided. The windshear detection capability shall detect, and present on the multi-function displays, areas of low-level windshear in sufficient time for corrective action.
The windshear detection capability shall present on the multi-function displays low altitude horizontal windshear warnings when a potential hazard (microburst) is present. The required coverage for this mode is ± 30 degrees in azimuth and 5 NMs in range. The desired detection range is 10 NMs.
In this mode weather reflectivity shall be presented over the required spatial domain using the same ARINC 708 standard described above. Windshear is defined in terms of an F factor over a distance where F is defined as:
F = Wx/g – Wh/v
where:
Wx = the horizontal component of the wind acceleration
Wh = the vertical component of the wind velocity
g = gravity
v = airspeed
Advanced warnings shall be presented for F factors greater than or equal to 0.105 averaged over one kilometer, for the approved weight, altitude, and temperature envelope of the aircraft. The windshear detection capability shall detect and present advanced windshear warning while the aircraft is at least 3 NMs from a hazard while operating in dry air with a reflectivity of 5 dBz and intervening rain up to the reflectivity of 40 dBz.
The windshear detection capability shall also provide various levels of windshear alerts, awareness, possible corrective action, and immediate corrective action. Detection of turbulence is also desired.
Defensive Systems (DS)The existing C-130 AAR-47 Missile Warning System (MWS), ALE-47 Countermeasures Dispensing System (CMDS), and ALR-69 Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) shall be integrated on Combat Delivery aircraft.
The existing ALQ-172 Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) jammer system, ALQ-196 jammer, ALR-69 RWR, AAR-44 MWS, ALE-47 CMDS, AAQ-24 DIRCM and APR-46 RF receiver subsystems shall be integrated on AC-130H and MC-130E aircraft.All stores equipment and stores used in the aircraft’s defensive systems suites shall comply with SEEK EAGLE requirements if applicable.to provide automated protection against IR and RF threats. The integrated DS shall optimize countermeasures techniques by correlating threat reports from the MWS and RWR to provide combined threat reporting to the CMDS. DS integration shall provide fully automatic threat response capabilities to minimize crew defensive duties during critical phases of flight. Threat and DS status information shall be integrated into the HUD and MFDs to increase situational awareness, improve threat response capabilities and decrease aircrew defensive workload.
DS IntegrationThe integrated DS shall retain the capabilities of the individual subsystems. The system shall be capable of capturing, processing and transmitting all data bus messages for all subsystems. The system shall be capable of receiving and transmitting the required data from/to other aircraft buses to allow for the required control and display functions. Information from the DS must be displayed to the crew to allow for rapid situation analysis and appropriate reaction.. The time from threat signal reception to display shall not exceed baseline subsystem capabilities plus one-half second. The integrated DS shall utilize FMS data to establish environmental criteria for automated defensive system operation and to enhance aircrew situational awareness. The system shall be capable of manual or automatic dispensing of CMDS expendables. Responses shall be based on threat priorities. In the automatic mode, chaff shall be dispensed in a patterned mode when a properly (no ambiguity) identified threat has been detected by the RWR. When an ambiguity exists, the system will dispense a generic chaff program. The system shall not allow dispensing of expendable while the aircraft is on the ground, however, there shall be a means for maintenance to test chaff/flare dispensing on the ground to ensure system confidence. The system shall be fault tolerant to the extent that no subsystem failure shall cause degradation of other DS subsystem baseline capabilities and data bus failure shall not degrade baseline subsystem integration.
A means shall be provided for flightline loading of all subsystems data (OFPs, threat tables, and mission data) from a single point. The DS system shall be programmable using the standard Air Force reprogramming device. System self-test shall be automatically initiated at power up. All software load (MDF, MDT and OFP) version information shall be displayed in the cockpit during initial system startup. The system should perform periodic autonomous self-test without degrading operation of the DS subsystems. The DS shall comply with AFI 10-703, Electronic Warfare Integrated Reprogramming (EWIR) requirements for rapid reprogramming of threat parameters and system software.
The system shall correlate threat reports based on the detected threat ID/emitter parameters using stored threat ID and correlation databases. Correlated threat reporting shall be provided to the CMDS for control of expendables dispensing. The system shall provide fused data for selected output to the aircraft display system including threat environment information, countermeasures availability/ response status, threat parameters, high priority text messages and caution and advisory messages.
All DS controls and displays shall have sufficient redundancy to preclude a single point failure of the system. Further requirements for DS control and display functions can be found in the classified annex.
ControlsThe It is desired that the DS shall have sufficient flexibility and growth potential to be capable of capturing, processing, and transmitting data bus messages for all planned subsystems, includingfor possible future additions such as laser warning receivers/jammers, laser dazzle devices, radio frequency and infrared countermeasure systems, towed decoys and off-board tactical broadcast receivers.
The DS shall be capable of capturing, processing and transmitting all data bus messages for all subsystems attached to the EW bus, with growth potential for all planned subsystems. System self-test shall be automatically initiated at power up.
The AFSOC DS integration shall enhance crew situational awareness by providing in-flight, near real-time tactical information in the cockpit. This threat data shall include pre-mission threat/tactical information, updates to the pre-mission threat data received in-flight and new threat information received from intelligence satellite broadcasts and on-board EW sensors. Pre-mission data (e.g. planned route, threat locations, targets or landing/drop zones, no-fly areas, etc.) shall be loaded from existing and upgraded mission planning and intelligence systems. The system shall also allow for manual input of any other tactical data. The system shall filter broadcast data so that only relevant intelligence updates are received in the cockpit. The filters shall be set on the ground, selectable in flight and include a moving filter about the aircraft present position. The system shall also provide threat geolocation with sufficient accuracy to support automatic and semi-automatic route replanning to increase probability of mission success. Threat information shall be displayed on any MFD in a digital moving map format. The system shall have the capability to monitor aircraft caution and advisory signals and display them to the EWO.
The DS shall allow easy and rapid input, in-flight or as preloaded mission data, of crew-designated no-fly/avoidance areas for example, weather, hostile ground troops, etc.
The DS shall provide in-flight, NRT (near real time) threat location using pre-mission, on-board and off-board data for route replanning and threat detection/avoidance. Pre-mission data shall be loaded from existing and upgraded mission planning systems. The DS shall filter broadcast data so that only relevant intelligence updates are received in the cockpit. The filters shall be set on the ground, selectable in flight and include a moving filter about the aircraft present position. The DS shall also provide threat geolocation to support automatic and semi-automatic route replanning to avoid detection/engagement. The DS shall provide cueing to the aircrew for countermeasures and maneuvers to assist in determining threat response strategies. The DS shall provide control information to the EW systems to provide a balance between covertness and countermeasures protection. This threshold protection capability shall be re-configurable in flight to allow maximum mission flexibility. A user-definable response approach shall be incorporated to contain desired countermeasures response for each detected threat as well as the desired EW system when there are overlapping capabilities. This response shall be re-programmable during ground or airborne operations on the aircraft without removing LRUs.
The DS shall receive Electronic Order of Battle (EOB) data through the Multi-mission Advanced Tactical Terminal (MATT) or equivalent, and other existing receivers. The system shall receive pre-mission EOB from current and planned USSOCOM intelligence systems and databases including SOCRATES and Combat Intelligence System (CIS). The DS shall utilize Specific Emitter Identification (SEI) from off-board sources where appropriate. The DS shall be able to receive, store and present pop-up threat data from the on-board sensors as well as from off-board broadcasts. Pop-up threats shall be displayed on MFDs and backup displays, at actual latitude/longitude or UTM coordinates, using RWR-compatible symbology. It is desired that EOB symbology be common throughout the SOF C-130 fleet.
Threat ResponseThreats detected by the EW sensors shall be displayed to the crew to allow for rapid situation analysis and appropriate reaction. The system shall present the pop-up threat and intervisibility within a two-second threshold 99% of the time. The DS system shall receive, store, and present pop-up threat data from the various onboard sensor systems as well as from off-board broadcasts via an intelligence receiver, paragraph 3.5.2.7. Each threat shall be displayed at its actual location using standard symbology. In the automatic mode, chaff shall be dispensed in a patterned mode when a properly (no ambiguity) identified threat has been detected by the RWR or other receiver.
The system shall allow easy and rapid input of crew-designated no-fly/avoidance areas including weather, hostile ground troops, etc. If detection or engagement cannot be avoided, the DS system shall provide alternative threat response strategies that are enabled by crew consent and shall include the host aircraft Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) capabilities, the hostile threat intentions, terrain, etc. The aircrew shall have absolute consent over all responses to threats. The system shall provide inputs for timely manual and semi-automatic aircrew-initiated route re-planning. The following requirements shall be refined at a crew station working group (CSWG):
Upon notification of a new threat, if detection can be avoided:
The DS shall determine if the planned route of flight will bring the aircraft within coverage of a threat received from on- or off-board systems. If the planned route is within threat coverage, the aircrew shall be alerted within 2 seconds. The DS shall complete an automatic route replan within 3 seconds, with an objective of 1 second, when a new threat is received that can have LOS visibility to the host aircraft.
If detection cannot be avoided:
The DS shall provide alternative threat response strategies that are enabled by crew consent and include the host aircraft ECM capabilities, hostile threat intentions, and terrain. The DS shall plan at least one abort route.
An MFD shall be provided at the EWO crew station which provides for consolidated control and monitoring of all EW/ESA subsystems. Further requirements for EW/ESA control and display functions can be found in the classified annex.
The aircrew shall have absolute consent over all responses to threats. ECM response should be selectable so as to apply either an automatic or EWO-initiated response for each subsystem to counter specific threats. In the automatic mode, chaff shall be dispensed in a patterned mode when a properly (no ambiguity) identified threat has been detected by the RWR or other receiver. When an ambiguity exists, the system will dispense a generic chaff program. The DS shall allow for easy and rapid input of crew designated no-fly/avoidance areas. The DS shall also allow for manual input of other tactical data, including threat avoidance data, routes and waypoints. There shall be dedicated buttons or main menu controls for brightness and contrast, which are readily accessible by each crewmember while seated. Each crewmember shall have selectable decluttering and precedence of display layers, with declutter or precedence changes in no more than 1 second, 99% of the time, with a desired goal of declutter or precedence changes within 0.5 seconds, 99% of the time. There shall be sufficient levels of feature deselect or declutter to permit a single layer or no layers to remain. Declutter levels shall be independent between displays. The AFSOC EW/ESA system shall have a declassify function which destroys sensitive EOB, MATT and mission data and zeroizes COMSEC data from any crew position in no more than 3 keystrokes, and includes a ‘CONFIRM’ message before data destruction.
A separate MFD or other device shall be provided at the EWO crew station which provides for control and monitoring of all DS subsystems. CMDS/ECM response shall be selectable between either an automatic or crew-initiated response for each subsystem (as it is capable) to counter specific threats. The EWO shall be able to select/deselect override of all remote dispense switches.
The consolidated EWO MFD shall display all requisite EW/ESA information simultaneously. It is desired that the common AMP MFD be used. The display shall provide the EWO with navigation data, off-board data, on-board pre-mission data and correlated and fused sensor data consolidated into a single user selectable display. The EWO display shall provide at a minimum; threat azimuth and estimated range, threat modes such as search, acquisition, track and launch, emitter parametric data and DS subsystems status. The crew shall be able to select a plain background or two- and three-dimensional map presentations. No more than 30% of the background shall be obscured by all active overlays; no single overlay/layer shall obscure more than 20% of the background. The DS shall have the capability to display APR-46 information in a format similar to that in use on SOF aircraft. The DS shall display emitter parameters for the highest priority threat or a threat selected by the operator. The DS shall display threats and their parameters on a flight following screen at a computed range and bearing. The MFD shall provide an indication for those threats that are being jammed by aircraft ECM systems The DS presentation shall include a PPI-format type display with threat symbols displayed in their relative position around the aircraft. Threat symbols shall be similar to those used by current USAF radar warning receivers. Threats which do not have existing RWR symbols shall be assigned a readily identifiable symbol as determined by a CSWG. IR missile launch indications shall be distinct from radar threat launches. IR missile launch indications shall be displayed at the appropriate azimuth with an indication of elevation (above or below the aircraft). The DS shall display flight path waypoints, basic navigational data (e.g., groundspeed, altitude, time/distance to waypoint) and location of threats programmed through the mission planning interface.
The DS should provide the capability to separate collocated threat symbols. Separated threat symbols should not be moved to an incorrect lethality range. The DS should provide the capability to designate a symbol as friendly. Provisions should be made for the addition of symbology, including a laser warning symbol. The DS should display emitter parameters for the highest priority threat or a threat selected by the operator. The DS should indicate the source of signal detection.
The EW/ESADS system shall allow for the integration of required aircraft data buses (FMS, controls and displays) and the seven required EW subsystems, with desired growth capacity for an additional eight EW subsystems. The AFSOC DS DS shall accommodate future incorporation of on-board Beyond Line of Sight Threat Detection/ Geo-location (BLOSTD/G) and a Special Receiver.
The system shall receive and filter near-real-time (NRT) electronic order of battle (EOB) updates and over-the-horizon threat information via National Source Broadcasts. Received threat updates, including imagery, shall be correlated and displayed on any applicable display. The system shall interface with the host platform, defensive system, display systems, display controls, and data transfer device systems to provide intelligence broadcast data to the receiver. System electrical interfaces, mechanical interfaces, environmental, electromagnetic, and effectiveness shall be optimized for host platform integration. Message filter settings shall be selectable in flight. Redefining message filter settings in-flight shall not significantly increase bus traffic nor impose performance degrading calculation demands on the AMP FMS. The system shall accommodate a carry-on or permanently mounted intelligence receiver.
A mission playback function shall provide a means to record up to four hours, with a desired goal of eight hours, of flight time information of data crossing the EWDS data bus. Record start/stop period shall be operator selectable. The function should record threat audio/symbol indications, aircraft intercom, threat reaction, aircraft position and EW system status and mode (switch settings). The DSplayback should interface with AFSOC mission planning systems to provide a graphical depiction of aircraft position for playback.
The system shall provide an on-board, training/simulation mode for aircrews. All capabilities and performance of the EW systems shall be preserved while in this mode. The DS shall use training or exercise EOB, including pop-up threats that are hidden from the aircrew until LOS is established. Pop-up threats shall be entered as part of pre-mission planning or in-flight. The DS shall use this data as actual threat data. The level of training shall be selectable to provide scenarios from entry level training to advanced tactical scenarios. The DS shall maintain up to three preplanned missions in aircraft memory. Pre-loaded training missions shall be modifiable on the aircraft prior to flight. The capability shall further exist to load an additional new mission. The DS shall upload/download mission data from/to AFSOC mission planning systems, and shall provide for quick and easy transfer of that data. The DS shall provide a means to ensure the aircrew that all pertinent mission data has been loaded. Aircrew shall receive a query if threat parameters, turn points or other mission essential data have not been input. In the training mode, the DS shall simulate threat inputs and provide all requisite aural and visual indications. The mission playback function shall record all training inputs as though they were actual threat engagements. The training mode shall use Air Force approved Jammer, Artillery, Radar, and Missile Systems (JARMS) symbology to construct training missions. The DS shall load and store data on aircrew reactions to support de-briefings and training.
Only physical security shall be required for these systems. When installed on an aircraft, the normal security provided for the aircraft should be sufficient. Communications, information, physical, and operational security requirements shall not exceed those currently on the aircraft. Program protection shall be applied throughout the system’s lifecycle to maintain technical superiority, system integrity and availability. System security measures shall be applied to integrate facilities, procedures, and equipment.
Security on board C-130 aircraft shall build upon the capabilities and doctrine presently employed on the different Mission Design Series (MDSs). The avionics systems may include encryption/decryption devices with embedded physical and operational security protection, to ensure sensitive classified information and data are protected both during normal and emergency operations. The system processors and encryption/decryption devices will include data and code destruction upon loss of system power and/or physical intrusion, either through attempted unauthorized access or through component destruction through battle damage or aircraft crash. Therefore, the AMP system and subsystems shall allow for appropriate loading of top secret/sensitive compartmented information (TS/SCI) level databases.
The use of safety devices, warning provisions or special procedures shall be limited to those applications demonstrated by analysis to provide a significant improvement in system effectiveness, or as otherwise specified herein. When so selected, safety devices, warning provisions and procedures shall be developed so failures, malfunctions, and errors do not result in hazards.
Equipment and software design features, which adequately control or eliminate hazards shall be given precedence over corrective or protective features which increase the equipment complexity.
The C-130 AMP design shall meet all the requirements in Sections 4 and 5 of MIL-STD-882C (Change 1).
The equipment shall provide personnel hazard protection in accordance with MIL-STD-1472. Appropriate safeguards shall be provided to prevent operator contact with moving parts, extreme temperatures, high voltages, sharp edges, or other hazards. Conspicuous placards shall be displayed near equipment that presents a hazard to personnel. Personnel shall not be exposed to unacceptable concentrations of toxic substances.
All design changes shall be made in such a way as to minimize degradation of air vehicle performance, service life, engine and auxiliary power unit capabilities, and crashworthiness from that of the unmodified C-130 air vehicle. Structural strength margins of modified structures and unmodified structures whose loads have been increased by the modifications shall show a positive margin of safety of 0.25.
Installations of the AMP Group A and B equipment shall meet the crashworthiness requirements as shown in the table below:
Unoccupied Area |
Crew Occupied Area |
|||
Forward : |
3.0 g |
Forward: |
9.0 g |
|
Aft: |
3.0 |
Aft: |
4.0 |
|
Up: |
2.55 |
Up: |
4.0 |
|
Down: |
5.55 |
Down: |
8.0 |
|
Side: |
+/-1.5 |
Side: |
+/-1.5 |
Crashworthiness of the unmodified portions of the airframe and subsystem installations shall not be degraded by AMP modifications.
The design, construction and installation of all new and/or modified equipment associated with the C-130 AMP program shall not provide an ignition source while exposed to an explosive environment. This requirement is the same for both normal operating modes and failure modes.
The C-130 AMP program (design, components, testing, production, installation, maintenance, support and disposal) shall not introduce any new Ozone Depleting Chemicals (ODCs). The C-130 AMP shall also minimize the use of other hazardous materials. If hazardous materials are used, adequate procedures and equipment shall be included to minimize risk to the environment, personnel, and to accomplish disposal. As a design goal, the production and maintenance procedures for all new items for the aircraft or its support should be free of hazardous materials. The Air Force will not modify any existing weapon or facility systems scheduled to remain in the Air Force inventory beyond 1 January 2020 in any manner that adds requirements for either Class I or Class II ODCs in their operations or maintenance.
The AMP system and its components shall operate in the C-130 during normal aircraft operation. The system shall be designed to operate tin the existing environment, or, the aircraft environment shall be modified to operation of the AMP system. AMP system performance and reliability shall not be degraded due to environmental issues.
Environmental ConditionsThe system shall be able to operate without degradation or operational constraints in biological and chemical environments that permit C-130 operation. The system shall be operable and maintainable by persons wearing biological or chemical protective ensembles, and/or cold weather gear.
The system shall be capable of self-sustained worldwide operations in the temperature range of -40oF to +120oF (outside air temperature) and in storage. The environmental conditions will be for the equipment as installed in the C-130 AMP aircraft. When the avionics equipment is required to operate outside of the temperature range stated in above, provisions shall be performed to condition the environment to acceptable levels to allow the equipment to operate within acceptable limits.
FungusThe C-130 AMP system shall withstand, in both operating and non-operating conditions, exposure to fungus growth experienced by the C-130 aircraft. Fungus inert materials shall be used, and the system shall not promote the growth of fungus.
The C-130 AMP system shall operate in ambient temperatures from -40oF to +120oF, without degradation of system performance and reliability.
Systems shall operate unpressurized at all altitudes and environments, equal to or greater than, the current aircraft ceiling of the C-130.
The C-130 AMP system shall operate at all combinations of temperatures, altitudes, and vibration as encountered during the missions of the C-130 aircraft.
The C-130 AMP system shall operate and meet all performance requirements when subjected to the extreme levels of vibration encountered throughout the mission.
The C-130 AMP system shall not incur damage or subsequently fail to operate properly when subjected to normal levels of shock that may be encountered in operational usage. All newly developed or modified equipment, and newly installed equipment, shall be designed to withstand crash shock experienced by the C-130 aircraft.
The C-130 AMP system shall operate in conditions of up to 100 percent humidity, including condensation, during operating and non-operating conditions without degraded performance.
The C-130 AMP system shall operate without degraded performance in salt atmosphere.
The C-130 AMP system shall withstand exposure to sand and dust without degrading performance.
The C-130 AMP system shall withstand pressure changes due to rapid decompression at altitude without degrading performance.
AMP system components shall be designed and installed to withstand exposure to natural and man-made fluids such as water, urine, de-icing fluid, hydraulic fluid and JP-4/8.
If the electrical load analysis determines that insufficient or inadequate power exists to support the aircraft equipment, either the existing MIL-STD-704 or MIL-E-7894 power shall be upgraded to meet the new requirement or the AMP equipment shall be made to operate reliably in all phases of operation, using the existing power.
The DC system shall have capability to provide 30 minutes of emergency back-up power, as a minimum, to critical avionics, navigation, performance, and communication systems in the event of partial or total electrical power failure (excluding the battery).
The 28VDC system shall be upgraded to provide "clean, regulated" electrical power as required by installed AMP equipment.
External PowerWhen powered by an external power source, the aircraft’s electrical system shall monitor the input power and shall protect all aircraft equipment from damage due to improper input voltage levels or from excessive input current.
All new aircraft wiring shall conform to MIL-W-5088 and be installed in accordance with TO 1-1A-14. Modification and repair of existing aircraft wiring shall be in accordance with TO 1-1A-14. All existing aircraft wiring required to be interfaced (spliced) into by the AMP wiring shall be replaced with new wiring. The wire identification code scheme shall be in accordance with Appendix "B" of MIL-W-5088. All wires in the areas of modification shall be inspected for visible damage, such as chafing. If damaged wires are found during the inspection, the wire shall be replaced. Existing wiring that has been removed shall not be reused.
Excess wiring shall be completely removed from the aircraft and shall not be capped and stowed.
The aircraft circuit breaker panels shall be standardized for core avionics within each MDS and shall utilize circuit breaker designs consistent with current industry. Fuses shall be 5/8" versus 1/2".
The cooling/heating capacity of the installed environmental control system shall be adequate to condition the basic airframe, retained avionics systems, and the installed AMP avionics systems and NVIS compatible devices when exposed to the environmental extremes associated with C-130 world-wide operations and the requirements of paragraph 3.9.1 of this document.
The aircraft environmental system shall ensure that the integrated avionics suite, as installed in the aircraft, is sufficiently cooled to prevent any degradation in performance or MTBF (mean time between failure) due to excessive heat buildup inside the aircraft throughout the entire operating spectrum of the aircraft.
Liquid cooling, even closed-cycle within a sub-system, shall not be employed. The modified aircraft shall have the capability to perform all required avionics and equipment ground checks prior to flight without the use of environmental ground support equipment (SE). System cooling/heating shall minimize increases in cabin temperature. The system shall minimize increases in aircraft infrared signature above current C-130H3 aircraft levels.
Computer resources shall consist of all computer hardware and software necessary to fulfill mission requirements. Computer resources include the hardware and software associated with aircraft avionics systems, mission planning systems, training systems and support equipment. Support equipment shall include, but is not limited to, Software Development Environment (SDE), Software Integration Laboratories (SILs), Automatic Test Equipment (ATE), data collection/reduction/analysis equipment, Programmer Loader Verifiers (PLVs), and ground support equipment.
Software Requirements General Software RequirementsAll software developed under this program shall meet these requirements.
All newly developed software, including modified COTS and modified GOTS, which is not aircraft software, shall follow the process described in IEEE/EIA 12207.0.1 and IEEE/EIA 12207.0.2. All newly developed aircraft software, including modified COTS and modified GOTS, shall follow the process described in DO-178B.
All combat delivery aircraft shall be modified into a single standard avionics software configuration regardless of starting configuration of aircraft. Additional software required for special mission aircraft shall build upon baseline aircraft configuration in an open system approach.
Version information for all operational software (MDF, MDT, and OFP) installed on the aircraft shall be displayed on a user selectable MFD automatically without aircrew or ground crew intervention at system start-up and upon operator request.
Unmodified OTS (COTS or GOTS) software shall be usedwhere it reduces life-cycle cost, reduces development cost, is affordable, and meets operational requirements . OTS (COTS or GOTS), where used, shall be modified as necessary to be compatible with any newly designed software and existing software, and shall be modified as necessary to operate within the open system architecture guidelines.
All computer hardware and software resources shall comply with DoD Year 2000 (Y2K) guidance.
All new software (OFPs, GMPs, test and support, etc.) shall be written in a higher order language and shall use ANSI standard instruction set. Modifications of existing code greater than 30% of the software unit shall be written in a higher order language. Assembly and other lower programming languages used only with prior written approval.
Software shall follow an open-system approach as defined by OSJTF. Software shall be logically partitioned into components that perform specific functions/sub-functions -- modular design. The software design shall lead to interfaces that reduce complexity of connections between modules and the external environment.
The software shall be designed such that computer program error allocations (e.g., round-off errors, truncation errors, algorithm errors, cycle time) when combined with the related hardware error allocation, shall not degrade any software/hardware accuracy.
Software design shall be capable of accepting third party design without redevelopment of existing software.
A DII-COE compliant mission planning capability (Aircraft/Weapons/Electronics interface module) shall be developed and delivered concurrently with the first modified aircraft of each MDS. The mission planning system shall use the same data transfer medium used by the aircraft Mission Data Loader.
A real-time operating system shall be used to provide a uniform, hardware independent application program interface.
An Application Program is defined as the system software that provides the operational functionality. Examples of Application Programs are navigation and fire control. "Core" application programs that meet the intent of or require FAA and/or ICAO certification and validation shall be independent from all combat mission (AMC, ACC, AFSOC) application software to provide for specific security, performance, and other unique special mission requirements. The combat mission application software shall be functionally partitioned into and managed as separate Computer Software Configuration Items (CSCIs) to accommodate incremental and separable requirements verification, validation, certification, and compliance.
The Application Program Interface is the interface definition that allows an application program module to communicate with the processing system hardware, software operating system, system utilities and other application program modules . The processing system shall provide a uniform API for interfacing all application software. The API shall provide application software independence from hardware including, but not limited to CPU type, bus and network interfaces, registers, and clocks. The API shall provide independence among the application software to the extent that no application is dependent on the inner workings of another application. The API shall allow new applications to be added to the system without affecting the existing applications to the maximum extent possible.
The API shall define and provide the following key features:
The time and overhead involved in switching among software tasks as well as computation speed and data access of the AMP system shall not degrade the performance of the existing aircraft system capabilities. The timing and capacity of the AMP system, including the reintegration of existing capabilities, shall cause no degradation in data transfer rates or latency of data in the aircraft system.
Fault tolerance provisions in the design shall allow mission completion with minimal degradation of performance in the event of subsystem failure. The system shall have enough redundancy to be able to identify and isolate faulty equipment and then continue to operate with minimal degradation by reconfiguring resources as needed.
The software shall allow for graceful degradation -- a smooth, automated transition with minimal increase in user workload when:
ARINC Report 610A, dated 1 February 1994, "Guidance for Use of Avionics Equipment and Software in Simulators," prepared by the Airlines Electronic Engineering Committee shall be used as a guide for designing the necessary accommodations and provisions to support training system software into new or modified operational flight software.
For all systems and sub-systems connected to the data bus, the operational flight software shall be loaded using the same commercially available data transfer medium used by the aircraft Mission Data Loader. Systems and sub-systems shall also be capable of being loaded (flightline reprogrammable) via an Air Force standard PLV through a single reprogramming point. The system shall automatically return to normal mode of operation when OFP load is complete and verified.
All AMP operational flight software loading and verification shall be capable of being applied in less than one hour by a single individual. All AMP operational flight software shall be capable of being loaded/verified in the field by three and five skill-level technicians without special tools (other than those identified in previous paragraph) and with appropriate instructions.
Computer Hardware Requirements General Computer Hardware RequirementsAt IOC, all computer hardware resources, including interconnecting databus, memory, and processor utilization rates, shall have a minimum 50% reserve (100% is desired) over that used or experienced during worst case processing based on each current MDS. The reserve capacity requirement for computer hardware shall be applied to each component or sub-system and shall not simply be a system wide average. Both foreground and background tasks shall be included in calculating reserves.
All computer resources shall provide a spare throughput capacity of 50% of that available while the software is operating under worst case processing conditions. This spare throughput capacity shall apply to each processor of a multiprocessor configuration individually. The spare throughput capacity shall be available at any periodic rate up to and including the most frequent rate used by the implementing software, and shall be available at any task priority. The spare throughput capacity shall be available during the worst case processing of the software for each of its various modes of operation, and is applicable to all periodic time intervals in use by the existing software and all aperiodic functions.
The computer hardware resources should be modularly extendible so as to be capable of a 10X increase in capacity through the addition of like or similar hardware without replacement or modification to the baseline hardware.
The contractor shall provide computer systems such that processor and memory modules can be upgraded with newer technology without requiring software changes or a lengthy re-certification process.
The system shall incorporate the latest fault tolerant techniques into the computer hardware design to eliminate any potential single point system failure modes.
All combat delivery aircraft shall be a single standard avionics hardware configuration regardless of starting configuration of aircraft. Additional hardware required for special mission aircraft (ACC and AFSOC) shall build upon the baseline AMP C130 aircraft configuration in an open system approach.
Databus ThroughputEach Databus must have a 50% reserve capacity in throughput over that used or experienced during worst case processing based on each current MDS. As an objective, databuses should have a growth capability in throughput of 100% without requiring future modification.
For new equipment, in the event of an emergency, the aircrew shall have the ability to declassify all mission data with a single action and zeroize all COMSEC data with a single action. During routine operations, operators shall have the capability to selectively declassify electronic combat, digital map and mission data, and selectively zeroize COMSEC data with power on or off the equipment is required.
The aircrew shall have the capability to destroy sensitive EOB, MATT, and mission data in a storage device in no more than 3 keystrokes when directed from multiple crew positions; include a "CONFIRM" message before data destruction.
Zeroizing data shall be accomplished in accordance with the procedures detailed in Air Force System Security Instruction 5020, Remanence Security, dated 20 August 1996.
The system shall be designed to allow full or partial updates to the database through machine interface or manually by the crew. The timing and database content requirements located elsewhere in this specification shall be used to determine system constraints such as, but not limited to, access time and storage capacity.
Modified or developmental solutions shall be applied where they save life-cycle cost, are affordable, and meet operational and environmental requirements.
The Software Engineering Environment (SEE) for the C130 AMP program shall include a Software Development Environment (SDE) and a Software Integration Laboratory (SIL) for the C-130 AMP Program which shall be used to manage, analyze, design, develop, test and maintain the C-130 AMP software. The SEE shall also be capable of incorporating software enhancements/modifications into parallel, scheduled software releases/updates for each MDS in accordance with current USAF procedures for identifying, tracking and managing software change requests. The SEE shall be capable of configuring and distributing these software releases/updates in accordance with TO 00-5-16, ACPINS or current USAF procedures. The capability for rapid turn around "software releases" shall also be part of the SEE. Releases/Updates shall be capable of being transmitted electronically to organizational or field maintenance teams for update.
Capabilities of the SEE shall include tools for the technical aspects as well as the managerial aspects of software development. Managerial capabilities included in the SEE shall include program management, requirements management, risk management, configuration management, documentation, and metrics collection. Technical capabilities of the SDE shall include the ability to analyze, design, develop, integrate and test (unit, component, integration, CSCI and possibly some CSCI to CSCI integration) C-130 AMP software. Technical capabilities of the SIL shall include the capability to analyze, integrate, test, verify, and debug software requirements at the system level. The SIL should have a simulation environment that can adequately test the software to the fidelity necessary to minimize flight testing. The SIL shall, at least, include simulations and models of the dynamics of the AMP system configuration as well as any other integrated systems for each MDS affected by the AMP modification, aircraft simulations for each MDS, error modeling, provisions for actual LRUs, data recording and reduction, and the capability to perform real-time debugging within an LRU.
Integrated Computer Aided Software Engineering (I-CASE) tools [compatible with Integrated Program Support Environment (IPSE) standards] shall be used to create an I-CASE environment for the Software Engineering Environment (SEE). The most current industry supported toolsets shall be used. For example, this means that all the software components (whether new/modified/reused) must be developed using the latest supportable version compiler and toolset available for that particular language and target processor. No modified COTS or proprietary support tools shall be used.
The SEE should be housed in a laboratory with raised flooring to accommodate an expanse of interconnected computer equipment and LRUs. The laboratory should provide aircraft power supply to the software support equipment and test stations.
Maximum use should be made of the following existing government facilities for the C-130 AMP modification to avoid duplication of effort and expense.
The following existing government facilities (SEEs) shall be modified or replaced to facilitate maintenance of all newly developed, mission specific software and modified OTS software:
The ability to modify and maintain existing software in these facilities shall be retained.
Support EquipmentSupport equipment shall be common at all levels where practical. Peculiar non-Air Force equipment shall be kept to a minimum. Support equipment shall be operable and maintainable under all Air Force environmental conditions (including biological and chemical).
New Automatic Test Equipment (ATE) shall not be developed when existing GFE capability exists. New ATE developed for aircraft shall have periodic Built In Test (BIT).
System Quality Factors Operational LifeThe operational life of 25,000 hours shall not be adversely affected by the AMP integration and installation into the C-130 aircraft.
The AMP system will incorporate integrated diagnostics to provide system status information and to detect and isolate all faults that degrade C-130 AMP functions. BIT for any subsystem shall be initiated from any MFD. BIT capabilities of existing systems shall be integrated into the overall AMP diagnostic system. A combination of Built-In Test (BIT), external test equipment, and Technical Orders (TO) manual procedures will detect and unambiguously isolate 100 percent of all faults to the repairable, adjustable, or replaceable assembly. The system design will minimize external test equipment on the flight line and facilitate efficient maintenance.
Built-In Test (BIT)Built-in-test (BIT) shall be used for fault detection/isolation. The BIT shall have the capability to effectively isolate 95 percent of all faults to one LRU and isolate 90 percent of all faults to one LRM, with an objective of 100 percent isolation to one LRU/LRM. Using a combination of BIT, Technical Orders (TO) and manual test, technicians shall be able to detect, isolate, and verify 100 percent of all faults to one LRU/LRM. The system must have a continuous BIT function, initiated at power up, that must detect 100 percent of all critical faults. Critical faults are defined as degradations or failures, indicated or actual, that jeopardize the flight worthiness of the aircraft or safety of the crew.
BIT shall provide essential information to both the operators and maintainers. The BIT shall include power-on, continuous, and initiated BIT, and shall identify any significant change in mission-critical functions to the systems operator in a clear and timely manner, without degrading system operation. BIT failure reporting should be in plain English and preclude the use of fault codes or cross-referencing of multiple codes. The BIT shall store fault and fault-related data in a nonvolatile memory medium for recall on demand by operator/maintenance personnel. As an objective, fault history data should include at least the last 100 detected faults and should be manually erasable by maintenance technicians only. Fault history downloads shall be at least equivalent to that of similar commercial air transport equipment, and not less than current C-130 avionics equipment that shall be replaced. Data shall be transferred using PCMCIA and PC-based technology through the aircraft's 1553 databus. If fault isolation codes are necessary, they shall be structured in a numerical sequence and a table to match the code in specific word profiles shall be built. Development of an information management system is not required. Bit false alarm rates shall be kept down to a maximum of 2%, with an objective of 1%, to maintain system confidence.
Built-in-test (BIT) shall be used for fault detection/isolation. The BIT shall have the capability to effectively isolate 95 percent of all faults to one LRU and isolate 90 percent of all faults to one LRM, with a goal of 100 percent isolation to one LRU/LRM. Using a combination of BIT, Technical Orders and manual test, technicians shall be able to detect, isolate, and verify 100 percent of all faults to one LRU/LRM. The system must have a continuous BIT function, initiated at power up, that must detect 100 percent of all critical faults. Critical faults are defined as degradations or failures, indicated or actual, that jeopardize the flight worthiness of the aircraft or safety of the crew.
BIT shall provide essential information to both the operators and maintainers. The BIT shall include power-on, continuous, and initiated BIT, and shall identify any significant change in mission-critical functions to the systems operator in a clear and timely manner. BIT failure reporting should be in plain English and preclude the use of fault codes or cross-referencing of multiple codes. The BIT shall store fault and fault-related data in a nonvolatile memory medium for recall on demand by operator/maintenance personnel. Fault history data should include at least the last 100 detected faults and should be manually erasable by maintenance technicians only. Fault history downloads shall be at least equivalent to that of similar commercial air transport equipment, and not less than current C-130 avionics equipment that shall be replaced. Data shall be transferred using PCMCIA and PC-based technology through the aircraft's 1553 databus. If fault isolation codes are necessary, they shall be structured in a numerical sequence and a table to match the code in specific word profiles shall be built. Development of an information management system is not required. Bit false alarm rates shall be kept down to a maximum of 2% (a 1% BIT false alarm rate is desired) to maintain system confidence.
Controls, displays, markings, coding, labeling, and arrangement schemes for equipment and panel layouts shall be uniform for common functions of all equipment. Units, which are not panel mounted, shall be designed for installation in aircraft areas, which do not interfere with mission operation, minimize aircraft modifications, and remain accessible for maintenance.
PayloadAny adverse mass property changes caused by the C-130 AMP equipment/system installation shall be held to a minimum. All mass property changes to the aircraft as a result of the installation of the modification shall be recorded and tracked by the contractor.
Weight and BalanceAny net weight increase caused by the installation of the C-130 AMP equipment shall be held to a minimum, with the objective of no net increase. All equipment which is required for C-130 AMP missions shall be included in the basic aircraft operating weight. The weight and balance of the C-130 aircraft shall be determined by calculation in accordance with Technical Order 1C-130X-5. The weight and balance shall conform to Technical Orders 1-1-40B, 1-1-50.
The installation of the C-130 AMP equipment/system shall not cause the need for any ballast to be added to the aircraft.
The modifications required to transform a C-130 aircraft into a C-130 AMP aircraft shall not impact the ability of the aircraft to maintain aircraft Center of Gravity (CG) within flight limits throughout the mission. The CG shall be controlled within limits under all fuel / payload combinations required to meet the missions.
While designing the changes required to modify a C-130 aircraft into a C-130 AMP aircraft, it is an objective that the AMP integrated system should not create additional parasitic and induced drag.
The equipment shall be easily accessible and removable to allow repair and inspection of the aircraft structures. The design should include the use of quick fasteners/disconnects to allow for rapid removal, replacement or inspection. The fasteners for LRUs and all cannon plugs should be self locking (not requiring safety wire). Common hardware should be captive hardware. To the maximum extent practicable, equipment location shall preclude the need for ladders, maintenance stands, or high reach support equipment during inspection or on-equipment maintenance. Equipment location shall require only common tools for access and repair activities. Equipment shall adhere to a "one-deep" packaging concept in which access to one LRU does not require removal of another LRU.
The materials, processes, and part used in the design of the C-130 AMP shall be selected on the basis of reliability, maintainability, producibility, survivability, safety, logistic considerations, and prior service history.
Finish CoatingsFinish coatings shall be applied to C-130 equipment to provide protection from corrosion, fungus growth, abrasion, and other deleterious action. Lusterless finishes shall be used on all surfaces visible to operating personnel. Items acquired to commercial specifications need not be refinished to meet this requirement. Selected finishes shall be compatible with existing finishes and shall meet the safety requirements of paragraph 3.8. MIL-HDBK 1568 shall be used for guidance in the selection of finish systems.
The manufacturing system shall have the facilities, capabilities and process controls to provide products of consistent quality that meet performance requirements. Key production processes shall have the stability, capability and process controls to maintain key production characteristics within design tolerances and allowances.
The installed performance of the C-130 AMP system shall achieve electromagnetic compatibility in accordance with MIL-STD-464. Paragraphs 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.6, 5.9 and 5.10 of MIL-STD-464 are applicable for the AMP program. Air Force Systems Command Design Handbook 1-4 shall be used as a design guide.
The C-130 AMP system shall be integrated to achieve mutual EMC and a fully compatible aircraft system, and shall comply with the requirements of MIL-E-6051. The AMP system shall not be vulnerable to manmade electromagnetic emissions which it can encounter in its operating environment.
Electronic equipment added to the aircraft shall consider Spectrum Management Guidance. All equipment shall comply with national and international spectrum standards and guidance on the use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Furthermore, the equipment shall be certified in accordance with AFI 33-118 and AFM 33-120 to be supportable in the electromagnetic spectrum prior to fielding the first aircraft.
As a minimum the system shall retain the current communications ECCM capability. Proposed equipment shall include a list of specifications of basic ECCM properties inherent in its design and operations.
AFSOC Only (MC-130E/H) Requirements.The systems shall maintain full operation of terrain sensing in an ECCM environment. ECCM techniques shall include, but are not limited to, frequency agility, frequency avoidance, sidelobe blanking, jamming detection and editing, and spoofing. Detection and warning of terrain/obstacle sensor jamming shall be displayed to the aircrew within 2 seconds in all sensing modes.
To meet military OPSEC/COMSEC and mission requirements, all installed systems that emit RF signals outside the aircraft shall be cockpit selectable, including the ability to turn it on and off from a primary crewmember position. It is desired that radars, communications, and beacons that emit RF signals outside the aircraft should be capable of operating in a low probability of intercept (LPI) mode. The LPI mode may be the standard operating mode, or a selectable mode. As a minimum, LPI mode should be included in all radars, communications, station keeping equipment, and beacons. All systems should be capable of operating in a non-emitting/receive only mode.
Bonding and grounding shall be in accordance with MIL-B-5087.
All parts, subassemblies, and assemblies having the same part number shall be mechanically and electrically interchangeable. When any of the plug-in boards or modules are interchanged, the equipment shall meet all performance limits without adjustment of any controls or tailoring of any part or subassembly.
Existing survivability enhancement and vulnerability reduction features inherent in the C-130 basic design shall be retained and considered in determining placement/ protection of all systems and subsystems used in this program. Modifications and equipment installations required for the C-130 AMP shall not degrade these design features.
System shall be interoperable with sister service, allied, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) equipment, procedures, and tactics, to include standard ground handling equipment and ground power units. DISA’s Joint Interoperability Test Command must certify all C4I systems prior to their production and fielding unless an official waiver has been granted.
Any information required to be in the primary field of view shall be within a 30-degree cone from the design eye point to the center of the visual sector of greatest concern to the individual aircrew member.
Displays shall be located so they may be read to the degree of accuracy required by personnel in the normal operating or servicing positions without requiring the operator to assume an uncomfortable, awkward or unsafe position. Control/display relationships shall be apparent through proximity, similarity of groupings and similar techniques.
Appropriate safeguards shall be provided to prevent operator contact with moving parts, extreme temperatures, high voltages, sharp edges, or other hazards
The system shall be maintainable by the 5th percentile female through the 95th percentile male as defined below, using common hand tools.
min |
max |
min |
max |
||
Stature |
60.0 |
74.0 |
Forearm Circ Exted |
7.9 |
13.0 |
Shoulder Height |
47.5 |
61.9 |
Hand Circ w/Thumb |
8.5 |
11.5 |
Sitting Height |
30.5 |
40.0 |
Shoulder Breadth |
12.2 |
17.8 |
Thumb-Tip Reach |
24.9 |
36.6 |
Chest Depth |
6.5 |
12.2 |
Thumb-Tip Reach Ext |
28.3 |
41.1 |
Hip Breadth |
11.2 |
16.8 |
New and modified equipment shall not degrade the existing acoustical environment to the point that it will cause personnel injury, interfere with voice or any other communications or degrade system reliability.
The AMP equipment shall meet the requirements to MIL-STD-1472, 5.9.1.8, regarding error-proof design.
C-130 AMP equipment that weighs more than 37 lbs. shall be prominently labeled with the weight of the object and lift limitation, e.g., mechanical or two-person lift.
Each LRU shall be equipped with two handles or grasp areas to aid removal and replacement.
Operational level technical orders shall be fully proceduralized job performance aid (FPJPA) materials. FPJPAs shall conform to the aircraft maintenance job guide using digitized technical data format. Emphasis shall be on cross-utilization among general mechanics and maintenance specialist personnel. Aircraft systems shall be designed to be supported using FPJPAs.
Training and trainers for new systems not used in the current fleets shall conform to current Air Force standards. New training for health hazards may be required. Manpower authorizations shall not be required to increase for the new system. An objective is that the system should allow maintenance manpower authorizations to decrease by at least 4.4%. Personnel, safety, and training may change for existing systems. The system shall be designed so as to require minimal workload.
{tbd}
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Installation of new systems will increase the overall avionics suite reliability. The AMP system shall not shorten scheduled interval for depot maintenance intervals of the aircraft. Scheduled maintenance down time shall be equal to or less than that for current C-130s.
For ease of maintainability, the systems shall be of line replaceable unit/line replaceable module (LRU/LRM) design. LRU/LRMs are defined as components such as black boxes, circuit boards, etc., which can be removed, replaced and fully tested in the aircraft.
The avionics system shall support a two-level maintenance concept and high degree of systems availability and reliability. Mechanical interfaces and packaging will ensure reliable operation across the diversity of missions, flight conditions, and environments for all C-130 variants.
Mean time between maintenance-corrected (MTBM-C) shall be used as a measure of logistics reliability. MTBM-C shall be at least equivalent to that of similar commercial air transport equipment, and exceed that of current avionics equipment being replace. MTMB-c shall be no less than TBD hours, with an objective of TBD hours.
Mean repair time (MRT) shall be used as a measure of system maintainability. MRT is the time required to complete a corrective maintenance action. Corrective maintenance includes all actions necessary to correct any inherent, induced, or no-defect malfunction. MRT shall not exceed 120 minutes with a goal of not exceeding 30 minutes.
Minimize the deployment footprint of the system, training (ops and maintenance), and its support. System shall have a deployment footprint equal or less than the current system. Effort should be made to reduce the deployment footprint size by 20%.
Support requirements should be developed to, as a minimum, allow AMP modified aircraft the ability to surge and self-support at a barebase location in or out of theater for 30 days without resupply.
Aircraft Battle Damage Repair (ABDR) CapabilityAll installed systems shall have the capability to have ABDR performed in the field using currently accepted temporary fixes to permit minimum operational capabilities as outlined in TO 1-1H-39.
Surge support requirements should be developed to allow C-130X AMP modified aircraft the ability to satisfy re-supply requirements for the 31st through 60th day following surge initiation.
Bare Base Operation support requirements should be developed to allow C-130X AMP modified aircraft the ability to self-support at a bare base location in or out of theater for 30 days without re-supply. C-130X AMP systems shall be capable of being maintained in a bare base environment without special facilities for maintenance, software loading, special alignment procedures, or specialized equipment beyond hand-held tools.
New equipment shall conform to the two-level maintenance concept. Maintenance actions shall be categorized as organizational-level (on-equipment) and depot-level (off-equipment) maintenance. The logistics infrastructure at the existing C-130 bases shall be considered the baseline of available support. The system shall be designed to allow maintenance to be accomplished by USAF three- and five-skill level personnel. The modification shall not impose increased scheduled maintenance requirements on the C-130.
All like components (same part numbers) shall be directly interchangeable with each other, and from one C-130 aircraft to another with minimal alignment, adjustment, or special harmonization. The desire is no additional alignment, adjustment, or special harmonization should be required. The equipment shall be easily accessible and removable to allow repair and inspection of the aircraft structures. The design should include the use of quick fasteners/disconnects to allow for rapid removal, replacement or inspection. The fasteners for LRUs and all cannon plugs should be self locking (not requiring safety wire). Common hardware should be captive hardware. To the maximum extent practicable, equipment location shall preclude the need for ladders, maintenance stands, or high reach support equipment during inspection or on-equipment maintenance. Equipment location shall require only common tools for access and repair activities. Equipment shall adhere to a "one-deep" packaging concept in which access to one LRU does not require removal of another LRU. All critical components shall be easy to maintain in an austere environment with minimum support equipment and manpower required.
O-level maintenance capability is required 30 days prior to first production system delivery. Depot-level maintenance capability can be either organic or contractor logistic support. However, the source of repair decision shall be made early enough to minimize interim contractor support, and provide sufficient lead time for programming appropriate funding. Logistics support information shall be acquired to provide information for planning and management of long term sustainment of end items and equipment introduced by this modification.
The maintenance concept shall support worldwide C-130 operations. The current logistics infrastructure at existing bases is the logistics baseline.
TMs shall describe system and LRU/LRM theory of operation, interfaces, component removal, preventive maintenance, repair, and replacement, and shall include necessary fault isolation manuals and fault reporting manuals. Flight manuals, system wiring diagrams, work unit code manuals, and an illustrated parts breakdown to facilitate parts ordering shall be supplemented or replaced as necessary to reflect modifications made to the C-130. TMs shall be validated by the contractor, verified by appropriate user personnel, and fully incorporated into the baseline technical orders (TO) as a change or revision. Technical data will be verified and validated, and fully incorporated into the baseline TOs. Time and cost to fully incorporate tech data will be part of the modification cost and schedule. Technical data shall be delivered in a digital format in accordance with Air Force standards—current directives require data to be delivered in indexed portable document file and have internal linking specified by Technical Order Conversion Requirements established by the MSG/ILMP. Data delivered digitally will be in a format capable of being stored and managed in Joint Computer Aided Acquisition and Logistics System, and maintained to meet Air Force technical manual specification and standards. All personnel should be able to order data in either paper or a digital data format.
Warranties should be pursued within the purview of AFMAN 64-110. Warranties and guarantees shall cover all spares, SE, and technical data shortfalls.
Existing facilities shall be used to the fullest extent possible. Construction of new facilities or modification to existing facilities, beyond those required to meet new/modified simulator requirements, shall not be required. Consideration should be given to sharing assets with other types of aircraft at the same beddown location. Compliance with all applicable laws, regulations, and standards on air/water pollution, waste/hazardous waste disposal, sewage disposal, radiation, noise, and reporting shall be complied with.
CALS shall be incorporated.
The C-130 AMP design shall ensure line replaceable units (LRUs) and support equipment are transportable via C-130 or operational support airlift aircraft in support of mobility and operations at austere locations.
Items for immediate use (i.e., test) shall be packaged to ASTM D3951-95.
Shipment may be by various forms of transportation, such as, but not limited to, truck, rail, or air. Bonded storage shall be provided for items not immediately delivered.
AMP equipment shall be designed for packaging and packing to allow shipment in standard containers.
As appropriate, all containers shall be tagged or stamped with all markings necessary for delivery and storage, all markings required by regulations, statutes, and common carriers, and all markings necessary for safety and safe delivery. Markings shall be IAW ASTM D3951-95.
VERIFICATION
The purpose of verification is to ensure system requirements are understood and correctly implemented. Verification, when accomplished incrementally, provides insight to the Government as the design matures and the program progresses to ensure early identification of problems. Verification of COTS/NDI system components may require presentation of existing qualification and verification data to insure COTS/NDI items are suitable for safe operation in the C-130 worldwide environment. Developmental components shall require verification throughout the development, test, and production process.
The C-130 AMP implements incremental verification. Lower level product verifications shall add up to and contribute to verification for the integrated system from the component and subsystem levels up to the system level. Incremental verification measures product integrity against established entrance and exit criteria found in management and test plans and presented at program milestones. Incremental verification uses increasingly more rigorous criteria at various stages throughout program to provide progressive insight into contractor’s progress. Program milestones and specific success criteria shall be developed by the contractor showing the use of incremental verification in the design effort.
The functional performance requirements of Section 3 shall be verified by one or more of the following five methods.
Inspection: |
A visual observation of equipment, drawings or documentation to assure a requirement has been met. |
Analysis: |
A detailed calculation of probabilities, trial runs, synthetic scenarios and simulations, empirical data, test results, etc. to assure a requirement has been met. This includes analysis of design data throughout the development process. |
Demonstration: |
Non-parametric exercise of actual equipment to assure a requirement has been met. Demonstration that a "growth" requirement has been met shall be provided via analytical means. |
Tests: |
Parametric operation of (1) equipment in mock-up, hot bench, and environmental qualification setups, or (2) installed equipment in its operational environment, under controlled conditions, using detailed test procedures, to assure a requirement has been met. |
Process Control: |
The detailed review and analysis of process descriptions and metrics, and production operations, to ensure a requirement is met by consistent product compliance with specific standards of quality. |
In all cases the method of verification shall successfully verify the requirement has been met; specifically, the C-130 AMP meets all installed system performance requirements of this document
Software Verification and ValidationContractor shall have a disciplined, standardized software verification and validation process. This process includes technical and documentation reviews, quality and configuration audits, software process/product measurements, and software certification (testing). Contractor shall develop a Verification and Validation plan which ensures that the software functionality is correctly implemented and that the customer’s software requirements have been achieved.
Software Testing/CertificationSoftware testing shall include unit (component) testing, integration testing, validation testing, system testing, and formal acceptance testing.
Software testing, at least, shall include these types of tests: white-box, black-box, recovery, performance, stress, and regression. Real-time tests shall, at least, include timing of data and parallelism of the processes that handle the data, interrupt handling and impacts of hardware faults on software processing. Regression tests shall be conducted before release of each configured software baseline. System testing shall, at least, include recovery testing, stress testing, performance testing and regression testing.
The Government desires that the cyclomatic complexity of each software module not exceed ten (10). Modified COTS or NDI equipment software shall be re-tested and re-qualified (via methodology equivalent to the original certification) to the level of functional criticality for its usage in the AMP architecture.
Incremental Success Criteria and Verification Methodology to be supplied by offeror.
Flight Director Performance VerificationIncremental Success Criteria and Verification Methodology to be supplied by offeror.
Incremental Success Criteria and Verification Methodology to be supplied by offeror.
Incremental Success Criteria and Verification Methodology to be supplied by offeror.
Multifunction Displays Performance VerificationIncremental Success Criteria and Verification Methodology to be supplied by offeror.
Incremental Success Criteria and Verification Methodology to be supplied by offeror.
Incremental Success Criteria and Verification Methodology to be supplied by offeror.
Incremental Success Criteria and Verification Methodology to be supplied by offeror.
Incremental Success Criteria and Verification Methodology to be supplied by offeror.
Incremental Success Criteria and Verification Methodology to be supplied by offeror.
NVIS Compatibility Performance VerificationIncremental Success Criteria and Verification Methodology to be supplied by offeror.
Incremental Success Criteria and Verification Methodology to be supplied by offeror.
Incremental Success Criteria and Verification Methodology to be supplied by offeror.
Incremental Success Criteria and Verification Methodology to be supplied by offeror.
Communication Performance VerificationIncremental Success Criteria and Verification Methodology to be supplied by offeror.
Incremental Success Criteria and Verification Methodology to be supplied by offeror.
Incremental Success Criteria and Verification Methodology to be supplied by offeror.
Incremental Success Criteria and Verification Methodology to be supplied by offeror.
Combat Delivery Defensive Systems Performance VerificationIncremental Success Criteria and Verification Methodology to be supplied by offeror.
Incremental Success Criteria and Verification Methodology to be supplied by offeror.
Incremental Success Criteria and Verification Methodology to be supplied by offeror.
Flexibility and Expansion Performance VerificationIncremental Success Criteria and Verification Methodology to be supplied by offeror.
Incremental Success Criteria and Verification Methodology to be supplied by offeror.
Incremental Success Criteria and Verification Methodology to be supplied by offeror.
Incremental Success Criteria and Verification Methodology to be supplied by offeror.
The contractor should focus on the following areas in their approach.
Use of Off-The-Shelf EquipmentThe AMP shall use off-the-shelf (OTS) equipment to the maximum extent possible to reduce schedule and cost impact. OTS is defined as equipment that has been either certified to meet commercial specifications and standards by an appropriate certification agency (e.g., FAA, CAA), or qualified by a military program under military specifications and standards for use on aircraft. Certification or qualification documentation shall be provided to the Government for verification. Commercial OTS (COTS) is the term used in this document for equipment that has been previously certified under commercial specifications and standards. In the case of modified COTS or NDI equipment (thus, reclassified as Developmental Items), the affected components or software shall be re-tested and re-qualified (via methodology equivalent to the original certification) to the level of functional criticality for its usage in the AMP architecture.
The contractor shall use modeling and simulations to perform early testing of units, subsystems and systems. The use of modeling and simulations shall be aimed at finding and resolving system design issues as early as possible in the design and development process.
The contractor shall perform a series of Human Factors Demonstrations. These demonstrations shall show the human-machine system function, and detail expected maintenance concepts.
The contractor must demonstrate to the government that the system design satisfies the human factors performance requirements. Demonstrate the human interfaces for the combat delivery aircraft and the differences for each special mission MDS. This demonstration shall include the level of detail required to show the size, location, appearance, and function of every panel, control, and display on the aircraft.
The human factors demonstrations shall be sufficient to show the impact to crew workload both for individual crew members and for the aircrew as a whole. Demonstrate the ability to perform all combat delivery missions with a reduced crew compliment.
The human factors demonstrations shall be sufficient to show the impact of the modification on maintenance crew workload.
The contractor shall perform a systems integration demonstration for each MDS prior to the input of the trial install aircraft. The system integration shall use actual EMD hardware and software for all new systems and subsystems being installed on the aircraft. Existing aircraft equipment can be either simulated or stimulated. Both the hardware and the software shall be fully functional, but neither has to be flight qualified. All interfaces, internal and external, shall be implemented and fully functional.
The contractor shall demonstrate that the systems are fully functional and that the aircraft integration is complete and verified to the extent that they can be in a laboratory environment. The integration demonstration shall be designed to allow both open loop and closed loop testing. The open loop testing shall use a set of cockpit displays and controls arranged like they will be in the actual aircraft. The demonstrations shall be sufficient to test throughput, databus loading and data latency issues.
Turbulence |
Turbulence is a random variable defined in terms of the spectral width of a weather return in meters per second (m/s). |
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Fail-operational |
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Fail-passive |
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Computer program and computer data at the microprogram level, any level of executable computer programs and computer data that cannot be readily modified under program control, i.e., read only; all information processing implementation technologies, programs, digital data, and devices not included under the definition of digital computers and associated computer programs and not included under hardware. Firmware includes microprocessors, Read Only Memories (ROMs), Programmable Read Only Memories (PROMs), and any other programmable logic elements. |
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Fusion |
Level I fusion deals with positional, kinematic and attribute fusion. Key features are 1) data alignment; 2) data/object correlation; 3)object positional, kinematic and attribute estimation; and 4) object identity estimation. Level II fusion deals with situation refinement and develops a description or interpretation of the current relationships among objects and events in the context of the environment. Level II develops a threat-oriented perspective of the data to estimate enemy capabilities, identify threat opportunities, estimate enemy intent and determine levels of danger. Level IV fusion produces a recommended course of action to be taken in order to defeat or frustrate enemy actions and can also reallocate resources based on anticipated needs. |
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The term "Group A Provisions" shall be defined as including the following: wire and wire bundles, cables, RF transmission lines, connecting devices, mounting hardware, cooling plumbing, and such other provisions necessary to allow quick installation of antennas, LRUs and control/displays as required. |
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The term "guide" when used in relation to a referenced document (e.g. MIL-STD-129C) shall be used as a guide) means that the contractor shall consider the information/data of the document during the design and development process and shall be prepared to provide, upon request, justifying rationale for-not complying with the requirements therein. |
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The term "intent of," when used in conjunction with military specification applications, means that the contractor shall comply with the aim or objective of the military specification but not necessarily the detailed application. Deviation from the aim or objective of the specification shall be identified. |
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Intervisibility |
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LRM |
Line Replaceable Module – is an item that can be removed without removing the LRU |
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Personnel |
Personnel shall include all aircrew, ground crew, and support personnel. |
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The term "significantly modified equipment" shall apply when one or more of the following applies to that equipment. The addition of new LRUs to an equipment set. The use of an unqualified or newly developed SRU (shop replaceable module) within an LRU. Change in or addition of mounting means, acquisition of cooling air, or active signal conditioning (located with the LRU). Change of 40 percent of the piece parts or 30 percent of the active components within an LRU. The use of other than military specification/military qualified parts within an LRU. If the end item (SRU or LRU) has been qualified using these parts, this shall not apply. |
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A system that implements sufficient open specifications for interfaces, services, and supporting formats to enable properly engineered components to be utilized across a wide range of systems with minimal changes, to interoperate with other components on local and remote systems, and to interact with users in a style that facilitates portability. An open system is characterized by the following: Well defined, widely used, preferably non-proprietary interfaces/protocols, and Use of standards which are developed/adopted by recognized standards bodies or the commercial market place, and Definition of all aspects of system interfaces to facilitate new or additional systems capabilities for a wide range of applications, and Explicit provision for expansion or upgrading through the incorporation of additional or higher performance elements with minimal impact on the system. |
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Open systems approach: |
The open systems approach is an integrated business and technical strategy to (1) choose commercially supported specifications and standards for selected system interfaces (external, internal, functional, and physical), products, practices, and tools, and (2) build systems based on modular hardware and software design. In order to achieve an integrated technical and business strategy, an integrated product team (IPT) process is needed that involves all interested parties, e.g. engineering, logistics, finance, contracting, industry, etc. Selection of commercial specifications and standards shall be based on: those adopted by industry consensus based standards bodies or de facto standards (those successful in the market place); market research that evaluates the short and long term availability of products; a disciplined systems engineering process that examines tradeoffs of performance, supportability and upgrade potential within defined cost constraint; and allowance for continued access to technological innovation supported by many customers and a broad industrial base. |
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Open Systems Architecture |
A system architecture produced by an open systems approach and employing open systems specifications and standards to an appropriate level. |
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Open system-based commercial items: |
Open system-based commercial items are commercial items that use open standards as their primary interface standards and are selected based on performance, cost, industry acceptance, long term availability and supportability, and upgrade potential. |
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Open system-based non-developmental items: |
Open system-based non-developmental items are non-developmental items that use open standards as their primary interface standards and are selected based on performance, cost, industry acceptance, long term availability and supportability, and upgrade potential. |
|
Open Systems Strategy |
An open systems strategy focuses on fielding superior warfighting capability more quickly and more affordably by using multiple suppliers and commercially supported practices, products, specifications, and standards, which are selected based on performance, cost, industry acceptance, long term availability and supportability, and upgrade potential. |
Geoid |
Mean sea level is the surface of equal gravity that best fits the average sea surface over the entire earth. This irregular, but smooth surface shall be called the geoid. |
Geoidal Height |
Geoidal height is the height of a particular point on the geoid above or below the WGS-84 ellipsoid, measured along a line that passes through the point on the geoid and is normal to the surface of the ellipsoid. |
Orthometric Height |
Orthometric height is the height of a point on the physical surface of the earth above or below the geoid, measured along a line that passes through both the point on the earth and the point on the geoid and is normal to the surface of the WGS-84 ellipsoid. This is the height usually found on geographic maps for ground elevation. |
Orthometric Altitude |
Orthometric altitude is the height of the airplane above or below the geoid, measured along a line that passes through both the airplane and the point on the geoid and is normal to the surface of the WGS-84 ellipsoid. |
Geodetic Height |
Geodetic height is the height of a point on the physical surface of the earth above or below the ellipsoid, measured along a line that passed through the point on the earth and is normal to the surface of the WGS-84 ellipsoid. |
Geodetic Altitude |
Geodetic altitude is the airplane distance above or below the ellipsoid as measured along a line that passes through the airplane and is normal to the surface of the WGS-84 ellipsoid. |
Pressure Altitude |
Pressure altitude is the airplane distance above mean sea level (the distance above the geoid) on a standard day. |
True Altitude |
True altitude is the actual airplane distance above mean sea level (the actual distance above the geoid). |
System Altitude |
The MCDU indication of the airplane height above the geoid shall be called SYSTEM ALTITUDE. SYSTEM ALTITUDE is an approximation of true altitude. The following words shall be used as a prefix to indicate the source of an altitude measurement:
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Height Above Ground Level |
The airplane height above ground level (or ground clearance or vertical range) shall be the vertical distance between the airplane and the ground directly below the airplane. This distance is equal to the difference between orthometric altitude and orthometric height, and is also equal to the difference between geodetic altitude and geodetic height. |
Height Above the Target |
The airplane height above the target (or target clearance or the target vertical range) shall be the vertical distance between the airplane and the ground elevation of a target or sensor aiming point. |
ABDR |
Aircraft Battle Damage Repair |
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ABI |
Airborne Broadcast Intelligence |
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AC |
Advisory Circular |
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AC |
Alternating Current |
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ACARS |
Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System |
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ACAS |
Airborne Collision Avoidance System |
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ACM |
Auxiliary Crew Member |
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ACP |
Automatic Control Processor |
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ADF |
Automatic Direction Finder |
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ADI |
Attitude Direction Indicator |
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ADS |
Automatic Dependent Surveillance |
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ADS-B |
Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast |
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AF |
Air Force |
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AFCS |
Automatic Flight Control System |
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AFI |
Air Force Instruction |
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AFMSS |
Air Force Mission Support System |
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AFSC |
Air Force Systems Command |
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AFSOC |
Air Force Special Operations Command |
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AGL |
Above Ground Level |
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AIMS |
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AM |
Amplitude Modulation |
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AMC |
Air Mobility Command |
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AMP |
Avionics Modernization Program |
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ANR |
Active Noise Reduction |
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AOC |
Airline Operational Control |
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ARINC |
Aeronautical Radio Incorporated |
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ASA |
Airborne Sensor Approach |
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ASC |
Aeronautical Systems Command |
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ATC |
Air Traffic Control |
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ATM |
Air Traffic Management |
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ATN |
Aeronautical Telecommunications Network |
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ATS |
Air Traffic Service |
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AVPAC |
Aviation VHF Packet Communication |
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AWADS |
Adverse Weather Aerial Delivery System |
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BIT |
Built-In Test |
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BLOS |
Beyond Line of Sight |
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BLOSTD/G |
BLOS Threat Detection/Geo-location |
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BRNAV |
Basic Area Navigation |
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C2 |
Command and Control |
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CAAP |
Common Avionics Architecture for Penetration |
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CADRG |
Compressed Arc Digitized Raster Graphics |
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CARP |
Computed Air Release Point |
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CDS |
Container Delivery System |
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CEP |
Circular Error Probability |
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CFETP |
Career Field Education Training Plan |
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CFR |
Code of Federal Regulations |
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CG |
Center of Gravity |
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CIB |
Common Imagery Base – page 105 |
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CIB |
Controlled Image Base - page 59Changes 2 reflected? |
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CJCS |
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff |
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CMDS |
Countermeasures Dispensing System |
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CMF |
Communications Management Function |
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CMU |
Communications Management Unit |
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CNS |
Communication, Navigation and Surveillance |
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COB |
Communications Order of Battle |
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COMSEC |
Communications Security |
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COTS |
Commercial Off The Shelf |
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CP |
Curved Path |
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CSWG |
Crew Station Working Group |
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CVR |
Cockpit Voice Recorder |
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CWA |
Cautions, Warnings and Advisory |
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DADC |
Digital Air Data Computer |
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DAFIF |
Digital Aeronautical Flight Information File |
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DAMA |
Demand Assigned Multiple Access |
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DAP |
Downlink Aircraft Parameters |
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DASA |
Demand Assigned Single Access |
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DC |
Direct Current |
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DF |
Direction Finding |
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DFDR |
Digital Flight Data Recorder |
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DGPS |
Differential GPS |
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DII-COE |
Defense Information Infrastructure-Common Operating Environment |
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DME |
Distance Measuring Equipment |
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DoD |
Department of Defense |
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DS |
Defensive System |
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DTD |
Data Transfer Device |
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DTED |
Digital Terrain Elevation Data |
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DVS |
Doppler Velocity Sensor |
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DZ |
Drop Zone |
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E2 |
Energy/Elevation |
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EASIF |
Engine and Aircraft Systems Information Function |
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ECCM |
Electronic Counter-Countermeasures |
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ECM |
Electronic Countermeasures |
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EIA |
Electronic Industries Association |
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EMC |
Electromagnetic Compatibility |
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EMI |
Electromagnetic Interference |
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EOB |
Electronic Order of Battle |
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ESA |
Enhanced Situational Awareness |
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ESU |
Electrical System Upgrade |
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ETCAS |
Enhanced TCAS |
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EW |
Electronic Warfare |
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EWIR |
Electronic Warfare Integrated Reprogramming |
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EWO |
Electronic Warfare Officer |
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FAA |
Federal Aviation Administration |
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FAR |
Federal Aviation Regulation |
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fc |
Foot-candles |
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FD |
Flight Director |
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fL |
Foot-lambert |
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FLIR |
Forward Looking Infrared |
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FM |
Frequency Modulation |
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FMS |
Flight Management System |
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FPJPA |
Fully Proceduralized Job Performance Aid |
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GAAS |
Page 50 |
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GATM |
Global Air Traffic Management |
|
GCAS |
Ground Collision Avoidance System |
|
GNC |
Global Navigation Chart |
|
GPS |
Global Positioning System |
|
HARP |
High Altitude Release Point |
|
HDD |
Head Down Display |
|
HF |
High Frequency |
|
HFDL |
High Frequency Data Link |
|
HMI |
Hazardously Misleading Information |
|
HSI |
Horizontal Situation Indicator |
|
HUD |
Head-Up Display |
|
IAS |
Indicated Air Speed |
|
IAW |
In accordance with |
|
ICAO |
International Civil Aviation Organization |
|
I-CASE |
Integrated Computer Aided Software Engineering |
|
ICS |
Interphone Communication System |
|
IDS |
Infrared Detection System |
|
IFF |
Identification Friend or Foe |
|
IFPCAS |
Intraformation Positioning/Collision Avoidance System |
|
IFR |
Instrument Flight Rules |
|
ILS |
Instrument Landing System |
|
IMC |
Instrument Meteorological Conditions |
|
INS |
Inertial Navigation System |
|
INU |
Inertial Navigation Unit |
|
IP |
Initial Point |
|
IR |
Infrared |
|
JARMS |
Jammer, Artillery, Radar and Missile Systems |
|
JNC |
Jet Navigation Chart |
|
JOG |
Joint Operational Graph |
|
JPALS |
Joint Precision Approach and Landing System |
|
JTA |
Joint Technical Architecture |
|
JTA-AF |
Joint Technical Architecture – Air Force |
|
KFNS |
Kalman Filter Navigation Solution |
|
kHz |
Kilo-Hertz |
|
LAAS |
Local Area Augmentation System |
|
LADGPS |
Local Area Differential GPS |
|
LCC |
Life Cycle Cost |
|
LHR |
Life History Recorder |
|
LIT |
Look Into Turn |
|
LNAV |
Lateral Navigation |
|
LOC |
Localizer |
|
LOS |
Line Of Sight |
|
LPD |
Low Probability of Detection |
|
LPI |
Low Probability of Intercept |
|
LRM |
Line Replaceable Module |
|
LRU |
Line Replaceable Unit |
|
LZ |
Landing Zone |
|
MAP |
Missed Approach Point |
|
MASPS |
Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards |
|
MCDU |
Multipurpose Control and Display Unit |
|
MDS |
Mission Design Series |
|
MFD |
Multifunction Display |
|
MIL-STD |
Military Standard |
|
MLS |
Microwave Landing System |
|
MOPS |
Minimum Operational Performance Standards |
|
MRT |
Mean Repair Time |
|
MTBF |
Mean Time Between Failure |
|
MTBM-C |
Mean Time Between Maintenance-Corrected |
|
MV |
Magnetic Variation |
|
MWS |
Missile Warning System |
|
Nav/Safety |
Navigation/Safety |
|
NAVAIDS |
Navigational Aids |
|
NAVWAR |
Navigation Warfare |
|
ND |
Navigational Display |
|
NDB |
Navigation Data Base |
|
NDI |
Non-Developmental Item |
|
NIMA |
National Imaging and Mapping Agency |
|
NM |
Nautical Miles |
|
NPC |
Navigation Pilotage Charts |
|
NRT |
Near Real Time |
|
NVG |
Night Vision Goggles |
|
NVIS |
Night Vision Imaging System |
|
OB |
Order of Battle |
|
OFP |
Operational Flight Program |
|
ONC |
Operational Navigation Chart |
|
OPSEC |
Operational Security |
|
ORD |
Operational Requirements Document |
|
OSJTF |
Open System Joint Task Force |
|
OTS |
Off the Shelf |
|
PFD |
Primary Flight Display |
|
PFF |
Primary Flight Function |
|
PHS&T |
Postage, Handling, Storage and Transportation |
|
P-ILS |
Protected Instrument Landing System |
|
PLV |
Programmer Loader Verifier |
|
PPI |
Plan Position Indicator |
|
PPS |
Precise Positioning Service |
|
PRF |
Pulse Repetition Frequency |
|
PRI |
Pulse Repetition Interval |
|
PRNAV |
Precision Area Navigation |
|
RAIM |
Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring |
|
RCS |
Radar Cross Section |
|
RF |
Radio Frequency |
|
RMS |
Root Mean Square |
|
RNAV |
Page 72 |
|
RNP |
Required Navigation Performance |
|
ROT |
Radius of Turn |
|
RPM |
Revolutions Per Minute |
|
RTCA |
Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics |
|
RTIC |
Real Time Information in the Cockpit |
|
RWR |
Radar Warning Receiver |
|
SAR |
Search and Rescue |
|
SARPs |
Standards And Recommended Practices |
|
SATCOM |
Satellite Communication |
|
SCNS |
Self Contained Navigation System |
|
SE |
Support Equipment |
|
IPSE |
Integrated Program Support Environment |
|
SEE |
Software Engineering Environment |
|
SEI |
Specific Emitter Identification |
|
MATT |
Multi-mission Advanced Tactical Terminal |
|
SIL |
Software Integration Laboratories |
|
ATE |
Automatic Test Equipment |
|
SDE |
Software Development Environment |
|
EISE |
||
SINCGARS |
Single Channel Ground Air Radio System |
|
SIS |
Standby Instrument Suite |
|
SKE |
Station Keeping Equipment |
|
SMC |
Special Mission Crewmember |
|
SMM |
System Mass Memory |
|
SOF |
Special Operations Forces |
|
SOFTED |
SOF Threat Environment Description |
|
SRU |
Shop Replaceable Unit |
|
SSB |
Single Side Band |
|
T/C |
Time to Climb |
|
T/D |
Time to Descend |
|
TA |
Terrain Avoidance |
|
TACAN |
Tactical Air Navigation |
|
TACC |
Tactical Airlift Control Center |
|
TAWS |
Terrain Awareness and Warning System |
|
TBD |
To Be Determined |
|
TCAS |
Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System |
|
TCO |
Total Cost of Ownership |
|
TCTO |
Time Compliance Technical Order |
|
TDMA |
Time-Division Multiple-Access |
|
TF |
Terrain Following |
|
TF/TA |
Terrain Following/Terrain Avoidance |
|
TIT |
Turbine Inlet Temperature |
|
TO |
Technical Order |
|
TOLD |
Take Off and Landing Data |
|
TPC |
Tactical Pilotage Chart |
|
TRN |
Terrain Reference Navigation |
|
TS/SCI |
Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information |
|
TSO |
Technical Standards Order |
|
UHF |
Ultra High Frequency |
|
USAF |
United States Air Force |
|
UTM |
Universal Transverse Mercator |
|
VA |
Volt-Ampere |
|
VAC |
Volts Alternating Current |
|
VDC |
Volts Direct Current |
|
VDL |
VHF Digital Link |
|
VHF |
Very High Frequency |
|
VMC |
Visual Meteorological Conditions |
|
VNAV |
Vertical Navigation |
|
VOR |
VHF Omni Ranging |
|
VSDS |
Video Symbology Display System |
|
A/W/E |
Aircraft/Weapons/Electronics |
|
W |
Watts |
|
WAAS |
Wide Area Augmentation System |
|
WGS-84 |
World Geodetic System-84 |
|
Y2K |
Year 2000 |
|
ZM |
Zone Marker |
APPENDIX 1 - Equipment Removal Listing
To Be Determined
Add MC-130H Radome to removal list.