This appendix contains several recent statements of communications requirements from the Submarine Force TYCOMs and related commands, such as the Special Operations Forces (SOF). They are indexed as follows:

Requirements Document Page

Submarine Force Future Communications Requirements Enclosure (1) to COMSUBLANT/COMSUBPAC Joint Letter 2000 Ser 00/08606 dated 04 Nov 93 ........................................................................................ E-2

Communications Connectivity Requirements for Submarines COMSUBLANT Letter 2000 Ser 00/00686 dated 3 Feb 94............................................ E-5

Submarine High Data Rate Communications Requirements CNO (N87) Letter 3000 Ser N87/4U656589 dated 24 Oct 94......................................... E-7

High Data Rate Satellite Communications Requirements for Submarines COMSUBLANT Letter 2300 Ser 00/5872 dated 29 Nov 94....................... E-8

Special Operations Forces (SOF) Appendix to Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Submarine Communications Program Summary COMNAVSPECWARCOM Letter 3120 Ser N6/0640 dated 8 May 95......... E-14

Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network Modes, JCS MCM-156-91 dated 30 August 91 ........................................................................... E-21

Enclosure (1) to
COMSUBLANT/COMSUBPAC Joint Letter 2000 Ser 00/08606 dtd 04
November 1993:

1. To aid in preparation for the Navy Program Review (PR) 1995-1999 and Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) 1996-1999, COMSUBLANT/COMSUBPAC request you propose a detailed plan of evolving submarine communications programs to incorporate capabilities that support the shift in submarine mission emphasis. This shift is from a global sea control mission to the support of regional conflict ashore as defined in “From The Sea” and represents support for the Submarine missions of: Joint Strike, Littoral, Surveillance, Space and Electronic Warfare (SEW)/Intelligence, Strategic Deterrence and Sealift/Protection. The following capabilities should be emphasized: Timeliness, rapid TLAM retargeting, reliable connectivity, robust throughput and a common tactical picture.

2. This request is based on results of the CNO (N8) POM wargames and Joint Military Assessment (JMA) process which highlight and need for a shift in emphasis in submarine communications capabilities and requirements. These wargames and JMA results agree with the recommendations of N87 sponsored studies and conferences to define post-cold war submarine communications needs. The thrust of the new emphasis in submarine communications is based on the following general requirements:

a. The need to be fully interoperable and have the ability to send/receive mission related information to/from the JTF.

b. The desired submarine radio room should be a flexible open system designed to be in step with architectures such as Copernicus. Additionally, it should be automated, CSS capable with basedband switching.

c. The need for sufficient data throughput to allow timely transfer of strike and surveillance missions; this includes data throughput capability necessary to support imagery.

d. The need to maintain continuous shipboard record traffic without mast exposure for force management and direction. This system should support all submarine related missions. The “current” (with authorized improvements), VLF/LF Fixed Submarine Broadcast System (FSBS) meets this requirements.

3. The following specific requirements should be addressed in your plan:

a. New antenna design/configuration is a critical need.

(1) Submarine antennas must be designed for operations in all submarine communications bands with primary emphasis on the higher frequency and high throughput regimes of the future (e.g., SHF, EHF, MDR and UHF). The feasibility of using a stealth sail as an antenna should be evaluated.

(2) The submarine antenna suite should be designed to provide assured connectivity across the spectrum of conflict.

(3) Submarine antenna should allow interoperability with joint Task Force Commanders and Joint Operating Force communications systems and other joint architectures.

(4) Our SSBNs require antennas capable of LDR EHF for Ship to Shore report back in a Low Probability of Intercept/Low Probability of Detection (LPI/LPD) environment and a back-up Emergency Action Message (EAM) source.

(5) All submarines will need medium data rate EHF capable antennas with low data rate antennas in the interim. SHF is a requirement for operations with JTF. This will provide both increased data throughput and interoperability. A throughput to support retargeting is required.

b. Submarine inboard communications should allow interoperability with Joint Task Force Commanders and Joint Operating Force communications systems and other joint architectures. Specifically:

(1) A Link 16/JTIDS capability for submarines is required. The bandwidth and capacity inherent in Link 16 will provide future flexibility for submarine connectivity with the JTF. Similarly, improvements in Link 11 with expansion to Link 22 is required for submarines to be interoperable with Navy Battle Groups.

(2) Battle group and JTF interoperability and commonality are of paramount importance. Battle Group unique systems such as a BGIXS enable the submarine to maintain rapid access to the Battle Group Commander and must be supported until replacement by a fleet wide standard. The use of submarine unique systems and equipment should be chosen only when necessary to provide required capabilities.

(3) The accelerated procurement of DAMA capable systems should continue.

(4) Your program plan should reflect radio room support for NTCS/JMCIS installations on all submarines including appropriate interfaces with the submarine’s combat control system.

(5) Our fleet ballistic submarines continue to be the backbone of the national strategic forces. Upgrades should concentrate on interoperability, reliability, open architecture and obsolete equipment replacement.

(6) Standard Navy or joint equipment upgrades should be the primary means of replacing obsolete equipment.

(7) The submarine radio room should support new expansion concepts like a Local Area Network, and Voice, Video, Fax, and Data (VVFD), with interoperable Joint Imagery Format.

(8) Other received/transmitted signals such as IFF and GPS and their expected follow-on systems will remain an integral part of submarine communications capability and must be supported.

(9) Connectivity with SOF communications (e.g., SOCRATES) must be supported by providing onboard equipment and antenna connection points for carry on equipment packages.

(10) Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) reception is required on all submarines, including reception of open ocean SAFETYNET warnings transmitted on INMARSAT-C and coastal navigation warnings transmitted on NAVTEX.

4. The two-site ELF system must continue to the supported.

5. Operational Commander Command and Control Facilities must be kept compatible with submarine systems and JTF systems.

6. Budgetary projections demand that affordability be a key factor in this plan. Procurement strategy should emphasize COTS/GOTS, Life cycle costs and Fleet Training requirement costs. This is a joint CSL/CSP letter.


Ser 00/00686
3 Feb 94
From: Commander Submarine Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet
To: Chief of Naval Operations (N87)
Ref: (a) COMSUBLANT ltr Ser 2000 00/06606 of 4 Nov 1993

1. Reference (a) discussed requirements for the submarine force communications architecture. Since that letter, certain issues have come to my attention, which require further discussion.

2. I now consider connectivity to the SHF link absolutely essential . Battle groups are passing mission essential data and critical information via SHF circuits which have no direct data path to the submarine communication suite. The commanding officer of the submarine must be able, for example, to pick up his STU-III and access the Joint Task Force Commander, as can the CO of a Spruance class destroyer. Additionally, the submarine must be capable of receiving the data transmitted via SHF links. The current plan to put SHF on all Tomahawk -capable CGs and DDGs is a clear invitation to leave the SSN out of the TLAM picture.

3. High data rates are required to enable the submarine to obtain mission essential data within a tactically reasonable period. The current stumbling block to this is the lack of a capability to communicate above the UHF range. Transfer of imagery data highlights this shortfall. Surface ships routinely obtain imagery data at 128 kbps while submarines are stuck at 2.4 kbps with the current ANDVT/CLUSTER NAVE path. For a submarine to obtain a black and white 64 grey shade image (at a relatively low 640 x 480 pixel resolution) at this low data rate requires the antenna to remain completely dry for nearly half an hour. This is not tactically reasonable . At a reasonable data rate of, say 64 kbps (the data rate advertised for MDR EHF), the time required could be reduced to about 45 seconds. This not only greatly enhances the probability the image will be successfully transferred, but frees the submarine to proceed onward with mission tasking.

4. I am concerned that the current plan of record (which I understand is to provide this connectivity to/from the submarine via a "seamless" EHF link) is in trouble. This program depends on several independent elements coming together. Even if all goes without a hitch, we will still be limited to relatively low data rates compared to other forces.

a. First, a constellation of EHF satellites must be placed in orbit (for which there does not seem to be a robust round of support). This minimal constellation is not to be complete until well into the next century. The EHF (MILSTAR) constellation has been reduced to only six satellites, with no polar adjunct capability. Thus, there will be no coverage beyond 65 degrees north (this includes UHF after AFSATCOM is discontinued in 1998). Additionally, the reduced constellation provides no backup in the event of catastrophic failure of any one satellite.

b. Second, the Non-Penetrating Mast (NPM) or some other advanced antenna must come to fruition in order to support Medium Data Rate (MDR). At least we may be able to exercise some control over the mast.

c. Third, the MDR (64 kbps) capability of the system is yet to be developed. The current EHF suites installed in both of our EHF equipped submarines are not MDR capable (installation of the MDR drawer is planned to coincide with launch of the MDR capable satellites). Neither are any current satellites EHF (MDR) capable. The first two MILSTAR satellites in the constellation of the six in stationary equatorial orbits will only be LDR capable, leaving a wide gap in MDR coverage . The plans for satellites to replace these two satellites at the end of their useful life (about 2001) have yet to be defined.

5. A possible alternative for the satellite path would be seamless "cross banding" between EHF and SHF bands for both uplinks and downlinks. This capability would provide a portion of the architecture for full use of the RF spectrum as described for the TADIXS Communications Support System (CSS). However, this would still not provide SHF connectivity with the battle group ships via a line of sight path such as envisioned for the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) system.

6. The SHF demonstration from one of our submarines planned for mid-1994 will utilize a commercially developed antenna housed in the AN/BRD-7 radome, which may provide an SHF data capability of 64 kbps (downlink) and 32 kbps (uplink). We need to keep working on these advanced antenna development efforts and the utilization of commercial equipment.

7. I believe that unless a more forward thinking plan is put forth, the submarine force will become a "disadvantaged user" relegated to secondary missions. With the surface forces having current connectivity at 128 kbps and higher, 64 kbps is already obsolete, and will be more so five and ten years from now.


Ser N87/4U656589
24 Oct 94
From: Director, Submarine Warfare Division (N87)
To: Director of Space and Electronic Warfare (N6)
Ref: (a) CNO ltr ORD 2050 Ser N81/4S6428 26 of 25 Feb 94 (Lightweight SHF Satellite Communications Terminals)
(b) N63 Commercial Satellite Communications ORD
(Draft) (c) USCINCSOC 1612222 Sep 94

1. This letter identifies the omission of attack submarines from the high data rate C4I architecture that supports the joint naval battle force. MILSATCOM connectivity that will provide attack submarines with the information transfer required for Task force operations, intelligence gathering, Tomahawk strikes, and SOF missions should be identified and included in the Navy's program of record.

2. High data rate requirements are specified for Tomahawk capable ships in reference (a), for CVBG support ships in reference (b) and SOF support submarines in reference (c). These operational requirements have been compared to the technical capabilities for SATCOM transmissions to submarine antennas. The results show that data rates of 128 kbps should be provided now, with 256 kbps by 1998, and 512 kbps by 2002. The C4I architecture should support achieving these data rates using mast mounted antennas that are no larger than 16 inches in diameter.

3. In order to ensure that the development of a submarine high data rate antenna is optimized for the Navy's MILSATCOM architecture, it is requested that the plan for submarine high data rate connectivity be formalized by 15 January 1995.

4. My points of contact are CDR E. R. Jablonski, N872E and LCDR N. P. Moe, N872E4, (703) 697-2008.

By direction


Ser 00/5872
29 Nov 94
From: Commander, Submarine Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet
To: Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet
Ref: (a) CNO ltr ORD 2050 Ser N81/4S642826 of 25 Feb 94
(b) N63 Commercial Satellite Communications ORD (Draft)
(c) USCINCSOC 1612222 Sep 94
(d) CNO message 191715Z Oct 94
Encl: (1) High Data Rate Requirements
(2) Consolidate Submarine H DR Communications Requirements
(3) High Data Rate Mission Drivers

1. Reference (a) specifies High Data Rate (HDR) communications requirements for Tomahawk capable ships. Reference (b) discusses emerging High Data Rate Satellite communications needs for CVBG support ships. Reference (c) specifies HDR communications requirements for SOF support submarines. Reference (d) requested Fleet input on HDR requirements fro submarines.

2. Enclosures (1) through (3) provide the HDR communications requirements to meet the current and anticipated submarine force needs from present to the year 2006. I consider HDR connectivity to be absolutely essential in order to properly carry out the submarine forces assigned missions. Battle groups are passing mission essential data and critical information via SHF circuits which have no direct data path to the submarine. The commanding officer of the submarine must be able, for example, to pick up his STU-III and access the Joint Task Force Commander. Additionally, the submarine must be capable of receiving data transmitted via HDR links. The current plan to put SHF on Tomahawk-capable platforms needs to include SSNs if the are to remain a viable strike warfare platform. Submarines are essential components of BG/TG commands and need to be able to communicate with the BG/TG commander on both tactical and non-tactical circuits including communications paths identified in reference (b).

3. The transfer of imagery data highlights the problem with current submarine communications systems. for a submarine to obtain a black and white 64 gray shade image (at a relatively low 640 x 480 pixel resolution) with its current data rate capability of 2.4 kbps requires the antenna to remain completely dry for nearly half an hour. This is not tactically reasonable . Higher data rates are needed to ensure images are successfully transferred and to free the submarine to proceed with mission tasking.

4. The HDR communications requirements identified in enclosures (1) through (3) represent the current and future needs of the submarine force. Enclosures (2) and (3) were a result of a joint effort by COMSUBPAC and COMSUBLANT.

5. COMSUBLANT point of contact is CDR D. L. Olberding, (804) 445-6633, DSN 564-6633.

Copy to:
CNO (N87)


1. COMSPAWARSYSCOM (PMW-173) and COMSUBDEVRON Twelve hosted a submarine high data rate requirements working group in August 1994. Results of this working group are graphically displayed in enclosures (2) and (3). Additional information requested in reference (d) is enclosed below.

2. Deployers requiring simultaneous support . Baseline planning requires that a minimum of nine submarines deploy within COMSUBLANT area of responsibility simultaneously.

a. JTG/BG support - minimum of four submarines are deployed to support JTG/BG's (3 Med/1 Caribbean).

b. SPECWAR - a minimum of one submarine is deployed in support of SPECWAR (Med).

c. Surveillance - a minimum of four submarines are deployed in support of surveillance operations (various locations).

3. Potential operating areas . Mission requirements continually place submarines in all oceans of the world, thus dictating the necessity for full time on-demand worldwide coverage in all geographic AORs. Additionally, the submarine fleet has requirements for polar satellite coverage.

- The EHF (MILSTAR) constellation is not to be complete until well into the next century and will comprise only 6 satellites, with no polar adjunct capability. This will leave no EHF converge beyond 65 degrees North and no UHF coverage after AFSATCOM is discontinued in 1998. Additionally, the reduced constellation provides no backup in the event of catastrophic failure of any one satellite.

4. Connectivity . Interoperable connectivity is required among fleet units, Joint forces, Allied forces, Navy C4I Commands and theater shore communication activities.

5. Information requirements . Enclosures (2) and (3) graphically display minimum data rate requirements and mission areas.

6. System responsiveness . Minimum data rates established were based on the submarine maintaining its stealth posture by minimizing mast exposure while at periscope depth. The system must be structured that mast exposure is limited to between one and five minutes.

7. Protection . The high data rate system should have a low probability of intercept (LPI)/low probability of detection (LPD) and should be jam resistant. Spread spectrum waveforms may meet the requirement for LPI/LPD. Jam resistant throughput should meet the minimum data rate requirements as described in enclosure (2).


Ser N6/0640
8 May 95
From: Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command
To: Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Comm and (SOJ6-I)
Ref: (a) COMSPAWARSYSCOM C4I mtg. of 8 and 9 Mar 95
(b) CNO Submarine Communications Program Summary Document
Encl: (1) SOF communications Appendix to CNO Submarine Communications Program Summary (Draft)

1. Reference (a) requested SOF communications requirements for inclusion into reference (b) by 25 May 1995. Enclosure (1) is a draft of SOF communications requirements.

2. Upon USCINCSOC approval of enclosure (1) COMNAVSPECWARCOM will forward requirements to COMSPAWARSYSCOM (PMW-173) for inclusion into reference (b).

3. COMNAVSPECWARCOM point of contact is LT. Long, DSN 577-2237 or commercial (619) 437-2237.

By direction
Copy to:



The current unstable world environment has created a greater need for highly trained, and superbly equipped Special Operations Forces (SOF). The multiple threat scenario now emerging poses an increasing requirement for timely, accurate information to support the varied, diverse roles and missions assigned to United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Given the draw-down of forces and reduced Department of Defense (DOD) budget, SOF must rely on commercial development to maintain state-of-the-art command, control, communications computers, and intelligence (C4I) capabilities and to satisfy operational and intelligence information requirements.

SOF are surgically precise, penetration-and-strike forces capable of responding to limited, specialized contingencies across the full range of military operations with stealth, speed, and audacity. The traditional roles of SOF include performing as warrior-diplomats who influence, advise, and train foreign indigenous forces. Becoming more and more the force of choice SOF must be equipped and trained to perform a wide variety of diverse special operations missions.

To carry out these missions, SOF are drawn from the following USSOCOM components:

- U.S. Army Special Operations Command

- Naval Special Warfare Command

- U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command - Joint Special Operations Command


The primary purpose of the USSOCOM C4I strategy is to provide the finest support possible to the warfighter. To ensure the required C4I support is available, USSOCOM performed a detailed bottom-up review of requirements resulting in a comprehensive C4I strategy.

This strategy is designed to yield direct benefits by giving SOF state-of-the-are technology through improvements to existing inventory. New developments will be pursued only when necessary Direct operational support is the product of this strategy Access to the infosphere will be transparent to the user allowing operational elements to deploy anywhere in the world with command and control connectivity assured from garrison or deployed locations. The intent is to enable exploitation of the infosphere at the lowest possible tactical level. As stated in the C4I for the Warrior paradigm: “The infosphere contains the total combination of information sources, fusion centers, and distribution systems that represent the C4I resources a warfighter needs to pursue his operational objective. “The desktop or tactical computer, in the hands of the special operator, will become a gateway into the infosphere.

The USSOCOM C4I strategy is composed of C4I doctrinal principles, a new open and flexible C4I architecture, and a redesigned investment strategy.


Special operations C4I fundamental principles are: Global, Secure, Mission Tailored, Value Added, and Joint. These five principles ensure successful C4I support to special operation. Global. C4I systems support special operators worldwide across the full range of military operations.

Secure. Humans are more important that hardware. C4I must never compromise a live team on the ground or contribute to mission failure. Additionally, all submarine operations involving SOF must be conceptualized and executed in such a way that protects the most vulnerable component of the mission, namely the special operations forces. Hostile, or potentially hostile, systems which pose no threat to the submarine may pose a significant threat to special operations. Operational doctrine must ensure that new systems do not alert a potential enemy to impending actions by SOF.

Mission Tailored. SOF cannot be mass produced. C4I systems must deploy in relation to the projected operational environment. Value Added. Quality is better that quantity. SOF must push new C4I technologies, equipment, and techniques to maintain the competitive edge.

Joint. Competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies. Special operation C4I is joint and supports joint, combined and coalition operations.


The special operations C4I architecture is seamless, robust, automated, standards compliant, and utilizes the full spectrum. The architecture allows access to the infosphere to be pushed down to the lowest possible level. It also interlaces national and commercial C4I architectures with current special operation functional architectures. With proper security measures, use of commercial and host nation telecommunications structures are encouraged. The C4I structure uses National Security Agency (NSA) approved technology, procedures, and safeguards to ensure operational elements are not compromised or exploited by an enemy. To be effective, the special operations C4I architecture must be relevant to today’s conditions and adaptable to those anticipated into the 21st Century.



1. HF Requirements (2-50 MHz)

a. Special Mission Radio (SMRS). The principle SMRS components are the AN/PRC-137 long-range manpack radio (MPR), its associated Digital Messages Entry Device (DMED), and the AN/TRQ-43 transportable base station (TBS). The SMRS components will be enhanced with new features and capabilities, including the implementation of the Interlocking Base Station (IBS) network. SMRS is optimized for the special reconnaissance mission but may be employed on any special operations missions requiring long-range, low-observable, or highly reliable data communication. The SMRS communications system will supplement and interoperate with other SOF C4I systems. For SOF/SUB application the MPR and DMED may be used.

b. All other HF radio applications will use Automatic Link Establishment (ALE) or straight HF, data, voice LPI/D.

2. VHF Requirement

a. Low Band (30-88 MHz). LOS communications used primarily with OF ashore and air assets. This requirement may be employed with or without SINCGARS, data, voice, LPI/D.

b. High Band (116-149 MHz). LOS communications used primarily with SOF ashore and air assets. This requirement may be employed with or without SINCGARS, data, voice, LPI/D.

c. Inter Team Radio (136-174 MHz). LOS communications to include LPI/D used between SOF Commander onboard and teams ashore. This concept employs a base station (FASCINATOR COMSEC equipment) onboard the submarine . 3. UHF Requirement

a. LOS. LOS communications used primarily with SOF ashore and air assets. This requirement may be employed with or without HAVEQUICK . b. Inter Team Radio (403-430 MHz). LOS communications to include LPI/D used between SOF commander onboard and teams ashore. This concept employs a base station (FASCINATOR COMSEC equipment) onboard the submarine.

c. SATCOM (225-499 MHz). Will be used in the 5 kHz (NB) and 25 kHz (WB) mode. DAMA and non-DAMA will be used.

4. SHF Requirement

a. Interoperability with national/DOD databases and intelligence systems. The Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) access could be provided though a shared use of submarine assets or though an ADP terminal brought onboard by SOF operators.

b. Increased Data Rate to support imagery and video to and from SOF forces onboard.

c. TRI-Band. Interoperability between Ku, X, and C band required at the JSOTF and TG and TU level.

5. EHF REQUIREMENT. Interoperability with JSOTF afloat or shore.


a. Connectivity to an imagery and information exchange system is required. JDISS is the DOD Intelligence Information System (DODIIS) standard for accessing national and DOD intelligence databases. A laptop JDISS terminal could satisfy this requirement for the SOF operator. Additionally, connectivity to digital camera imagery transmissions is a requirement for the SOF operator to receive near real time operational updates.

b. Currently, the Naval Special Warfare Information Exchange System (NSWIXS) prototype provides the capability to transfer information to/from SEAL operators. This data stream could be a candidate to satisfy imagery and information transfer requirements. Operating in a personal computer environment, the NSWIXS provides the SOF operator the ability to push and pull information as necessary. NSWIXS can operate over all frequency mediums. Radiant TIN compression utilized with NSWIXS makes it very effective for passing imagery. NSWIXS and Radiant TIN are currently in the prototype stage.

c. Provide a state of the art digital imaging system. The system must be capable of imagery collection and dissemination in a digital format which can be interfaces and integrated with other SOF system applications. Currently available is the Digital Video Imaging Terminal (DVITS) which has an RS232 port capable of transmitting or receiving up to 32kpbs.


These requirements include voice, VTC, PERVIZ, Photo nics, UAV, file transfer, JDISS, ATO, broadcast, IXS, naval message, OP notes. Video is the largest HDR driver with bandwidths of 128 kbps to T1 connectivity. 8. Remote SOF C2. This concept would allow simultaneous utilization of the submarine’s antenna assets by submarine and SOF operators.


1. A two phased approac h needs to be considered. Short term and long term options are provided below. a. Short Term. Current DDS/SDV configured submarines that are not scheduled for SCSS upgrade require installation of SOF equipment. Current configuration consists of PRC-104 (HF Non-ALE), PSC-7 (UHF SATCOM Non-DAMA) KY-57, KY99, ADC (data packet switching device), stand alone PC, and AM-7175 (power supply). This set up is installed on the USS KAMEHAMEHA. It is desired to make this permanent alteration for both east and west coast DDS/SDV submarines.

b. Long Term. For future requirements SCSS should include SOF communications capabilities. these capabilities include HF ALE, VHF SINCGARS, UHF HAVEQUICK , UHF SATCOM 5/25KHZ DAMA, and ADC. If these capabilities exist inherent to the SCSS then SOF would utilize submarine equipment on a not to interfere basis. However, if the SCSS cannot accommodate these capabilities then space, weight, and power would have to be available for a carry on SOF C4I capability.


Reply ZIP Code:
20318-0300 MCM-156-91
30 August 1991
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff, US Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff, US Air Force
Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Command
Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command
Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command
Subject: Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network Modes

1. In order to provide a solid basis for operational and acquisition planning for the VLF/LF portion of the Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network (MEECN), the following mode architecture is promulgated:

CJCS Modes 15, 9, and 9 MMPM (MEECN Message Processing Mode) are designated as the standard CJCS interoperable MEECN modes for Emergency Action Message (EAM) dissemination at VLF/LF. When the High Data Rate mode reaches Full Operational Capability, it will be included as an interoperable MEECN mode. CJCS Mode 8 (although still used by SAC for timing) and Mode 29 are deleted as interoperable MEECN modes. The above changes will be included in future updates of Emergency Action Procedures of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume VII.

2. The Joint Staff point of contact is Lieutenant Colonel Harvey Le Cato, USAF, DSN 224-5651.

For the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director, Joint Staff