COMSEC equipment requires special handling during repair and maintenance. Cryptographic equipment is divided into two general types: basic and related equipment/devices. Basic cryptographic equipment is non-paper material that has a direct function in the encryption process. It includes on-line transmitters and receivers, IFF units, and off-line encryption/decryption equipment. Related cryptographic equipment and devices are non-paper items that do not have direct encryption/decryption process functions, but relate to the process (e.g., power units, remote units, extender cables, maintenance/modification kits, and cabinets).

Operator maintenance is maintenance that is authorized for, performed by, and the responsibility of COMSEC equipment operators. This normally consists of inspecting, cleaning, servicing, preserving, lubricating, and adjusting equipment. It may also include minor parts replacement not requiring highly technical skills. Operators should receive indoctrination and training from FTSC activities or their own COMSEC equipment repair personnel (your technicians) on how to do this work. KAM or KAO manuals provide specific instructions.

Intermediate maintenance of cryptographic equipment is performed by designated maintenance activities or by qualified COMSEC equipment repair technicians attached to user commands.

Intermediate maintenance is normally limited to replacement of unserviceable parts,

subassemblies, or assemblies by cleared personnel who graduated from a crypto repair school for

a specific model or type of COMSEC equipment. This is generally the highest level of shipboard COMSEC equipment maintenance.

Depot maintenance involves a major overhaul or complete rebuilding of parts, subassemblies, or the entire equipment. This maintenance is intended to augment stocks of serviceable equipment or to support lower levels of maintenance by using additional shop equipment and personnel with higher technical skills than are available in organizational or field maintenance activities. Overhaul of ship COMSEC equipment should normally be done by a CRF.

CMS custodians are responsible for ensuring that all of the equipment they hold is complete and operational at all times. Emphasis should be placed on determining defects and correcting them, and, when replacement parts are not carried or have been used up, on the expeditious submission of requisitions to the supply system. MILSTRIP forms should not be accumulated for one-time preparation and lot submission to a supply point at a later date or on a delayed basis. Replacement parts not on hand should be requisitioned as the defects occur. Cryptographic equipment turned into a CMIO (COMSEC Material Issuing Office) or into the DCMS (Director, Communications Security Material System) is cycled through a Crypto Repair Facility (CRF) before it is reissued. If cryptographic equipment is received that is not in proper operating condition, the receiving user will attempt to repair the equipment, using qualified repair personnel. If the equipment is beyond ship's force repair capabilities, the user will turn the equipment into a CRF for repair and return. All cryptographic equipment transfers must be in accordance with CMS-1 CMS Policy and Procedures Manual. See your CMS Custodian. Should operational necessity dictate, contact your CMS custodian to initiate action to obtain replacement equipment.

Detailed authorized maintenance and repair procedures for a particular cryptographic equipment are contained in the associated maintenance manuals (KAMs, SAMs, LMMs), crypto EIBs (CEIBs), and MRCs. Separate repair kits (also known as Q-kits) and spare cryptographic equipment are provided in quantities sufficient to satisfy anticipated usage or failure rates. It is the responsibility of the unit's parent CMS account, or parent local holder account, to determine the quantity of spare equipment and/or associated maintenance and repair parts to be held. These spares will be provided by DCMS when available in CMS assets. SPCC provides logistic support for cryptographic equipment. DCMS issues repair parts kits for immediate logistic support. Cryptographic repair kits contain classified and unclassified material and are CMS-accountable. An inventory list is kept in the kit. Parts/assemblies contained in the kit must be replenished/repaired as they are used. Note that while shipboard CRFs are not technically secure processing centers, physical security criteria for a secure processing center applies.

Modifications to cryptographic equipment are generated to install improved or special capabilities, improve electrical processing capabilities and security, correct equipment

deficiencies, satisfy specific operational requirements, and adapt to local conditions. Modifications are mandatory, operational/special mission modifications, or repair actions. Installed modifications are indicated on the equipment modification record plate.

Mandatory modifications must be installed in order to ensure continued effectiveness of the cryptographic equipment and to retain its approval for use. Mandatory modifications must be installed by a predetermined, time-compliance date that is determined on the basis of security, human safety, TEMPEST, or reliability. There are two types of mandatory modifications:

NSA-optional modifications are not required to be installed by all users. They are generally tailored to specific operational/environmental needs and may be installed at the discretion of the command or as directed by higher authority. They are issued in kit form when the required assemblies/parts are unique and not obtainable elsewhere; otherwise, modification parts are obtained through the Navy Supply System.

NSA repair actions are optional and do not affect the original characteristics of the cryptographic equipment. Repair actions are limited to minor electrical and/or mechanical improvements to the equipment operation, maintenance, reliability, etc. Authorized repair actions are listed in the appropriate KAM/SAM manuals.

All DON military and civilian personnel involved in the installation, maintenance, and repair of COMSEC equipment must be trained and complete work in accordance with OPNAVINST 2221.3C, Communications Security Equipment Maintenance and Training and all current, applicable cryptosecurity rules, regulations, procedures, and instructions. COMSEC equipment includes cryptoequipment, cryptoancilliary equipment, cryptoproduction equipment, and authentication equipment. Formal schools operated by the military departments, agencies, and other agencies of DOD are the primary sources of training in cryptographic equipment installation, maintenance, and repair. DCMS arranges initial factory training for the implementation of new cryptographic equipment.

The complexity of modern COMSEC equipment places the maintenance technician in a critical position of responsibility that directly affects secure operation. Since technical proficiency is largely dependent on the quality and amount of maintenance training received and on the extent of experience acquired in applying this training, all DOD components must ensure the following:

Maintenance personnel will be trained to the minimum level (limited or full maintenance) required for accomplishment of their assigned duties. Personnel operating general purpose COMSEC Automatic Test Equipment (ATE) are not required to be trained on the individual COMSEC equipment or components being tested. Personnel performing piece-part replacement

of components on COMSEC elements, previously identified as defective by either ATE or a certified full COMSEC maintenance technician at the full maintenance site, are not required to be trained on the COMSEC equipment.

The proficiency of trained personnel is determined and certification maintained in accordance with the DD Form 1435, COMSEC Maintenance Training and Experience Record, shown in Figure 2.2-1, and more detailed guidelines in NTP-7, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard Cryptographic Equipment/Guidance Manual. You will fill out a DD Form 1435 in Job Sheet

2-2-1J.

A DD Form 1435 must be completed for each technician who completes a COMSEC maintenance course and may be used as a graduation certificate. This form constitutes a chronological record of all COMSEC training and maintenance experience received by the technician, and will become a part of the technician's permanent personnel record. Each form will be reviewed and updated every twelve months and before a permanent change of station. Technicians trained to perform only limited maintenance are excluded from this review requirement. Supervisory personnel must review each DD Form 1435 to ensure that the training and experience requirements on particular equipment are met before the technician is assigned maintenance responsibility. When (1) a previously trained and qualified technician, who no longer meets the requirements for installing and maintaining a particular equipment because they have not had training, nor experience with, the equipment in the preceding thirty-six months, or

(2) retraining is required due to major changes in the equipment, the technician will be retrained or requalified by approved examination. Certification to perform maintenance on certain

ancillaries can be granted to personnel by on the job training, provided they are presently

Figure 2.2-1 COMSEC Maintenance Training and Experience Record

certified to maintain the equipment associated with the ancillaries. Individuals maintaining ancillaries must have received general TEMPEST training and any unique TEMPEST training applicable to the ancillary being maintained. TEMPEST is addressed later in this lesson topic.

Note that CMS-1 supersedes CMS-4L and CSP-1A as of April 14, 1993. CMS-5, Communications Security Material System Cryptographic Equipment Information/Guidance Manual, is being revised as CMS-5A, as of this writing.

Annex M of CMS-1 prescribes policy and procedures for planning, protecting, and destroying COMSEC material during emergency conditions. Every command that holds classified COMSEC or CCI material must prepare emergency plans for safeguarding such material in the

event of an emergency. These plans must be incorporated into the command Emergency Action

Plan. Planning and training must include every individual who uses COMSEC material. For commands located in CONUS, emergencies include natural disasters, e.g., fires, floods, tornados, and earthquakes. For commands located outside CONUS, emergencies include natural disasters and hostile actions, e.g., enemy attack, mob action, or civil uprising. For natural disasters, security control over the material should be maintained until order is restored. For hostile actions, COMSEC material must be safely evacuated or destroyed.

Guidelines for minimizing the number/complexity of emergency actions are:

Planning for hostile actions must include:

Except under extraordinary conditions, e.g., an urgent need to restore secure communications after relocation, COMSEC keying material should be destroyed rather than evacuated. Facilities and emergency procedures must also address:

The emergency destruction plan should be prepared by the person most aware of the extent and significance of the COMSEC material on hand. The commanding officer or other responsible official must approve the plan. All destruction material, devices, and facilities must be readily available and in good working order. The plan must be realistic, workable, and effective. This is accomplished by ensuring the following:

Destroy keying material and publications beyond reconstruction. Destroy full maintenance

manuals or, when time does not permit, remove and destroy sensitive pages by removing post/rings, inserting rod in top left binder holes, and shaking out sensitive pages.

Render equipment inoperable. Destroy cryptographic logic beyond reconstruction if time permits.

If ship is in imminent danger of sinking in a U.S. controlled area, zeroize equipment and destroy COMSEC material as completely as possible, lock it in security containers, and permit it to sink with the ship. If ship is in imminent danger of capture or sinking in an area where foreign elements have salvage opportunities, destroy all COMSEC material and keying material.

In a deteriorating situation all "full" maintenance manuals (i.e., those containing cryptographic logic information) which are not absolutely essential to continued mission accomplishment must be destroyed. When there is insufficient time under emergency conditions to completely destroy such manuals, every reasonable effort must be made to remove and destroy their sensitive pages. To prepare for emergency destruction of KAMs with sensitive pages:

Compromising emanations (CE), generally referred to as TEMPEST, are data-related or intelligence-bearing signals unintentionally radiated from equipment and the ship's structure. If CE is intercepted or analyzed, it can disclose the classified information processed by electrical information processing equipment or systems. Classified Information Processing Systems, although commonly associated with communications systems, also include any equipment or

system that processes classified information in an electrical form. Such systems include, but are not limited to, computers and word processors, Mode 4 IFF (Identification Friend or Foe), AN/SLQ-32 countermeasures sets, Tomahawk weapons systems, LAMPS (Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System) III sonar systems, SSES (Special Signals Exploitation System), OUTBOARD (classified information processing system), and any closed circuit television system used for classified briefings and programs. Countermeasures taken to protect against CE include:

MIL-STD-1680 (SHIPS), Installation Criteria for Shipboard Secure Electrical Information Processing Systems is the definitive guidance for TEMPEST. You must have a thorough working knowledge of the requirements outlined in MIL-STD-1680 (SHIPS) to be able to ensure that system modifications are properly installed and inspected.

Every command, activity, and contracting officer responsible for the design, development, procurement, installation, inspection, testing, evaluation, operation, maintenance, or repair of equipment or systems, which are or will be used to electrically process classified information, must take necessary actions to fulfill the responsibilities for TEMPEST. TEMPEST familiarization courses are taught at all FTSCs. Recall from Lesson Topic 1.3 that the COMNAVSURFLANT TEMPEST Instruction requires, at a minimum, that the communications officer, EMO, ERO, leading radioman, and leading electronics technician attend a TEMPEST familiarization course. The Communications Security (COMSEC) Equipment Maintenance and Training instruction requires that personnel maintaining cryptoancillaries receive general TEMPEST training.

There are two types of TEMPEST inspections. One is the instrumented TEMPEST survey,

an on-site field test to determine the nature and amplitude of conducted or radiated signals that may contain compromising (classified) information. A field test normally includes detection and measurement of such signals, and an analysis to determine the correlation between emanating signals and classified information being processed. A National Policy Certification is issued to the ship when the ship's equipment has been found to meet requirements. This certification permits the ship to operate all of its information processing systems according to prescribed

procedures. Because of its cost, the instrumented survey is usually completed on only one ship of a class.

The second inspection is the Visual TEMPEST Configuration Control Inspection (VTCCI), which is conducted independently or concurrently with the instrumented TEMPEST survey, to determine whether shipboard secure electrical processing systems are installed properly. A VTCCI is required for all ships that have a secure electrical information processing system

installed. The VTCCI will include Visual TEMPEST Inspection (VTI) and configuration control plan and elevation view drawings. The VTI will determine compliance or noncompliance of the

system. The diagrams identify the type and relative location of all equipment in the system. The

most recent VTCCI report and amendments must be retained by the ship and reflect the existing configuration and all installation discrepancies that exist. Any change, however minor, in the secure electrical processing center, by forces afloat or installation activity, must be made and inspected in accordance with criteria outlined in MIL-STD-1680.

Communications systems, equipment, and conductors are designated as RED or BLACK. These designations are defined in the following paragraphs.

The RED designation is applied to all cryptographic equipments, subscriber terminal equipments, and interconnecting conductors involved in processing classified plain language information. The designation also applies to primary power circuits, DC circuits, control wiring, and ground conductors serving cryptographic equipments and subscriber terminal equipments, that are designated RED. The RED designation is also applied to junction boxes, terminal boxes, distribution frames, conduit, ducts, cable racks and hangers, patching and switching panels, cabinets, AC/DC power distribution panels, and other ancillary devices serving the conductors and equipments mentioned above. To provide direct correlation with other agency definitions, RED wiring terminology is as follows:

The BLACK designation is applied to all conductors and equipment involved in handling or processing unclassified plain language and/or encrypted information in electrical form. It is also applied to all facilities and circuits that are not designated RED.

Any change to a red (classified) side of a system must be followed with a Partial TEMPEST Inspection (PVTCCI). If the ship has red high level keying, any change to the black side of the processing system also requires an inspection. Additionally, if the black processor in any way interfaces with a red processor (i.e. single audio system, shared displays, shared junction boxes, etc.), the installation will require an inspection regardless of whether the red keying level is high

or low level. If alterations are performed by an industrial activity, the installing activity is

responsible for the inspection and the correction of any discrepancies found. If the installation or modification is done by ship's force, the ship is required to obtain the services of a certified Field Technical Authority (FTA) to hold a PVTCCI.

Any correspondence that mentions specific TEMPEST discrepancies must be classified at least Confidential. Discrepancies determined by the FTA inspection activity to be of a serious nature are classified Secret. Since TEMPEST discrepancies are classified, they will not be discussed on a non-secure phone. All installation discrepancies documented in a TEMPEST inspection report must be corrected. These corrections must themselves be inspected. Inspection reports that document compliance (zero discrepancies) are Unclassified. All discrepancies identified in a VTCCI report are assigned a correction priority. Priority 1 requires immediate correction, since these violations greatly increase the possibility of compromising classified information. All other discrepancies must be corrected in a timely manner. Discrepancies that cannot be corrected in a timely manner because they require an industrial assist to correct must be documented on the CSMP. The CSMP must reference the discrepancy number only, NOT the discrepancy narrative or MIL-STD-1680 paragraph number. Relating a ship name or hull number to a TEMPEST discrepancy makes the CSMP at least Confidential.

Ensure that you have the following documents aboard your ship: OPNAVINST 5510.93, MIL-STD-1680, and TEMPEST Survey Results.

This standard sets forth the design and installation criteria applicable to shipboard secure electrical information processing systems. This includes definitions, detailed hardware and equipment requirements, applicable inspection, reporting procedures, and documentation. It is of utmost importance that installation and maintenance managers of these processing systems be well versed in the contents of this standard. Specifically, this instruction provides requirements regarding:

The installation standards of MIL-STD-1680 must be implemented as specified to reduce or eliminate CE. In new construction ships and ships undergoing a major rip-out to the exterior communications system, the secure electrical information processing system should be installed using a red low level signaling distribution system. There are no TEMPEST related installation requirements for cryptographic equipment in a portable configuration. This includes, but is not limited to, cryptographic attachments to portable radio sets, vehicular mounted equipment used in a flight or hanger deck applications, and cryptographic devices used to load or fill a cryptographic system.

PROCEED TO ASSIGNMENT SHEET 2-2-1A IN THE ASSIGNMENT BOOKLET. UPON COMPLETION, TAKE THE ASSIGNMENT BOOKLET TO THE LEARNING CENTER INSTRUCTOR. AFTER REVIEWING ASSIGNMENT SHEET 2-2-1A WITH THE LEARNING CENTER INSTRUCTOR, PROCEED TO JOB SHEET 2-2-1J. UPON COMPLETION TAKE THE ASSIGNMENT BOOKLET TO THE LEARNING CENTER INSTRUCTOR.